Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2802-2803 of 2002
PETITIONER:
Gurpal Singh
RESPONDENT:
State of Punjab & Ors
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/05/2005
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
By the impugned judgment a Division Bench of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court held that the appointment of the
appellant as Auction Recorder of the Market Committee,
Patran was invalid and illegal. The said order came to be
passed on the basis of a Writ Petition filed by respondent
No. 4. It is to be noted that the said petition was styled
as a Public Interest Litigation (in short ’PIL’).
A brief reference to the factual aspect would be
necessary.
Appellant was appointed as Auction Recorder on
19.11.1986. Appointment of the appellant was challenged by
one Ashok Kumar, clerk of the Market Committee by filing a
complaint before the competent authority alleging that the
appellant having been convicted under Section 61(1)(a) of
Punjab Excise Act in 1974 for alleged commission of offence
on 21.5.1973 and was therefore ineligible for being
considered for appointment. The complaint was looked into
by the Market Committee and by order dated 22nd May, 1989
it was held that the appointment was not contrary to law.
The Standing Counsel of the Committee categorically opined
that since no moral turpitude of any kind was involved,
there was no ineligibility attached to the appellant and his
appointment was in accordance with law. For the aforesaid
purpose reliance was placed on a decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the case of Narain Singh v. N.S. Chima
(1997 SLWR 448). On 5.9.1989 appellant’s services were
regularized under the Punjab Market Committees (Class III)
Rules, 1989 which came to be operative after appellant was
appointed. Prior to that no specific Rules were there. A
Civil Writ Petition No. 3451 of 1989 was filed by one
Chandra Bhan before Punjab and Haryana High Court
challenging the direct appointment of the appellant. During
pendency of the said Writ Petition Sukhjinder Singh filed a
complaint before the Administrator, Market Committee
questioning appellant’s appointment. Notice was issued by
the Administrator to the appellant, who filed his reply. A
revision in terms of Section 42 of the Punjab and Haryana
Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (in short the
’Markets Act’) was filed before the Special Secretary to the
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Government of Punjab, Department of Agriculture who passed
orders to the effect that Administrator should look into the
matter and take a decision as to whether action against the
appellant was called for. While Writ Petition No. 3451 of
1989 was pending, Civil Writ Petition No. 6180 of 2000 was
filed by the respondent No. 4 challenging appointment of the
appellant and as noted above the petition was stated to be
one in public interest. Counter Affidavit was filed by the
Punjab Mandi Board and the Market Committee taking the stand
that since conviction of the appellant did not involve any
moral turpitude the appointment was in accordance with law.
Appellant also filed counter affidavit before the Market
Committee questioning locus standi of the Writ Petitioner to
challenge his appointment. It was pointed out that no public
interest involved and because of political and personal
rivalry the petition had been filed. The High Court by the
impugned order held that since the appellant had been
convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction under Section
61 of the Punjab Excise Act, his appointment was not
according to rules. Therefore his appointment was set aside
and the Punjab Mandi Board and the Market Committee were
directed to start fresh process of selection for filling up
of the post.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that Writ Petition filed by the writ
petitioner (respondent No. 4) was nothing but a sheer abuse
of process of court. It was by no stretch of imagination
Public Interest Litigation and it was filed because of
personal and political rivalry and ought to have been
dismissed by the High Court. The assertion that appellant
and respondent No.4 were pitted against each other in
several elections has not been denied. Even the Punjab
Government has as back as on 22.6.1981 issued a Circular
that only records of conviction for preceding five years
were to be taken note of.
Learned counsel appearing for the Market Committee
supported the stand of the appellant and submitted that
there was nothing irregular in the appointment of the
appellant and the same was in terms of the rules of
appointment. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, writ
petitioner however, submitted that merely because the writ
petition was filed after fourteen years and because there
was some personal differences that cannot dilute the public
interest element involved in the writ petition. It was
further submitted that notwithstanding the clear direction
of the High Court to start the process of selection afresh
within four months, nothing has been done and this amounts
to contempt of Court.
The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a
public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner
particularly in matters involving service of an employee has
been examined by this court in various cases. The Court has
to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant;
(b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information
given by him; (c) the information being not vague and
indefinite. The information should show gravity and
seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between
two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to
indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the
character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief
and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for
oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such
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case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It
has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of
redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the
sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the
Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing
with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers
impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade
as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of
Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public
or even of their own to protect.
Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and
prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the
social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake
of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the
social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra
vs. Prabhu, (1994 (2) SCC 481), and Andhra Pradesh State
Financial Corporation vs. M/s GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr.,
(AIR 1994 SC 2151). No litigant has a right to unlimited
draught on the Court time and public money in order to get
his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access
to justice should not be misused as a licence to file
misconceived and frivolous petitions. (See Dr. B.K.
Subbarao vs. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996 (7) JT 265). Today
people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this
attractive name of public interest. They must inspire
confidence in Courts and among the public.
As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the
petitions, which though titled as public interest
litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to
note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called
public interest litigations where even a minuscule
percentage can legitimately be called as public interest
litigations. Though the parameters of public interest
litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number
of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and
objectives, High Courts are entertaining such petitions and
wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could
be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though
in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and
Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service
matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-
called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in
the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the
High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of
the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in
the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even
indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them.
In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was
given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was
lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner
opened it, he found copies of the official documents.
Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain
possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the
petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be
desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous
petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so
that the message goes in the right direction that petitions
filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the
Courts.
The aforesaid position was highlighted in Ashok Kumar
Pandey v. State of W.B. (2004 (3) SCC 349).
It is depressing to note that on account of such
trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts,
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innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have
been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine
litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and
developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our
long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the
oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are
infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-
represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our
opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate
grievances relating to civil matters involving properties
worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights
and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death
facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to
life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years,
persons suffering from undue delay in service matters -
government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax
cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized
collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting
their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all
standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond
hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances
redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers,
wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real
public interest except for personal gain or private profit
either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any
other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break
the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public
interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing
vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who
have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing and
thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as
a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of
the court never moves, which piquant situation creates
frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.
Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be
used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary
has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful
veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested
interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to
be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for
delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive
brand name of public interest litigation should not be
allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It
should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or
public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on
personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be
careful to see that a body of persons or member of public,
who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for
personal gain or private motive or political motivation or
other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its
process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked
phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with
vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with
judicial process either by force of habit or from improper
motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich
themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win
notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy
bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the
threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford
Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation"
in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:
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"Public Interest Law is the name that has
recently been given to efforts provide legal
representation to previously unrepresented
groups and interests. Such efforts have
been undertaken in the recognition that
ordinary market place for legal services
fails to provide such services to
significant segments of the population and
to significant interests. Such groups and
interests include the proper
environmentalists, consumers, racial and
ethnic minorities and others." (See : Dr.
B. Singh v. Union of India and Others
(2004(3) SCC 363)
When a particular person is the object and target of a
petition styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see
whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really
intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or
some other mala fide object. Since in service matters public
interest litigation cannot be filed there is no scope for
taking action for contempt, particularly, when the petition
is itself not maintainable. In any event, by order dated
15.4.2002 this Court had stayed operation of the High
Court’s order.
Judged in the above said background the High Court was
not justified in entertaining the Writ Petition. The
judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is therefore
set aside.
The appeals are allowed with no orders as to costs.