Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 238
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<br>CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | ||
| CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | |||
| CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 202 |
RAGHUNATHA AND ANOTHER …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
th
2. This appeal challenges the judgement dated 14 July,
2021, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No. 1389 of 2019,
thereby partly allowing the appeal filed by the appellants,
namely, Raghunatha (Accused No. 1) and Manjunatha (Accused
No. 2) and modifying the order of conviction and sentence
awarded to them by the Court of III Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Kolar (sitting at K.G.F.) (hereinafter referred to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by th
Narendra Prasad as “trial court”) in S.C. No. 276 of 2014 on 17 June, 2019.
Date: 2024.03.21
12:54:27 IST
Reason:
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3. Shorn of details, brief facts leading to present appeal
are as under:
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3.1. On 7 July 2014, upon complaint being lodged by Sri
R. Lokanathan (PW-1), Kaamasamudram police registered
Crime No. 44/2014 for offence punishable under section 302
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’)
against unknown persons.
3.2. The prosecution case, in a nutshell, is that complainant
and his father-Ramu (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’)
were running a fertilizer shop and were also involved in
agriculture and money lending business. There were
misunderstandings in the business run by complainant and
accused No.1 on account of which the accused No. 1 bore
enmity with the complainant due to loss suffered in the
business. Following which, the appellants hatched a
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conspiracy to murder the deceased. On 7 July 2014,
deceased left the house at about 6:45 am on a ‘TVS Moped’ to
go to Tholampalli for recovery of loan amount from Ahmed
(PW-12). The appellants were waiting on Bisanathamm-
Tholampalli road and attempted to assault the deceased with
a chopper from backside. When the deceased tried to escape,
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he fell down, after which accused No.1 caught hold of the
deceased while accused No.2 assaulted him on the head with
the chopper and murdered him.
3.3.
At about 8 am, complainant’s uncle-Babu (PW-6) came
and informed the complainant that a TVS Moped was found
lying between Bisanathamm-Tholampalli road and took the
complainant to the said spot. Complainant identified the
Moped and found the deceased lying in prone position in the
mud with bleeding injuries on his head. Deceased was not
conscious; however, he was alive and his hands were
shaking. Thereafter, the complainant and Babu (PW-6) took
the deceased to KGF Hospital, where the doctor declared him
dead.
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3.4. The appellants came to be arrested on 23 July, 2014.
On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed
against the appellants for offences punishable under
Sections 120-B and 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. Since
the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Judge, the
same was committed to the Sessions Judge vide order dated
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10 December, 2014.
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3.5. On 6 May 2015, charges were framed against the
appellants for offences punishable under Sections 120-B and
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302 of IPC. Thereafter, on 11 June 2019, altered charges
were framed under Sections 120-B and 302 read with 34 of
IPC.
3.6. The appellants denied the charges and claimed to be
tried. Prosecution examined 23 witnesses and 20 exhibits to
bring home the guilt of the appellants.
3.7. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial court found
that the prosecution had succeeded in proving that the
appellants had committed the murder of the deceased.
Therefore, the learned trial court convicted the appellants for
offences punishable under Sections 120-B and 302 read with
34 of the IPC and were awarded a sentence of life
imprisonment. Further, a fine of Rs. 7,500/- for each offence
was imposed on both the appellants and out of the said fine
amount, Rs. 25,000/- was to be paid as compensation to the
complainant.
3.8. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 1389 of 2019 before the High Court. The
High Court, vide impugned judgment, partly allowed the
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appeal and modified the conviction to Section 304 Part-I of
IPC and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for 10
years. Further, the High Court imposed a fine of Rs. 75,000/-
on each of the appellants and directed a sum of Rs.
1,40,000/- of the fine amount to be paid to PW-7-Sarla, wife
of deceased.
3.9. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
4. We have heard Shri Shekhar G. Devasa, learned
counsel appearing for the appellants, Shri Aman Panwar,
learned Additional Advocate General (AAG) appearing for the
respondent-State.
5. Shri Devasa, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants submits that the trial court and the High Court
have grossly erred in convicting the appellants. He submits
that the present case is a case based on circumstantial
evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to
prove any of the incriminating circumstances. Further, the
prosecution has not been in a position to prove the chain of
circumstances which leads to no other conclusion than the
guilt of the accused. He therefore submits that the appeal
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deserves to be allowed and the appellants are to be acquitted
of the charges charged with.
6. Shri Panwar, learned AAG appearing for the
respondent-State submits that both the courts have
concurrently held that the prosecution has proved the chain
of circumstances which leads to no other conclusion than the
guilt of the accused. He therefore submits that no
interference is warranted in the present appeal.
| 7. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on | ||
|---|---|---|
| circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on | ||
| the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been | ||
| crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case of | ||
| Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1, | ||
| wherein this Court held thus: | ||
| “152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by | ||
| the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions | ||
| on the nature, character and essential proof | ||
| required in a criminal case which rests on | ||
| circumstantial evidence alone. The most | ||
| fundamental and basic decision of this Court is | ||
| Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 | ||
| SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 | ||
| Cri LJ 129]. This case has been uniformly followed | ||
| and applied by this Court in a large number of later | ||
| decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of | ||
| Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969) |
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(1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
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3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.
State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972
SC 656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan,
J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC
71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri
LJ 129] :
“It is well to remember that in cases
where the evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should in the first instance be fully
established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to
exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words,
there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for a conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and it must
be such as to show that within all human
probability the act must have been done
by the accused.”
153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:
(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned “must or should” and
not “may be” established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be
proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was
held by this Court in
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC
(Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the
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observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may
be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between ‘may be’ and
‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the
act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case
based on circumstantial evidence.”
8. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the
prosecution that the circumstances from which the
conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. The Court held that it is a primary principle
that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved
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guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been
held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should
be proved’. It has been held that the facts so established
should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that
is to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further
been held that the circumstances should be such that they
exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of
evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probabilities the
act must have been done by the accused.
9. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it
may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of
suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is
presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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10. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to
examine the present case.
11. The circumstances on which the prosecution relies are
as follows:
(i) Last seen theory;
(ii) Motive; and
(iii) Recovery of the chopper used in the crime.
12. Insofar as the ‘last seen’ circumstance is concerned, the
learned Judges of the High Court have relied on the
testimonies of Sarla (PW-7) and Shivaraj (PW-8). The
testimonies of Sarla (PW-7) and Shivaraj (PW-8) would reveal
that they had seen accused Nos. 1 and 2 nearby the place of
incident before the incident had occurred. They further
stated that they had seen accused No. 1 holding chopper in
his hand. The High Court further relied on the evidence of
Babu (PW-6) who had noticed the unattended two-wheeler
belonging to the deceased and informed about the same to
Sri R. Lokanathan (PW-1) and Murthy (PW-5) i.e. son and
brother of the deceased. Thereafter, the said witnesses
started searching for the deceased and the deceased was
found lying injured in the close vicinity. The learned Judges
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of the High Court found the said evidence to be sufficient to
establish the last seen theory.
13. No doubt that where the prosecution proves that the
deceased was last seen in the company of the appellants and
the death of the deceased has occurred soon thereafter, the
burden would shift upon the appellants. However, for that,
initially the prosecution will have to discharge the burden.
Merely because the appellants were seen nearby the place
where the crime occurred and the accused No. 1 was holding
the chopper, it cannot be said that the deceased was last
seen in the company of the appellants. In our view, this will
be nothing but basing the finding of conviction on
conjectures and surmises.
14. Further, the perusal of evidence of PW-7 would reveal
that she has not deposed that the appellants were seen
nearby the place where the dead body of the deceased was
found.
15. The trial court found that the prosecution has proved
the motive behind the crime. However, the High Court has
reversed the finding on the said issue. It will be relevant to
refer to the following observations of the High Court:
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| “21. …….But what exactly is the financial loss and | ||
|---|---|---|
| whether that loss and intervention of deceased | ||
| resulted in sufficient enmity between the deceased | ||
| and accused No.1 and the same being nurtured | ||
| from the date of closure of business till the date of | ||
| death is not deposed to by prosecution witnesses. | ||
| Therefore, the case of the prosecution that accused | ||
| No.1 possessed and nurtured enmity resulting in | ||
| taking away the life of the deceased by accused No.1 | ||
| is not established by the prosecution with cogent | ||
| and convincing evidence on record. Prosecution did | ||
| not examine none else to establish | ||
| misunderstanding especially when PW.6 in his | ||
| cross examination has admitted that there was a | ||
| panchayath convened in that regard. Investigating | ||
| agency did not cite the panchaythdar as witness to | ||
| establish the question of motive. Therefore, the | ||
| finding recorded by the trial Judge that prosecution | ||
| has established motive for the incident cannot be | ||
| countenanced in law and to that extent, the | ||
| reasoning assigned by the learned trial Judge needs | ||
| interference at the ends of this Court.” | ||
| 16. Now, what is left, is only the third circumstance with | ||
| regard to recovery. The recovery is from an open place | ||
| accessible to one and all. In any case, only on the basis of | ||
| the circumstance of recovery, it cannot be said that the | ||
| prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. | ||
| 17. It is further to be noted that though the High Court has | ||
| concurred with the trial court that it is the appellants, who | ||
| have committed the crime but has altered the conviction to | ||
| Part-I of Section 304 of IPC from Section 302 of IPC. No |
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| discussion for the same has been offered in the impugned | |
|---|---|
| judgment. | |
| 18. In that view of the matter, we find that the impugned | |
| judgment is not sustainable. | |
| 19. In the result, we pass the following order: | |
| (i) The appeal is allowed; | |
| (ii) The impugned judgment dated 14th July 2021 | |
| passed by the High Court of Karnataka at | |
| Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No. 1389 of 2019 | |
| and the judgment dated 17th June 2019 passed by | |
| the trial court in S.C. No. 276 of 2014 are quashed | |
| and set aside; | |
| (iii) The appellants are acquitted of all the charges | |
| charged with and are directed to be released | |
| forthwith, if not required in any other case. | |
| 20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. |
….........................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
….........................J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 21, 2024.
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