Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DARSHAN SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF PUNJAB.ATTAR SINGHV.STATE OF PUNJAB.UNION OF INDIA-
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
05/12/1952
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
HASAN, GHULAM
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ)
AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
BOSE, VIVIAN
CITATION:
1953 AIR 83 1953 SCR 319
ACT:
East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947-Provincial law
prohibiting export of essential commodity without permit-
Validity-Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946,
ss. 3 and 4-" Trade and Commerce ", meaning of- Whether
include export-Construction of statutes-Acts must be
construed as a whole.
HEADNOTE:
Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946, which was passed by the Indian Legislature in
1946 empowered the Central Government by notified order to
provide for regulating and prohibiting the production,
supply and distribution of any essential commodity and trade
and commerce therein; s. 4 of the Act empowered the Central
Government to delegate its powers under s. 3 to the
Provincial Government or any officer thereof. The Governor
of the Punjab to whom such powers had been delegated under
s. 4 passed the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control
Order, 1947, which prohibited the export of cotton cloth and
yarn to any country outside India except under a permit, and
made export without permit an offence. The validity of this
order was questioned on the ground that the Governor had
acted in excess of his powers in so far as lie prohibited
export outside India without a permit:
Held, (i) that, keeping the object of the Essential
Supplies Act, 1946, in view and reading the words " trade
and commerce " in a. 3 of the Act in the light of the
context, these words could be interpreted as including the
export of goods outside the Province including a
neighbouring foreign State and the Governor in passing the
impugned Order did not act in excess of the powers delegated
to him;
(ii)that as the Central Legislature was fully competent
to legislate on exports and imports and making any provision
relating thereto under the Government of India Act, 1935, it
had power to make a law prohibiting export to a foreign
State, even &part from the powers conferred on it by the
India (Central Government and and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9
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JUDGMENT:
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(iii) even taking the legislation to be purely on the
provincial subjects of production, distribution and supply
of goods, restriction of import as ancillary to production
and supply of essential commodities would be quite within
the scope and ambit of such legislation and in pith and
substance the enactment would be one dealing exclusively
with these provincial matters.
It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the language
used ’by the legislature is the true depository of the
legislative intent, and that words and phrases occurring in
a statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached
manner dissociated from the context, but are to be read
together and construed in the light of the purpose and
object of the Act itself.
&
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Cases Nos. 11 and 12 of
1950. Appeals under Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated April 5, 1950, of
the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at
Simla (Khosla J.) in Criminal Revision Nos, 1144 and 1147 of
1949.
Achhru Ram (Gopal Singh, with him) for the appellant in Case
No. 11.
H. J. Umrigar for the appellant in Case No. 12.
S. M. Sikri (Advocate-General of Punjab) (H. S. Gujral,
with him) for the respondent, the State of Punjab.
M. C. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) (B. Sen, with
him) for the Intervener.
1952. December 5. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MUKHERJEA J.-The facts giving rise to these two connected
appeals may be briefly narrated as follows: Darshan Singh,
the appellant in Case No. 1-1, and Attar Singh who is the
appellant in Case No. 12, along with three other persons
were tried by the Special Magistrate, Ambala, East Punjab,
on charges under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code,
read with section 3/10 of the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and
Yarn (Regulation of’ Movement) Order, 1947, and section 7 of
the Essential Supplies Act, 1946. There wets a further
charge under section, 8 of the Essential Supplies Act
against three of these accused, Darshan Singh begning on of
them.
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The allegation against all the accused, in substance, was
that they conspired to export 76 bags of mill-made cloth to
Pakistan without a permit, by smuggling them through the
customs barrier near Wagha, on the morning of the 26th ,May,
1948. Wagha is., about 18 miles from Amritsar, and at a
distance of nearly half a mile from this place lies the
actual Indo-Pakistan border. Between the customs barrier
and the border there is a small Police Post and almost
opposite the Police Post is the customs office which is
located in a tent. The prosecution case’ is that at about 7
a. m. on the 26th of May, 1948, a truck, loaded with a large
quantity of millmade cloth owned by the accused Ram Singh,
arrived at the customs barrier near Wagha. Rajendra Singh,
another accused, who was on duty at that time as the Customs
Supervisor, allowed the truck to pass through and the truck
stopped near the customs office on the side of the Police
Post. As soon as the truck stopped, Darshan Singh, who was
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the Deputy Superintendent in charge of the customs barrier,
and Attar Singh, who was a Customs Preventive Officer at
Amritsar and was then under order of transfer to some other
place, went to the Police Station and asked Kulraj, the Sub-
Inspector in charge of the same, to allow the lorry to pass
through upto the border. Kulraj did not accede to this
request and thereupon both Darshan Singh and Attar Singh
went back to the customs tent. The truck was then unloaded
and the goods were handed over to a large number of coolies
who began carrying them towards the border, being followed
by both Attar Singh and Ram Singh. A little later, Kailash
Chandra, a Police Sub-Inspector of Amritsar who was at that
time on special duty in connection with checking and detec-
tion of smuggling cases, arrived at the place on a motor
bicycle and being informed by Kulraj of what had happened
before, both he and Kulraj proceeded in his motor cycle
towards the border and overtook the coolies who were
carrying the goods. The coolies were rounded up and brought
back to the border along
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with Attar Singh, though Ram Singh managed to Slip away.
Kailash Chandra made a report of the occurrence to Inder
Singh, who was the head of the Special Police Establishment
at Delhi dealing with smuggling cases, and after a detailed
investigation, the five accused were sent up to take their-
trial. The trying Magistrate convicted all of them under
section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, read with section
3/10 of the East ’Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947,
and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for a period of
one year each. Attar Singh was further convicted under
section 7 of the Essential Supplies Act and Darshan Singh
under section 8 of the said Act, and there was a sentence of
one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000
upon each one of them under these sections, the sentence of
rigorous imprisonment to run concurrently with that on the
previous charges.
Against this judgment there was an appeal taken by all the
accused to the Court of the Sessions Judge at Amritsar. The
Additional Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal, acquitted
two of the accused but maintained the conviction of the
other three, namely, Attar Singh, Ram Singh and Darshan
Singh, though their sentences were reduced. Thereupon these
three persons presented three separate revision petitions to
the High Court of East Punjab at Simla which were heard and
disposed of by Mr. Justice Khosla sitting singly. The
learned Judge dismissed the revision petitions but granted a
certificate under article 132 of the Constitution on the
ground that the cases involved a substantial question of low
as to the interpretation of the Constitution. It is on the
strength of this certificate that these two appeals have
come before us, one being filed by Darshan Singh and the
other by Attar Singh. No appeal has been preferred by the
accused Ram Singh.
The constitutional point involved in these appeals has
been presented before us very lucidly by Mr. Achhru Ram who
appeared on behalf of Darslian
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Singh, the appellant in Case No. II, and his contention, in
substance, is that the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn
Order, 1947, which was promulgated by the Governor of East
Punjab by notification dated 15th November, 1647, and under
the provisions of which the prosecution was launched against
the accused, was ultra vires the authority of the Governor,
in so far as it purported to legislate on matters of export
and import across the customs frontier, and consequently the
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accused could not be held guilty of any offence for having
violated such provisions.
For a proper appreciation of raised by the learned
counsel, it would be necessary to refer to certain
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, as well as
to those of a number of later enactments. Under entries 27
and 29 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, "
trade and commerce within the province " and " produc-
tion...... supply and distribution of goods " were
provincial subjects, while " import and export across the
customs frontier " was a central subject being covered by
item 19 in List I. Section 102 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, gave the Central Legislature the power to
legislate on provincial subjects if and when a proclamation
was issued by the Governor-General that a state of emergency
existed in the country, and such legislation would, under
sub-section (4) ’of the section, cease to have effect on the
expiration of a. period of’ six months after the
proclamation had ceased to operate. It appears that these
extraordinary powers were assumed by the Central Legislature
during the period of the last war when there was a
Proclamation of Emergency by the Governor-General, and the
Defence of India Rules promulgated during this period dealt
with various’ provincial matters. The Proclamation of
Emergency was revoked by the Governor-General under section
102, clause (3), of the Constitution Act on 1st April, 1946,
and the result of the revocation was that all orders passed
on the basis of the Defence of India Act or the Defence of
India Rules ceased to be
42
324
operative after the 30th of September, 1946. The (state of
the country, however, was at that time far from normal and
it was considered necessary that the control of the Central
Legislature over the production, supply and distribution of
goods should not be discontinued. To meet this situation,
the British Parliament passed a temporary Act (9 and 10 Geo.
6 chapter 39) which gave the Indian Legislature, during the
period specified in the Act, the power to make laws with
regard to certain provincial subjects. The provision of
section 2 of the Act, so far as is necessary for our present
purpose, stood as follows:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Government of India
Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature shall, during the period
mentioned in section 4 of this Act, have power to make laws
with respect to the following matters:
(a)trade and commerce (whether or not within a Province)
in and the production, supply and distribution of, cotton
and woollen textiles, paper, petroleum products, spare parts
of mechanically propelled vehicles, coal, iron, steel and
mica; ".
Armed with this authority, the Indian Legislature passed
the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946,
sections 3 and 4 of which are in these
terms:-
" 3. The Central Government so far as it appears to it
necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing
supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their
equitable distribution and availability at fair prices may,
by notified order provide for regulating and prohibiting the
production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and
commerce therein.
4.The Central Government may by notified order direct
that the power to make orders under section 3 shall in
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relation to such matters and subject to such conditions,, if
any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable
also by
326
(a)
(b)such Provincial Government or such officer or authority
subordinate to a Provincial Government as may be specified
in the direction."
By a notification dated 20th of December, 1946, issued
under section 4 mentioned above, the Central Government
delegated to the Governor of Punjab the powers under section
3 of the Act. On the 15th of November, 1947, the Governor
of East Punjab, in exercise of the powers delegated by the
said notification, passed the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and
Yarn (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1947, and sections 2, 3
and 10 of the Order are material for our present purpose.
Section 2 is in these terms:-
"In this Order unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context, (a) " export " means to take out of
the Province of the East Punjab or the said land by rail,
road or river to any Province or State of the Dominions of
India and Pakistan and includes taking out of the Province
of East Punjab to any place, situated in the said lands as
well as out of the said lands to any place situated in the
East Punjab. "
Section 3 runs as follows:-
" No person shall export or attempt to export cotton
cloth or yarn except under the authority and in accordance
with the conditions of a permit, issued by a permit issuing
authority.......... The permit shall be in form IV,
specified in Schedule ’A’ annexed to this Order ".
Section 10 provides:-
"If any person contravenes any provision of this Order,
he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to
3 years, with fine or both and without prejudice to any
other general punishment which may be imposed by any court
trying such contravention may direct that any cotton cloth
and/,or yarn in respect of which the court is satisfied that
this order, has been contravened together with the
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covering and packing of such cloth shall be forfeited to
His Majesty."
The point for our consideration is, whether the -above
provisions which prohibit inter alia the export of certain
essential commodities to any country outside India without a
permit and make the violation of such provisions an offence,
were validly made by the Governor in exercise of the powers
delegated to him under section 4 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act 1946 ?
It is not suggested by the learned counsel that there
was anything improper in the Central Government’s delegating
its powers to the Governor of East Punjab under section 4 of
the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. His
contention is that the Governor, in making the order, acted
in excess of is delegated authority by prohibiting the
export of cotton cloth and yarn to any I place outside
India. Matters of export and import, it is said, were not
within the scope of section 3 of the Essential Supplies and
:the notification tinder section 4 could only delegate to
the Governor such powers as the Central Government could
itself ’exercise under section 3. Section 3 of the Essential
Supplies Act, it is true, authorised the Central Government
to make provisions for regulating-and prohibiting the
production, supply and distribution of the essential
commodities -specified in the Act and also trade and
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commerce therein; but it is argued by the learned counsel
that the expression, " trade and commerce ", as used in the
section, must be taken to mean trade and commerce within a
province or at the most between provinces inter se, but it
cannot include any transaction by way of exporting goods
outside India. This interpretation, somewhat restricted as
it appears to us, is sought to be supported by a two-fold
argument. In the first Place, it, is said, that the
Essential Supplies Act, as its, Preamble shows, was passed
by the Central Legislature in exercise of the authority
conferred upon it by the India (Central Government and
Legislature) Act, 1946, (9 and, 10 Geo. 6, c. 39) and that
statute
327
conferred, only for a short period of time, a, power in the
Central Indian.Legislature to legislate on certain
provincial matters, which it could not do after the
revocation of the Proclamation of -Emergency on the
termination of the war. It is said, therefore, that the
Essential Supplies Act purported to deal exclusively with
provincial matters, and import and export of goods outside
the Indian territory, being a central subject, could not
reasonably be brought within the purview of the Act. The
other line of reasoning that is put forward in support of
the argument is, that the intention of the Central Legis-
lature not to include export and import within the
provisions of the Essential Supplies Act is evidenced by the
fact, that the Central Legislature dealt with export and
import -of goods separately, and by an, altogether different
set of enactments which exist side by side with the
Essential Supplies Act and other legislation of the same
type preceding it. It is pointed out that there was an
order made under the Defence of India Rules on 3rd November,
1945, (being Order No. 91 c. w. (1) 45) imposing
prohibitions on export of various descriptions of goods
specified therein. The Defence of India Rules were due to
expire on the 30th September, 1946. On the 26th September,
1946, the Essential Supplies Ordinance was passed and this
was later replaced by the Essential Supplies Act. On the
very day that this Ordinance ,was passed, another Ordinance,
being Ordinance No. XX of 1946, was promulgated, which inter
alia continued the provisions of the Defence of India Rules
relating to prohibition and restriction of import and export
of goods. Subsequently on the 26th of March, 1947, the Im-
ports and Exports (Control) Act was passed, which dealt
comprehensively with the subject of control over exports and
imports. As it would be unnatural to suppose that the
legislature was legislating on the same subject
simultaneously by two parallel sets of legislation existing
side by side, it is argued that export and import of goods
were not within the scope and intendment of the Essential
Supplies Act.
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These arguments though somewhat plausible at first sight, do
not appear to us to be sound or convincing. It is a
cardinal rule of interpretation that the language used by
the legislature is the true depository of the legislative
intent, and that words and phrases occurring in a statute
are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner
dissociated from the context, but are to be read together
and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the
Act itself.
The object of the Essential Supplies Act, as set out in
the preamble, was to provide for the continuance, during a
limited period of time, of the power to control the
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production, supply and distribution of, and trade and
commerce in, foodstuffs, cotton and woollen textiles,
petroleum, iron and other essential commodities, a list of
which appeared in the Act itself. Section 3, which is the
most material part of the Act,, authorised the Central
Government, whenever it considered expedient or necessary,
for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential
commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and
availability at fair prices, to provide by notified order,
for regulating or prohibiting, the production, supply and
distribution thereof or trade and commerce therein.
Keeping this object in view and reading the words"
trade and commerce " in the light of the context, there
appears to be no reason why these words should not be taken
in their ordinary or natural sense and why restriction on
the export of goods to any place outside a province,
including a neighbouring foreign State should be deemed to
be outside their scope and ambit. For maintenance or
increase of supply of essential commodities within a
province and to secure their equitable distribution and
availability at fair prices, it might certainly be necessary
to restrict export of the goods outside the province, and
Pakistan being a foreign State abutting on the very borders
of East Punjab, it was quite natural for the East Punjab
Governor to mention Pakistan as one of the places to which
export of goods from his province should not be allowed
without a proper permit. As
329
the main object of the legislation was the continuance of
control over the production, supply and distribution of
commodities considered essential to the community and as
these are provincial subjects, the Central Legislature in
legislating on them must have to invoke the powers conferred
upon it by the India (Central Government and Legislature)
Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 39) spoken of above; and that
is plainly the reason why a reference to that statute was
made in the second paragraph, of the preamble. But from
this it cannot be argued that the Central Legislature was
legislating only in exercise of the powers which it derived
from the British Parliament and that it did not exercise the
powers which it itself had under the Government of India
Act. It is not disputed that the Central Legislature was
fully competent to legislate on exports and imports which
are central subjects and in making any provision relating
thereto, it cannot be said that it acted in excess of its
authority.
Even taking the legislation to be purely on the
provincial subjects of production, distribution and supply
of goods, restriction of export as ancillary to production
and supply of essential commodities would, in our opinion,
be quite within the scope and ambit of such legislation and
in pith and substance it would be an enactment dealing
exclusively with these provincial matters.
Looked at from this standpoint, the other argument
advanced by Mr. Achhru Ram would also be found to be without
any substance. The imports and Exports Act or the earlier
Order and Ordinance, referred to by the learned counsel,
were legislation essentially on the subject of exports and
imports. Their object was to regulate or control imports
and exports generally and they dealt with a large variety of
articles far outnumbering those enumerated in the Essential
Supplies Act. The object of the imports and Exports Act was
not to regulate production and distribution of commodities
considered essential to the community
330
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and it was not as a means to secure that object that it
purported to prohibit or restrict exporting of goods. Thus
the scope and purpose of the two sets of legislation were
totally different and there was nothing wrong if they
existed side by the side and were in operation at one and
the same time, We are not told that there was any
overlapping of the provisions of these two statutes; and as
the competency of the legislature to enact both these sets
of provisions is not disputed, we do not think that any
occasional overlapping, even if it is assumed to exist,
would be at all material. In our opinion, therefore, the
contentions raised in regard to the constitutional point
involved in these appeals are unsupportable and could not be
accepted.
As the appeals have come up before us on the strength of
a certificate granted under article. 132(1) of the
Constitution, the appellants are not entitled to challenge
the propriety of the decision appealed against on a ground
other than that on which the certificate was given except
with the leave of this court as provided for by clause (3)
of article 132 of the Constitution. At the close of the
arguments of the parties in regard to the constitutional
point referred, to above., we made it clear to the learned
counsel appearing for both the appellants that we would not
allow any question relating to the merits of the cases to be
raised before us which turned merely on appreciation of
evidence by the courts below. Mr. Umrigar, who appeared for
Attar Singh the appellant in Case No. 12, however stated to
us that he would crave leave to bring to our notice one
important matter which, according to him, resulted in grave
miscarriage of Justice at least so far as his client was
concerned. He pointed out that both the Additional Sessions
judge and the learned Judge of the High Court in deciding
the case against his client relied upon an admission alleged
to have been made by the latter that he was present at the
customs barrier at Wagha on the morning of the day of
occurrence and had gone there to say good-bye to the customs
staff, he
331
being under an order of transfer from Amritsar to Gurdaspur.
It is said by the learned counsel that his client never
admitted his presence at the customs barrier on the morning
of 26th May, 1948, and that he neither did nor had any
occasion to put forward any explanation regarding his
presence there at that time. The whole thing, it is said,
is based upon sheer misapprehension and is not warranted by
anything appearing on the record.
There is no doubt that the Additional Sessions Judge as
well as the High Court did refer in their respective
judgments to the alleged admission of Attar Singh and rely
upon the same to arrive at their decision in the case. The
Additional Sessions Judge said in his judgment:
" The next important man is Attar Singh accused. He
admits his presence at the barrier on that morning, when he
says that he had gone to bid good-bye to the customs staff
on his transfer to Gurdaspur According to the leave obtained
by him he had yet to remain at Amritsar till 28th and in
view of illness of his wife he need not have been in hurry
to go to the barrier for this purpose so soon. I am not
convinced with his explanation."
The High Court in referring to the said admission observed
as follows:
" Attar Singh admitted that he was present at the barrier
on that morning but the explanation he gave was this. His
office is at Amritsar but be had received orders of transfer
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to Gurdaspur. His wife was ill and, therefore, he could not
move immediately. So he applied for a few days leave, and
on the morning of the 26th of May he went to the barrier to
say goodbye to his colleagues in the Customs Department and
while he was there this incident took place without his
knowledge......... Attar Singh’s explanation of his presence
at the spot does not convince me at all."
It appears that in course of the examination of the
accused Attar Singh under section 342 of the Criminal
43
332
Procedure Code before the trial Magistrate a specific
question was put to him as to whether he could explain his
presence on the scene of occurrence on the 26th May, 1948,
although it was alleged that he was on leave. To this
question he replied categorically that he was not present as
alleged. In this state of the records, we asked the learned
Advocate-General, who appeared for the State of East Punjab,
as to when and how was the admission referred to above made
by Attar Singh. The Advocate-General, answered that the
admission might be in the written statement which Attar
Singh said he would file when he was interrogated under
section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In order to
clear up the matter we had the further hearing of the case
adjourned to enable the Advocate-General to produce before
us the written statement, if any, that was filed by Attar
Singh in the trial court. The case was again taken up for
hearing on the 26th of November last and the Advocate-
General frankly stated to us that no written statement by
Attar Singh ’was on the records at all. It is clear,
therefore, that both the courts below in coming to their
decision regarding the guilt of the accused did rely to a
considerable extent on the so-called admission of Attar
Singh which, it must be held, had no existence in fact. The
Advocate-General contends that even if there was an error
committed by the courts below in this respect, we should
nevertheless dismiss the appeal inasmuch as there is
sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the accused
independently of the so-called admission of Attar Singh; and
he invited us to examine the evidence ourselves and come to
our own decision on the point. Without in any way disputing
our right to adopt this course in cases where it may be
considered necessary, we think that in the circumstances of
the present case the proper order to make will be to direct
a rehearing of the appeal by the Session& Court on the
evidence as it actually stands after excluding from
consideration the alleged Admission of Attar Singh. There
can be no doubt
333
that the supposed admission was of a very damaging character
and was highly prejudicial to the accused. It is quite,,
problematic to value its effect upon the minds of the Judges
in the courts below and it is difficult for us to say that
had it been excluded from consideration the courts would
have come to the same decision of guilt or that conversely a
verdict of acquittal would have been a perverse one. In
such cases, the function of this court, which is not an
ordinary court of criminal appeal, is not so much to weigh
and appraise the evidence again to find out the guilt or
innocence of the accused as to see that the accused gets a
fair trial on proper evidence.
It has been argued by Mr. Achhru Ram, and in our opinion
quite rightly, that if the case of Attar Singh is to be
heard afresh, the same order should be made in the case of
Darshan Singh as well. Not only are the two cases closely
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interconnected, but so far as Darshan Singh is concerned the
prosecution sought to establish his complicity. in the
affair primarily by adducing evidence to show that he was in
the company of Attar Singh when both of them approached
Kulraj, the officer-in-charge of the police station, and
requested him to allow the truck to pass through. The
Additional Sessions Judge observed in his judgment that the
only motive of Darshan Singh was to help his colleague,
namely Attar Singh, who was about to leave the district. It
is necessary, therefore, that the case of Darshan Singh
should also be reheard and the whole evidence against him
reconsidered with a view to find out whether he is guilty or
innocent.
The result, therefore, is that both the appeals are
allowed. The judgment of the High Court as well as that of
the Additional Sessions Judge are set aside and the cases
remitted to the Sessions Court in order that they may be
heard afresh on the evidence on record in the light of the
observations made above after excluding from consideration
the supposed admission of Attar Singh., Pending the decision
of
the Session a Court, the accused would remain on bail 7 on
the same terms as before.
Appeals allowed.
Agent for the appellant in Case No. 11: Naunit Lal.
Agent for the appellant in Case No. 12: A. D. Mathur.
Agent for the respondent and the intervener G. H.
Rajadhyaksha.