State Of U.P. vs. Ajmal Beg Etc.

2025 INSC 1435
REPORTABLE



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 132-133 OF 2017




STATE OF U.P. … APPELLANT(S)


Versus


…
AJMAL BEG ETC. RESPONDENT(S)



J U D G M E N T


SANJAY KAROL, J.


For convenience of reference, this judgment is divided into
the following parts:
Signature Not Verified


Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2025.12.15
16:22:25 IST
Reason:
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 1 of 46


INDEX

THE APPEALS ............................................................................... 3
DOWRY: A CROSS-CULTURAL EVIL ...................................... 4
FACTS OF THE CASE .................................................................. 9
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ................................. 11
THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT ................................................... 13
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ................................................. 16

CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 38



Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 2 of 46



THE APPEALS

1. These appeals are at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh,
laying challenge to a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Appeal under Section 374 Cr.PC. Nos. 5109
of 2003 and 5110 of 2003, entering a finding of acquittal of the
th
respondents herein, setting aside the judgment and order dated 7
October 2003, of conviction returned by the Additional Sessions
1
Judge, Bijnor in Sessions Trial 573 and 574 of 2001 arising out of
2
the First Information Report bearing No. 94/2001 registered at P.S
Kiratpur, under Sections 498-A and 304-B, Indian Penal Code,
3 4
1860 and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 .

2. In this case, a young girl, barely of twenty, when she was sent
away from the world of the living by way of a most heinous and
painful death, met this unfortunate end simply because her parents
did not have the material means and resources to satisfy the wants
or the greed of her family by matrimony. A coloured television, a
motorcycle and Rs. 15,000/- is all she was apparently worth of.



1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’
2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR’
3
Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘DPA, 1961’
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 3 of 46


DOWRY: A CROSS-CULTURAL EVIL

3. Evil, unless eradicated, can never be contained. What
originally began as a voluntary gift-giving practice to the daughter
upon marriage, for her own use and financial independence, with
time, morphed into an institutionalized practice - becoming an
5
essential aspect of hypergamy . This practice of marrying ‘ higher
up ’ traces its origins to caste and kinship along with, to use a
colloquial term, the ‘ baggage of the samaj ’ that comes with it. Since
lineage is traced through the patriarchal line, the desire to marry
daughters into equal or higher-status families ensured that their
offspring retained or enhanced the family’s standing. Hypergamy
thus became both a social strategy and a religiously sanctioned
norm. Among upper castes, this evolved into rigid practices where
daughters were “ married up ” to families of higher ritual or political
rank, often necessitating large dowries as inducements. Over time,
hypergamy was not just about varna but also about wealth,
landholding, and political influence. Medieval royal families
practiced hypergamy to forge alliances, and landed elites followed
suit to consolidate power. By the early modern and colonial periods,
hypergamy had become a widespread cultural pattern across many
Hindu communities, entrenching the link between dowry and

5
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypergamy
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 4 of 46


upward mobility. Today, even though outlawed, it continues, having
divorced itself entirely from the well-being of the female ( its
original intent ) to what is now being referred to as the ‘ groom price
theory ’- i.e., the amount of dowry being determined by the
particulars of the groom, such as social and educational background,
earning capacity etc. What all of this translates to, is a systemic bias
against women - pervasive across all sections of society -
undervaluing them grossly. The amount of dowry the woman brings
into the marital home directly corresponds to the value of the groom,
which the woman, just as herself, is condemned to be unable to
6
meet, or is otherwise unworthy, sans the dower.

4. As this case represents, however, dowry is not a feature only
amongst the Hindus, but it can also be found in other communities
professing different faiths and religions. In Islam, dowry, stricto
senso , is prohibited. What is prescribed is, in fact, the reverse.
‘ mehr’ is a compulsory gift that the groom is required to give to the
bride at the time of marriage. It is an essential part of the nikah
(marriage contract), without which the contract is considered
incomplete. The mehr can take many forms - money, jewellery,
property, or any valuable as agreed upon by the couple - but what

6
Suparna Soni, PhD “Institution of Dowry in India: A Theoretical Inquiry”, Societies Without
Borders, Vol 14, Issue 1 (2020)
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 5 of 46


defines it is that it belongs solely to the bride and cannot be taken
back by the husband or his family. The Quran makes this obligation
7

explicit in Surah An-Nisa (4:4) نِحْل
: طِبْن ف إِن ۚ ة ص دُق ـٰتِهِن ٱلن ِس آء
و ء اتُوا
ُ ْ
“And give the women [upon
ُف كُل س ا ُم ِنْه ن ف كُم ع ن ْل
وه ه نِيٓـ ا م رِ يٓـ ا ٤ ش ىْء
marriage] their bridal gifts graciously. But if they of themselves
remit to you a portion of it, then you may enjoy it with pleasure and
8
goodwill” The purpose of mehr is both symbolic and practical: it
signifies respect for the woman and ensures her financial security in
the marriage.

5. The adoption of dowry amongst the Muslims of the
subcontinent is explained through a combination of cultural,
economic, and institutional factors. Historically, dowry was most
closely associated with Hindu caste society, but over a time it
diffused into Muslim practices through processes of cultural
9
assimilation, social emulation, and inter-community influence .
Scholarly undertakings trace how Muslim families, particularly in
urban centers, began adopting dowry as a status marker and as part
of competitive marriage negotiations. At the same time, marriage-

7
https://quran.com/an-nisa/4
8
The Qur’an, English Meanings, Saheeh International, 1997. See,
https://alrashidmosque.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/The-Quran-Saheeh-International.pdf
9
See, Generally- Abdul Waaheed, The Phenomenon of Dowry Among Muslims in India,
Centre for the Study Of Social Systems School of Social Sciences Jawaharlal Nehru University,
1987
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 6 of 46


market pressures - including imbalances in sex ratios, rising
educational aspirations, and competition for higher-status grooms -
encouraged families to provide substantial dowry payments.



6. As a result, mehr and dowry have come to coexist in complex
ways. In many Muslim marriages in India, mehr continues to be
stipulated, but often only in nominal terms. The real financial
transfers flow from the bride’s family to the groom, effectively
hollowing out the protective function of mehr. This undermines the
original Islamic intention of empowering women through property
ownership, as the dowry frequently ends up under the control of the
10
husband or his family . Where dowry replaces or overshadows
mehr, women lose an important bargaining tool and face greater
economic vulnerability. Scholars note that this dual system -
nominal mehr alongside substantial dowry - illustrates how religious
norms have been reshaped by social and economic forces. The
consequences of this shift are serious. Dowry places a heavy
financial burden on the bride’s family, sometimes delaying or

10
See, Section 4 of Okumus and Gümüş, “Revitalizing 'mahr' for Muslim women's
empowerment within Türkiye's secular legal system”, Social Sciences and Humanities Open,
Volume 12, 2025. See,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291125003729#abs0015

Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 7 of 46


11
preventing daughters’ marriages . It has also been linked to
harassment, domestic violence, and even dowry deaths - problems
that affect not only the Muslim households but cut across all
religions. By contrast, the neglect of mehr erodes women’s financial
security, leaving them less protected in cases of divorce or
widowhood.

7. The eradication of dowry is an urgent constitutional and
social necessity. Dowry, legally defined under Section 2 of the DPA,
1961, refers to “ any property or valuable security given or agreed
to be given directly or indirectly ” by one party to a marriage to the
other, or by the parents of either party, in connection with the
marriage. Although the law sought to prohibit the practice, dowry
has persisted in society, slipping through the statutory definition,
cloaked as “ gifts ” and social expectations. This practice is, at the
most basic level, at odds with the values enshrined in the
Constitution, i.e., the constitutional ethos of justice, liberty, and
fraternity, and more particularly, Article 14, which guarantees
equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, a principle
directly undermined by a system that treats women as a source of
financial extraction and reinforces structural discrimination.

11
In this case as well, one of the reasons given by the father of the deceased, for not being able
to fulfill the demands of the respondent son-in law, was that he had other daughters whose
marriage, he has to make arrangements for.
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 8 of 46




8. The Constituent Assembly debates highlight that
independence was meant to inaugurate not only political freedom
but also social transformation. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, amongst others
emphasized that democracy in India would be hollow if entrenched
social hierarchies and oppressive customs continued unchecked.
While dowry was not debated specifically, the Assembly’s call for
social reform in pursuit of justice and equality clearly applies to the
eradication of such a practice.

9. Thus, eliminating dowry is not only a matter of enforcing the
DPA 1961 but a constitutional imperative. It fulfills the Republic’s
promise that every woman should enter marriage as an equal citizen
and not as the bearer of an unjust financial burden .

FACTS OF THE CASE

10. The facts of this case are as follows:
(i) Nasrin ( hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’ ), who
12
was married to Ajmal Beg , was the daughter-in-law
13
of Jamila Beg . The deceased and Ajmal had been
married just over a year prior to the incident.

12
Respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 132 of 2017
13
Respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 133 of 2017
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 9 of 46


(ii) Repeatedly, Ajmal, Jamila and other family members
had demanded from the deceased and her father Taslim
14
Beg (PW1) , a coloured television, a motorcycle and
Rs. 15,000/-.
th
(iii) Ajmal reiterated his demand to PW1 on 4 June 2001
and, in similar fashion to the previous times that this
demand had been made, later had expressed his
inability to comply.
th
(iv) The next day, on 5 June 2001 Ajmal, Jamila (the two
Respondents before us) Aslam, Shakila @Wakila,
Shabina and Akbar Beg - all accused persons before the
Trial Court , allegedly assaulted the deceased and
threatened her that if she doesn’t fulfil their demands,
they would kill her.
(v) Alarmed at such threat, the deceased called for help and
certain persons namely, Fahmid Beg and Khaliq Beg
15
(PW2) reached the spot but by that time the accused
persons had set her on fire by pouring kerosene oil, and
she could not be saved.
(vi) PW2 informed PW1 who reached the spot of crime and
found the deceased lying burnt, dead. An FIR was

14
Hereinafter referred to as ‘PW1’
15
Hereinafter referred to as ‘PW2’
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 10 of 46


lodged, setting in motion the machinery of criminal
law.
(vii) Upon completion of investigation, challan was
presented for trial.



THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

11. The findings arrived at by the Trial Court were on the basis
of 8 witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The defense
led no evidence other than deposing in statements under Section 313
16
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 , that they had been falsely
implicated in the case, owing to enmity. The discussion made by the
Trial Court can be encapsulated as follows:
(i) As regards the charge under Section 304-B is concerned,
the evidence of PW1 was considered. He testified to the
fact of the deceased having visited her parental home on
10 - 12 occasions since having been married and having
consistently mentioned regarding the demand of dowry.
Further, in his cross examination he testified to the demand
for a colour TV, motorcycle/scooter and Rs.15000/-. The
th
demand made on 4 June 2001 was testified by PW1 and

16
Hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 11 of 46


17
Zahida (PW6) as well. The fact that the names of all the
accused persons were not mentioned in the FIR is not of
negative consequence for the prosecution as the same has
been mentioned by PW1 in his statement under Section
161, CrPC.
(ii) Qua the involvement of the other accused (excluding
Ajmal, Jamila), upon consideration of all the testimonies
on record, it was held that Shakila and Shabina, being
married daughters, resided in their matrimonial homes
and were not to gain anything from the additional demand
of dowry. For Aslam also, it was concluded that he does
not live in the same house.
(iii) The defence of the accused, to the effect that no
immediate demand for dowry had been made, was
rejected, given the uncontroverted position that a day
prior to the incident, Ajmal’s demand for dowry had been
established. Physical and mental torture, in the facts,
stood proved.
(iv) Other ancillary arguments such as the possibility that the
deceased had committed suicide were rejected given that
none of the accused persons had tried to save her.

17
Hereinafter referred to as ‘PW6’
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 12 of 46


(v) The quilt and the thatched roof having also been burnt led
the Court to the conclusion that the deceased has been
burnt to death, by pouring so much kerosene oil that even
the above-mentioned quilt and roof caught fire.
(vi) Guilt of only Ajmal and Jamila - Respondents before us,
was as such deemed established beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced as under:

THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

12. Quite apparently no appeal against the judgment of acquittal
was preferred and only the two aforesaid convicts assailed the Trial
Court judgment. The High Court in arriving at a conclusion,
opposite to the Trial Court acquitted both Ajmal and Jamila, and
made the following observations: –
(i) Both PW1 and PW6 are not eyewitnesses to the
incident, being residents of not the same, but a nearby
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 13 of 46


village. They claim receipt of information about the
incident through PW2, brother of PW6.
(ii) The evidence of PW2 is unreliable. It was held-
(a) That he seems confused and not in direct
knowledge of the events surrounding the death of the
deceased. Instead, it appeared that he had gathered
information from secondary sources, which he then
transmitted to PW1.
(b) In his examination-in-chief, the witness stated
that having seen the deceased lying dead in the
verandah from where he, along with another witness,
Fahmid, saw Ajmal and other men fleeing, as also the
females exiting, he went and informed the parents of
the deceased. However, in his cross-examination, he
says that he has not informed them.
(c) Similarly, he cannot place the above said
Fahmid, at the scene of the incident, when cross-
examined about the same.
(d) His version that the deceased had, prior to the
incident, had come over to his house and complained
about the behaviour of Ajmal and others is concluded
by the High Court to be an important fact. This too,
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 14 of 46


however, is disbelieved given that PW1 and PW6,
both, did not say anything to that effect.
(e) Another factor taken against the credibility of
PW2 is that he did not, in the course of investigation,
make any statement before the police.
(iii) The evidence of PW6 is also doubted on similar
accounts as she did not make any statement during the
investigation, before the police, and that during her
cross examination she stated that her daughter lived in
the matrimonial house happily.
(iv) Certain other observations made, merit being extracted
hereunder: –
“ PW6 was stating in paragraph 5 of her evidence that
there was no demand of dowry ever prior to the marriage,
and it was made only after marriage. Thus, there is
sufficient evidence before the Court to record that the
marriage was dowryless. If that be so, then we have some
difficulty in accepting that such heavy demands for
articles could be made by the appellants subsequently.
We, further find the allegations of demand of dowry-
articles improbable for the reason that PW6 and PW1,
both have stated that the accused persons were poor
fellows. We believe that the demands are made as per
status of a man, as regards the present case, in our opinion,
the appellants could not have even afforded to maintain
the articles, which was demanded by them. This also
makes it notacceptable. We find that both PWs 1 & 6 were
feeling cheated and let down by the fact that their daughter
had been married to a person who belonged to the poor
stratum of the society. PW1, the father was venting his
disgust and frustration on account of being cheated. While
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 15 of 46


reply to a question, which appears at page 22 of the paper
book, that the accused persons had let him down.”

13. The State, being aggrieved by the acquittal based on the
findings as aforesaid, has carried the matter in appeal before us. We
have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.


ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

14. Before adverting to the merits of the matter, it would be useful
to take note of a few pronouncements of this Court regarding the
sections under which the Trial Court had originally convicted, and
the High Court has subsequently acquitted Ajmal and Jamila.

I. DOWRY DEATH

14.1 Section 304-B, IPC

It reads as follows:
“ Dowry death.—
(1)Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or
bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is
shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband
for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death
shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry”
shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 16 of 46



(2)Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

18
a) Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana , culled out the
-
following essentials of the Section
“6. Let us see Section 304-B IPC. The ingredients necessary
for the application of Section 304-B are:

(a) When the death of a woman is caused by any burns or
bodily injury, or

(b) occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances

(c) and the aforesaid two facts spring within 7 years of girl's
marriage

(d) and soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or his relative,

(e) this is in connection with the demand of dowry.

7. If these conditions exist, it would constitute a dowry death;
and the husband and/or his relatives shall be deemed to have
caused her death. In the present case, it is not in dispute that
the deceased Urmil died of burn injuries, that she died
otherwise than under normal circumstances, and that the death
was within a period of 7 years of marriage. The only
consideration has to be: whether she was subjected to any
cruelty or harassment by the appellants soon before her death,
and whether the same was for or in connection with any
demand of dowry.”


18
(1998) 3 SCC 309
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 17 of 46


19
b) The discussion in Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana
is important to understand the phrase “soon before her death ”
as it appears in the Section. It was held:-
“19. … In our view, the expression “soon before her death”
cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. They
must be understood in their plain language and with reference
to their meaning in common parlance. These are the
provisions relating to human behaviour and, therefore,
cannot be given such a narrower meaning, which would
defeat the very purpose of the provisions of the Act. Of
course, these are penal provisions and must receive strict
construction. But, even the rule of strict construction requires
that the provisions have to be read in conjunction with other
relevant provisions and scheme of the Act. Further, the
interpretation given should be one which would avoid absurd
results on the one hand and would further the object and
cause of the law so enacted on the other.

20. We are of the considered view that the concept of
reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for
appreciation and examination of such cases. This Court
in Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab [(2008) 16 SCC 155 :
(2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 27] , held that the legislative object in
providing such a radius of time by employing the words
“soon before her death” is to emphasise the idea that her
death should, in all probabilities, has been the aftermath of
such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a
reasonable, if not direct, nexus between her death and the
dowry-related cruelty or harassment inflicted on her.
…
22. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any
relative could be directly relatable to or in connection with,
any demand for dowry. The expression “demand for dowry”
will have to be construed ejusdem generis to the word
immediately preceding this expression. Similarly, “in
connection with the marriage” is an expression which has to

19
(2010) 12 SCC 350
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 18 of 46


be given a wider connotation. It is of some significance that
these expressions should be given appropriate meaning to
avoid undue harassment or advantage to either of the parties.
These are penal provisions but ultimately these are the social
legislations, intended to control offences relating to the
society as a whole. Dowry is something which existed in our
country for a considerable time and the legislature in its
wisdom considered it appropriate to enact the law relating to
dowry prohibition so as to ensure that any party to the
marriage is not harassed or treated with cruelty for
satisfaction of demands in consideration and for subsistence
of the marriage.”
(emphasis supplied)

20
[See also: Devender Singh v. State of Uttarakhand & Parvati
21
Devi v. State of Bihar ]

II. PRESUMPTION OF DOWRY DEATH

14.2 Section 113B
“Presumption as to dowry death. ––-When the question is
whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman
and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had
been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or
in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall
presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation. –– For the purposes of this section, “dowry
death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]”


20
(2022) 13 SCC 82
21
(2022) 14 SCC 500
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 19 of 46


a) A three judge bench in Devender Singh v. State of
22
Uttarakhand , succinctly encapsulated the functioning of this
presumption as follows:
“12. Section 304-BIPC read along with Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that once the prosecution
has succeeded in demonstrating that a woman has been
subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with
any demand for dowry soon before her death, a presumption
shall be drawn against the said persons that they have caused
dowry death as contemplated under Section 304-BIPC. The
said presumption comes with a rider inasmuch as this
presumption can be rebutted by the accused on demonstrating
during the trial that all the ingredients of Section 304-BIPC
have not been satisfied. [Ref. : Bansi Lal v. State of
Haryana [Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359
: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] , Maya Devi v. State of
Haryana [Maya Devi v. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC
405 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 768] , G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of
Karnataka [G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2010)
3 SCC 152 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] and Ashok
Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of
Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] .]”

(emphasis supplied)

III. WOMEN SUBJECTED TO CRUELTY
14.3 Section 498-A
It runs:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.—

Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of
a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished

22
(2022) 13 SCC 82
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 20 of 46


with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or

(b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with
a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet
any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security
or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her
to meet such demand.”

Although there are numerous judgments that delineate the scope,
object behind the introduction of this Section reference to a recent
order of this Court in Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi
23
Rao , would serve the present purpose. The relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereunder: -

“8. Section 498A of the IPC was introduced in the year 1983
with the primary objective of protecting married women from
cruelty at the hands of their husbands or their in-laws. The
section provides a broad and inclusive definition of “cruelty,”
encompassing both physical and mental harm to the woman's
body or health. In addition, it covers acts of harassment
designed to coerce the woman or her family into fulfilling
unlawful demands for property or valuable security,
including demands related to dowry. Notably, the provision
also recognizes acts that create circumstances leading a
woman to the point of suicide as a form of cruelty.


23
2024 SCC OnLine SC 5473

Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 21 of 46


9. The definition of “harassment” under the Explanation to
Section 498A is specifically outlined in clause (b),
independent to the “wilful conduct” described in clause (a),
thus necessitating a separate reading of the two. It is
significant to note that the inclusion of the word “or” at the
end of clause (a) clearly indicates that “cruelty” for the
purposes of Section 498A can either involve wilful conduct
that causes mental or physical harm or harassment related to
unlawful demands, such as dowry. Moreover, these forms of
cruelty can co-exist, but the absence of a dowry-related
demand does not preclude the application of the section in
cases where there is mental or physical harassment unrelated
to dowry. In interpreting the provision, it is crucial to
consider the broader objective behind its introduction—to
safeguard women from all forms of cruelty, regardless of
whether the nature of the harm inflicted includes a specific
demand for dowry or not.

10. The statement of objects and reasons for the introduction
of this provision in the Penal Code, 1860 by The Criminal
Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 45 of
1983) reads as under—

“The increasing number of Dowry Deaths is a matter of
serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented
upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the
working of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Cases of cruelty by
the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate
in suicide by, or murder of, the hapless woman concerned,
constitute only a small fraction of the cases involving such
cruelty. It is therefore proposed to amend the Penal Code,
1860, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian
Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases
of Dowry Death but also cases of cruelty to married woman
by their in laws.”

11. It is relevant to note the last line which explains that the
aim for the introduction of Section 498A in the IPC is not
only to curb cruelty relating to dowry demand but also cases
of cruelty to married woman by their in laws. A reasonable
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 22 of 46


interpretation of this would be that cruelty within this section
goes beyond the definition of cruelty relating just to dowry
demand.
(emphasis supplied)



IV. DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT

14.4 Sections 3 & 4, DPA,1961

It is also important to make reference to the objects and reasons
of the said Act, here itself:

“The object of this Bill is to prohibit the evil practice of
giving and taking of dowry. This question has been engaging
the attention of the Government for some time past, and one
of the methods by which this problem, which is essentially a
social one, was sought to be tackled was by the conferment
of improved property rights on women by the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. It is, however, felt that a law which
makes the practice punishable and at the same time ensures
that any dowry, if given does ensure for the benefit of the
wife will go a long way to educating public opinion and to
the eradication of this evil. There has also been a persistent
demand for such a law both in and outside Parliament. Hence,
the present Bill. It, however, takes care to exclude presents in
the form of clothes, ornaments, etc., which are customary at
marriages, provided the value thereof does not exceed Rs
2000. Such a provision appears to be necessary to make the
24
law workable.”



3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry. —

[(1)] If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives
or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be

24
as quoted in Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, In re, (2005)
4 SCC 565
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 23 of 46


punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less
than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of
such dowry, whichever is more
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons
to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of less than five years.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation
to,—
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the
bride (without any demand having
been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in
accordance with the rules made under this Act;
(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the
bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that
behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in
accordance with the rules made under this Act:
Provided further that where such presents are made by or on
behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such
presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is
not excessive having regard to the financial status of the
person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are
given.]
…
4. Penalty for demanding dowry .—If any person demands,
directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any
dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than six months, but which may
extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons
to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of less than six months.]”

Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 24 of 46


A Bench of two learned Judges in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of
25
A.P. , appreciated the context and purpose of the provisions of
DPA, 1961 in the following terms :

“11. The definition of the expression ‘dowry’ contained in
Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the ‘demand’
of money, property or valuable security “made at or after the
performance of marriage” as is urged by Mr Rao. The
legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition
of ‘dowry’ emphasised that any money, property or valuable
security given, as a consideration for marriage, “before, at or
after ” the marriage would be covered by the expression
‘dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be
read wherever the expression ‘dowry’ occurs in the Act.
Meaning of the expression ‘dowry’ as commonly used and
understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof
under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of
‘dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused.
Thus, any ‘demand’ of money, property or valuable security
made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the
bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice versa
would fall within the mischief of ‘dowry’ under the Act where
such demand is not properly referable to any legally
recognised claim and is relatable only to the consideration of
marriage . Marriage in this context would include a proposed
marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of
the “demand of dowry” leads to the ugly consequence of the
marriage not taking place at all. …Where definition has been
given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor desirable to look
to the dictionaries etc. to find out the meaning of the
expression. The definition given in the statute is the
determinative factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation
which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of
dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of
dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at
the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable

25
(1996) 4 SCC 596
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 25 of 46


to the consideration of marriage . Dowry as a quid pro quo for
marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents
to the bride or the bridegroom by friends and relatives. Thus,
voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to
the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional
nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but
out of love, affection or regard, would not fall within the
mischief of the expression ‘dowry’ made punishable under the
Act.”


15. Having appreciated the provisions and the judgments as
aforesaid, let us now proceed to consider whether, in view of the
evidence, the High Court was justified in setting aside the findings of
the Trial Court. However, prior to that we will undertake the task of
examining the scope of this Court’s power under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India in criminal matters.
26
15.1 In Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar , it was held:
“ 25. It may be highlighted at the outset that although the
powers vested in this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution are wide, this Court in a criminal appeal by
special leave will ordinarily loath to enter into a fresh
reappraisement of evidence and question the credibility of
witnesses when there is a concurrent finding of fact, save for
certain exceptional circumstances. While it is difficult to lay
down a rule of universal application, it has been affirmed
time and again that except where the assessment of the High
Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure, or is based
on misreading of evidence, or is inconsistent with the
evidence and thus has led to a perverse finding, this Court
will refrain from interfering with the findings of the courts
below.”


26
(2022) 11 SCC 800
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 26 of 46


15.2 On a reading of various judgements, viz. , Ramaniklal
27
Gokaldas v. State of Gujarat , , Nadodi Jayaraman v. State
28 29
of T.N. , Banwari Ram v. State of U.P. , the generally
accepted standard - which it ought to be stated, is not a rule -
is that when the Courts below concurred, this Court does not
enter into the reappreciation of the evidence, in a criminal
case. In the present case, the Courts below have, in fact,
arrived at opposite findings and as such, to set the matter to
rest either by conviction or acquittal, this Court must analyse
the evidence on record.


16 . As we have already observed, the defense led no evidence. Let
us, in that view of the matter, revisit the evidence of those witnesses
on the basis of which the High Court arrived at findings opposite that
of the Trial Court.
16.1 PW1, Taslim Beg, the father of the deceased testified
that marriage of the deceased and Ajmal, took place about 2
years and a few months back from the date of recording of the
evidence and that he had given certain goods as dowry in the
said wedding. The demand for further dowry in the form of
goods mentioned earlier as well has been consistent, to which

27
(1976) 1 SCC 6
28
1992 Supp (3) SCC 161
29
(1998) 9 SCC 3
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 27 of 46


he has also disclosed his response which was to the effect that,
providing the same would be beyond his financial
capabilities. He testified that since her marriage the deceased
had visited her natal home, on 10 - 12 occasions, till her
passing and that grievance of harassment regarding dowry
was almost a regular feature. The deceased told her father that
she had been warned of the consequences of non-fulfillment
of their demands - to the effect that she would be killed. On
the last occasion when she visited, even then, this issue came
up and he ‘ advised ’ her before sending her off with Ajmal.
According to him, PW2 and Fahmid Beg, who told him of this
horrible incident, were eyewitnesses to the same.
The only effective point in the cross-examination was
as to why the initial report filed by this witness was lacking
in detail - but in our considered view, not material particulars.

16.2 PW2 is Khaliq Beg, the maternal uncle of the
deceased and brother-in-law of the complainant - PW1. In
his examination-in-chief he testified to the specific demand
of dowry in terms of the motorcycle, colour TV and cash to
the tune of Rs.15,000/- and complaints made by the
deceased regarding harassment, to the effect that Ajmal and
other members of his family did undertake, in his presence
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 28 of 46


as also that of other witnesses that they would not harass the
deceased in this regard. He, along with Fahmid Beg reached
the spot and saw some of the accused, including Ajmal
fleeing from the spot and yet others running away from the
house, seeing them approaching.
By way of cross-examination, it comes forth that
although he was the one to have informed PW1 of the
incident, but the presence of Fahmid Beg is under question.
On a suggestion that, the deceased was in fact unhappy and
as such, had committed suicide as opposed to Ajmal and the
other accused having killed her, he denied the same. He states
that he had seen the accused persons running away from the
spot but however, not seen them actually setting the deceased
ablaze.
16.3 PW-4 is Dr. VK Mishra who conducted the post-
mortem of the deceased. The cause of death was testified to
be asphyxia and shock caused by extreme burns. It was
deposed that hundred percent of the body surface was burnt
down to the muscles. It was possible, therefore, that the death
had been caused due to pouring of kerosene. There was no
injury inflicted by any weapon on the body.
16.4 PW6, is the mother of the deceased and wife of the
complainant. She testified to the particular demand of
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 29 of 46


motorcycle, cash Rs.15,000/- and a colour TV; the 10 or 12
prior visits of the deceased; the demand of dowry a day before
the death of the deceased and, PW2 informing them of the
incident. In her cross-examination, it comes forth that the
deceased apparently lived in the matrimonial home, happily.


17. A perusal of the witness statements, as encapsulated above,
reveal the following facts:
(a) The deceased and Ajmal were married, and the former
resided in her matrimonial home. The marriage lasted for just
over a year, before the deceased passed away.

(b) All the witnesses have consistently deposed the demand for
two specific items and that particular amount of cash.
(c) All the witnesses have testified that the deceased told them
that she had been threatened with her life, should the demands
not be fulfilled.
(d) The case of the prosecution is consistent insofar as the
demand for dowry being restated by Ajmal himself, just one
day prior to the death of the deceased.

18. A perusal of the testimonies also reveals the following
inconsistencies:
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 30 of 46


(a) On the one hand, PW6 states that there was no demand at
the time of marriage but on the other, her husband states that
he had given dowry at the time of marriage that is, double bed
etc.
(b) PW1 states that it was PW2 who informed him about the
incident and were eyewitnesses to the incident but however
PW2 states that he had not seen the accused people setting the
deceased ablaze.
(c) PW2 stated that he and one Fahmid Beg, reached the spot
after the deceased cried for help, but however, in his cross-
examination it appears that presence of Fahmid Beg, could not
be established.
(d) On the one hand, all witnesses depose as to the continued
harassment of the deceased for dowry, whereas on the other,
PW6 stated that she lived in her matrimonial home happily.


19. What is now for us to do is balance the position of statements
unblemished by the assault of cross-examination and the
inconsistencies, omissions, contradictions in the testimony of
witnesses, in order to determine the guilt, as found proved by the
Trial Court, or lack thereof as held by the High Court. At this
juncture, we must notice the effect of certain omissions or
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses.
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 31 of 46


30
19.1 In Sohrab v. State of M.P. the Court held as follows
in connection with inconsistencies in statement of witnesses in
a criminal trial:
“8…It appears to us that merely because there have been
discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence of some or
all of the witnesses does not mean that the entire evidence of
the prosecution has to be discarded. It is only after exercising
caution and care and sifting the evidence to separate the truth
from untruth, exaggeration, embellishments and
improvement, the Court comes to the conclusion that what
can be accepted implicates the appellants it will convict them.
This Court has held that falseus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across
a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth
or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments.
In most cases, the witnesses when asked about details venture
to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant for fear
that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main
incident which they have witnessed but that is not to say that
their evidence as to the salient features of the case after
cautious scrutiny cannot be considered though where the
substratum of the prosecution case or material part of the
evidence is disbelievable it will not be permissible for the
Court to reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest….”

19.2 In this connection, various judgments of this Court have
restated the position. [See: Radha Mohan Singh v. State of
31 32
U.P . , Hari v. State of U.P. and Ravasaheb v. State of
33
Karnataka .]


30
(1972) 3 SCC 751
31
(2006) 2 SCC 450
32
(2021) 17 SCC 111
33
(2023) 5 SCC 391
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 32 of 46


20. The position of law being clear, as referred supra let us now
consider the evidence. The demand for dowry, and in particular, a
motorcycle, a colour TV and Rs.15,000/- in cash, have been
established beyond reasonable doubt, with such a version not to
have been shaken at all. Equally so, in no manner could it be
disputed that the said demand had been reiterated just a day prior to
the deceased passing away. This ties in with the fact that PW1 and
PW 2, both have testified to the effect of continuous harassment of
the deceased. The expression “ soon before her death ”, as explained
in Ashok Kumar ( supra ) would, in the considered view of this
Court, be met and all the essentials, as noted in Pavan Kumar
( supra ) would be satisfied. Here itself, it may then be noted that the
presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
came into effect as soon as it stood proved that the deceased had
been subjected to cruelty soon before her death, and went unrebutted
by the defence, since no evidence was led by them.

21. The next aspect to be considered is the disregarding of the
evidence of PW2, by the High Court. We are of the view that the
same was not justified. He has stated that when he reached the spot
he saw Ajmal and other co-accused persons fleeing. He is the one
who told PW1. Nowhere in his testimony has it come forth that he
is an eyewitness to the incident. PW1 on the contrary said that PW2
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 33 of 46


and Fahmid Beg had witnessed the incident. On first blush, this
contradiction appears significant and material, but, it is not so. The
witness, PW2, regarding whose presence the discrepancy is, has
himself categorically stated that upon reaching the spot, he only saw
that the deceased had been set ablaze and that the accused persons
were fleeing away. He has nowhere said that he saw the act being
committed. As such, this contradiction will not have a bearing on
the overall value of the testimony of PW2. The High Court, in
disbelieving the testimony of this witness, as extracted supra,
further stated that prior to the incident the deceased had come to his
residence which is in the same village as her matrimonial home and
complained to her uncle, about her maltreatment, at the hands of
Ajmal and others on account of the demand for dowry. As such, the
same was held, not to be an ordinary fact and so, it could be very
well supposed that PW 1 and 6, parents of the deceased knew of this
incident. Given that in their testimonies, neither of these persons
mentioned this, has been taken to mean a credible doubt on the
testimony of PW 2.
We cannot agree. True it is that this fact has not come in the
testimony of the parents of the deceased, but it is equally so that the
statement of PW2 could not be shaken by cross-examination.
Further, it is generally well understood that demands for dowry lead
to considerable stress on the paternal family, and it is entirely
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 34 of 46


possible that, being fully aware of the situation, PW2 did not want
this additional incident to cause further stress on PWs 1 and 6. We
notice further that the examination-in-chief as well as the cross-
th
examination of PW 2 took place on 8 April 2003 and this fact was
therefore, on record much before the testimony and cross-
nd
examination of PW6 which took place on 2 July 2003. No question
appears on record regarding this incident. That being the case, it
would only be on the basis of conjectures and surmises that the
statement of PW2 would be rejected and as such, it would be unfair
and unjust to cast doubt on the testimony of the said witness.

22. Now, coming to the alleged happiness of the deceased in her
married life we only wish that it was true. Once again adverting to
the testimonies of the witnesses, PW1 said as quoted hereunder:
“Ajmal Beg came to my house one day before the incident. He
had come to my house with my daughter also. He had demanded
colour TV, motorcycle and INR 15,000/-coming to my house.
However I had sent the daughter after persuading her. The
daughter also went with him happily. Since I was a poor man I
did not stop my daughter and sent her she was assaulted and
dowry was demanded from her.”

PW 6 stated as below:

“My daughter mostly resided in her matrimonial home after the
marriage and she lived there happily.”

Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 35 of 46


The High Court appears to have been misdirected by the use of the
word ‘ happily ’, at least insofar as the testimony of PW1 is
concerned. Reading the entire statement as extracted herein above,
clearly establishes that the deceased went back to her matrimonial
home having been persuaded and assured by her father. He also
states that she had been assaulted and dowry had been demanded
from her. Therefore, the use of one word does not colour the entire
tenor of the evidence. The sum of the evidence is to be understood,
taking into account all aspects testified to therein.
Insofar as the statement of PW6 is concerned, we find the
same to be an outlier on record. It cannot be read out of context.
Nothing else whatsoever, present on record can lend credence to this
statement of the mother. The evidence of all the witnesses, including
the mother, is consistent on the demand of dowry and both PW1 and
PW2 have also testified to the continued harassment that was
endured by the deceased. The High Court disbelieved the evidence
of PW2 but as we have observed above, his testimony cannot be
disregarded in its entirety. This statement alone cannot help the case
of Ajmal and Jamila. When the harassment for dowry is proved and
so is the fact that such harassment was made soon before her death,
then a mere statement of one of the witnesses that she was
apparently happy, would not save the Respondents from guilt.

Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 36 of 46


23. We may also record that the reasoning given by the High
Court to acquit Ajmal and Jamila, in the considered view of this
Court, is fallacious. The learned judges record that as per the
statement of PW6, there was no demand of dowry prior to the
marriage and, therefore, they have certain difficulties in accepting
the factum of subsequent demand. We find this difficult to accept
for two reasons - one , that PW1’s statement regarding having given
certain goods as dowry to Ajmal and his family at the time of
marriage, has gone unrebutted, and two , that the DPA, 1961 does
not distinguish between demand made prior to or after marriage. In
this regard Section 2 thereof, which runs thus, may be seen –
2. Definition of “dowry”.—In this Act, “dowry” means any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly— (a) by one party to a marriage to the other
party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before [or any time after the marriage] [in connection with
the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or
mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) applies.
4 *
Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security” has the same
meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

It is clear from the above that any property or valuable security given
by either party to a marriage to the other, or by any other person to
the party to marriage, or to any other person, on the day of marriage,
before or at any time after marriage, shall be considered to be dowry.
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 37 of 46


So, the demand by Ajmal and/or his family members for a colour
TV, a motorcycle and Rs.15,000/- in cash, unquestionably
constitutes dowry.
Yet another reason given by the High Court for acquittal was
that since Ajmal and his family members were poor, they could not
have made such demand because even if they managed to procure
the same, they had no means of maintaining the said goods. Suffice
it to say that this reason does not appeal to reason.
We may also observe that, while reversing the findings of
facts returned by the Trial Court, the High Court has not assigned
any reasons explicitly holding such findings to be
erroneous/perverse or illegal.

CONCLUSION

24. The upshot of the discussion made in the preceding
paragraphs is that the High Court has erred in setting aside the
judgment of conviction returned by the Additional District Judge,
Bijnor, and acquitting Ajmal and Jamila in connection with the FIR
bearing No. 94/2001 registered at P.S Kiratpur, under Sections 498-
A and 304-B, IPC and Section 3/4 of the DPA, 1961. The State’s
appeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed.

The judgment of the Trial Court, insofar as it relates to the
conviction of both Ajmal and Jamila, is restored, as also the
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 38 of 46


quantum of sentence in respect of Ajmal is concerned. However,
insofar as the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 133 of 2017 is
concerned, i.e., Jamila, who, as we have recorded in our order
th
reserving judgment dated 10 September 2025, is 94 years of age -
the question we must ask ourselves is whether any fruitful purpose
will be served by sending her to prison. While weighing and
assessing sentencing particularly in case of convicts of advanced age
such as in praesenti causa, the Court must take into consideration
humanitarian considerations which dictate that imposing
imprisonment may be inhumane, given the severe physical frailty,
likely medical dependency, and reduced capacity to endure the
hardships of custody, thereby implicating and compromising the
dignity protected under law. As such, while we restore the
conviction as awarded by the Trial Court however, in the attending
facts and circumstances of this case, we refrain from incarcerating
her. Respondent Ajmal in Criminal Appeal No. 132 of 2017 is
directed to surrender before the concerned Court, within a period of
four weeks from today, for serving the sentence awarded by the Trial
Court.

25. Before we part with this judgment, we deem it appropriate to
note that while in this case, the accused person(s) has finally been
brought to book, there are many cases in which it is not the case.
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 39 of 46


Many, who openly seek and give dowry, go scot-free. It has been
noted time and again, in various judicial pronouncements that DPA,
1961 suffers from various difficulties in its implementation. About
forty-two years ago, R.S Pathak J., ( as His Lordship then was ) in
34
Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police , observed:
“ 18. … Young women of education, intelligence and character do
not set fire to themselves to welcome the embrace of death unless
provoked and compelled to that desperate step by the intolerance
of their misery. It is pertinent to note that such cases evidence a
deep-seated malady in our social order. The greed for dowry, and
indeed the dowry system as an institution, calls for the severest
condemnation. It is evident that legislative measures such as the
Dowry Prohibition Act have not met with the success for which
they were designed. Perhaps, legislation in itself cannot succeed
in stamping out such an evil, and the solution must ultimately be
found in the conscience and will of the social community and in
its active expression through legal and constitutional methods.

19. Besides this, what is important to point out is that where the
death in such cases is due to a crime, the perpetrators of the crime
not infrequently escape from the nemesis of the law because of
inadequate police investigation. It would be of considerable
assistance if an appropriately high priority was given to the
expeditious investigation of such cases, if a special magisterial
machinery was created for the purpose of the prompt
investigation of such incidents, and efficient investigative
techniques and procedures were adopted taking into account the
peculiar features of such cases. Among other suggestions, we
would recommend that a female police officer of sufficient rank
and status in the police force should be associated with the
investigation from its very inception. There are evident
advantages in that. In a case where a wife dies in suspicious
circumstances in the husband's home it is invariably a matter of
considerable difficulty to ascertain the precise circumstances in

34
(1983) 3 SCC 344
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 40 of 46


which the incident occurred. As the incident takes place in the
home of the husband, the material witnesses are usually the
husband and his parents or other relations of the husband staying
with him. Whether it was cooking at the kitchen stove which was
responsible for the accident or, according to the inmates of the
house, there was an inexplicable urge to suicide or whether indeed
the young wife was the victim of a planned murder are matters
closely involving the intimate knowledge of a woman's daily
existence.

A few years later, taking note of this ineffective implementation,
35
this Court even entertained a writ petition and issued various
directions for effective implementation of the Act finally
culminating in Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry
36
Prohibition Act, 1961, In re .
37
These issues undoubtedly persist today. The tables below
capture the current position of cases arising out of Section 304-B
and 498-A IPC.


1. Annual Incidence of Dowry Deaths
38
(Section 304B IPC) [2019–2023]

35
W.P. No. 499 of 1997
36
(2005) 4 SCC 565
37
Data supplied by Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India
38
Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) Reports
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 41 of 46

2. Annual Incidence of Cruelty by Husband/ Relatives
39
(Section 498A IPC) [2019–2023]

While on the one hand, the law suffers from ineffectiveness
and so, the malpractice of dowry remains rampant, on the other
hand, the provisions of this Act have also been used to ventilate
ulterior motives along with Section 498-A, IPC. This oscillation
between ineffectiveness and misuse creates a judicial tension
which needs urgent resolution. While this urgent resolution cannot
be stressed upon enough, at the same time it is necessary to be

39
Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) Reports
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 42 of 46


recognized that particularly when it comes to the giving and taking
of dowry, this practice unfortunately has deep roots in society,
hence, it not being a matter of swift change, instead needs
concentrated effort on part of all the involved parties, be it
Legislature, law enforcement, Judiciary, civil society
organizations etc.

26. With an intent to further this change, we issue the following
directions: -
(a) to ensure that the change brought in is able to make
an impact on the efforts to eradicate this evil, it is to be
ensured that the future generation, youngsters of today, are
informed and made aware about this evil practice and the
necessity to eschew it. As such, it is directed that States and
even the Union Government consider changes as are
necessary to the educational curricula across levels,
reinforcing the constitutional position that parties to a
marriage are equal to one another and one is not subservient
to the other as is sought to be established by giving and
taking of money and or articles at the time of marriage;
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 43 of 46


(b) The law provides for the appointment of Dowry
40
Prohibition Officers in States. It is to be ensured that these
officers are duly deputed, aware of their responsibilities and
given the necessary wherewithal to carry out the duties
entrusted to them. The contact details (name, official phone
number and email ID) of such an officer designated to this
position are disseminated adequately by the local authorities
ensuring awareness of citizens of the area;
(c) the police officials, as also the judicial officers
dealing with such cases, should periodically be given
training, equipping them to fully appreciate the social and
psychological implications which are often at the forefront
of these cases. This would also ensure a sensitivity of the
concerned officials towards genuine cases versus those
which are frivolous and abusive of the process of law;
(d) it is not lost on us that the instant case began in 2001
and could only be concluded 24 years later by way of this
judgment. It is but obvious that there would be many such
similar cases. The High Courts are requested to take stock
of the situation, ascertain the number of cases pending

40
Section 8B of DPA
Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 44 of 46


dealing with Section 304-B, 498-A from the earliest to the
latest for expeditious disposal; and
(e) in furtherance of (a) above, we also recognize that
many people today are/have been outside the education fold,
and that it is equally, if not more so, important to reach them
and make accessible and comprehensible, the relevant
information regarding the act of giving or taking of dowry
as also other acts sometimes associated therewith, other
times independent thereof (mental and physical cruelty) is
an offence in law. The District Administration along with
the District Legal Services Authorities, by engaging and
involving civil society groups and dedicated social activists,
is requested to conduct workshops/awareness programs at
regular intervals. This is to ensure change at the grassroot
level.


27. Let a copy of this judgment be circulated electronically to
the Registrar General of the High Courts who are requested to
place the same before the Learned Chief Justices and solicit
directions in accordance with the above, and also, to the Chief
Secretaries of all States for necessary follow up action.

Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 45 of 46


27.1 While the main appeals are disposed of, so far as these
directions are concerned, to ensure compliance thereof, as
also issue any other directions as may be necessary, list this
matter after four weeks. States are requested to file affidavits
indicating the position qua the direction given under (b)
hereinabove. The High Courts shall do the same for (d).

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.



…………………………………………….…J.
(SANJAY KAROL)




……………………………………………..…J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)


New Delhi;
December 15, 2025


Crl. Appeal Nos. 132-133 of 2017 Page 46 of 46