Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.78 OF 2022
Geeta Devi ..Appellant(S)
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ..Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 06.12.2019 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in
Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2019 by which the High Court
has dismissed the said appeal preferred by the victim of the
offence, which was filed against the judgment and order
dated 13.09.2019 passed by the learned Special Court,
acquitting the respondent accused under Sections 354, 504,
506 of the IPC, Section 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Rajni Mukhi
Date: 2022.01.18
14:12:02 IST
Reason:
1
Act, 1989, the victim – original appellant has preferred the
present appeal.
2. That the learned Special Court/Trial Court convicted
respondent Nos.2 to 4 – accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 452, 323/34 and 325/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, however, acquitted them for the offences punishable
under Sections 354, 504, 506 of the IPC, Section 3(1)(x) and
3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Feeling aggrieved and
dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the
learned Special Court acquitting the respondents – accused
for the aforesaid offences, the victim preferred an appeal
before the High Court by way of Criminal Appeal No.2356 of
2019 and by the impugned one page/paragraph judgment
and order, the High Court has dismissed the said appeal,
which is the subject matter of the present appeal before this
Court.
3. We have heard Shri T.V. George, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, Shri Adarsh Upadhyay, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the State – Respondent No.1
2
and Shri Shahid Anwar, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4 – accused.
4. Number of submissions have been made by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties.
However, for the reasons stated hereinbelow we propose to
remand the matter to the High Court and hence we refrain
from dealing with any of the submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
parties on merits as any observation made by this Court
may affect either the prosecution or the defence.
5. We have gone through the judgment and order passed by
the High Court dismissing the appeal preferred by the victim
– appellant. As already noted, the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court as such is one
page/paragraph order. After observing in paragraph 3 that
“I have gone through the judgment of the learned Trial
Court carefully” thereafter without further elaborate re
appreciation of the entire evidence on record the High Court
has dismissed the appeal by observing in paragraph 4 as
under:
“4. Trial Court has considered the statement of P.W.2
carefully and has found that the testimony of P.W.2
3
cannot be relied on for offence under Sections 354, 504,
506 IPC, 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) S.C./S.T. Act. There is no
corroboration to the testimony of P.W.2 when the trial
Court itself has found the testimony of P.W.2 doubtful.
There is no ground to interfere with the well considered
judgment of trial Court and, therefore, I find this appeal
without merit and substance. The appeal is thus,
dismissed.”
6. We are constrained to observe that this is not the manner in
which the High Court should have dealt with the appeal
against an order of acquittal which as such is a first appeal
against the order of acquittal. The High Court has only
made general observations on the deposition of the witness
examined. However, there is no reappreciation of the entire
evidence in detail which exercise ought to have been made
by the High Court while dealing with the judgment and
order of acquittal. The High Court ought to have re
appreciated the entire evidence on record as it was dealing
with a first appeal. Being the first appellate court, the High
Court was required to reappreciate the entire evidence on
record and also the reasoning given by the learned Trial
Court. How to deal with and decide an appeal in the case of
an acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is dealt with
in the case of Umedbhai Jadavbhai Vs. The State of
Gujarat (1978) 1 SCC 228. It was observed therein and held
4
by this Court that once the appeal is entertained against the
order of acquittal, the High Court is entitled to reappreciate
the entire evidence independently and come to its own
conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same
were arrived at after a proper appreciation of the evidence.
Against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court the
High Court would be justified on reappreciation of the
entire evidence independently and come to its own
conclusion that acquittal is perverse and manifestly
erroneous.
6.1 How to deal with, decide and dispose of the criminal appeal
against an acquittal under Section 378 Cr.PC has been
elaborately dealt with by this Court and after considering
the earlier catena of decisions of this Court in the case of
, (2021) 6
Guru Dutt Pathak Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
SCC 116, in paragraphs 15 to 20 it has been observed as
under:
15. In Babu v. State of Kerala [ Babu v. State of Kerala ,
(2010) 9 SCC 189, this Court has reiterated the principles
to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under
Section 378 CrPC. In paras 12 to 19, it is observed and
held as under: (SCC pp. 196199)
5
“ 12 . This Court time and again has laid down
the guidelines for the High Court to interfere
with the judgment and order of acquittal passed
by the trial court. The appellate court should not
ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a
case where two views are possible, though the
view of the appellate court may be the more
probable one. While dealing with a judgment of
acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the
entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a
finding as to whether the views of the trial court
were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The
appellate court is entitled to consider whether in
arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had
failed to take into consideration admissible
evidence and/or had taken into consideration
the evidence brought on record contrary to law.
Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may
also be a subjectmatter of scrutiny by the
appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of
U.P. [ Balak Ram v. State of U.P. , (1975) 3 SCC
219], Shambhoo Missir v. State of
Bihar [ Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar , (1990)
4 SCC 17] , Shailendra Pratap v. State of
U.P. [ Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. , (2003) 1
SCC 761], Narendra Singh v. State of
M.P. [ Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. , (2004) 10
SCC 699], Budh Singh v. State of U.P. [ Budh
Singh v. State of U.P. , (2006) 9 SCC 731], State
of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh [ State of U.P. v. Ram
Veer Singh , (2007) 13 SCC 102], S. Rama
Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [ S. Rama Krishna v. S.
Rami Reddy , (2008) 5 SCC 535], Arulvelu
v. State [ Arulvelu v. State , (2009) 10 SCC
206], Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of
A.P. [ Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. ,
(2009) 16 SCC 98] and Ram Singh v. State of
[ v. , (2010) 2 SCC
H.P. Ram Singh State of H.P.
445)
13 . In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [ Sheo
Swarup v. King Emperor , 1934 SCC OnLine PC
42], the Privy Council observed as under: (SCC
OnLine PC)
‘… the High Court should and will always
give proper weight and consideration to such
matters as ( 1 ) the views of the trial Judge as to
6
the credibility of the witnesses; ( 2 ) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused, a presumption certainly not weakened
by the fact that he has been acquitted at his
trial; ( 3 ) the right of the accused to the benefit of
any doubt; and ( 4 ) the slowness of an appellate
court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the
witnesses.’
14 . The aforesaid principle of law has
consistently been followed by this Court.
(See Tulsiram Kanu v. State [ Tulsiram
Kanu v. State , AIR 1954 SC 1 : 1954 Cri LJ
225] , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab [ Balbir
Singh v. State of Punjab , AIR 1957 SC 216 :
1957 Cri LJ 481] , M.G. Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra [ M.G. Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra , AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ
235] , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar [ Khedu
Mohton v. State of Bihar , (1970) 2 SCC 450 :
1970 SCC (Cri) 479] , Sambasivan v. State of
Kerala [ Sambasivan v. State of Kerala , (1998) 5
SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , Bhagwan
Singh v. State of M.P. [ Bhagwan Singh v. State of
M.P. , (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736]
and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [ State of
v. , (2007) 3 SCC 755 :
Goa Sanjay Thakran
(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] .)
15 . In Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka [ Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka ,
(2007) 4 SCC 415] , this Court reiterated the
legal position as under : (SCC p. 432, para 42)
‘ 42 . … (1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
puts no limitation, restriction or condition on
exercise of such power and an appellate court on
the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial
and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient
grounds”, “very strong circumstances”,
7
“distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of
an appellate court in an appeal against
acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise
the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
court to review the evidence and to come to its
own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly ,
the presumption of innocence is available to him
under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly , the
accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court.’
16 . In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. [ Ghurey
v. , (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1
Lal State of U.P.
SCC (Cri) 60] , this Court reiterated the said
view, observing that the appellate court in
dealing with the cases in which the trial courts
have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind
that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the
presumption that he is innocent. The appellate
court must give due weight and consideration to
the decision of the trial court as the trial court
had the distinct advantage of watching the
demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better
position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses.
17 . In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh [ State of
Rajasthan v. Naresh , (2009) 9 SCC 368 : (2009)
3 SCC (Cri) 1069] , the Court again examined
the earlier judgments of this Court and laid
down that : (SCC p. 374, para 20)
8
‘ 20 . … An order of acquittal should not be
lightly interfered with even if the Court believes
that there is some evidence pointing out the
finger towards the accused.”
18 . In State of U.P. v. Banne [ State of
U.P. v. Banne , (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Cri) 260] , this Court gave certain illustrative
circumstances in which the Court would be
justified in interfering with a judgment of
acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances
include : ( Banne case [ State of U.P. v. Banne ,
(2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] ,
SCC p. 286, para 28)
‘ 28 . … ( i ) The High Court's decision is based
on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the
settled legal position;
( ii ) The High Court's conclusions are contrary
to evidence and documents on record;
( iii ) The entire approach of the High Court in
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal
leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
( iv ) The High Court's judgment is manifestly
unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case;
( v ) This Court must always give proper weight
and consideration to the findings of the High
Court;
( vi ) This Court would be extremely reluctant
in interfering with a case when both the
Sessions Court and the High Court have
recorded an order of acquittal.’
A similar view has been reiterated by this
Court in Dhanapal v. State [ Dhanapal v. State ,
(2009) 10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] .
19 . Thus, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that in exceptional
cases where there are compelling circumstances,
and the judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere with
the order of acquittal. The appellate court
9
should bear in mind the presumption of
innocence of the accused and further that the
trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption
of his innocence. Interference in a routine
manner where the other view is possible should
be avoided, unless there are good reasons for
interference
16. When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be
held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in
para 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under :
( Babu case [ Babu v. State of Kerala , (2010) 9 SCC 189 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , SCC p. 199)
“ 20 . The findings of fact recorded by a court
can be held to be perverse if the findings have
been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding
may also be said to be perverse if it is “against
the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the
vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar
Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ Rajinder Kumar
Kindra v. Delhi Admn. , (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985
SCC (L&S) 131] , Excise & Taxation Officercum
Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [ Excise
& Taxation OfficercumAssessing
Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons , 1992 Supp (2)
SCC 312] , Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [ Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE ,
1994 Supp (3) SCC 665] , Gaya Din v. Hanuman
Prasad [ Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad , (2001) 1
SCC 501] , Arulvelu v. State [ Arulvelu v. State ,
(2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288]
and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of
A.P. [ Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. ,
(2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )”
It is further observed, after following the
decision of this Court in Kuldeep
Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep
Singh v. Commr. of Police , (1999) 2 SCC 10 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 429], that if a decision is
arrived at on the basis of no evidence or
thoroughly unreliable evidence and no
reasonable person would act upon it, the order
10
would be perverse. But if there is some evidence
on record which is acceptable and which could
be relied upon, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings would not
be interfered with.
17. In the decision of this Court in Vijay Mohan
Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of
Karnataka , (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] ,
this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of
Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court
in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a
catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952
onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under:
( Vijay Mohan Singh case , SCC pp. 44749)
“ 31 . An identical question came to be
considered before this Court in
Umedbhai
Jadavbhai [ Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of
Gujarat , (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108]
. In the case before this Court, the High Court
interfered with the order of acquittal passed by
the learned trial court on reappreciation of the
entire evidence on record. However, the High
Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not
consider the reasons given by the learned trial
court while acquitting the accused. Confirming
the judgment of the High Court, this Court
observed and held in para 10 as under : (SCC p.
233)
‘ 10 . Once the appeal was rightly entertained
against the order of acquittal, the High Court
was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence
independently and come to its own conclusion.
Ordinarily, the High Court would give due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge
if the same were arrived at after proper
appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not
be applicable in the present case where the
Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong
assumption of a very material and clinching
aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the
case.’
11
31.1 . In Sambasivan v. State of
Kerala [ Sambasivan v. State of Kerala , (1998) 5
SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , the High Court
reversed the order of acquittal passed by the
learned trial court and held the accused guilty
on reappreciation of the entire evidence on
record, however, the High Court did not record
its conclusion on the question whether the
approach of the trial court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions
arrived at by it were wholly untenable.
Confirming the order passed by the High Court
convicting the accused on reversal of the
acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after
being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed
by the learned trial court was perverse and
suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to
interfere with the order of conviction passed by
the High Court. While confirming the order of
conviction passed by the High Court, this Court
observed in para 8 as under : (SCC p. 416)
‘ 8 . We have perused the judgment under
appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has
conformed to the aforementioned principles. We
find that the High Court has not strictly
proceeded in the manner laid down by this
Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of
Gujarat [ Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of
Gujarat , (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972]
viz. first recording its conclusion on the question
whether the approach of the trial court in
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or
the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly
untenable, which alone will justify interference
in an order of acquittal though the High Court
has rendered a wellconsidered judgment duly
meeting all the contentions raised before it. But
then will this noncompliance per se justify
setting aside the judgment under appeal? We
think, not. In our view, in such a case, the
approach of the court which is considering the
validity of the judgment of an appellate court
which has reversed the order of acquittal passed
by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the
approach of the trial court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal or conclusions
12
arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable
and whether the judgment of the appellate court
is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that
the trial court judgment warranted interference.
In such a case, there is obviously no reason why
the appellate court's judgment should be
disturbed. But if on the other hand the court
comes to the conclusion that the judgment of
the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity,
it cannot but be held that the interference by the
appellate court in the order of acquittal was not
justified; then in such a case the judgment of
the appellate court has to be set aside as of the
two reasonable views, the one in support of the
acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to
the above discussion, we shall proceed to
examine the judgment of the trial court in this
case.’
31.2 . In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State
of Kerala [ K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of
Kerala , (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] ,
after observing that though there is some
substance in the grievance of the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that
the High Court has not adverted to all the
reasons given by the trial Judge for according an
order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside
the order of conviction passed by the High Court
after having found that the approach of the
Sessions Judge in recording the order of
acquittal was not proper and the conclusion
arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on
several aspects was unsustainable. This Court
further observed that as the Sessions Judge was
not justified in discarding the relevant/material
evidence while acquitting the accused, the High
Court, therefore, was fully entitled to
reappreciate the evidence and record its own
conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence
of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons
adduced by the trial court for discarding the
testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all
sound. This Court also observed that as the
evaluation of the evidence made by the trial
court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it
was the duty of the High Court to interfere with
13
an order of acquittal passed by the learned
Sessions Judge.
31.3 . In Atley v. State of U.P. [ Atley v. State of
U.P. , AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , in
para 5, this Court observed and held as under :
(AIR pp. 80910)
‘ 5 . It has been argued by the learned counsel
for the appellant that the judgment of the trial
court being one of acquittal, the High Court
should not have set it aside on mere
appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution unless it came to the conclusion
that the judgment of the trial Judge was
perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say
that unless the appellate court in an appeal
under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion
that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was
perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is
open to the High Court on an appeal against an
order of acquittal to review the entire evidence
and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
keeping in view the wellestablished rule that
the presumption of innocence of the accused is
not weakened but strengthened by the judgment
of acquittal passed by the trial court which had
the advantage of observing the demeanour of
witnesses whose evidence has been recorded in
its presence.
It is also wellsettled that the court of appeal
has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence
in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in
the case of an appeal against an order of
conviction, subject to the riders that the
presumption of innocence with which the
accused person starts in the trial court
continues even up to the appellate stage and
that the appellate court should attach due
weight to the opinion of the trial court which
recorded the order of acquittal.
14
If the appellate court reviews the evidence,
keeping those principles in mind, and comes to
a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be
said to have been vitiated. (See in this
connection the very cases cited at the Bar,
namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [ Surajpal
Singh v. State , 1951 SCC 1207] ; Wilayat
v. [ v.
Khan State of U.P. Wilayat Khan State of
U.P. , 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no
substance in the contention raised on behalf of
the appellant that the High Court was not
justified in reviewing the entire evidence and
coming to its own conclusions.’
31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [ K.
Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. , (1979) 1 SCC 355 :
1979 SCC (Cri) 305] , this Court has observed
that where the trial court allows itself to be beset
with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy
evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of
the evidence which is but barely possible, it is
the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in
the interest of justice, lest the administration of
justice be brought to ridicule.”
18. In Umedbhai Jadavbhai [ Umedbhai
Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat , (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 108] , in para 10, it is observed and held as
under : (SCC p. 233)
“ 10 . Once the appeal was rightly entertained
against the order of acquittal, the High Court
was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence
independently and come to its own conclusion.
Ordinarily, the High Court would give due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge
if the same were arrived at after proper
appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not
be applicable in the present case where the
Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong
assumption of a very material and clinching
aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the
case.”
15
19. In Atley v. State of U.P. [ Atley v. State of U.P. , AIR
1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , this Court has
observed and held as under : (AIR pp. 80910, para 5)
“ 5 . It has been argued by the learned counsel
for the appellant that the judgment of the trial
court being one of acquittal, the High Court
should not have set it aside on mere
appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution unless it came to the conclusion
that the judgment of the trial Judge was
perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say
that unless the appellate court in an appeal
under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion
that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was
perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is
open to the High Court on an appeal against an
order of acquittal to review the entire evidence
and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
keeping in view the wellestablished rule that
the presumption of innocence of the accused is
not weakened but strengthened by the judgment
of acquittal passed by the trial court which had
the advantage of observing the demeanour of
witnesses whose evidence has been recorded in
its presence.
It is also wellsettled that the court of appeal
has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence
in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in
the case of an appeal against an order of
conviction, subject to the riders that the
presumption of innocence with which the
accused person starts in the trial court
continues even up to the appellate stage and
that the appellate court should attach due
weight to the opinion of the trial court which
recorded the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence,
keeping those principles in mind, and comes to
a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be
said to have been vitiated. (See in this
connection the very cases cited at the Bar,
namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [ Surajpal
16
Singh v. State , 1951 SCC 1207] ; Wilayat
Khan v. State of U.P. [ Wilayat Khan v. State of
U.P. , 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no
substance in the contention raised on behalf of
the appellant that the High Court was not
justified in reviewing the entire evidence and
coming to its own conclusions.”
| 20. | In | K. Gopal Reddy | v. | State of A.P. | [ | K. Gopal | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reddy | v. | State of A.P. | , (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) | |||||||||||
| 305] , this Court has observed that where the trial court | ||||||||||||||
| allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects | ||||||||||||||
| creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a | ||||||||||||||
| view of the evidence which is but barely | possible | , it is the | ||||||||||||
| obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest | ||||||||||||||
| of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to | ||||||||||||||
| ridicule.” |
7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions of this Court to the facts of the case on hand and
while considering the impugned judgment and order passed
by the High Court, we find the same is unsustainable. On
perusal of the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court, we find that decision of the High Court is totally
erroneous as it has ignored the settled legal position. As
observed hereinabove, the High Court has not at all
discussed and/or reappreciated the entire evidence on
record. In fact, the High Court has only made the general
observations on the deposition of the witnesses examined.
However, there is no reappreciation of entire evidence on
17
record in detail, which ought to have been done by the High
Court, being a first appellate court. Under the
circumstances on the aforesaid ground alone, impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court deserves to
be quashed and set aside and the same is to be remanded
back to the High Court to decide the appeal afresh in
accordance with law and on its own merits being mindful of
the observations made hereinabove.
8.
In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and
without expressing anything on the merits of the case, the
present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.2356
of 2019 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal before
the High Court is ordered to be restored to its original file.
The High Court to decide and dispose of the appeal in
accordance with law and on its own merits, bearing in mind
the observations made hereinabove. The High Court is
requested to decide and dispose of the appeal on merits at
the earliest.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
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…………………………………J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
th
January, 18 2022
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