Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
C.I.T., PUNJAB, HARYANA, J & K, H.P. & UNION TERRITORY OFCHA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PANIPAT WOOLLEN & GENERAL MILLS co. LTD.CHANDIGARH
DATE OF JUDGMENT02/01/1976
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION:
1976 AIR 640 1976 SCR (3) 186
1976 SCC (2) 5
ACT:
lncome Tax Act (11 of 1922) s. lO(2) (IV)-Scope of-
Payment under agreement between assessee and selling agent
to the latter Whether permissible deductions or amount to
division of profits between the two.
Practice-Power of High Court to go outside statement
of Case submitted by Tribunal.
HEADNOTE:
In 1952, the assessee-company installed a new plant by
raising a loan from the Industrial Finance Corporation, and
appointed a sole selling agent of its product. ln 1953, the
assessee changed the selling agent, and entered into an
agreement with another selling agent. Under the agreement,
the agent was to make advances and finance the assessee.
Under cl. 7(1 ) of the agreement, the agent was to get a
commission at the rate of 11% on the net proceeds of the
sales of all its goods and 50% commission on the net profits
of the new plant (the net profits being ascertained after
deducting all the manufacturing costs, interest, insurance,
etc.). The selling agent advanced 2 sums of money in the
assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58 respectively, and
received, during those 2 years, two sums as their 50%
commission on the net profits of the new plant. The assessee
claimed, in its returns for those 2 years, that the amounts
paid as commission to the selling agent were expenses
incurred to earn profit and could, therefore, be deducted
under s. lO(2)(xv) lncome Tax Act, 1922; but the Income Tax
officer disallowed the claim. On appeal, the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner held in favour of the assessee, but
the Tribunal, on further appeal held that the agreement
between the assessee and the selling agent amounted to a
joint venture for the distribution of profits between the
two, after the profits were ascertained, and upheld the
contention of the Revenue that the two sums were not legal
deductions within s. 1O(2)(xv). On reference, the High Court
held in favour of the assessee.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
^
HELD: (I)(a) In order to fall within s. 10(2)(xv) the
deduction claimed must amount to an expenditure which was
laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose
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of the business profession or vocation; and this depends
upon the facts of each case; and [191 G-H]
(b) In order to determine the reasonableness of the
expenditure, the test of commercial expediency would have to
be adjudged from the point of view of the businessman and
not of the Income Tax Department. [191H-192A]
(2) It is well-settled that the Court, in order to
construe an agreement has to look to the substance or the
essence of it rather than to its form. A party cannot escape
the consequences of law merely by describing an agreement in
a particular form, though, in essence and substance, it may
be a different transaction. [l94 G-H]
(a) Clause 3 of the agreement requires not only
consultation by the assessee with the selling agent, but
also the consent, for me programme of manufacture of the
product. that is, if the agent withholds its consent, it
could veto the programme of manufacture. Such a limitation
placed on the power of the assessee is not in consonance
with a pure and simple contract of agency. [192 F-G]
(b) Under cl. 6(1) the selling agent would have to make
a full and complete investment for the working of the new
plant to the fullest possible capacity
187
including wages, power, stores, repairs etc. This is more in
consonance with a partnership than an agency. [193 C-D]
(c) Clause 6(ii) provides that the plant should be
overhauled before tho commencement and the termination of
the agreement. This is also beyond the role of a simple
selling agent. [193 D-E]
(d) Sub-clauses (Viii) and (ix) of cl. 6 show that any
damage to the goods in transit would have to be debited to
the account of the new plant and that such accounts would
have to be maintained separately. The object of these sub-
clauses is that the selling agent should be in a position to
ascertain the net profits and control the working of the new
plant.[193E]
(e) An analysis of the terms of cl. 7(i) shows that the
selling agent was agent to secure most liberal and
profitable terms. While it is difficult to lay down any rule
of universal application as to what percentage of profit
would be consistent with the payment in lieu of services,
the conduct of the selling agent, in the present case. in
sharing half of the net profits is not consistent with
payments made to agents for services rendered. Taking the
totality of the provisions of c the agreement, the
percentage of profits and the manner in which it is to be
deter mined is more consistent with the position of the
selling agent as a partner than as an agent. 1194 A-Cl
(f) In cl. 7 there is also provision for the selling
agent sharing the loss incurred by the assessee, by
deducting 50% of the loss from its remuneration, and for a
lump sum deduction of Rs. 50,000/- towards depreciation
etc., for deter mining the net profit or loss position.
Clause 7(iv) provides for a separate commission account to
be maintained by the selling agent and for payment of
commission every 6 months. Having regard to the terms and
conditions of the agreement, the view taken by the Tribunal
that the two sums were not legally deductible under s.
10(2)(xv) was correct. By contributing to the investments by
controlling the manufacturing programme, by sharing to the
extent of 50 per cent in the net profits ascertained in the
manner stipulated in the agreement, and above all, by
agreeing to share SO per cent of the losses which are to be
deducted from the commission of the agent, the selling agent
has actually contributed to a joint venture and became
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completely equated with the assessee, and therefore, the
agreement between the two is really a sort of a partnership
and has been given the cloak and colour of an agency to
conceal the real intent and purpose of the commercial
venture; and it must be construed as an agreement for
division of profits in specified proportions. [194 C-D, F;
195 E-G; 201 E-F]
British Sugar Manufacturers Ltd. v. Harris (Inspector
of Taxes), 7 I.T.R. 101, applied.
(3) The decision in Dharamvir’s case (43 I.T.R. 7) is
distinguishable.
[195, G-H]
(a) In that case it was not agreed between the assessee
and the trust, which agreed to advance a loan to him, that
the profits would be ascertained after deducting the net
expenses as in the agreement in the present case. [196 B-C]
(b) While the contract was to be carried on in
accordance with the policy settled between the assessee and
the trust, in that case, it did not give any veto power to
the trust to torpedo the contract. In the present case, the
agreement gave to the selling agents controlling power at
every stage in the programme of manufacture and even at the
stage of the sale of the products, by requiring the consent
of the selling agent. [196 C-D]
(c) Not only was there no provision in Dharamvir’s case
under which the trust was to share the loss, but there was
an express provision to the contrary. Therefore, the payment
of interest at the rate of 6 per cent on the loan advanced
to the assessee by the trust and a percentage in the
profits, in that case, is quite consistent with a
remuneration in lieu of services lent and would amount to an
expenditure incurred by the assessee, wholly and exclusively
for the purpose of the business which was conducted by the
assessee. [196 D-E]
(4) In the present case, it is difficult to hold that
commercial expediency dictated the assessee to allow itself
to be completely overshadowed by its selling
188
agent, so as to pay them not only for the services rendered
but allow them to share profits, control the manufacture of
goods and to share the losses. The test of commercial
expediency cannot be reduced to the shape of a ritualistic
formula. The test merely means that the Court will place
itself in the position of a businessman and find out whether
the expenses incurred could be said to have been laid out
for the purpose of the business, or whether the transaction
was merely a subterfuge for the purpose of sharing or
dividing the profits ascertained in a particular manner. In
the ultimate analysis, the matter would depend on the
intention of the parties as spelt out from the terms for the
agreement or the surrounding circumstances, the nature or
character of the trade or venture, the purpose for which the
expenses are incurred and the object which is sought to be
achieved for incurring those expenses. If the expenses
incurred amount o a profit of an enduring nature, they may
be treated as capital expenditure; whereas, if the expenses
merely serve to promote or increase the commercial activity,
they may amount to an expenditure which is incurred for the
purpose of the business. [196H-197D]
J. K. Woollen Manufacturers v. Commissioner of Income
Tax, V.P. [1969]1 S.C.R. 525, distinguished.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Travancore Sugar
and Chemicals Ltd., 88 I.T.R. 1, 10; Commissioner of income
Tax, Bombay v. Poona Electric Supply Co. Ltd., 49 I.T.R.
913, 924 and Jamshedpur Motor Accessories Stores v.
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Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar & Orissa, 95 I.T.R. 664,
672 referred to.
(5) The High Court is not entitled to go behind the
Statement of the case submitted by the Tribunal. But, in the
present case, in interpreting the agreement, the High Court
relied upon what it called surrounding circumstances,
namely, that the assessee was a losing concern from its
inception, that it was in such a bad shape that it had to
get rid of its first selling agent. BECAUSE, it caused
considerable embarrassment to the assessee while the second
selling agent was prepared to give the assessee advantageous
terms. that the selling agent had no other connection than
a business connection with the assessee; and that because of
the death of one of the promoters of the assessee, who
commanded credit in the money market, the assessee was not
able to raise money from the banks. But, these facts were
not found by the Tribunal nor was there any warrant for any
of the assumptions. [198G-199C]
Commissioner of Income Tax, Poona v. Manna Ramji and
Company, 86 I.T.R. 29, 37, followed.
(6) The facts found by the Tribunal and those mentioned
in its Statement of the case to the High Court, lead to the
inescapable conclusion that the agreement is nothing but a
joint venture to divide the profits after they are
ascertained, and hence, the payments to the selling agent
cannot, in any sense be deemed to be expenses incurred by
the assessee for the purpose of its business or for earning
profits.
Pondicherry Railway Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income
Tax madras, A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 165, 170, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 622 &
623 of 1971.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 20-1-1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at
Chandigarh in I.T. Reference No. 2 of 1965.
B. B. Ahuja and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants.
A. N. Goyal, for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.-These are appeals by the Revenue by
special leave against the order of the High Court of Punjab
& Haryana dated
189
January 20, 1970 answering the questions referred to the
High Court by the Tribunal in favour of the
assessees/respondents and against the Revenue. The appeal
arises in the following circumstances.
M/s. Panipat Woollen & General Mills Co. Ltd.-hereafter
referred to as ’the assessee Company’ had two Departments-
(1) for spinning of yarn from raw and waste wool and (2) for
spinning of yarn from imported wool tops. The second
Department which carried on the operations of spinning of
yarn from imported wool tops was started some time in the
year 1952. Weaving operations were, how ever carried on in
both these Departments. One of the Departments was known as
M/s. PaniPat Woollen Mills, Kharar while the other one was
known as M/s. Navin Woollen Mills. It is said that the
assessee Company was running at a constant loss as a result
of which in 1952 the assessee Company decided to instal a
plant for manufacture of worsted yarn from imported wool
tops by raising a loan of Rs. 7 lakhs from the Industrial
Finance Corporation. The plant went into production in
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September 1952. The assessee Company appointed M/s.
Murlidhar Chiranjilal as the sole selling agents for the
worsted yarn on payment of 2% commission. Subsequently on
December 15, 1953 the assessee Company entered into an
agreement with Mis Saligram Premnath under which the latter
were appointed as the sole selling agents on certain
specified conditions, the important of which being that the
agents were to finance the assessee Company to the extent of
Rs. 2,50,000/- and the assessee Company agreed to pay 6%
interest on the advances to be made by the agents and
further agreed to pay 2% commission on the net proceeds of
sales of goods in India. Before expiry of this agreement,
another agreement was entered into by the assessee Company
with the agents on October 20, 1955 under which the agents
were to get 6% interest on all the advances made by them, 1%
commission on net sales and 50% commission on net sales of
the worsted plant. ’ What is more was that the agents agreed
to a deduction of 50% of the loss incurred by the assessee
Company from their remuneration. There were a number of
other conditions with which we shall deal later. The selling
agents M/s. Saligram Premnath advanced a sum of Rs.
6,26,847/- and Rs. 8,71,873/- and received Rs. 37,157/- and
Rs. 73,787/- as 50% commission on the net profits of the
worsted plant in the course of two years, namely, assessment
years 195-57 ending on March 31, 1956 and 1957-58 ending on
March, 31, 1957. The assessee Company accordingly in its
return for the year 1956-57 claimed the amount of Rs.
37,157/- and Rs. 73,787/- for the assessment year 1957-58 as
a deduction under the provisions of s. 10(2) (xv) of the
Income-tax Act, 1922. The case of the assessee was that the
two amounts mentioned above being in the nature of
commission paid to the selling agents would be deemed
expenses incurred by the Company in order to earn profits
and would, therefore, fall within the ambit of s. 10(2) (xv)
of the Income-tax Act, 1922-hereafter referred to as ’the
Act’. The Income-tax officer, however, disallowed the
deduction and held that the deduction claimed was actually a
division of profits after the profits had come into
existence and had been ascertained, and therefore could not
he claimed as a valid deduction under the provisions of the
Act.
190
The assessee Company went up in appeal to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner who accepted the plea of the assessee
Company and held that the payment was a permissible
deduction as it was incurred for the purpose of the
assessee’s trade in order to facilitate the business’ of the
assessee. The Revenue then went up in appeal before the
Tribunal which after considering the facts and the law on
the subject upheld the contention of the Revenue and held
that the sums in question were not legal deductions as
contemplated under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act but amounted to
application of profits after they were earned. The Tribunal
further held that the agreement dated October 20, 1955
amounted to a joint venture for the distribution of profit,
between the assessee Company and the selling agents after
the profits were ascertained. The assessee Company then
approached the Tribunal for making a reference to the High
Court and the Tribunal accordingly referred the following
two questions to the High Court for its opinion:
"1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of the case, the Tribunal rightly held that the sums of
Rs. 37,157/- and Rs. 73,787/- were chargeable to tax in
the hands of the assessee Company in the assessment
years 1956-57 and 1957-58 respectively?
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2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of the case, the Tribunal rightly disallowed the
assessee Company‘s claim for deduction of the payment
of Rs. 37,157/ and Rs. 73,787/-, under sec. 10(l) and
Sec. 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, in the
assessment years 1956 57 and 1957-58 respectively?"
The High Court by its judgment dated January 20, 1970,
answered both the questions in favour of the assessee
Company and held that the payments in question amounted to a
legitimate deduction under i. 10(2)(xv) of the Act, and the
Tribunal was wrong in disallowing the same. Thereafter the
appellant moved the High Court for grant of leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court which having been rejected the
appellant filed a petition for special leave. The special
leave having been granted, the appeal is now before us.
The High Court in reversing the order of the Tribunal
mainly relied on what it described as the surrounding
circumstances under which the alleged payments were made to
the selling agents by the assessee Company as spelt out from
the agreement entered into by the assessee Company with the
selling agents. The main point which was argued before the
Tribunal as also before the High Court was that the
cumulative effect of the interpretation of the various
clauses of the agreement dated October 20, 1955 unmistakably
revealed that in the garb of an agency the parties entered
into a joint venture for distributing the net profits, after
being ascertained between themselves and that is why there
was an express provision in the agreement by which the
agents agreed to share the losses to the extent of 50% which
were to be deducted from the remuneration payable to the
agents. The Tribunal held that the agreement amounted to a
joint venture resulting in division of net profits and
therefore the amount paid to the agents could not be claimed
by the assessee Company as a deduction under
191
s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act, as it was not incurred for the
purpose of the business or for earning profits. The High
Court held that the mere fact that the agents agreed to
share the profits and the losses would not take the case of
the assessee beyond the ambit of s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act in
order to show that the payments made to the agents were not
expenses incurred for the purpose of the business. The High
Court laid special emphasis on the fact that the Revenue
could not examine the question of the commercial expediency
of the businessman to incur expenses or earn profits in a
particular manner. The High Court accordingly found that the
agreement per se was a contract of agency and not a joint
venture and accordingly the High Court accepted the plea of
the assessee Company.
In support of the appeal Mr. Ahuja, the learned
standing counsel for the Revenue submitted the following two
points before us: C
(1) In the first place it was submitted that there
being an express provision in the agreement dated
October 20, 1955 by which the agents agreed to share
losses which was a provision peculiar to the present
transaction and was not at all covered by any authority
cited before the Tribunal or the High Court, that
itself was proof positive of the fact that the
transaction amounted to a joint venture with a view to
division of profits; and
(2) It was argued that the High Court had exceeded
its jurisdiction in travelling beyond the agreed
statement of the case framed by the Tribunal and had
relied on certain materials which were not at all found
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by the Tribunal in its order nor were those materials
mentioned in the statement of the case.
Mr. A. N. Goyal counsel for the assessee Company has,
however. submitted that the view taken by the High Court is
absolutely correct and the facts of the present case are
clearly covered by the decision of this Court in Dharamvir
Dhir v. Commissioner of Income-tax Bihar & Orissa(1). A
number of other cases have also been cited at the Bar and we
shall refer to the same after marshalling the facts found in
the present case.
Before coming to the facts it may be necessary to
mention that there can be no dispute with respect to the two
important propositions:
(1) that in order to fall within s. 10(2)(xv) of
the Act the deduction claimed must amount to an
expenditure which was laid out or expended wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of the business, profession
or vocation. This will naturally depend upon the facts
of each case.
(2) that in order to determine the question of
reason ableness of the expenditure, the test of
commercial expediency would have to be adjudged from
the point of view of the businessman and not of the
Income-tax Depart-
(1)42 I.T.R.7.
192
ment. With this preface we now proceed to deal with the
facts of the present case on the basis of which the
questions of law referred to the High Court and
answered in favour of the assessee Company arise.
To begin with, it is conceded by the learned standing
counsel for the Revenue that the assessee Company was
running at a loss as a result of which it had to raise a
lorn of several lakhs of rupees from. the Industrial Finance
Corporation. It was perhaps for this reason that the
assessee Company entered into an agreement with the new
selling agents M/s Saligram Premnath who were prepared to.
give to the assessee Company better and more profitable
terms. The main question to be determined is as to whether
or not the agreement dated October 20, 1955 read as a whole
amounts to a joint venture for the purpose of division of
profits. In order to decide this question it may be
necessary to refer to some important portions of the second
agreement which alone is relevant for the purpose of
deciding this point. We might mention, however, that so far
as the first agreement is concerned the terms thereof do not
make out a case of joint venture but appear to be in
consonance with the agreement being one of an agency
simpliciter. It is the second agreement that in our opinion
appears to change the entire complexion of the case. This
agreement is set out at p. 17 of the Paper Book and consists
of ten main clauses. The agreement was to enure for a period
of two years to commence from January 1, 1956 or the date on
which manufacturing actually starts under the agreement
whichever is later. This is provided in clause 2 of the
agreement. It was further provided that the period of the
agency could be extended further by mutual consent. Clause
3(ii) runs thus:
"Program for the manufacture of goods will be made
from time to time by the Company in consultation and
with the consent of the Agents."
It may be noticed that this clause requires not only
consultation with the agents for the programme of
manufacture of goods but a tacit consent of the agents. In
other words, if the agents withheld their consent, they
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could veto the programme of manufacture. Such a limitation
placed on the power of the assessee Company does not appear
to us to be in consonance with a pure and simple contract of
agency. Clause 6 which deals with financial arrangements may
be extracted thus:
"(i) The Agents shall invest full amount for the
working of the Worsted Plant to the full possible
capacity beginning from the purchase of tops to the
completion of the yarn sales including wages, power,
stores, and repairs and maintenance etc. Such
investments and expenses incurred on tops,
manufacturing, bank charges, transport, insurance and
octroi will be debited to the account of the Company.
193
(ii) Before the beginning of the arrangements
under this Agreement, the Machinery of the Worsted
Plant will be overhauled and similarly before this
arrangement ends the Machinery will be overhauled.
x x x x x
(viii) In case of any loss or damage to the tops
or goods in transit or in godowns, the same will be
debited to the account of the Worsted Plant.
(ix) The accounts of the Worsted Plant will be
maintained separately in an office situated near the
Worsted Plant and the Agents will have free access to
the account books.
x x x x x
Sub-clause (i) clearly contemplates that the agents would
have to make full and complete investment for the working of
the worsted plant to the fullest possible capacity including
wages, power, stores, repairs and maintenance etc. This
provision appears to be more in consonance with the terms of
a person who is a partner in a venture rather than one who
is a mere agent. Further more, sub-clause (ii) provides that
before the agreement starts the machinery of the worsted
plant would be overhauled and would be again overhauled
before the agreement ends. This provision also has its own
importance and appears to be beyond the role of the selling
agents simpliciter. Sub-clauses (viii) and (ix) extracted
above clearly show that the damage to the tops or goods in
transit would have to be debited to the account of the
worsted plant and such accounts would have to be maintained
separately. The obvious object is that the agents should be
in a position to ascertain tile net profits and control the
working of the worsted plant. Clause 7 is the most important
clause of this agreement, which, in our opinion, clearly
shows that the agreement in essence and in purport is a sort
of a partnership or a joint venture rather than a contract
of agency. Sub-clause (i) of clause 7 p runs thus:
"7. Commission
(i) The Agents shall be allowed a commission at 1
1/4% (one and a quarter per cent) on the net proceeds
of sales of all goods. Such commission shall be
chargeable upon money actually credited to the Company,
and not on out- standing debts, if any. Besides, Agents
will get 50% (fifty per cent) commission on the net
profits of the Worsted Plant. The net profits will be
ascertained after deducting all the manufacturing
expenses, interest, insurance, depreciation and selling
commission etc. For allowing annual depreciation in the
value of the machinery and buildings and interest on
the value of machinery, buildings and commencing from
the date on which manufacturing actually starts under
this Agreement, a lump sum of Rs. 50,000/- has been
agreed to be deducted for determining the net profits
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or loss
194
position. In case of net loss, if any, there will be a
deduction of 50% (fifty per cent) of such loss from the
Agent’s Account."
Analysing the terms of this sub-clause it would appear that
the agents have been able to secure most liberal and
profitable terms. To begin with they were to get a
commission at the rate of one and a quarter per cent on the
net proceeds of sales of all goods There can be no objection
to this. Secondly, the agents will get 50% commission on the
net profits of the worsted plant. The net profits would have
to be ascertained after deducing all the manufacturing
costs, interest, insurance etc. The conduct of the agents in
sharing half of the net profits does not appear to us to be
consistent with the payments made to the agents for services
rendered. It is difficult to lay down any rule of universal
application as to what percentage of profit would be
consistent with the payment in lieu of services but taking
the totality of the provisions of the agreement it seems to
us that the percentage of profits and the manner in which it
is to be determined is more consistent with the position of
a partner than that of an Agent. Finally the provision for
sharing the loss incurred by the Company and for a lump sum
deduction of Rs. 50,000/- is totally inconsistent with a
contract of agency. Further more, sub-clause (iv) of clause
7 provides as under:
"(iv) The commission account will be maintained
separately by the Agents and the commission will be
payable to the Agents by the Company every six months.
In the same way, the amount of Rs. 25,000/- for six
months as provided in sub-clause (i) above, will be
paid to the Company every half-year within ten days.
The profit and loss account of the Worsted Plant will
be made every six months within ten days and the
adjustments will be made accordingly by actual
payments, as the case may be, within ten days."
The above sub-clause clearly provides for a separate
commission ac count to be maintained by the agents and the
commission to be paid every six months. Consequently the
agents agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for six months
every half year within ten days. We might further mention
here that the provision in the agreement regarding sharing
of the loss is absolutely peculiar to this particular
agreement and there is not a single authority, which has, in
spite of such a provision, held that the transaction does
not amount to a joint venture or a division of profits. The
provision regarding the consent of the agents to the sales
and the programme of manufacture is also pertinent in order
to determine whether the transaction amount ted to a joint
venture in the garb of a contract of agency. It is well
settled that the Court in order to construe an agreement has
to look to the substance or the essence of it rather than to
its form. A party cannot escape the consequences of law
merely by describing an agreement in a particular form
though in essence and in substance IT H may be a different
transaction. In these circumstances, therefore, if we
construe the agreement as a sort of a joint venture or a
transaction like a partnership which has been given the form
and appearance of a contract of agency, the law must have
its course.
195
Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for
the Re venue to a decision in British Sugar Manufacturers
Ltd. v. Harris (Inspector of Taxes)(1), where Greene, M. R.
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clearly observed that where a person contributes to some
sort of joint adventure which ultimately results in division
of profits, it could not be construed as. a remuneration for
services. In this connection, Greene, M. R. Ob served as
follows:
"It is not cash that passes in exchange for these
profits, it is services; and the badge of such a
contract is remuneration for services, and therefore
the first thing that this remuneration would certainly
not be is a share of profits purchased by the employee.
x x x I can conceive of a case where a person
contributes to some sort of joint adventure services,
while others contribute perhaps capital, land, plant,
and goods, arranging between themselves (it may be
something short of a partnership) that nobody shall get
anything until the pool of profits is ascertained, and
then they shall divide it up between them in specified
proportions. That, it seems to me would be a real
agreement for division of profits, because there would
be D’ one profit fund only. There would not be two
’profit’ funds to be ascertained for different
purposes."
These observations seem to us to cover the facts of the
instant case. Having regard to the terms and conditions of
the agreement detailed and analysed above, there can be no
doubt that the agents by contributing to the investments and
by sharing the profits as also the E. losses have actually
contributed to a joint venture and ultimate division of the
profits with the principals and the agreement must be
construed as an agreement for division of the profits in
specified pro portions as mentioned therein. It is true that
in the aforesaid case on the facts found the Court held that
the transaction did not amount to a joint venture but it was
clearly pointed out in the judgment that there is a very
thin line of distinction between a contract for payment of a
share of profits simpliciter and a payment of remuneration
which is deductible in truth from the profits divisible. We,
therefore, find ourselves in complete agreement with the
observations made by Greene, M. R., which aptly apply to the
facts of the present case on the basis of the various
clauses of the agreement dated October 20, 1955. The High
Court, however, appears to have relied upon the decision in
Dharamvir Dhir’s case (supra). The facts of that case appear
to be clearly distinguishable from those of the present
case. What had happened in Dharamvir Dhir’s case was that
the assessee was an employee of the firm earning a
particular salary. The employee entered into a coal raising
contract with a coal company and as he did not have the
necessary funds he persuaded a public charitable trust to
advance to him sums upto 1 1/2 lakhs on payment of
(1) 7 I.T.R.101.
196
interest at 6 per cent. and share 11/16ths of the profits of
the business. The assessee agreed that the coal raising
contract would be carried on in accordance with the policy
settled between him and the trust and the trust could
withdraw its money at any time. It is, there fore, clear
that in the first place the agent, namely, the trust, agreed
to finance the assessee by giving him a loan of Rs. 1 1/2
lakhs at 6 percent interest. This was undoubtedly
permissible. The trust was also b to get 11/16th of the
profits of the business. It was, however, not agreed between
the parties that the profits would be ascertained after .
_." deducting the net expenses as mentioned in the agreement
before us. It is true that the contract was to be carried on
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in accordance with the policy settled between the assessee
and the trust but that did not give any veto power to the
trust to tarpedo the contract. In the instant case the
agreement clearly provided for the consent of the agents not
only at the beginning of the manufacture of the yarn by the
plant to be installed by the assessee Company but at every
stage in the pro gramme of manufacture. Even at the stage of
the sale of the products the consent of the agents was
necessary. In other words the agents were given a complete
controlling power so far as the manufacture and sale of the
products of the assessee Company were concerned. No such
stipulation is to be found in Dharamvir Dhir’s case (supra).
Finally, not only there was no provision in Dharamvir Dhir’s
case under which the trust was to share the losses but there
was an ex press provision to the contrary, namely, that the
trust was not liable for any loss. Thus the mere payment of
interest at the rate of 6 per cent. On the loan advanced to
the assessee and a percentage in the profits of the business
would be quite consistent with a remuneration in lieu of
services lent and would certainly amount to an expenditure
incurred by the assessee wholly and exclusively for the
purpose of the business which was conducted by the assessee.
The same, however, " cannot be said of the present case. It
was on the peculiar facts of the Dharamvir Dhir’s case that
this Court observed as follows: r
"on the facts proved in the present case the trust
agreed to finance the business of the appellant on the
terms set out in the agreement and there is nothing to
show that he could have made any better arrangements or
would not have last the contract if he had failed to
enter into the agreement, i.e. the agreement to pay the
amounts in dispute. There fore, in a commercial sense,
the payments were an expenditure wholly and exclusively
laid out for the purpose of the " business."
It may be mentioned that this Court had considered the
decision in the British Sugar Manufactures Ltd.’s case
(supra) and had approved of the same.
Great stress was laid by counsel for the assessee
Company on the fact that this Court could not go behind the
commercial expediency which had to be determined from the
point of view of a businessman. Even so whatever be the
commercial considerations, it is difficult to hold that the
commercial expediency dictated the assessee Company to allow
itself to be completely overshadowed by its selling agents
so as to pay them not only for the services rendered but
also allow them
197
to share profits, control the manufacture of the goods and
the programme thereof and also to share the losses. The test
of commercial expediency cannot be reduced in the shape of a
ritualistic formula, nor can it be put in a water-tight
compartment so as to be confined in a strait jacket. The
test merely means that the Court will place itself in the
position of a businessman and find out whether the expenses
incurred could be said to have been laid out for the purpose
of the business or the transaction was merely a subterfuge
for the ’ purpose of sharing or dividing the profits
ascertained in a particular manner. It seems to us that in
ultimate analysis the matter would . depend on the intention
of the parties as spelt out from the terms of - the
agreement or the surrounding circumstances, the nature or
character of the trade or venture, the purpose for which the
expenses are incurred and the object which is sought to be
achieved for incurring those expenses. If the expenses
incurred amount to a profit of an enduring nature they may
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be treated as capital expenditure, whereas if the expenses
merely serve to promote or increase the commercial activity
they may amount to an expenditure which is incurred for the
purpose of the business.
Reliance was also placed by counsel for the assessee
Company on the decision in J. K. Woollen Manufacturers v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P.(1), where this Court
observed as follows:
"The question as to whether an amount claimed as
expenditure was laid out or expended wholly or
exclusively for the purpose of business, profession or
vocation as required under Section 10(2) (xv) of the
Income Tax Act . has to be decided on the facts and in
the light of the circumstances of each particular case.
x x x x In our opinion, neither the High Court nor the
Appellate Tribunal has applied the proper legal test in
this case. As pointed out by this Court in C.I.T.
Bombay v. Walchand and Co. Private Ltd., 1967-65 ITR
381= (AIR 1967 SC 1435) in applying the test of
commercial expediency for determining whether an
expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for the
purpose of the business, reasonableness of the
expenditure has to be adjudged from the point of r view
of the businessman and not of the Income Tax
Department. It is, of course, open to the Appellate
Tribunal to come to a conclusion either that the
alleged payment is not real or that it is not incurred
by the assessee in the character of trader or it is not
laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the
business of the assessee and to disallow it. But it is
not the function of the Tribunal to determine the
remuneration which in their view should be paid to an
employee of the assessee."
It would appear that in the aforesaid case the only question
was regarding the quantum of remuneration to be given to the
General , Manager and this Court observed that the
businessman must be given complete freedom to fix the terms
of his employees after taking an
(1) [1969] 1. S. C. R. 525
198
overall view of the situation. This was not at all a case
where an agreement like the present one was entered into
between the assessee Company and its agents. On the other
hand in Commissioner of Income-tax, Kerala v. Travancore
Sugars and Chemicals Ltd.(l), this Court added‘ a word of
caution that the test of commercial expediency should not be
applied in a mechanical manner and observed as follows:
"In considering the nature of the expenditure
incurred in the discharge of an obligation under a
contract or a statute or a decree or some similar
binding covenant, one must avoid r being caught in the
maze of judicial decisions rendered on different facts
and which always present distinguishing features for a
comparison with the facts and circumstances of the case
in hand. Nor would it be conducive for clarity or for
reaching a logical result if we were to concentrate on
the facts of the decided cases with a view to match the
colour of that case with that of the case which
requires determination. The surer way of arriving at a
just conclusion would be to first ascertain by
reference to the document under which the obligation
for incurring the expenditure is created and thereafter
to apply the principle embalmed in the decisions of
those facts. Judicial statements on the facts of a
particular case can never assist courts in the
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construction , of an agreement or a statute which was
not considered in i those judgments or to ascertain
what the intention of the legislature was. What we must
look at is the contract or the statute or the decree,
in relation to its terms, the obligation imposed and
the purpose for which the transaction was , entered
into."
The learned counsel for the assessee Company relied on the
aforesaid case because the question whether the transaction
amounted to a joint venture appears to have been raised but
it appears that this point had been given up when the case
was sent on remand and was therefore not decided. In these
circumstances, the decision in the aforesaid case does not
appear to be of any assistance to the assessee Company.
The Tribunal had interpreted the agreement keeping into
account J the tests of commercial expediency and we find
ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the
Tribunal. The High Court on the other hand relied upon what
it called the surrounding circumstances that the assessee
Company was a losing concern from its inception and had to
get rid of the previous selling agents M/s Murlidhar
Chiranjilal because they caused considerable embarrassment
to the assessee Company. While the standing counsel for the
Revenue has admitted that the Company was running at some
loss there was no evidence that the Company was in such a
bad shape that it had to get rid of the first selling agents
because the selling agents were l causing embarrassment to
it. The High Court then relied on the fact that the first
agency which was entered into with M/s Murlidhar
(1)881.T.R.1,10.
199
Chiranjilal in 1953 also resulted in loss as a result of
which the A second agreement dated October 20, 1955 was
entered into. This does not appear to be of much
consequence. The High Court then relied on the fact that the
agents had no other connection with the assessee Company
except that of the business connection. The High Court
further found that the promoter of the assessee Company Mr.
Desh Bandhu Gupta had a stature which enabled him to borrow
loans from the Banks on personal security and as he died in
an air crash the credit of the Company went down and it was
not abl to raise money from the Banks. There is absolutely
no warrant for these facts referred to by the High Court
which are neither mentioned in the agreed statement of the
case submitted by the Tribunal to the High Court nor in the
order of the Tribunal. It is well settled that the High
Court is not entitled to go behind the statement of the
case. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Poona v. Manna Ramji
and Company(1) this Court observed as follows:
"In this respect we are of the view that the
Tribunal is the final fact Finding authority. It is for
the Tribunal to find facts and it is for the High Court
and this Court to lay down the law applicable to the
facts found. Neither the High Court nor this Court has
jurisdiction to go behind or to question the statement
of facts made by the Tribunal. The statement of case is
binding on the parties and they are Dot entitled to go
behind the facts of the Tribunal in the statement. When
the question referred to the High Court speaks of ’on
the facts and circumstances of the case’, it means on
the facts and circumstances found by the Tribunal and
not on the facts and circumstances as may be found by
the High Court."
In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Poona Electric
Supply Co. Ltd.(2) the Bombay High Court observed as
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follows:
"It is true that the Electricity act exercises
control on the business of the licensee, but the
control that is exercised by reason of the aforesaid
proviso is to compel the assessee to distribute part of
its clear profits if it is found that ’clear profits’
are in excess of the reasonable return as contemplated
under the Act. That, in our opinion, would only amount
to apportionment or distribution of the profits after
they have been earned. It cannot, therefore, be said
that the amount set apart for the purpose of
distribution amongst the consumers is not chargeable to
tax on the ground that it represents over-charge."
This case however was decided on its own facts and has no
application to the facts in the instant case.
Reliance was also placed by counsel for the assessee
Company on a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court
in Jamshedpur
(1)86I.T.R.29, 37. (2)49 I.T.R.913 924.
14-L390SCI/76
200
Motor Accessories Stores v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bihar & Orissa(1) where Untwalia, C.J., as he then was,
observed as follows:
"That position being accepted the matter as to
what amount was payable to Parikh ought to have been
adjudged from the assessee’s point of view and not from
the department or Tribunal’s point of view. It has to
he emphasised that unless there is, a limitation put by
the law on the amount , of expenditure a lesser amount
than the amount expended cannot be allowed merely
because the assessing authority c thinks that the
assessee could have managed by paying a < lesser amount
as a prudent businessman. - The test of prudence by
substituting its own view in place of the business
man’s has not been approved by the Supreme Court in the
decisions referred to above."
Here also the observations were confined only to the
question that the test of prudence was to be determined from
the point of view of the businessman. Jamshedpur Motor
Accessrories Stores’ case(supra) was also concerned
regarding the quantum of the payment of com mission and
does not appear to be useful in deciding the point at in the
present case.
Some other decisions were cited at the Bar but they
have no bearing on the issue and it is not necessary for us
to refer to them. What is, therefore, important to us is
that no decision has been cited before us which takes the
view that even though under the contract of agency the
selling agents who agreed to make substantial investments in
the assessee Company and got interest on the loans apart
from the commission they also shared profit to the extent of
50% as also loss to that extent and had complete controlling
power in the manufacturing programme or the sale of the
products and yet the transaction would be one of agency
simpliciter and not a joint Venture. On the facts found by
the Tribunal and those mentioned in the statement of the
case as discussed above leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the present contract of agency really amounts to a
transaction by which substantial investments had been made
by the selling agents with a. view to control the
manufacturing programme and the agents had also agreed to
share the profits and losses equally. This is, therefore,
nothing, but a joint venture to divide the profits after the
same are ascertained and cannot in any sense be deemed to be
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expenses incurred by the assessee Company for the purpose of
its business or for that matter for earning profits. In fact
in Pondicherry Railway Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-
tax, Madras(2), Lord Macmillan pointed out that a payment
made to of profits and conditional on profits being earned
cannot be legitimately described as a payment made to earn
profits. It assumes that profits have first come into
existence. But profits on their coming into existence
attract tax at that point and the Revenue is not concerned
with the subsequent
(1)95 I.T.R.664,672. (2) A.I.R.1931 P.C. 165, 170.
201
application of the profits In this connection the Privy
Council observed as follows.
"It is claimed for the company that when it makes
over to the Colonial Government their half of the net
profits it is making an expenditure incurred solely for
the purpose of " earning its own profits. The Court
below has unanimously negatived this contention and in
their Lordships’ opinion has rightly done so. A payment
out of profits and conditional on profits being, earned
cannot accurately be described as a payment made to
earn profits. It assumes that profits have first come
into existence. But profits on their coming into
existence attract tax at that point and the revenue is
not concerned with the subsequent application of the
profits. * But the principle laid down by Lord
Chancellor Halsbury in Gresham Life Assurance Society
v. Styles (1892) A.C. 309-at p. 315, is of general
application unaffected by the specialities of the
English tax system:
’......But when once an individual or a company
has in that proper sense ascertained what are the
profits of his business or his trade, the destination
of those profits or the charge which has been made on
those profits by previous agreement or otherwise is
perfectly immaterial. The tax is payable upon the
profits realised and the meaning to my mind is rendered
plain by the words payable out of profits’.
Thus in short by controlling the manufacturing
programme, sharing to the extent of 50% in the net profits
ascertained in the manner stipulated in the agreement and
above all for sharing 50% of the losses which are to be
deducted from the commission of the agents the agents become
completely equated with the proprietors of the firm itself
and therefore the contract of agency is really a sort of a
partner ship and has been given the cloak and colour of an
agency to conceal the real intent and purpose the commercial
venture.
In view of the decisions referred to above and the
peculiar facts of the present case we are satisfied that the
view taken by the Tribunal that the payments in question
were not legally deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act
was correct. The view taken by the High Court that the
amounts in question were deductible under s. 10(2) (xv)
appears to be legally erroneous cannot be upheld.
For the reasons given above, the appeals are allowed
and the : judgment of the High Court is set aside and that-
of the Tribunal is restored and the two questions referred
to the High Court are answer ed against the assessee Company
and in favour of the Revenue. In view of the peculiar acts
af the present case, we leave the parties to bear their own
costs in this Court.
V.P.S. Appeals allowed.
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