Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 415
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO._______ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 29972/2015)
HOME CARE RETAIL MARTS PVT. LTD. .…. APPELLANT
VERSUS
HARESH N. SANGHAVI ..…RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO._______ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 26876/2014)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO._______ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 11139/2020)
J U D G M E N T
MANMOHAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW
2. The substantial question of law that arises for consideration in the present
batch of appeals is whether a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) at the post-award
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHETAN ARORA
Date: 2026.04.24
17:06:53 IST
Reason:
stage, by a party that has lost in the arbitral proceedings and has no enforceable
award in its favour, is maintainable in law?
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 1 of 25
CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS OF DIFFERENT HIGH COURTS
3. While Bombay High Court ( Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Maharashtra State
Electricity Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481 ), Delhi High Court
( Nussli Switzerland Ltd. vs. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games,
2010, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834 as well as National Highways Authority of
India vs. Punjab National Bank and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4810 ), Madras
High Court ( A. Chidambaram vs. S. Rajagopal and Ors., OA No. 843 of 2024 )
and Karnataka High Court ( Smt. Padma Mahadev & Ors. vs. M/s. Sierra
nd
Constructions Private Limited, COMAP No. 2 of 2021, dated 22 March 2021 )
have held that a party unsuccessful in arbitral proceedings cannot maintain a
petition under Section 9 of the Act, Telangana High Court [ M/s Saptarishi Hotels
Pvt. Ltd & Anr. vs. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management
(NITHM), 2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765 ], Gujarat High Court [ GAIL (India) Ltd.
vs. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836 ] and Punjab &
Haryana High Court [ M/s DLF Home Developers Ltd. vs. M/s Orris
st
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., FAO-CARB-51-2024 (O&M), dated 21
February, 2025 ] have taken a contrary view and held that a party unsuccessful in
arbitral proceedings can maintain a petition under Section 9 of the Act.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF MR. K.M. NATARAJ, ASG AND
MR. ABHIMANYU BHANDARI, SR. ADV.
4. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General and
Mr. Abhimanyu Bhandari, learned senior counsel, submitted that the Bombay
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 2 of 25
High Court by the impugned order in SLP (C) No. 29972 of 2015 dismissed the
appeals filed under Section 37 of the Act by placing reliance upon its earlier
judgment in Dirk India (supra). They submitted that in Dirk India (supra), the
Bombay High Court held that a party unsuccessful in arbitral proceedings cannot
maintain a petition under Section 9 of the Act. According to them, the Court
reasoned that the purpose of interim measures under Section 9 of the Act, post-
award, is confined to protecting the ‘ fruits of arbitral proceedings ’, since under
Section 34 of the Act, the Court may either set aside or uphold the award but
cannot reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal. Consequently, as an
unsuccessful party is not entitled to any ‘ fruits of arbitral award ’, it cannot seek
interim relief under Section 9 of the Act.
5. They, however, contended that the judgment in Dirk India (supra) does not
lay down good law. According to them, the decision failed to consider that if the
Court ultimately sets aside the award under Section 34 of the Act, the underlying
contract between the parties and their rights thereunder are revived. In such a
situation, the so-called losing party would be entitled to enforce or protect its
contractual rights de novo , necessitating recourse to fresh arbitration. They argued
that the interpretation adopted in Dirk India (supra) leaves such a party entirely
remediless.
6. They further submitted that Section 43(4) of the Act preserves the right of
parties to pursue arbitration by excluding the time spent in earlier proceedings,
thereby ensuring that parties may re-initiate arbitration and reassert their
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 3 of 25
contractual rights. They contended that when the statute itself preserves the right
of an unsuccessful party to re-agitate disputes, such a party must also be entitled
to seek protection of the subject matter of the dispute by invoking Section 9 of
the Act.
7. Learned ASG and learned senior counsel emphasised that the Arbitration
and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 significantly altered the legal regime
by clarifying that arbitral tribunals cease to have jurisdiction to grant interim
measures post-award.
8. They submitted that this Court in Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft
Technologies Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986 has recently held that
modification of an award is permissible in limited circumstances by sustaining it
in relation to severable parts and setting aside the remainder. Therefore, according
to them, the fundamental premise of Dirk India (supra) that the Court can only
uphold or set aside an award stands vitiated.
9. They emphasised that once the Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section
34 of the Act, can modify an award, a party whose claim was rejected in
arbitration cannot be left remediless during the pendency of the petition under
Section 34 of the Act.
10. They also relied upon the judgments of the Gujarat High Court in GAIL
(supra) and the Telangana High Court in M/s Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
(supra), which hold that interim measures are available to all parties who
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 4 of 25
demonstrate a bona fide apprehension of injury or dissipation of the subject
matter pending Section 34 proceedings.
11. They repeatedly stated that Section 9 of the Act uses the expression ‘ party ’
which is defined in Section 2(h) of the Act. They relied upon the decision of this
Court in Firm Ashok Traders and Anr. vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja and Ors.,
(2004) 3 SCC 155 , wherein the term ‘ party ’ was interpreted in the following
terms:
““Party” is defined in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of
the A&C Act to mean “a party to an arbitration agreement”. So, the
right conferred by Section 9 is on a party to an arbitration
agreement. The time or the stage for invoking the jurisdiction of
court under Section 9 can be: (i) before, or (ii) during arbitral
proceedings, or (iii) at any time after the making of the arbitral
award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36.…For
the moment suffice it to say that the right conferred by Section 9
cannot be said to be one arising out of a contract. The qualification
which the person invoking jurisdiction of the court under Section 9
must possess is of being a “party” to an arbitration agreement. A
person not party to an arbitration agreement cannot enter the court
for protection under Section 9. This has relevance only to his locus
standi as an applicant.....”
12. They stated that in provisions such as Section 8 (reference to arbitration),
Section 11(4), (5), and (6) (appointment of arbitrators), Section 12(4) and 13(5)
(challenge procedure), Section 16(6) (jurisdictional objections), and Section 34
(setting aside of awards), the legislature has expressly specified the circumstances
in which a particular party may invoke the provision. In contrast, no such
limitation is prescribed in Section 9 of the Act.
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 5 of 25
13. They highlighted that the scope of interim measures under Section 9 of the
Act is considerably broader than the limited relief of stay contemplated under
Section 36 of the Act. They submitted that while Section 36 is confined to
questions of enforceability and the conditions for stay of enforcement, Section 9
empowers the Court to grant such measures as it may deem just and convenient.
According to them, where the Court grants a stay of enforcement under Section
36 of the Act upon being satisfied that the unsuccessful party has established a
prima facie case on grounds such as fraud or patent illegality, it becomes essential
to preserve that party’s rights through interim protection under Section 9 during
the pendency of proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
14. They further pointed out that in Wind World (India) Ltd. vs. Enercon
GmbH and Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1147 , the interim relief sought by the
unsuccessful party under Section 9 of the Act was merely the continuation of
confidentiality of certain documents during the pendency of its Section 34
application. Nevertheless, the Bombay High Court, relying upon Dirk India
(supra), dismissed the application, despite the fact that the relief sought did not in
any manner prejudice or impede the rights of the successful party in respect of
the subject matter of the dispute.
PER CONTRA, ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF DR. MENAKA GURUSWAMY
15. Per contra , Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, learned senior counsel, contended
that arbitral process is a consensual mechanism of dispute resolution, culminating
in a final and binding arbitral award, which is subject only to the limited grounds
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 6 of 25
of challenge envisaged under Section 34 of the Act. She submitted that although
Section 9 of the Act empowers the Court to grant interim measures at three
distinct stages, yet the said provision cannot be construed so as to dilute or
undermine the finality attaching to an arbitral award.
16. According to her, prior to the conclusion of arbitral proceedings, the parties
stand on an equal footing and may independently seek to establish a prima facie
case for interim relief under Section 9 of the Act. However, once an arbitral award
has been rendered, the claims and counterclaims of the parties stand conclusively
adjudicated. At that stage, it is the successful party alone that is in a position to
demonstrate a prima facie entitlement to interim measures under Section 9 of the
Act. It is, therefore, only such a party that can legitimately invoke Section 9 of
the Act at the post-award stage to seek interim measures of protection, with a
view to securing the fruits of the award. Conversely, a party against whom no
enforceable award exists, and which consequently has ‘ no fruits of award to
preserve ’, cannot maintain a petition under Section 9 of the Act for interim relief.
In support of her submissions, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the
Bombay High Court in Dirk India (supra) , wherein the Court has held as under:
“14. ….Section 9(ii) is intended to protect through the measure, the
fruits of a successful conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. A party
whose claim has been rejected in the course of the arbitral proceedings
cannot obviously have an arbitral award enforced in accordance with
Section 36….”
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 7 of 25
17. Therefore, according to her, Section 9 operates distinctly at different stages
of the arbitral process. At the post-award stage, its function is confined to securing
the fruits of the award and facilitating its enforcement.
18. She further submitted that this Court, in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.
and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors., (2020) 17 SCC 324 , has affirmed the
decision of the Bombay High Court in Dirk India (supra), wherein this Court
observed as under:
“36. Interpreting Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dirk (India) (P)
Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd. [Dirk (India)
(P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC
OnLine Bom 481 : (2013) 7 Bom CR 493] held that: (SCC OnLine
Bom para 13)
“13. … The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus
between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings.
When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during
arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition
of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award
is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is
intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual
enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is
a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that
enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the
award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the
subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement.”
37. This being the legislative intent, the observation in Nalco [National
Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel & Fabrications (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC
540] that once a Section 34 application is filed, “there is no discretion
left with the Court to pass any interlocutory order in regard to the said
award…” flies in the face of the opening words of Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996, extracted above.”
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 8 of 25
19. She also relied upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in A.
Chidambaram (supra) , wherein it has been held that interim relief under Section
9 of the Act cannot be sought by an unsuccessful party, which would include a
claimant whose claims in arbitral proceedings have been dismissed simpliciter.
20. She submitted that once an award has been rendered, the only remedy
available to the losing party is to challenge the award under Section 34 of the Act
and, if necessary, to seek a stay of its operation under Section 36(2), by
demonstrating a prima facie case that the award is vulnerable on the grounds
specified in Section 34 and the proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act.
21. According to her, the nature of prima facie satisfaction required under
Sections 34 and 36 of the Act is fundamentally distinct from that contemplated
under Section 9 of the Act. She submitted that Section 36(3) of the Act empowers
the Court to stay the operation of an arbitral award subject to such conditions as
the Court may deem fit, thereby enabling a balancing of equities appropriate to
the post-award stage. In contrast, she argued that Section 9 of the Act contains no
comparable safeguards to regulate interim relief at the post-award stage or to
prevent its misuse by an unsuccessful party. She pointed out that a counter-
claimant who does not have an enforceable award in its favour may nevertheless
secure the disputed amount by satisfying the Court under Section 36 to impose
conditions that balance equities and protect its interest. Thus, permitting a
counter-claimant, whose claims have been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, to
circumvent the statutory scheme by obtaining security under Section 9 of the Act
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 9 of 25
would undermine the discipline of the Act and effectively confer a relief greater
than that contemplated under Section 34, which is limited to setting aside the
award.
22. She highlighted that the Act is designed to ensure speedy resolution of
disputes with minimal judicial intervention. This legislative intent is reflected in
Section 5 of the Act, which expressly bars judicial intervention, except where
provided under the statute. She submitted that allowing Section 9 relief to an
unsuccessful party at the post-award stage would tantamount to opening a
pandora’s box, particularly since orders under Section 9 are appealable under
1
Section 37 of the Act, unlike orders passed under Section 36 . Such an
interpretation, she emphasised, would invite multiplicity of proceedings and
erode the finality envisaged by the Act.
23. She further submitted that Section 9 of the Act must not be construed
merely on the basis of its literal wording, but in the context of the statute as a
whole and the scheme within which it operates. In this regard, she relied upon the
judgment of the Delhi High Court in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. (supra), wherein,
relying on State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 , the Court
interpreted the expression “party” under Section 9 in the following terms:
"18. A plain textual reading of the above indicates that at any stage of the
proceedings, before, during or after the making of the arbitral award (but
before it is executed) a party to an arbitration agreement may approach the
Court seeking interim measures. The word ‘ but ’ can either be a conjunction
or a proposition or a noun or an adverb. In the textual setting in which the
word ‘ but ’ finds itself in the section, it is obviously not used as a noun or an
1
Kakade Construction Co Ltd v. Vistra ITCL (India) Ldi, 2019 SC OnLine Bom 1521 Para 32
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 10 of 25
adverb. Whether the word ‘ but ’ is read as a conjunction or proposition
would make no difference because if read as a conjunction, the section would
read : ‘A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time
after the making of the arbitral award and not before it is enforced’ and if
read as a proposition, the section would read : A party may, before or during
arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral
award except before it is enforced’.
xxx xxx xxx
25. ……..a Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing
its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire
statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the
setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs."
24. She pointed out that one of us (Manmohan, J) as a Judge of the Delhi High
Court in National Highways Authority of India (supra) has relied upon the
Judgment of Dirk India and Nussli Switzerland Ltd. (supra) to dismiss an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act.
25. She additionally placed reliance upon the judgment of the Madras High
Court in A. Chidambaram (supra), wherein, while interpreting the expression
“party” under Section 9 of the Act, the Court observed as under:
"25. [..] Section 9 opens with 'a party may'. However, the reference to 'a
party' shall have to be applied in the context of the three scenarios under
which the application under Section 9 can be maintained seeking interim
measures from this Court…."
26. Thus, according to her, Section 9 of the Act contains the term ‘ a party’
instead of a ‘successful party’ because it envisions interim relief for all three
stages of arbitration and not just for the post-award stage where a party may be
segregated into a successful or an unsuccessful party. However, this cannot be
construed to mean that an unsuccessful party, having no enforceable award in its
favour, may seek interim relief under Section 9 of the Act at the post-award stage.
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 11 of 25
27. She lastly submitted that an unsuccessful party may seek interim protection
only within the narrowly circumscribed framework of Section 36, which is
consistent with the sanctity of arbitral proceedings and the principle of minimal
judicial interference. To permit such a party to bypass this statutory discipline by
invoking Section 9 would defeat the safeguards expressly incorporated under
Section 36(3), render them nugatory, and result in an incoherent interpretation of
the statutory scheme.
REASONING
MEANING OF THE TERM ‘A PARTY’ CANNOT BE CONTEXTUALLY
MODULATED OR VARIED DEPNDING UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
28. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in
their natural, ordinary, and grammatical sense, giving effect to the legislative
2
intent without resort to any interpretative embellishment . In R. v. Oakes, [1959]
2 Q.B. 350, Lord Parker C.J. said, “ Where the literal reading of a statute…
produces an intelligible result… there is no ground for reading in words or
changing words according to what may be the supposed intention of Parliament. ”
2
In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 , the Supreme Court held, “ Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the Court has to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used therein; it is not for
the Court to add or subtract words. ” Further, in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002)
4 SCC 297 , the Supreme Court held, “ The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language
used. When the language is plain and unambiguous, it is not open to add words to a statute on the basis of
presumed intention. ”
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 12 of 25
29. Section 9 of the Act commences with the expression ‘ a party’ , which, by
virtue of Section 2(h) of the Act, is defined as ‘ a party to an arbitration
agreement’ . Neither Section 2(h) nor Section 9 of the Act draws any distinction
between a successful and an unsuccessful party in arbitration proceedings.
30. The object of incorporating definitions within a statute is to assign a precise
and particular meaning to terms in the context of that enactment. It is only in
situations where a term remains undefined in the statute that the Court assumes
the duty of ascertaining and delineating its meaning through principles of
interpretation.
31. Moreover, to assign a different meaning to the same expression, namely ‘ a
party ’, in the context of interim measures sought after the arbitral award has been
rendered but prior to its enforcement, would result in an anomalous situation.
Such an approach would imply that before the award is delivered, the term ‘ a
party ’ encompasses all parties to the arbitration agreement, whereas after the
award, the same expression would acquire a narrower connotation, referring only
to the successful party in the arbitration. This Court is of the view that the
statutory framework does not prescribe any qualification that would confine the
availability of post-award relief under Section 9 solely to award-holders.
32. Further, this Court is of the opinion that acceptance of the views expressed
in Dirk India , Nussli Switzerland Ltd. , Padma Mahadev and A. Chidambaram
(supra) would deprive the unsuccessful party of a right expressly conferred by the
Act.
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 13 of 25
33. Consequently, this Court holds that the meaning of the expression ‘ a party ’
cannot be contextually modulated or varied depending upon the outcome of the
arbitral proceedings. Such modulation would amount to judicial amendment of
3
the statute, which lies beyond the province of the Court .
OBJECT OF SECTION 9 IS TO ENSURE THAT PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT
TO APPROACH THE COURT FOR INTERIM MEASURES TILL THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS HAS REACHED ITS CULMINATION .
34. Additionally, Section 9 of the Act expressly permits any party to an
arbitration agreement to approach the Court for interim measures at three distinct
stages: (i) prior to the commencement of arbitration, (ii) during the pendency of
arbitral proceedings, and (iii) after the award has been rendered but before it is
enforced in accordance with Section 36 of the Act.
35. On its plain language, the provision does not distinguish between a
successful or unsuccessful party. It does not expressly bar a party whose claims
have been rejected by the arbitral tribunal from seeking interim reliefs after the
award is rendered. A literal interpretation of Section 9 of the Act would indicate
that the right to seek interim relief is available to any party to the arbitration
before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the award is delivered
but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36 of the Act.
3
According to Craies on Statute Law (Seventh Edition by S.G.G. Edgar), “ Even though a Court is satisfied that
the legislature did not contemplate the consequences of an enactment, a court is bound to give effect to its clear
language”. Thus Lord Herschell in Cox v. Hakes , (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506, 528 said: "It is not easy to exaggerate
the magnitude of this change…. nevertheless, it must be admitted that, if the language of the legislature, interpreted
according to the recognised canons of construction, involves this result, your lordships must frankly yield to it,
even if you should be satisfied that it was not in the contemplation of the legislature."
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 14 of 25
36. Indeed, while construing Section 9 of the Act in Sundaram Finance Ltd.
vs. NEPC India Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 479 , this Court categorically, inter alia, held
as under:
“ 13.…Reading the section as a whole it appears to us that the court has
jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 9 either before
arbitral proceedings or during arbitral proceedings or after the making
of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with
Section 36 of the Act. ”
37. It is pertinent to note that the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act is
modelled upon the framework of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law. However, the Indian
enactment departs from the Model Law in certain respects. By way of illustration,
Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides as follows:—
“ Article 9. Arbitration agreement and interim measures by court
It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to
request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim
measure of protection and for a court to grant such measure.”
38. The corresponding provision in the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, which is pari materia to Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, reads as
follows:—
“9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.—[(1)]A party may, before or
during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the
arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36,
apply to a court—….
(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the
Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same
power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation
to, any proceedings before it….”
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 15 of 25
39. From the foregoing, it is evident that the Indian Parliament has consciously
conferred an additional right upon parties to seek interim measures after the
arbitral award has been rendered but prior to its enforcement. This departure from
Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model law, by introducing a post-award stage during
which interim relief may be sought, demonstrates that the legislature deliberately
expanded the scope of Section 9 of the Act. Significantly, while doing so, it did
not impose any restriction on the category of parties entitled to seek such relief.
40. The interpretation adopted in Dirk India (supra) appears inconsistent with
the statutory scheme. By restricting the availability of post-award interim relief
to a successful party, the judgment introduces a limitation unsupported by the
language of Section 9 of the Act. If the legislature, while consciously deviating
from the UNCITRAL Model Law, intended to impose such a restriction, it would
have done so expressly.
41. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the object and
purpose of Section 9 of the Act is to ensure that parties retain the right to approach
the Court for interim measures until the judicial process has reached its
culmination.
SECTIONS 34 AS WELL AS 36(2) AND SECTION 9 OPERATE IN DISTINCT
SPHERES
42. The mere availability of recourse under Section 34 of the Act or of a stay
under Section 36(2) of the Act cannot operate as a bar to seeking protection under
Section 9.
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 16 of 25
43. Sections 34 as well as 36 provide remedies against an award or a stay
thereof, whereas Section 9 ensures protection of the subject matter or the amount
in dispute. An unsuccessful party cannot secure protection of its claim under
Section 34 or Section 36. To deny interim relief under Section 9 would leave such
a party remediless. In fact, if the Court declines to entertain an application of a
losing party for interim relief, there would be no forum available for protection
of the subject matter, even where the award under challenge is stayed and
potentially liable to be set aside. Moreover, the ultimate outcome may alter the
rights of parties and, therefore, distinction between a ‘ winning’ and a ‘ losing ’
party cannot govern access to the remedy under Section 9 of the Act.
FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE JUDGMENTS IN DIRK
INDIA, NUSSLI SWITZERLAND LIMITED, PADMA MAHADEV AND A.
CHIDAMBARAM (SUPRA) ARE UNTENABLE IN LAW
44. The fundamental premise on which Dirk India , Nussli Switzerland Ltd. ,
Padma Mahadev and A. Chidambaram (supra) held that an unsuccessful party,
post award, is disentitled to seek interim relief is that under Section 34 of the Act,
the Court may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or set it aside,
therefore the interim measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of
the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award.
45. This assumption is untenable in law, for it now stands conclusively settled
by the Constitution Bench Judgment in Gayatri Balasamy (supra) that Courts
exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act possess the power to
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 17 of 25
modify an arbitral award where the award is severable, by excising the invalid
portion from the valid portion, and/or by correcting clerical, computational, or
typographical errors, and/or by modifying post-award interest in appropriate
circumstances. It has also been held that this Court, in exercise of its powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution, has the authority to amend the award.
46. Besides, Courts may quash an award, thereby leaving the parties free to
recommence arbitration de novo , should they so choose. It is also pertinent to note
that Section 43(4) of the Act stipulates that the period between the
commencement of arbitration and the date of the Court’s order shall be excluded
in computing the limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 for the
initiation of proceedings, including arbitration, in respect of the dispute
submitted.
47. Additionally, the expressions ‘ subject matter of arbitration’ and ‘ amount
in dispute’ used in Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act are broader in scope, width and
amplitude than the phrase ‘ fruits of arbitration ’. Where the Legislature has
expressly provided that measures under Section 9 of the Act may secure the
subject matter of arbitration or the amount in dispute, the Court in Dirk India ,
Nussli Switzerland Ltd., Padma Mahadev and A. Chidambaram (supra) could
not have restricted its ambit to securing an enforceable claim of the successful
party. Such a restrictive interpretation is impermissible when the language of the
provision is plain and categorical.
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 18 of 25
48. It is noteworthy that under Section 18 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the
grant of interim measures was expressly confined to the successful party and
directed solely towards ensuring enforcement of the award. In contrast, under the
Act, the Legislature, in its wisdom, has imposed no such restriction or
qualification upon the Court under Section 9 of the Act. Consequently, the
legislative intent is manifest.
EVEN IF PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IS APPLIED, THE EXPRESSION ‘A
PARTY’ MEANS ANY PARTY TO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
49. Even applying the test of purposive interpretation, ‘ a party ’ must mean any
party to the arbitration agreement. This Court can envisage situations where a
party that has lost in arbitration may nonetheless require interim protection. For
instance, where an arbitral award has been rendered without proper notice to a
party, or where a party is able to prima facie demonstrate that the award has been
induced or tainted by fraud or corruption. In such situations, the Court may not
only stay the award but also grant interim measures under Section 9 of the Act to
balance the equities. Similarly, in certain cases, an unsuccessful party may have
obtained interim protection during the arbitral proceedings, such as an order
restraining invocation of a bank guarantee. Upon the rendering of the arbitral
award, such interim protection ordinarily stands vacated. However, the
unsuccessful party may challenge the award under Section 34 of the Act and
obtain a stay on the enforcement of the arbitral award under Section 36(3) of the
Act. In such circumstances, immediate removal of interim protection, for
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 19 of 25
example, in relation to a bank guarantee, may result in irreversible prejudice to
the unsuccessful party whose challenge to the arbitral award is pending
adjudication.
50. Further, the Courts are not disabled from granting ‘ non-prejudicial ’ interim
relief in favour of an unsuccessful party in arbitral proceedings, particularly
where such relief does not affect the enforceability of the award but merely
preserves ancillary rights pending adjudication under Section 34 of the Act as was
sought in the case of Wind World (India) Ltd. (supra).
51. Another interesting conundrum may be where a party is partially
successful, inasmuch as, part of its claims are allowed but as a consequence of a
higher amount of counter-claim being allowed, it is branded as an unsuccessful
party in accordance with Dirk India (supra) and is not in a position to prevent the
other party from selling its assets after the award has been rendered. It is possible
that in Section 34 proceedings, the arbitral award may be modified to the extent
that the counter-claim is set aside and severed from the award. However, without
interim relief, assets may dissipate rendering final success illusory.
52. Consequently, in rare and compelling cases, it may be necessary to permit
the unsuccessful party to invoke Section 9 of the Act to seek continuation of the
existing interim protection. This assumes greater significance, as noted earlier, in
light of the decision in Gayatri Balasamy (supra) which recognises the Court’s
power under Section 34 of the Act to modify an arbitral award, including the
power to sever ‘ the “invalid” portion from the “valid” portion of the award ’ .
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 20 of 25
JUDGMENT IN HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTIONS COMPANY LTD. AND
ANR. (SUPRA) IS NOT BINDING PRECEDENT ON PRESENT ISSUE
53. This Court in Hindustan Constructions Company Ltd. and Anr. (supra),
while rejecting the argument that an award when challenged under Section 34 of
the Act becomes unexecutable merely by virtue of such challenge being made,
has quoted the judgment by the Bombay High Court in Dirk India (supra).
Accordingly, this Court in Hindustan Constructions Company Ltd. and Anr.
(supra) did not consider whether an unsuccessful party may seek Section 9 relief
post-award. It is settled law that observations of Courts must be read in the
4
context in which they appear and not as provisions of a Statute.
54. Consequently, a decision which does not proceed on consideration of an
issue cannot be deemed to be law declared to have a binding effect as
5
contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution .
COURTS INTERPRET THE LAW, BUT THEY DO NOT ALTER IT
55. It is equally well settled that Courts interpret the law, they do not alter or
6
amend it . Upon a careful reading of the judgments in Dirk India , Nussli
Switzerland Ltd., Padma Mahadev and A. Chidambaram (supra), this Court is
constrained to observe that the High Courts in the said judgments have adopted a
4
Escorts Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-II, (2004) 8 SCC 335
5
MCD Vs. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101 & State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139
6
Lord Brougham, in Gwynne v. Burnell , “ (1840) 7 Cl. & F. 572, 696 said “ If we depart from the plain and
obvious meaning on account of such views….we do not in truth construe the Act, but alter it. We add words to it,
or vary the words in which its provisions are couched. We supply a defect which the legislature could easily have
supplied, and are making the law, not interpreting it…The prolixity of modern statutes, so very remarkable of late,
affords no grounds to justify such a sort of interpretation. ”
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 21 of 25
strained interpretation of a provision that is clear, categorical, and couched in
simple and direct terms. This is evident from the reasoning in Nussli Switzerland
Ltd. (supra), wherein it has been held, “ that law is not a logical code…the words
of a statute must not be varied has to be harmoniously applied with the second
rule that the intention of the legislature has also to be given effect to…words must
be interpretated in a manner and given meaning to render the provision workable
in a fair manner. ”
56. The principle of contextual or purposive interpretation cannot be invoked
where the statutory language is unambiguous and admits of only one meaning. It
is trite law that where the expressions employed in a statute are clear, categorical,
and leave no room for doubt, the Court must refrain from resorting to contextual
7
or purposive construction . If Courts were to resort to contextual or purposive
interpretation so as to arrive at a meaning contrary to the plain language of the
statute, it would not only do violence to the statute but at a jurisprudential level
would constitute a breach of the doctrine of separation of powers. As Craies on
Statute Law (Seventh Edition) cautions, “ It is not, however, competent to a judge
to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it into
accordance with his own views as to what is right or reasonable. Boni judicis est
dicere, non jus dare. “No doubt”, said Willes J., In Abel v. Lee (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 365,
7
In Jugal Kishore Saraf Vs. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd (1955) 1 SCC 248 , this Court has held “The cardinal rule of
construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their
ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are
susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible,
the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.”
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 22 of 25
371 “the general rule is that the language of an Act is to be read according to its
ordinary grammatical construction unless so reading it would entail some
absurdity, repugnancy, or injustice…But I utterly repudiate the notion that it is
competent to a judge to modify the language of an Act in order to bring it in
accordance with his views of what is right or reasonable. ” Even this Court in
DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust vs. State of
Haryana and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 622 has similarly held, “ Basic rule of
interpretation of statute is that the Court shall not go beyond the statute unless it
is absolutely necessary so to do ”.
57. The test of whether the plain meaning of words leads to repugnancy,
injustice, or absurdity is of a very high threshold and may be applied only in the
rarest of rare cases, and that too for compelling reasons.
58. Consequently, rule of purposive construction is resorted to only when the
provision read literally leads to manifest injustice or absurdity – a threshold not
met in the present case.
THRESHOLD FOR INTERIM RELIEF HIGHER FOR UNSUCCESSFUL
PARTIES
59. Needless to say, the grant of interim relief under Section 9 of the Act will
continue to be guided by well-established principles, namely, the existence of a
prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable harm or
injury. This Court, in Essar House Private Limited v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon
Steel India Limited, (2022) 20 SCC 178 , has held as under :
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 23 of 25
“ 47. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act confers wide power on the Court
to pass orders securing the amount in dispute in arbitration, whether
before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, during the
arbitral proceedings or at any time after making of the arbitral award,
but before its enforcement in accordance with Section 36 of the
Arbitration Act. All that the Court is required to see is, whether the
applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie case, whether the
balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief as prayed for being
granted and whether the applicant has approached the court with
reasonable expedition. ”
60. Undoubtedly, the threshold for grant of interim relief will be higher in the
case of an unsuccessful party in arbitration seeking such relief. In rare and
compelling cases, permitting the unsuccessful party to invoke Section 9 of the
Act would prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the efficacy of the challenge
proceedings. However, the rights of such a party cannot be curtailed merely on
the apprehension of possible misuse of a statutory provision.
CONCLUSION
61. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court holds that t he judgments of the
Bombay, Delhi, Madras, and Karnataka High Courts insofar as they deny an
opportunity to unsuccessful parties in arbitration to apply for relief under Section
9, do not lay down good law. The contrary views expressed by the Telangana,
Gujarat, and Punjab & Haryana High Courts correctly reflect the statutory
position.
62. Consequently, this Court holds that any party to an arbitration agreement,
including an unsuccessful party in arbitration, may invoke Section 9 of the Act at
the post-award stage. However, the Courts would be well advised to exercise care,
SLP(C) Nos. 29972/2015, 11139/2020 & 26876/2014 Page 24 of 25
caution and circumspection while dealing with a Section 9 application filed by an
unsuccessful party in arbitration.
63. Accordingly, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.11139/2020 is
disposed of.
64. List the Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.29972/2015 and SLP (C)
No. 26876/2014 for hearing on merits after four weeks.
……………………J.
[MANOJ MISRA]
…………………J.
[MANMOHAN]
New Delhi;
April 24, 2026
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