NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST vs. SHEELA RAMCHANDRA TIKHE (DEAD) THROUGH LRS

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 31-10-2018

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Full Judgment Text

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO.      10853        of 2018  (arising out of SLP (C) No.18959 /2017) NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST                ...APPELLANT(S)     VERSUS  SHEELA RAMCHANDRA TIKHE              ..RESPONDENT(S)  J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN,J. Leave granted. 2.   This appeal has been filed by Nagpur Improvement Trust, challenging the judgment dated 14.03.2017 of High Court of Judicature Bombay at Nagpur in Second Appeal No.   122   of   2015,   by   which   judgment   the   Second   Appeal filed   by   the   respondent   has   been   allowed   by   setting aside   the   judgment   of   lower   appellate   court   and restoring   the   judgment   of   trial   court   decreeing   the suit. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA Date: 2018.10.31 17:39:06 IST Reason: 3.  Brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for deciding this appeal are:­ 2 The Nagpur Improvement Trust, the appellant has been constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,   1936.     For   the   purposes   of   Drainage   and Sewerage Scheme Part­II, notification under Section 39   of   the   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust   Act,   1936   was issued on 27.11.1953 for acquiring 44.61 acres of land   of   the   respondent.     An   award   was   passed   on 31.12.1962   determining   the   compensation   of Rs.23,500/­   on   the   basis   of   compromise,   which compensation amount was paid to the respondent and possession was taken over by the appellant of the land.  On taking up the possession, the land vested in the appellant, which became the absolute owner. A   statutory   rule   namely,   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1955 was framed in exercise of power under Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 for disposal of land by the Nagpur Improvement Trust. As per Rule 3 of the Statutory Rules, 1955, one of the mode of transfer of trust land was by direct negotiation   with   the   party.     With   regard   to   land admeasuring   44.61   acres   as   noted   above,   a   policy 3 decision was taken by the Board of the Trust dated 03.05.1968   for   disposal   of   land   to   the   owners   on lease   by   charging   the   determined   premium   and   the ground   rent.     The   appellant   accordingly   invited application for re­allotment of the land on lease. The respondent filed an application dated 03.09.1975 for re­allotment of entire 44.61 acres of land. A decision dated 06.10.1975 was taken to re­allot the 44.61   acres   to   the   respondent   on   the   terms   and conditions stipulated in the Board Resolution dated 03.05.1968.     By   letter   dated   16.10.1975,   the appellant   informed   the   respondent   in   reference   to her application dated 03.09.1975 that land acquired by the Trust may be allotted to her on the terms and conditions as mentioned in the letter.   The letter dated   16.10.1975   communicated   that   amount   of consideration for allotment would be 1.5 times of the   amount   received   by   them   from   the   Land Acquisition Officer.   The lessee can use the land only   for   Agriculture   purposes   and   the   amount   of consideration   will   have   to   be   made   in   maximum   10 4 installments.     The   respondent   was   required   to deposit   amount   of   Rs.3,525/­   towards   first installment   and   sign   the   form   of   terms   and conditions   of   the   allotment,   only   after   that   the Trust would be able to take further action in the matter. The respondent in reply to the aforesaid letter wrote back to the appellant on 01.11.1975 requesting to revise the amount of premium payable by her.  The respondent   wrote   further   letters,   lastly   on 02.03.1982, again reiterating her request to reduce the   amount.     It   was   further   requested   that   she should be given the land measuring 44.61 acres  at the   cost   of   acquisition   only.     The   letter   dated 02.03.1982 was replied by the appellant vide letter dated 09.06.1982 allocating land measuring 24 acres out   of   44.61   acres.     The   revised   premium   for allotment of 24 acres was fixed as Rs.19,230/­ and first installment of 10% was requested to be paid immediately   and   to   further   accept   terms   and conditions of allotment. The respondent acknowledged 5 the   allotment   letter   dated   09.06.1982   and communicated   her   acceptance   on   15.06.1982.   The respondent   accepted   the   allotment   on   revised premium.     In   pursuance   of   the   acceptance   of allotment letter dated 09.06.1982 allotting 24 acres of land on terms and conditions mentioned therein, the possession of 24 acres of land was also handed over to the respondent on 11.11.1982. The respondent after taking possession of 24 acres of land again wrote   a   letter   dated   17.06.1983   thanking   the appellant   for   allotment   of   24   acres   of   land   and further requesting to release remaining 20.61 acres of land.  The appellant wrote on 31.12.1986 to the respondent   to   pay   Rs.4514.95   due   from   her.   The respondent   thereafter   sent   various   representations for allotment of remaining 20.61 acres of land.  On 09.02.1989, a lease was executed by the appellant in favour of respondent for 24 acres of land as was allotted by allotment letter dated 09.06.1982.  The respondent   filed   a   suit   –   Regular   Civil   Suit   No. 2515 of 1989 against the Nagpur Improvement Trust, 6 praying for following reliefs:­ (a) Declare that the plaintiff is entitled to re­allotment of 20.61 acres of her land to her   to   the   exclusion   of   anybody   else   as the   acquisition   of   the   plaintiff’s   land for  the  purpose  of  defendant’s   scheme  is not   required   by   the   defendant   for   its scheme.  (b) Issue a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to re­allot 20.61 acres of land out of survey no.9/1, 11 and 9/2 of Mouza Godani,   Umrer   Road,   Nagpur,   to   the plaintiff   and   execute   a   lease   indenture accordingly in favour of the plaintiff. (c) Issue   mandatory   injunction   directing   the defendant   to   make   the   offer   of   her   land admeasuring   20.61   acres   of   suit   land S/Nos.9/1,   11,   9/2   of   Mouza   Gondhani, Umrer Road, Nagpur to the plaintiffs land is not required by the defendant for its scheme   and   the   defendant   a   permanently 7 restrained from making offer of plaintiffs remaining suit land to anybody else in any manner and under any pretext. (d) Declare that the plaintiffs suit land i.e. 20.6 acres of land in Survey Nos. 9/1, 11, 9/2 of Mouza Godhani, Umrer Road, Nagpur, has   been   unnecessarily   acquired   with malafide  intention  and   that  it   was  never required  and   needed  by  the   defendant   for its drainage and Sewerage Disposal Scheme Part­II as firstly notified on 27.11.1983, as per award dated 31.12.1962. (e) Saddle   the   costs   of   the   suit   on   the defendant and (f) Grant any other relief which this Hon’ble Court   deems   fit   in   the   facts   and circumstances of the case.   The trial court framed following issues:­ 1) Does   the   plaintiff   prove   by   abuse   of process   of   law,   malafidely   and   under colorabale   exercise   of   power   that defendant   has   unnecessarily   acquired   her 8 land?  2) Does   she   further   prove   that   she   has   the preferential   right   to   get   reallotment   of remaining 20.61 acres of land? 3) Does   she   further   prove   that   she   had deposited   Rs.4515.95   for   allotment   of remaining 20.61 acres of land? 4) Does  she   further  prove  that  defendant  is avoiding   to   re­allot   her   remaining   20.61 acres of land? 5) Whether   plaintiff   is   entitled   to   get relief as prayed? 6) What order and decree? The trial court held that Issue No. 1 does not survive.     Issue   No.3   was   decided   against   the plaintiff, however, trial court answered the Issue Nos.   2,   4   and   5   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   and decreed the suit holding that plaintiff is entitled for   allotment   of   remaining   20.61   acres   of   land. Plaintiff was directed to deposit remaining premium amount of Rs.16,295/­ along with 10% p.a. interest and the appellant was directed to execute the lease­ deed of land admeasuring 20.61 acres in favour of 9 the respondent.   The   appellant   aggrieved   by   the   judgment   and decree   of   the   trial   court   filed   a   Regular   Civil Appeal No. 632 of 2007.  The District Judge, Nagpur formulated following points for consideration:­ 1) Whether   respondent­plaintiff   is   entitled   to allotment of the suit land? 2) Is the suit barred by time? 3) Is   the   judgment   and   decree   impugned   herein call for interference? 4) What order? The learned District Judge held that plaintiff was not entitled for allotment.  The District Judge further held that suit filed by the plaintiff was virtually   a   suit   for   specific   performance   of   the letter of allotment dated 16.10.1975 and suit having been filed beyond a period of 3 years is barred by time.     The   District   Judge   vide   judgment   dated 26.08.2014 allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit.  Against the judgment of the Appellate Court, second appeal 10 was filed by the respondent before the High Court. The   High   Court   framed   following   two   substantial questions of law in the appeal:­ (1) Whether the lower appellate Court erred in applying   and   relying   on   the   Nagpur Improvement   Trust   Land   Disposal   Rules, 1983, when in fact what was sought to be enforced   by   the   appellant   was   the   order dated   16.10.1975   in   consonance   with letter/order   dated   06.10.1975   passed   in terms   of   Board   Resolution   dated 03.05.1968,   i.e.   decision   taken   by   the respondent   much   prior   to   the   framing   of Rules of 1983? (2) Once   the   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust,   the acquiring   body   chooses   to   re­allot   the land acquired, whether such action of re­ allotment can be enforced in the Court of Law? The High Court held that plaintiff was entitled for   allotment   of   20.61   acres   of   land   in   view   of 11 resolution of the Board dated 03.05.1968.  The High Court   also   held   that   the   Rules   namely   Nagpur Improvement Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1983 having came into force on 18.05.1983 was not applicable to the   Board   Resolution   dated   03.05.1968   and   the decision taken on 06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975.   The High Court further held that trial court having not framed   any   issues   regarding   limitation,   the   first appellate Court committed error in holding that the suit   was   barred   by   limitation,   consequently,   the second appeal has been allowed by the High Court, restoring   the   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial court. The Nagpur Improvement Trust being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has come up in this appeal.            4. We   have   heard   Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned   senior counsel and Shri Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel for   the   appellant.     We   have   also   heard   Shri   Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel, who   has appeared for the respondent.  5. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that 12 suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. The appellant had claimed re­allotment of 44.61 acres of land as per Resolution of the Board dated 03.05.1968. The Board having taken a decision to allot only 24 acres of   land,   which   was   communicated   by   letter   dated 09.06.1982,   the   cause   of   action   with   regard   to   20.61 acres   of   land   arose   on   the   said   very   date   and   suit having been filed in the year 1989 is barred by time. It is further submitted that after enforcement of Rules, 1983, Rule 5 provided for manner of disposal of land and there being no statutory provision for re­allotment of land to the land owner from whom land was acquired, the suit   filed   by   the   plaintiff   for   claiming   re­allotment could not have been decreed.  Earlier Rules, 1955, which permitted allotment by direct negotiations having been rescinded   and   statutory   Rules,   1983   created   a prohibition   for   allotment   of   any   land   of   the   Trust except   as   Rule   5(2),   the   claim   of   the   plaintiff   was liable   to   be   dismissed   and   the   trial   court   committed error in decreeing the suit.   It is further submitted that even the Rules 1955, Rule 3(a), which provided for 13 allotment of land by direct negotiations was struck down by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court vide its judgment   dated   7/20.09.2004   Transport   Nagar   Free   Zone Co­operative   Society   Limited   Vs.   Nagpur   Improvement Trust, 2005(3) Bom.C.R.485.  The plaintiff could not have relied on Rules, 1955 claiming allotment. The High Court committed error in observing that First Appellate Court erred in considering the question of limitation when no issue was framed by the trial court.   It is submitted that   suit   having   been   barred   by   limitation,   the Appellate   Court   was   well   within   its   jurisdiction   to enter   into   the   issue   of   limitation   and   hold   that   the suit was barred by time.   The suit filed in the year 1989   was   clearly   barred   by   time   and   was   rightly dismissed by the First Appellate Court.  The High Court committed   error   in   holding   that   Statutory   Rules,   1983 were not applicable.       6.  Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel refuting the   submission   of   counsel   for   the   appellant   contends that   plaintiff   was   clearly   entitled   for   allotment   of 20.61   acres   of   balance   area   of   land   as   was   already 14 allotted   by   letter   dated   16.10.1975.   The   allotment   of land to the plaintiff was under Rule 5 of Rules, 1955. Hence, Division Bench judgment relied by the appellant in   Transport   Nagar   Free   Zone   Co­operative   Society Limited (supra)   is not applicable. The resolution having been passed by the Board to re­allot area acquired from plaintiff, it was no longer a matter of contract. The letter   dated   09.06.1982   allotting   24   acres   of   land cannot be said to be letter denying allotment of 44.61 acres, hence no cause of action arose to the plaintiff in the year 1982 and first time cause of action arose in the year 1989 when lease­deed was executed. Hence, the suit of the plaintiff was not barred by limitation. The suit of the plaintiff was filed under Section 39 of the Specific   Relief   Act,   1963   by   which   plaintiff   was enforcing her entitlement.  7. Learned counsel for the respondent further contends that present is not a case where this Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of   India   by   interfering   in   the   judgment   of   the   High Court. The total area of land was 44.61 acres which was 15 owned by the plaintiff and was acquired and Trust having taken a decision to return the land to land owner since it was no longer required for the scheme, the plaintiff has every right to receive acquired area of 44.61 acres and no error has been committed by the trial court in decreeing the suit. 8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 9. The principal issue which needs to be decided is as to   whether   trial   court   was   right   in   holding   that plaintiff was entitled for allotment of 20.61 acres of land   for   which   decree   was   granted.   From   the   facts noticed above, there is no dispute between the parties that in pursuance of resolution dated 03.05.1968 of the Board, plaintiff had made an application on 03.09.1975 for allotment of entire 44.61 acres of land and a letter of allotment dated 16.10.1975 for 44.61 acres of land was   issued.   The   allotment   letter   dated   16.10.1975 contains certain conditions. It is useful to extract the communication dated 16.10.1975 which is to the following effect: 16 “With   reference   to   the   above   application letter this is to inform you that under the drainage and sewage disposal scheme allotment of 44.61 acres land in Khasra NO.9­1,9­2 and 11 out of excess land acquired by the Trust may   be   allotted   to   you   on   the   terms   and conditions   as   mentioned   in   lease   deed subjected to using it only for agricultural purpose. 1. The amount of consideration for the  above land would be 1.50 times of the amount   received from Land Acquisition Officer. 2. The allotment from the Trust Layout would be done on  the  basis of lease for which Land   Rent   of   2%   of   the   value   of   consideration will have to be paid. 3. The lessee can use the said land only for agricultural purpose. For irrigating the  land the water of sewage flow would be   provided   by   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust   and/or Nagpur Municipal Corporation as   per the rate fixed up by Nagpur Municipal Corporation whenever possible. 4. The amount of consideration will have to  be made in maximum 10 instalments and on  the   remaining   unpaid   amount   of   the   consideration interest would be charged   at the  rate of 10% p.a. Hence you are required to deposit amount of Rs.3,525/­   towards   first   instalment   of   the consideration in this office at the earliest and sign the form of terms and conditions of the   allotment.   Only   after   that   the   Trust would be able to take further action in the matter which please note.” 17 10. On   receipt   of   letter   dated   16.10.1975   appellant requested   for   reduction   of   proportionate   value   of   the premium   from   the   total   amount   and   further   wrote   on 02.03.1982 to the Trust wherein rate of 1.5 times of the amount of compensation was asked to be reduced. In the letter   dated   02.03.1982   following   request   was   made   by the plaintiff: "Considering   all   the   situation   stated above, how can I give you more amount as cost of field which you acquired I would like to request you to give the same at the cost of acquisition   only.   Further   terms   are acceptable to me, at any time. If you do not consider my above request, I will have to move the Govt. for shelter.” 11. After   receipt   of   the   letter   dated   02.03.1982   the Trust by letter dated 09.06.1982 made allotment of 24 acres   out   of   44.61   acres   of   land   to   the   following effect: "With reference to your application mentioned above this is to inform that the Chairman is pleased   to   consider   your   request   for allotment   of   land   measuring   about   24   acres out of 44.61 acres of land   acquired  under drainage and sewerage disposal scheme on the same   terms   and   conditions   informed   to   you vide No.ES/7821 dated 16.10.1975. The revised premium   for   allotment   of   24   acres   would   be 18 st about Rs.19.230/­ and you will have to pay 1 installment   10%   of   the   premium   immediately and   accept   the   terms   and   conditions   for allotment and sign necessary lease indenture etc.” 12. The possession of 24 acres of land was also handed over to the respondent on 11.11.1982. The plaintiff thus was well aware that her request for allotment of entire 44.61 acres was not acceded to and only 24 acres have been allotted. Subsequent execution of the lease dated 09.02.1989   was   in   continuation   of   the   allotment   dated 09.06.1982.   13. As noted above the allotment of land of the Trust was   subject   to   statutory   Rules,   namely,   Nagpur Improvement Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1955. Rule 3 of the Rules provides as follows: "Rule 3. The transfer of Trust land shall be­ (a) by direct negotiation with the party; or (b) by public auction;  or (c) by inviting tenders; pr (d) by concessional rated.” 14. Rule   5   of   the   1955   Rules   which   has   also   been referred is as follows: 19 "Rule 5. The   Trust   may   lease   out   on concessional rates any Trust land to any (i) Public   institution   or   body   registered   under any   law   for   the   time   being   in   force   or   to (ii) the evictees (which means persons whose lands in some locality have been compulsorily acquired by the Trust and includes tenants in occupation of such lands) which vests or is to vest in the Trust, or to (iii) the poor persons   residing   within   the   limits   of   the Nagpur Corporation who have no house of their own within the limits either individually or as   a   member   of   a   joint   family   and   whose annual   income   from   all   sources   either individually or of the joint family, as the case   may   be   does   not   exceed   Rs.1,800/­   per annum.” 15. The Resolution dated 03.05.1968 was passed by the Board   for   disposal   of   surplus   land   acquired   for   the drainage and sewage disposal scheme, during the period of enforcement of 1955 Rules. The allotment letter dated 16.10.1975 to the plaintiff of 44.61 acres of land was in   furtherance   of   Resolution   dated   03.05.1968.   The plaintiff after receipt of the letter dated 16.10.1975 prayed   for   reduction   of   amount   of   premium   demanded, several letters were written by the plaintiff regarding premium   and   allotment,   last   being   letter   dated 02.03.1982   as   extracted   above,   in   which   the   plaintiff herself   was   not   ready   to   accept   the   terms   as 20 communicated   by   letter   dated   16.10.1975.   The   Trust   on 09.06.1982, thus, has alloted only 24 acres out of 44.61 acres of land. The facts of the case and correspondence as noticed above clearly indicate that at no point of time allotment of 44.61 acres was made in favour of the plaintiff.   The   decision   to   allot   44.61   acres   was communicated   on   16.10.1975   on   terms   and   conditions mentioned   therein.   The   plaintiff   having   expressed certain reservation with the conditions   and asked for relaxation of conditions and the Trust after taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances took a decision to allot only 24 acres of land out of 44.61 acres on 09.06.1982, there was never any firm allotment of   44.61   acres   of   land   to   the   plaintiff   giving   any indefeasible right of allotment of 44.61 acres of land and   the   plaintiff   herself   has   to   be   blamed   for   not getting   allotment   of   entire   44.61   acres   of   land   on account of she having raised request for the reduction of   the   premium   and   she   having   not   communicated   her consent   to   accede   to   the   terms   and   conditions   of allotment as proposed by the Trust. 21 16. After   the   allotment   of   24   acres   of   land   on 09.06.1982, a new set of Rules for disposal of land of Nagpur   Improvement   Trust   was   framed,   namely,   Nagpur Improvement Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1983 which came into   force   w.e.f.   18.05.1983.   Part   III   of   the   Rules dealt with manner of disposal of land. Rule 5(1) & (2) which are relevant for the present case are as follows: “Rule 5. General.­ (1) No piece of Government land vested in or managed by the Trust shall be   transferred   except   with   the   general   or special sanction of the Government given in that behalf.  (2) Except as otherwise provided in sub­rule (1) and in Part VI of these rules, all other lands   vested   in   and   acquired   by   the   Trust shall be disposed of by the Trust by ­ (i) holding public auction; or (ii) inviting tenders by public    advertisement; or (iii)   making   offers   to   or   accepting offers   from   any   Government,   Local Authority, Public Sector Undertaking or a body   corporate   which   is   owned   or controlled by Government; (iv)   inviting   applications   from   persons or bodies of persons who are eligible for allotment   of   plots   under   rule   4,   by public advertisement to be published at 22 least   in   one   leading   local   news   paper each in Marathi, Hindi and English on the basis of predetermined premium or other considerations or both and deciding these applications   by   drawing   lots,   if necessary, as it may determine, from time to   time   in   accordance   with   the   rules hereinafter appearing. (v) Land for public amenities such as for primary   school,   vehicle   stand,   public latrine   or   urinal,   public   library, reading   room,   hospital,   dispensary   or such other purpose may be transferred to the   Corporation   of   the   City   of   Nagpur, either free of premium and ground rent or at nominal premium and ground rent as the Trust may determine in each case.” 17. The present is a case where for the disposal of the land   in   question   Rule   5(2)   became   applicable     from 18.05.1983.   The   earlier   Resolution   of   the   Board   dated 03.05.1968 would no longer have been availed after the enforcement   of   1983   Rules   for   allotment   of   land.   Sub ­rule   (2)   of   Rule   5   which   provides   for   no   exception except as otherwise provided in sub­rule (1) and Part VI of   these   Rules.   Sub­rule   (1)   of   Rule   5   referred   to general or special sanction of the Government which is not applicable in the present case. Part VI dealt with grant of land for religious, educational, charitable and 23 public   purposes   which   also   is   not   applicable   in   the facts of the present case. Hence, after the enforcement of the Rules of land vested and acquired by the Trust was to be disposed of only in the manner as indicated in sub­rule (2) of Rule 5. Admittedly 24 acres out of 44.61 acres of land was already allotted to the plaintiff on 09.06.1982 and Trust has taken a decision not to allot any   further   land   in   view   of   its   subsequent   decision dated 24.04.1983 to keep the remaining 20.61 acres of land for Department of Social Forest Trees for Central Nursery and for Nursery of the Nagpur Improvement Trust was   taken   by   the   Board.   Thus,   there   was   decision   of Trust to set apart land of 20.61 acres for Department of Social Forest Trees for Central Nursery and for Nursery of   the   Trust.   After   enforcement   of   Rules,   1983   which were brought into force on 18.05.1983, 20.61 acres of land could not be allotted to the plaintiff except by following Rule 5 of the Rules, 1983. The First Appellate Court has categorically made note of the Rules, 1983 and held that the plaintiff was not entitled for any further allotment. After referring to Rules, 1983 specifically 24 Rules   5,   4   and   23,   the   First   Appellate   Court   in paragraph 22 laid down following: "22) In the present case, admittedly land adm.24   acres   was   already   allotted   to   the respondent   by   the   appellant   before   coming into   force   of   the   Rules   of   1983   and therefore, the appellant is not even entitled to  claim  500 sq.  meter  of land. Except the aforesaid   provision   there   is   no   other provision in these Rules empowering the Trust to allot land to the respondent without the sanction of State Government.” 18. Rules, 1983 were also relied by the appellant before the   High   Court   in   the   Second   Appeal   filed   by   the plaintiff. The High Court held that Rules, 1983 had no retrospective effect so as to nullify the actions taken in accordance with the earlier Rules, hence, Rules,1983 were   not   relied.   The   High   Court   held   that   lower Appellate Court committed error in relying on Rule 5 of Rules,   1983.   The   High   Court   in   paragraph   18   of   the judgment has held following: "18.  The lower Appellate Court has committed an   error   in   holding   that   the   defendant­NIT could not have disposed of the land in favour of   the   appellant­plaintiff   without   there being any authority of law. The reliance was placed   by   the   lower   Appellate   Court   on   the provision of Rule 5 of the Nagpur Improvement 25 Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1982 to hold that there was no compliance and the allotment was not in conformity with it. In my view, such reliance was misplaced. The reason being that the   said   Rules   wee   brought   in   force   on 18.05.1983 and the decision to re­allot 44.61 acres of land to the appellant­plaintiff was taken on 6.10.1975 and 16.10.1975, i.e. prior to   coming   into   force   of   these   Rules.   The Rules   had   no   retrospective   effect   so   as   to nullify the actions taken in accordance with the earlier Rules prevailing. The substantial question   of   law   at   serial   No.(I)   is, therefore, answered accordingly.” 19. The High Court took the view that since the decision to allot 44.61 acres of land was taken on 06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975 i.e. prior to Rules, 1983, the Rules had no retrospective effect which shall not nullify the actions taken   in   accordance   with   the   earlier   Rules   then prevailing.   There   is   no   question   of   nullifying   the decision   taken   on   06.10.1975   and   16.10.1975   which   was taken   earlier   to   the   subsequent   Rules,   1983.   In pursuance of earlier decision i.e. taken on 06.10.1975 and   16.10.1975   the   entire   allotment   which   took   place prior to Rules, 1983 were completely saved but allotment which could not culminate before enforcement of Rules, 1983, would not have been made after the enforcement of 26 Rules, 1983 except in accordance with Rules, 1983. We have   already   noticed   that   the   plaintiff   was   allotted only   24   acres   of   land   in   pursuance   of   decision   dated 06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975 and request of the plaintiff to allot entire 44.61 acres of land was not acceded to and   only   24   acres   of   land   was   allotted   possession   of which was handed over to the plaintiff on 11.11.1982. There   being   no   allotment   of   rest   20.61   acres   of   land prior to 18.05.1983 on the basis of earlier decision no allotment would have been made after the enforcement of the   Rules     in   disregard   to   the   statutory   Rules.   The statutory Rules enforced w.e.f 18.05.1983 substantially changed   the   manner   of   allotment   and   more   rigorous conditions   were   put   on   the   land   of   the   Trust.   There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that after the land is acquired for public purpose it vests in the acquiring body and the land holder has no right to claim the land acquired. In this context reference has been made to  State of Kerala and others vs. M. Bhaskar Pillai and another, (1997) 5 SCC 432.  In paragraph 4 following has been laid down: 27 “4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   it   stood vested   in   the   State   free   from   all encumbrances.   The   question   emerges:   whether the   Government   can   assign   the   land   to   the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the   land   is   acquired   for   a   public   purpose, after   the   public   purpose   was   achieved,   the rest of the land could be used for any other public   purpose.   In   case   there   is   no   other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead  of disposal  by way of  sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles   of   the   Constitution.   In   the present   case,   what   we   find   is   that   the executive order is not in consonance with the provision   of   the   Act   and   is,   therefore, invalid.   Under   these   circumstances,   the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the   executive   order   as   invalid.   Whatever assignment   is   made,   should   be   for   a   public purpose.   Otherwise,   the   land   of   the Government   should   be   sold   only   through   the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting higher value. ” 20. This   Court   again   in   Sulochana   Chandrakant   Galande vs. Pune Municipal Transport and others, (2010) 8 SCC 467,  held that after vesting of land in State free from all   encumbrances   after   acquisition,   landowner   becomes persona   non   grata   after   vesting   and   has   right   to 28 compensation only and cannot claim right of restoration of   land   on   any   ground,   whatsoever.   In   paragraph   22 following has been laid down: “22.   In   view   of   the   above,   the   law   can   be summarised that once the land is acquired, it vests   in   the   State   free   from   all encumbrances.   It   is   not   the   concern   of   the land owner how his land is used and whether the land  is being used  for the  purpose for which   it   was   acquired   or   for   any   other purpose.   He   becomes   persona   non   grata   once the land vests in the State. He has a right to   get   compensation   only   for   the   same.   The person interested cannot claim the right of restoration   of   land   on   any   ground, whatsoever. ” 21. The   plaintiff's   case   at   the   highest   is   that   her application   for   allotment   of   20.61   acres   of   land   was pending   consideration   when   Rules,   1983   were   enforced. The plaintiff's own case is that refusal to allot 20.61 acres   of   land   took   place   only   on   09.02.1989   when   the Trust executed lease of 24 acres of land only. Thus, at best the application for re­allotment of 20.61 acres of land   was   pending   at   the   time   when   new   Rules   came   in force.   New   Rules,   thus,   were   fully   attracted   for   any further disposal of land by the Trust as per Rule 5 and 29 as per sub­Rule (2) of Rule 5 the land would have been disposed of except as otherwise provided in sub­Rule (1) only   by   holding   public   auction;   inviting   tenders   by public   advertisement;   making   offers   to   or   accepting offers   from   any   Government,   Local   Authority,   Public Sector Undertaking or a body corporate which is owned or controlled   by   Government;   inviting   applications   from persons   or   bodies   of   persons   who   are   eligible   for allotment of plots under Rule 4, by public advertisement and   land   for  public   amenities   such   as   for   primary school, vehicle stand, public latrine or urinal, public library,   reading   room,   hospital,   dispensary   or   such other purpose, etc. Plaintiff's claim is not covered  in any manner of disposal under Rule 5(2), hence no decree would have been passed by the trial court contrary to the statutory Rules as envisaged by Rule 5(2). The view of the High Court that Rules, 1983 are prospective and shall   not   effect   the   allotment   made   in   favour   of   the plaintiff on 06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975 was erroneous. As observed   above   the   allotments   which   were   finalised   in pursuance of Resolution dated 06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975 30 were saved, but allotment of any land which could not take place finally before enforcement of Rules, 1983 has to   be   in   accordance   with   the   Rules,   1983.   In   this context, reference is made to the judgment of this Court in   State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Hind Stone and others, (1981)   2   SCC   205.   In   that   case,   the   applications   by various   persons   desirous   of   taking   mining   lease   were pending when the Rules for grant of lease were amended. The Rules were amended on 02.12.1977 by introducing Rule 8­C, it was contended by several applicants that Rule 8­C   was   not   applicable   to   the   applicants   whose applications   were   pending.   The   relevant   facts   were mentioned   in   paragraph   4   which   are   to   the   following effect: “4.   Several   persons   who   held   leases   for quarrying   black   granite   belonging   to   the State Government and whose leases were about to expire, applied to the Government of Tamil Nadu for renewal of their leases. In some of the cases applications were made long prior to   the   date   of   G.O.   Ms.   No.   1312   by   which Rule   8C   was   introduced.   Some   applications were   made   after   Rule   8C   came   into   force. There   were   also   some   applications   for   the grant   of   fresh   leases   for   quarrying   black granite. All the applications were dealt with after Rule 8C came into force and all of them 31 were rejected in view of Rule 8C Several Writ Petitions   were   filed   in   the   High   Court questioning the vires of Rule 8C on various grounds. Apart from canvassing the vires of Rule 8C,  it was contended that Rule 8C did not apply to grant of renewals of lease at all. It was also argued that in any event, in those   cases   in   which   the   applications   for renewal   had   been   made   prior'   to   the   coming into   force   of   Rule   8C,   their   applications should have been dealt with without reference to Rule 8C. The Madras High Court while not accepting some of the contentions raised on behalf of the applicants, struck down Rule 8C on   the   ground   that   it   exceeded   the   rule making   power   given   to   the   State   Government under Section 15 which, it was said, was only to regulate and not to prohibit the grant of mining   leases.   As   a   consequence   all   the applications were directed to be disposed of without   reference   to   Rule   8C.   It   was   also observed that even  if Rule  8C was valid it applied only to the grant of fresh leases and not to renewals. It was also held that it was not   open   to   the   Government   to   keep   the applications pending for a long time and then to   dispose   them   of   on   the   basis   of   a   rule which   had   come   into   force   later.   The   State Government   has   come   in   appeal   against   the judgment of the Madras High Court while the respondent­applicants   have   tried   to   sustain the   judgment   of   the   Madras   High   Court   on grounds   which   were   decided   against   them   by the Madras High Court. ” 22. Rejecting   the   argument   that   Rule   8­C   is   not attracted on the applications which were pending on date of   amendment,   it   was   held   that   applications   were 32 required to be disposed of on the basis of the Rules in force at the time of the disposal of the applications. Following was laid down in paragraph 13: "13.   Another   submission   of   the   learned Counsel in connection with the consideration of   applications   for   renewal   was   that applications made sixty days or more before the date  of G.O.  Ms. No.  1312 (December 2, 1977) should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not   come   into   force.   It   was   also   contended that   even   applications   for   grant   of   leases made   long   before   the   date   of   G.O.   Ms.   No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. The submission was that it   was   not   open   to   the   Government   to   keep applications   for   the   grant   of   leases   and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of Rule   8C   notwithstanding   the   fact   that   the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8C came into force. While it is true that such applications should be dealt   with   within   a   reasonable   time,   it cannot on that account be said that the right to   have   an   application   disposed   of   in   a reasonable   time   clothes   an   applicant   for   a lease   with   a   right   to   have   the   application disposed   of   on   the   basis   of   the   rules   in force   at   the   time   of   the   making   of   the application. No one has a vested right to the grant   or   renewal   of   a   lease   and   none   can claim a vested right to have an application for   the   grant   or   renewal   of   a   lease   dealt with   in   a   particular   way,   by   applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease   has   necessarily   to   be   dealt   with according to the rules in force on the date 33 of   the   disposal   of   the   application   despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable   to   accept   the   submission   of   the learned   Counsel   that   applications   for   the grant or renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O. Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8­C did not exist. ” 23. We,   thus,   are   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the claim of plaintiff for allotment of additional land of 20.61 acres which can be at best said to be pending  on the date of enforcement of Rules, 1983 would have been only dealt with in accordance with Rule 5 of Rules, 1983 and disregard of said Rules the trial court would not have   decreed   the   suit   directing   the   Trust   to   execute lease   in     favour   of   the   plaintiff   of   20.61   acres   of land. The decree of the trial court was clearly in the teeth   of   the   statutory   Rules   and   the   High   Court committed error in taking the view that Rules, 1983 were not applicable in the present case.  24. It is also relevant to notice that lower Appellate Court has held that suit of the plaintiff was barred by time it having been filed more than three years after the refusal to allot the land. The High Court has held 34 that the Appellate Court has committed error of law in considering the issue of limitation which was not the question raised before the trial court. In paragraph 17 of the judgment following has been held: "17. Though   the   allotment   of   44.61   acres   of land   was   on   16.10.1975,   the   lease­deed   in respect of 24 acres of land was executed on 09.02.1989.   Thus,   there   was   refusal   on 09.02.1989   to   execute   the   lease­deed   in respect   of   20.61   acres   of   land.   Hence,   the cause of action in terms of Article 54 of the Limitation   Act   would   start   running   from 09.02.1989 when the defendant­NIT refused to execute the lease­deed. The suit in question having   filed   on   15.12.1989   was   not, therefore, barred by the law of limitation. In   fact,   this   was   not   the   question   raised before   the   trial   court   and   no   issue   was framed in respect of it. The lower Appellate Court   has   committed   an   error   of   law   in considering such issue and holding that the suit   in   question   was   barred   by   the   law   of limitation.   The   finding   of   the   lower Appellant Court, therefore, needs to be set aside.” 25. In so far as view of the High Court that Appellate Court   committed   error   in   entertaining   the   question   of limitation which was not the issue framed by the trial court, suffice is to refer the   provision of Section 3 of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963.   Section   3(1)   of   the 35 Limitation Act provides as follows: “Section 3. Bar of limitation.­(1) Subject to the   provisions   contained   in   sections   4   to 24(inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred,   and   application   made   after   the prescribed   period   shall   be   dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” 26. This Court in  Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited   vs.   Praveen   D.   Desai(dead)   through   Legal Representatives   and   others,   (2015)   6   SCC   412,   had considered   the   question   of   jurisdiction   of   Court   in reference   to   provisions   of   Limitation   Act.   Noticing Section 3 of the Act following was observed: “48.   Section   3   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963 clearly provides that every suit instituted, appeal   preferred   and   application   made   after the prescribed period of limitation, subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24,   shall   be   dismissed   although   the limitation has not been set up as a defence.  49.   A   Constitution   Bench   of   five   Judges   of this   Court   in   the   case   of   Pandurang   Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC 153,   while   dealing   with   the   question   of jurisdiction,   observed   that   a   plea   of limitation or plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the court which tries the proceeding. The Bench held(AIR p.155, para 10): 36 10. The provisions of Section 115 of the Code   have   been   examined   by   judicial decisions   on   several   occasions.   While exercising its jurisdiction Under Section 115,   it   is   not   competent   to   the   High Court to correct errors of fact however gross they may, or even errors of law, unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. As Clauses (a), (b) and (e) of Section 115 indicate, it is only in cases where the subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by   law,   or   has   failed   to   exercise   a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the   exercise   of   its   jurisdiction illegally   or   with   material   irregularity that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly invoked. It is conceivable that points of law may arise in   proceedings   instituted   before subordinate courts which are related to questions   of   jurisdiction.   It   is   well settled that a plea of limitation or a plea   of   res   judicata   is   a   plea   of   law which   concerns   the   jurisdiction   of   the court   which   tries   the   proceedings.   A finding on these pleas in favour of the party   raising   them   would   oust   the jurisdiction   of   the   court,   and   so,   an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said   to   be   concerned   with   questions   of jurisdiction   which   fall   within   the purview of Section 115 of the Code. But an   erroneous   decision   on   a   question   of law   reached   by   the   subordinate   court which   has   no   relation   to   questions   of jurisdiction   of   that   court,   cannot   be corrected by the High Court Under Section 115. ” 37 27. No   error   was   committed   by   the   Appellate   Court   in entering into the issue as to whether application was barred by time. The Appellate Court was well within its jurisdiction in considering the question of limitation. We, however, for the present case need not express any opinion   with   regard   to   the   question   of   limitation   in view of we having held that plaintiff was not entitled for   the   decree.   Thus,   even   without   entering   into   the question of limitation we are of the clear opinion that plaintiff was not entitled for the decree as has been granted   by   the   trial   court   and   affirmed   by   the   High Court. 28. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of   the   High   Court   is   set   aside   and   the   suit   of   the plaintiff stands dismissed.  ..........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI ) ..........................J.     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 31, 2018.