Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
D. N. CHANCHALA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MYSORE AND ORS. ETC.(with connected petitions)
DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1971
BENCH:
SHELAT, J.M.
BENCH:
SHELAT, J.M.
DUA, I.D.
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
CITATION:
1971 AIR 1762 1971 SCR 608
ACT:
Mysore Medical Colleges (Selection for Admission) Rules
1970--Scope of Government’s rule making power-Rules in
University Acts laying down qualifications for admission do
not deprive Government of power to regulate admission to its
own medical colleges affiliated to the Universities Unive
rsity-wise distribution of seats under r. 9(1) not
violative of Art. 14 of Constitution-Setting apart of
certain number of seats under r. 4 and reservation of seats
under r. 5 whether excessive-Whether violative of Art. 15(4)
of Constitution-Requirement of 10 years residence in state
under r. 3-Intermittent residence does not satisfy rule-
Classification of children of political sufferers under r.
4(h) whether a reasonable classification--Term ’political
sufferer’ whether vague.
Constitution of India 1950-Rule 9(1) of Mysore Medical
Colleges (Selection for Admission) Rules 1970 whether
violates Art. 14-Rules 4 and 5 whether make excessive
reservation-Whether violative of Art. 15(4)-Rule 4(h) making
reservation in favour of children of ’political sufferers’
whether discriminatory.
HEADNOTE:
The Government of Mysore State conducts four medical
colleges two of which are affiliated to the Universities of
Mysore and Bangalore, the other two being affiliated to
Karnatak University. C passed her pre-university course
examination from Bangalore University with 67% marks in
optional subjects, namely Physics, Chemistry and Biology.
She then passed the, B.Sc. Part I examination of Karnatak
University. Under the Ordinances of the Karnatak
University, she was entitled to be admitted to the M.B.B.S.
course of Karnatak University. However the Selection
Committee formed under the Mysore Medical Colleges
(Selection for Admission) Rules 1970 did not select her for
admission to that course because of Rule 9 of the said Rules
under which preference for admission to a medical college
run by a University was given to students who had passed the
P.U.C. Examination of the same University and only 20% of
the seats were available to those passing the P.U.C.
Examination of other Universities. C filed a writ petition
under Art. 32 of the Constitution on the following
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contentions: (1) that once the petitioner was eligible for
admission to a medical college affiliated to the Karnatak
University according to the Ordinances of that University,
the State Government could not make rules, the effect of
which was to deprive her of admission; (2) that the
university-wise distribution of seats provided under r. 9(1)
was discriminatory and being without any rational basis
violated Art. 14 of the Constitution; (3) that the
reservation of seats under rr. 4 & 5 for the various
categories of persons set out therein was far more excessive
than permitted by the decisions of this Court and was in
violation of Art. 15(4).
V passed her P.U.C. examination from a government college
affiliated to Venkateshwar University in Andhra Pradesh with
Physics, Chemistry and Biology as her optional subjects,
securing in those subjects 150 out of 200 marks i.e. 75%.
On July 1970 she made an application for selection
609
to a seat in in any one of the medical colleges affiliated
to Karnatak University. The Selection Committee did not
include her in the list of selected candidates and the
reason given was that she was not a resident of the State of
Mysore for not less than 10 years at any time prior to the
date of the application for a seat as required by r. 3 of
the Mysore Medical Colleges (Selection for Admission) Rules
1970. In this connection the petitioner filed a certificate
from the Tahsildar, Bellary that she had resided in the
State of Mysore for a period of 10 years before her
application. It was further stated on her behalf that
though she had left the State of Mysore on the transfer of
her father to Andhra Pradesh before she was ten years old,
she had continued to come and reside at her family house in
the State of Mysore during her vacations.
J. challenged the validity of r. 4(h) of the aforesaid
Rules on the ground that the reservation for children of
’political sufferers’ made therein was not valid under the
Constitution.
Held: (i) So long as the rules for selection applicable
to the medical colleges run by Government do not suffer from
any constitutional or legal infirmity, they cannot be
challenged as the Government can regulate admission to its
own institutions. The objection that it cannot by such
rules, provide for requirements over and above those laid
down by the universities for eligibility, cannot be
sustained. [617D-E]
(ii) Since the universities are set up for satisfying the
educational needs of different areas where they are set up
and medical colleges are established in those areas, it can
safely be presumed that they also were so set up to satisfy
the needs for medical training of those attached to those
universities. There is nothing undesirable in ensuring as
has been done under r. 9 (1) that those attached to such
universities have their ambitions to have training in
specialised subjects like medicine satisfied through
colleges attached to their own universities. Such a basis
for selection has not the disadvantage of district wise or
unit wise selection as any student from any part of the
state can pass the qualifying examination in any of the
three universities irrespective of his place of birth or
residence. Further the rules confer a discretion on the
selection committee to admit outsiders upto 20% of the total
available seats in any one of these colleges i.e. those who
have passed the equivalent examination held by any other
university not only in the state but also elsewhere in
India. It was therefore impossible to say that the basis of
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selection adopted in those rules would defeat the object of
the rules as was said in Rajendran’s case. [619E-620C]
The rules lay down a valid classification. Candidates
passing through the qualifying examination held by a
university form a class by themselves as distinguished from
those passing through such examination from the other two
universities. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus
with the object of the rules, namely, to cater to the needs
of candidates who would naturally look to their own
university to advance their training in technical studies,
such as medical studies. The rules therefore cannot justly
be attached on the ground of hostile discrimination or as
being otherwise in breach of Art. 14. [620G-621A]
(iii) Setting apart 60 seats under r. 4 is not a
reservation but laying down sources for selection
necessitated by certain overriding considerations, such as
obligations towards those who serve the interest of the
country,s security, certain reciprocal obligations and the
like. The reservation under r. 5 though apparently
appearing on the high side, not having been shown as
unreasonably excessive the contention in regard to it must
fail. [622B]
39-1 S.C. India/71
610
(iv) The residence contemplated by r. 3 must prima facie
have an element of continuity or regularity in residence and
would not mean all intermittent stay such as during the
vacations. It would thus appear that V did not,
withstanding the certificate of residence issued by the
Tehsildar, comply with the requirement of 10 years residence
under r. 3. However the percentage of 750/, marks claimed by
the petitioner was only in respect of optional subjects.
Her aggregate marks were only 65% as compared to 65.6%
obtained by the student last selected and on the basis of
this percentage her application was rightly rejected. It
was therefore not necessary to go into the facts relating to
the petitioner’s residence in Mysore State or the validity
of r. 3. [624B-F, G-H]
(v) Per Shelat & Bhargava, JJ. (Dua J. dissenting)
The definition of ’political sufferer’ in r. 4(h) is in
clear and unambiguous language, besides containing
sufficient details so as to distinctively identify the
persons who would fall within it. The person must have suf-
fered incarceration, whether as imprisonment or detention,
for a period of at least six months or been awarded capital
punishment, or must have died while actually in detention or
undergoing imprisonment, or killed or incapacitated
permanently by firing or lathi charge by the police or by
the military, or must have lost employment, property, or
means of livelihood. These should have been the
consequences ’of his having participated in the national
movement for the emancipation of India. There was thus no
ambiguity in the definition of political sufferer which
would result in discrimination in administering the rule.
[626F-H]
It is not unreasonable to extend the principle on which Art.
15 (4) is based to the children of political sufferers who
in consequence of their participation in the emancipation
struggle became unsettled in life, in some cases
economically ruined, and were therefore not in a position to
make available to their children that class of education
which would place them in fair competition with the children
of those who did not suffer from that disadvantage. If that
be so, it must follow that the definition of ’Political
sufferer’ not only makes the children of such sufferers
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distinguishable from the rest but such classification has a
reasonable nexus with the object of the rules which can be
nothing else than a fair and just distribution of seats.
[629G-630C]
Per Dua, J. The object of selection for admission to the
medical colleges, considered in the light of the directive
principles of State policy contained in our Constitution
appears to be to select the best material from amongst the
candidates in order not only to provide them with adequate
means of livelihood, but also to provide the much needed
medical aid to the people and to improve public health
generally. It cannot be confidently said that there is a
reasonable nexus between the differential on which the
children of political sufferers are classified as a distinct
group and the object of admission to the Medical Colleges.
In view however of the admitted fact that the marks obtained
by J were lower than the marks secured by the last candidate
admitted from the category of the children of political
sufferers, the petitioner was not entitled to claim
admission, even if the children of political sufferers were
not given any priority. On this ground alone the petition
of J deserved to be dismissed. Accordingly it was
unnecessary to go into the question of the invalidity of r.
4(h) in this case. [632F-H]
In view of the above findings the writ petitions must be
dismissed.
Rajendran v. Madras, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786, Periakaruppan v.
Tamil Nadu, W.P. 285 and 314 of 1970, decided on Sept. 23,
1970 and Balaji v. Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439,
distinguished.
611
Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath, C.As. 2161-A and 2161B
of 1970, decided on Feb. 11, 1971 and Chitra Ghosh v. Union
of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413, applied.
Surendrakumar v. State, A.I.R. 1969 Raj. 182, Umesh Chandra
v. V. N. Singh, [1967] I.L.R. 46 Pat. 616, Kerala v. Jacob,
A.I.R. 1964 3 6, Ramchandra v. State, A.I.R. 1961 M.P. 247,
Subhashini v. State, A.I.R. 1966 Mys. 40 and Anil Kumar v.
Mysore, (1969) 17 L.R. (Mysore) 110, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 618 to 622 of
1970.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of fundamental rights.
Lakshminarasu, Vineet Kumar and Bindra Thakur, for the
petitioners (in W. P. Nos. 618 and 620 to 622 of 1970).
S. K. Venkataranga, Shyamala Pappu, Vineet Kumar and
Bindra Thakur, for the, petitioner (in W. P. No. 619 of
1970).
Niren De, Attorney-General, R. C. Mahindra and S. P. Nayar,
for respondent Nos. I and 2 (in W. P. Nos. 618 and 620 to
622 ,of 1970).
Sunder Swami, Advocate-General, Mysore and S. P. Nayar for
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (in W. P. No. 619 of 1970).
R. B. Datar, for intervener (in W. P. No. 621 of 1970).
The Judgment of J. M. SHELAT and V. BHARGAVA, JJ. was
delivered by SHELAT, J. I. D. DuA, J. gave a partly
dissenting Opinion.
Shelat, J.-These five petitions have been filed by
candidates who failed to be selected for admission in
Government Medical colleges in the State of Mysore and
challenge the validity of the Selection Rules framed by the
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Government. Since they raise common questions, it is
expedient to deal with them together and dispose them of by
a common judgment. Writ petition No. 619 of 1970, we were
told by counsel, is the most comprehensive of them all and
therefore we shall deal with it first and as typical of the
rest. As the rest of the petitions raise the same
questions, it is not necessary to deal with each of them
separately. Writ petitions Nos. 621 and 622. however, raise
certain additional questions which will be dealt with to
that extent separately.
Writ Petition No. 619 of 1970
The petitioner in this Writ Petition passed the Secondary
School Leaving examination in March 1968 obtaining first
class marks. In March 1969, she passed the Pre-University
Course
612
Examination held by the Bangalore University securing 67%
marks in optional subjects, namely, Physics, Chemistry and
Biology, and 71% marks in the aggregate. Her father having
retired at Dharwar, she prosecuted her further studies for
B.Sc. Part I examination in the Karnatak Science College,
Dharwar, a college affiliated to the Karnatak University.
She passed the B.Sc. Part I examination held by that
University securing once again a first class.
Under Ordinance 144(c) of the Karnatak University, a student
having passed the B.Sc. Part I examination with Physics,
Chemistry and Biology as his optional subjects would be a
eligible for admission to a medical course provided he has
obtained the minimum marks prescribed for admission to that
course from time to time. The petitioner having obtained
first class marks in the B.Sc. Part I examination was,
therefore, eligible for admission to the medical course in
the medical colleges affiliated to that University.
There are three universities in Mysore State, namely, Kar-
natak, Mysore and Bangalore universities. All the three
universities hold pre-university course examination, the
passing of which makes a student eligible for admission to
courses leading to university degrees. But, whereas the
Karnatak. University requires the passing of B.Sc. Part I
examination leading to M.B.B.S. as the minimum qualification
for being eligible for medical course, the other two
universities require the passing of what is called the Pre-
Professional examination, which is equivalent to B.Sc. Part
I leading to M.B.B.S. degree of the Kamatak University.
The State of Mysore conducts four medical colleges, the
Government Medical College at Mysore, which is affiliated to
the Mysore University, the Government Medical College at
Bangalore, which is affiliated to the Bangalore University,
and the Karnatak Medical College at Hubli and the Government
Medical College at Bellary, which are affiliated to the
Karnatak University. All the four medical colleges together
have 765 seats in the aggregate. Besides these four
institutions, there are also private managed medical
colleges at Manipal, Davangere, Belgaum and Gulbarga with
120 seats in each of them, admission upto 10% therein being
under the control of the Government.
The State Government has framed rules, called the Mysore
Medical Colleges.(Selection for Admission) Rules, 1970
regulating admission to Government medical colleges and for
a certain number of seats specified therein in each of the
said private medical colleges. Under these rules, the
selection for admission to the Government medical colleges
as also for the seats under the control of the Government in
other colleges is entrusted to a selection committee
constituted by the Government.
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613
In accordance with the said rules, the petitioner applied to
the selection committee for admission to any one of the
medical colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University. She
was, however, not selected. For appreciating the reasons
why the committee could not select her, one has first to
examine the said rules framed by the Government.
These rules are annexure ’3’ to the writ petition. Under r.
1(2), these rules are to apply for selection for admission
to the Pre-Professional/B.Sc. Part I Course leading to
M.B.B.S. in the said Government medical colleges and to 59
seats in the aggregate in the four private medical colleges
mentioned therein. The expression "the Pre-
Professional/B.Sc. Part I Course leading to M.B.B.S." has
been used in sub-r. (2) of r. 1 to mean Pre-Professional
course in Bangalore and Mysore universities, and B.Sc. Part
I course leading to M.B.B.S. in the Karnatak University.
The scheme under the rules is that on passing the Pre-
University Course examination a pupil becomes eligible to
apply for admission to the Pre-Professional Course in
Bangalore and Mysore universities and to the B.Sc. Part I
Course leading to M.B.B.S. in the Karnatak University, the
common qualification for eligibility to both the said
courses in the three universities being the passing of the
P.U.C. examination. Rule 2 prescribes the qualification for
eligibility. Under this rule the candidate must have passed
the P.U.C. examination or the XI standard of the Higher
Secondary Schools examination of any university established
by law in India or of any institution recognized by the
State Government, or an equivalent examination with (i)
Physics, Chemistry and Biology, or (ii) Chemistry, Botany
and Zoology as optional subjects, or, as provided by cl.
(b), who is a graduate of any university with (i) Physics,
Chemistry and Biology, or (ii) Chemistry, Botany and Zoology
as optional subjects. Such a candidate must have obtained
specified percentage of marks and must be within the age
limit, prescribed by the three universities. Under rule 2,
therefore, there are two categories of candidates who only
are eligible for selection; (1) those who have passed the
P.U.C. examination or an equivalent examination, and (2)
those who are graduates, having graduated with the optional
subjects specified therein. The petitioner, not being a
graduate, fell under the first category, of candidates
eligible for selection.
Rule 2(2) provides that out of the available number of
seats, after deducting the number of seats set apart under
r. 4, 80% of the seats shall be open for those who have
passed the P.U.C. "examination and 20% for those who are
graduates. Rule 4 sets apart in all 60 seats for different
categories of persons, namely, students from Union
territories and States where there are no medical colleges,
students from relatively less developed Commonwealth
countries, cultural scholars and students under T.C.S. of
the
614
Colombo Plan and special Commonwealth Assistance Plan, stu-
dents from Nepal. repatriates from Burma, Ceylon,
Mozambique, children of Defence Personnel and Ex-Defence
Personnel, students who have passed L.A.M.S. and L.U.M.S.,
lady students taking family planning programme, children of
political sufferers, and lastly, students from Goa. Rule 5
provides that out of the number of seats available for
allotment, after deducting the number of seats set apart
under r. 4, 15% shall be reserved for persons belonging to
the Scheduled Castes, 3% shall be reserved for persons
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belonging to the Scheduled Tribes and 30% shall be reserved
for persons belonging to socially and educationally backward
classes. Rule 7(1) provides for the constitution of the
Selection Committee, and Cl. (2) thereof entrusts to the
Committee the duty to select candidates possessing the
requisite qualification for admission to the said Pre-
Professional/B.Sc. Part I Course leading to M.B.B.S. Rules 9
deals with distribution of seats among the several colleges.
Cl. (1) thereof provides that seats in the general pool
shall be distributed university-wise, that is, seats in
colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University shall be
allotted to persons passing from colleges affiliated to that
university, and seats in colleges affiliated to Bangalore
and Mysore Universities shall respectively be allotted to
persons passing from colleges affiliated to each such
university, provided that not more than 20% of the seats in
the colleges affiliated to any university may, in the
discretion of the Selection Committee, be allotted to
students passing from colleges affiliated to any Other
university in the State or elsewhere in India. The rest of
the rules do not affect the petitioner’s case, and
therefore, need not be cited.
Briefly, the effect of these rules is that the qualification
for selection to the Pre-Professional Course, as it is known
in Mysore and Bangalore universities, or B.Sc. Part I Course
leading to M.B.B.S. in the Karnatak University, is that the
candidate has either passed the P.U.C. examination, or is a
graduate having had the aforesaid optional subjects. The
selection is to be made by the-selection committee under r.
7(2) for admission to the Pre-Professional/B.Sc. Part I
leading to M.B.B.S. A student getting admission to the
aforesaid course has thus to pass the Pre-Professional
examination held by the Mysore and Bangalore universities,
or B.Sc. Part I leading to M.B.B.S. examination held by the
Karnatak University. It is only after passing this
examination that a candidate can prosecute the regular
M.B.B.S. course. The common qualification for being
selected for the Pre-Professional or B.Sc. Part- I leading
to M.B.B.S. degree being the passing of the P.U.C.
examination or of being a graduate, passing of B.Sc. Part I
examination by a student is irrelevant, as the marks counted
for selection are those obtained by him either in P.U.C.
examination or the B.Sc. examination. As already stated, r.
2(2) sets
615
apart upto 20% of the seats for those who are graduates,
i.e., those who have obtained B.Sc. degree. A student
passing the P.U.C. examination or an examination equivalent
to that examination can branch off either to (1) Pre-
Professional/B.Sc. Part I leading to M.B.B.S., or (2) B.Sc.
degree course. Under the rules no direct admission to
M.B.B.S. course is possible because every student wishing to
take up that course. has first to be selected for the Pre-
Professional/B.Sc. Part I leading to M.B.B.S. course and
pass the requisite examination in that course.
Though, for the purposes of selection, marks obtained at the
P.U.C. examination or at the B.Sc. examination only are
taken into account and the passing of the B.Sc. Part I
examination is for that purpose not relevant, there appears
to be one advantage to a candidate who has passed B.Sc. Part
I examination with the prescribed optional subjects held by
the Karnatak University. That advantage, as appearing from
the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner’s father
and the correspondence between him and the University
authorities, is that such a candidate, if selected, would be
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directly admitted to the M.B.B.S. degree course in the
medical colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University. It
is not necessary to say anything about what happens in the
other universities since we are for the present not
concerned with such a question.
The second effect of these rules is that if a student has
passed the P.U.C. examination held by a particular
university, such a student is, by virtue of r. 9(1),
eligible for admission in the medical college or colleges
affiliated to that university. The Selection Committee,
however, has the discretion to allot seats, upto 20% of the
seats in the colleges affiliated to a university, to
students passing from colleges affiliated to any other
university in the State or even elsewhere in India.
Consequently, the petitioner having passed her P.U.C. exa-
mination from Bangalore University could apply for admission
in a medical college affiliated to that university. If she
were to apply for admission in a medical college affiliated
to the Karnatak University she could only be selected to a
seat from among seats upto the maximum of 20 % of seats left
in the discretion of the Selection Committee as provided by
r. 9(1). It is true that she had got 67% marks in optional
subjects in the P.U.C. examination and students with lesser
number of marks, but passing from colleges affiliated to the
Karnatak University, got admission. But that was because
she had passed the P.U.C. examination held by the Bangalore
University and wanted admission in a medical
616
college affiliated to another university. namely, the
Karnatak University.
In view of this consequence, counsel for the petitioner made
three submissions: (1) that once the petitioner was eligible
for admission to a medical college affiliated to the
Karnatak University according to the Ordinances of that
university, the State Government could not make rules, the
effect of which was to deprive her of admission (2) that the
university-wise distribution of seats provided under r. 9(1)
was discriminatory and being without any rational basis
violated Art. 14 of the Constitution; and (3) that the
reservation of seats under rr. 4 and 5 for the various cate-
gories of persons set out therein was far more excessive
than permitted by the decisions of this Court and was in
violation of Art. 15(4). Consequently, rr. 4 and 5 laying
down such reservation should be held invalid.
We propose to deal with these submissions in the order in
which they were placed before us by counsel. As seen
earlier, there are two sets of provisions dealing with the
teaching of medical courses. The first consists of
Ordinances of the universities, and the second consists of
the rules framed by the Government for selection of
candidates for admission to the Pre-Professional/ B.Sc. Part
I leading to M.B.B.S. degree,. The Ordinances framed by the
three universities are made under the different Universities
Acts setting up those universities and under the powers
reserved to them under them. These Ordinances are made for
the purposes set out in those Acts and for carrying out
those purposes. One of such purposes would be the
maintenance of certain academic standards in the various
faculties taught in the college affiliated to the
universities. For the purposes of maintaining such
standards the universities lay down certain minimum
qualifications for eligibility for entrance in those
faculties. These Ordinances and regulations made under the
Acts lay down the minimum qualifications required for
eligibility and are not to be confused with rules for
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admission. A candidate may have the minimum qualification
so as to make him eligible for entrance in a particular
faculty. That does not mean that his being eligible
necessarily makes him entitled to admission in that faculty,
for, admission can only be commensurate with the number of
available seats in such a faculty.
The medical colleges in question are not university colleges
but have been set up and are being maintained by the State
Government from out of public funds. Since they are
affiliated to one or the other of the three universities,
the Government cannot frame rules or act inconsistently with
the ordinances or the regulations of the universities laying
down standards of eligibility. It is nobody’s case that the
Government has made rules which are
617
in any way inconsistent with the rules for eligibility laid
down in such ordinances and regulations.
Since the Government has set up these colleges and maintains
them, it has prima facie the power to regulate admission in
its own institutions. Counsel for the petitioner pointed
out to us no provision from the University Acts which
deprives the Government of the power of making rules for
admission in its own colleges. That being so, it cannot be
said that the Government has no power to regulate admission
in its own colleges or that because a student is eligible
for admission under the University ordinances, he
automatically gets a right to admission which he can enforce
in a court of law.
The rules are limited to admission to the Pre-Professional/
B.Sc. Part I Course leading to M.B.B.S. degree in the
Government medical colleges and in respect of 59 seats in
the aggregate in the medical colleges run-by private
management. The control for admission in respect of the 59
seats in the private colleges must .have been acquired by
the Government with the consent of or under some agreement
with those colleges by reason of their getting financial and
other aid from the Government. So long as the rules for
selection applicable to the colleges run by the Government
do not suffer from any constitutional or legal infirmity,
they cannot be challenged as the Government can regulate ad-
mission to its own institutions. The objection that it
cannot, by such rules, provide for requirements over and
above those laid down by the universities for eligibility
cannot be sustained. (See Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu
Narendranath (1) wherein the earlier decisions on this
subject have been examined and followed.)
The next contention was that r. 9(1), which prescribes uni-
versity-wise distribution of seats results in discrimination
for it lays down a classification which is neither based on
any intelligible differentia, nor has a rational nexus with
the object of the rules. The argument was that although
there is one selection committee for all the Government
medical colleges in all the three universities and for the
said 59 seats in private colleges, students passing from
colleges affiliated to a particular university are first
admitted in Government medical colleges affiliated to that
university and only seats upto 20% in each of such medical
colleges can be allotted to outsiders in the discretion of
the committee. The result is that a student having higher
marks than the last admitted student is deprived of a seat
only for the reason that he had passed his P.U.C.
examination from a college affiliated to another university.
According to counsel, such a classification has no rational
basis and has no reasonable nexus with and
(1) C. As. 2161-A and 2161-B of 1970, dec. on Feb. 11,
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1971.
618
is in fact inconsistent with the very object of
establishment of Government medical colleges, namely, to
train in medicine the. most meritorious amongst the
candidates seeking admission.
In support of this contention counsel relied on Rajendran v.
Madras (1) where rule 8 of the selection rules framed by
the, Madras Government was struck down on the ground of its
being violative of Art. 14. Rule 8 provided that the seats
available in the general pool, as also those reserved for
the socially and educationally backward classes would be
allotted amongst various districts on the basis of the ratio
of the population of each district to the total population
of the State. The contention was that distribution of seats
districtwise would result in denial of’ better candidates
from being selected and candidates of inferior calibre
getting selected only because they were born in that dis-
trict where there were fewer candidates of good calibre. In
defence of such a classification, two reasons were urged:
(1) that if districtwise classification was not provided,
candidates from Madras city would get a larger number of
seats in proportion to the population of the State, elbowing
out candidates from the districts, and (2) if selection was
made districtwise, those selected from a district were
likely to settle down as practitioners in that district, so
that the districts were likely to benefit from their
training. It was conceded that Art. 14 permitted
classification. But this Court rejected the justification
for the aforesaid classifications urged by the State on the
ground that the first meant that candidates from the
districts, admitted to be of inferior calibre than
candidates from Madras city, would stand a better chance of’
selection, a result defeating the very object of selection,
namely, to get the best candidates, and the second on the
ground that it was neither pleaded in the counter-affidavit
of the State, nor had the State placed any facts or figures
justifying the plea that students selected districtwise
would settle down as medical practitioners in the respective
districts where they resided. In Periakaruppan v. Tamil
Nadu (2), a rule which provided for distribution of seats
unitwise and which set up different selection committees for
each unit was held to be bad on the ground that it did not
differ much from the districtwise distribution struck down
in Rajendran’s case (1). Whereas formerly the distribution
was districtwise, the system under attack established six
units where, medical colleges were situate, namely, Madras
city, Madurai, Chingleput, Coimbatore, Thanjavur and
Tirunelveli. Though in theory the candidates had the
liberty to apply for any one or more of those units, they
were advised to apply to the unit nearest to, their
residence and were also informed that even if they were to.
(1) [1968]2 S.C.R. 786.
(2) W. Ps. 285 & 314 of 1970, dec. on Sept. 23, 1970.
619
apply to other units, their applications would be forwarded
to the selection committee of that unit which was nearest to
their residence. The consequence of the unit system was
clearly to confine the candidates to the unit nearest to
their residence.
It will be easily seen that the university-wise distribution
of seats in the Government medical colleges has nothing in
common with the districtwise or unitwise selection struck
down in Rajendran’s case (1) and Periakaruppan’s case (2).
In both the cases what was mainly objected to was that the
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selection would have to be made on the basis either of the
place of birth or residence and the candidate was confined
to the medical college at or nearest to such, a place. Such
a basis for selection was held to have no reasonable nexus
with the object of the rules, namely, to select the most
meritorious amongst the candidates to have the advantage of
such education. In Periakaruppan’s case (1) there was a
further infirmity, in that, there were several committees
for selection resulting in varying standards, thus defeating
the very object of screening the candidates with a view to
give chance to the best of them. Both these decisions are
distinguishable as the basis on which the selection of
candidates is sought to be made under the present rules is
quite different in that it is neither districtwise nor
unitwise, but is university-wise. Therefore, the in,
firmaties found in the selection rules in those two cases
and for which they were struck down cannot be relevant in
any scrutiny of the present rules, much less can they be
relied upon for an attack on them.
The three universities were set up in three different places
presumably for the purpose of catering to the educational
and academic needs of those areas. Obviously one university
for the whole of the State could neither have been adequate
nor feaseable to satisfy those needs. Since it would not be
possible to admit all candidates in the medical colleges run
by the Government, some basis for screening the candidates
had to be set up. There can be no manner of doubt, and it
is now fairly well settled, that the Government, as. also
other private agencies, who found such centres for medical
training, have the right to frame rules for admission so
long as those rules are not ’inconsistent with the
university statutes and regulations and do not suffer from
infirmities, constitutional or otherwise. Since the
universities are set up for satisfying-the educational needs
of different areas where they are set up and medical
colleges are established in those areas, it can safely be
presumed that they also were so set up to satisfy the needs
for medical training of those attached to those univer-
sities. In our view, there is nothing undesirable in
ensuring that those attached to such universities have their
ambitions to have
(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786.
(2) W. Ps. 285 & 314 of 1970, dec. on Sept. 23, 1970.
620
training in specialised subjects, like medicine, satisfied
through colleges affiliated to their own universities. Such
a basis for selection has not the disadvantage of
districtwise or unitwise selection as any student from any
part of the state can pass the qualifying examination in any
of the three universities irrespective of the place of his
birth or residence. Further, the rules confer a discretion
on the selection committee to admit outsiders upto 20% of
the total available seats in any one of these colleges,
i.e., those who have passed the equivalent examination held
by any other university not only in the State but also
elsewhere in India. It is, therefore, impossible to say
that the basis of selection adopted in these rules would
defeat the object of the rules as was said in Rajendran’s
case (1) or make possible less meritorious students
obtaining admission at the cost of the better candidates.
The fact that a candidate having lesser marks might obtain
admission at the cost of another having higher marks from
another university does not necessarily mean that a less
meritorious candidate gets advantage over a more meritorious
one. As is well known, different universities have
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different standards in the examinations held by them. A
preference to one attached to one university in its own
institutions for post-graduate or technical training is not
uncommon. Rules giving such a preference are to be found in
various universities. Such a system for that reason alone
is not to be condemned as discriminatory, particularly when
admission to such a university by passing a qualifying
examination held by it is not precluded by any restrictive
qualifications, such as birth or residence, or any other
similar restrictions. In our view, it is not possible to
equate the present basis for selection with these which were
held invalid in the aforesaid two decisions. Further, the
Government which bears the financial burden of running the
Government colleges is entitled to lay down criteria for admis
sion in its own colleges and to decide the sources
from which admission would be made, provided of course, such
classification is not arbitrary and has a rational basis and
a reasonable connection with the object of the rules. So
long as there is no discrimination within each of such
sources, the validity of the rules laying down such sources
cannot be successfully challenged. (See Chitra Ghosh v.
Union of India (2)). In our view, the rules lay down a
valid classification. Candidates passing through the
qualifying examination held by a university form a class by
themselves as distinguished from those passing through such
examination from the other two universities. Such a classi-
fication has a reasonable nexus with the object of the
rules, namely, to cater to the needs of candidates who would
naturally look to their own university to advance their
training in technical
(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786.
(2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413, at 418.
621
studies, such as medical studies. In our opinion, the rules
cannot justly be attacked on the ground of hostile
discrimination being otherwise in breach of Art. 14.
The last challenge to the validity of these rules was based
on the allegation that they lay down excessive reservation
for certain categories of candidates. As already stated,
under cls. (a) to (i) of r. 4, sixty, out of the present
aggregate of 765 seats at the disposal of the Government,
are set apart for the various categories of persons therein
mentioned. As aforesaid, the Government is entitled to lay
down sources from which selection for admission would be
made. A provision laying down such sources is strictly
speaking not a reservation. It is not a reservation as
understood by Art. 15 against which objection can be taken
on the ground that It is excessive. The reservation, as
contemplated by Art. 15, is the one which is made under r.
5. Under that rule, 15 % reservation is for persons
belonging to the Scheduled Castes, 3 % for Scheduled Tribes
and 30 % for socially and educationally backward classes,
that is to say, 48 % in all against 690 available seats
after deducting 60 seats set apart under r. 4. But, setting
apart 15 seats under r. 4(g) for candidates who take up
family planning programme does not constitute a reservation
as any one of the lady candidates can take up that
programme. Therefore, the seats available for distribution
would be 720, 48 % of which are reserved under r. 5. The
question is whether such a reservation is unreasonably
excessive.
It was not disputed that under Art. 15(4) the State was en-
titled to make special provisions for the advancement of
socially and educationally backward classes. It has to be
remembered that the object of Art. 15(4) is to advance the
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interests of the society as a whole by looking after the
interests of its weaker sections. But as stated in Balaji
v. Mysore (1), while making such a provision the rights and
interests of the rest of the society are not to be
absolutely ignored. Consideration for the rest of the
society and those who are its weaker elements have both to
be kept in mind and taking the prevailing circumstances as a
whole have to be adjusted. The impugned provision in
Balaji’s case (1) made reservation of 68% of the seats for
the socially and educationally backward classes in medical
and engineering colleges. Such a high percentage was held
to amount almost to an exclusion of the deserving and
qualified candidates from other communities, which also was
not in the interests of the society as a whole. The Court
there observed that in adjusting the claim of both the
weaker and the stronger elements the reservation for the
former should ordinarily be less than 50%, although no
inflexible percentage could be fixed and the actual
reservation must depend upon the relevant prevailing
circumstances in each case. In
(1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439.
622
Periakaruppan’s case (1) 41 % reservation for the socially
and educationally backward classes was held not to be
excessive. No materials have been placed before us which
would show that in the circumstances prevailing in Mysore
State reservation made under r. 5 is unreasonably excessive.
Setting apart 60 seats under r. 4 is as already stated, not
a reservation but laying down sources for selection
necessitated by certain overriding considerations, such as
obligations towards those who serve the interests of the
country’s security, certain reciprocal obligations and the
like. The reservation, under r. 5, though apparently
appearing on the high side, not having been shown as
unreasonably excessive, the contention in regard to it must
fail.
These were the only three heads under which the validity of
the rules was challenged. For the reasons set opt above,
none of them can be upheld. The writ petition,, therefore,
fails and has to be rejected.
Writ Petition No. 621 of 1970
The petitioner here was born on August 2, 1954 at Bellary.
Bellary had become part of the State of Mysore on October 1,
1953 in consequence of the reorganization of States. In
April 1954, her father, who was till then serving as a
Government servant in the State of Mysore, was transferred
to Andhra Pradesh where he continued to serve until his
retirement from service on June 11, 1970. According to para
(2) of the petition, the petitioner was during this period
with her father at Cuddappah in Andhra Pradesh where he was
serving. In 11968-69, the petitioner passed her S.S.L.C.
examination at, Cuddappah obtaining first class marks. In
1969-70, she passed her P.U.C. examination from a Government
college affiliated to Venkateswara University in Andhra
Pradesh with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as her optional
subjects, securing in those subjects 150 out of 200 marks,
i.e., 75%.
On July 22, 1970, she made an application for selection to a
seat in any one of the medical colleges affiliated to the
Karnatak University. An interview card was issued to her
which bore No. K-20, which signified that she was a
candidate for selection for admission in a medical college
affiliated to the Karnatak University. on October 6, 1970,
the Selection Committee published a list of selected
candidates, but her name was not included in the said list.
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According to the petition, the last student admitted to the
Bellary Medical College in the general pool of seats, (that
is from the balance of seats, after deducting from the total
number of seats reserved under rr. 4 and 5) had obtained
less marks in the P.U.C. examination than marks obtained by
her, that is, 295 out 450 marks which would be 65.6%. The
last student ad-
(1) W. P.S. 285 & 314 of 1970, decd. on Sep. 23, 1970.
623
mitted to the Karnatak Medical College, Hubli had also
obtained 295 out of 450 marks, i.e. 65.6%. Both these
students had passed the P.U.C. examination held by the
Karnatak University.
The reason for non-inclusion of the petitioner’s name in the
said list given by the Selection Committee was that she was
not " a resident in the State of Mysore for not less than
10 years at any time prior to the date of the application
for a seat" as required by r. 3 of, the said Rules. Rule 3
requires that to be eligible for selection, a candidate must
be (a) a citizen of India, (b) a per-son domiciled in the
State of Mysore, and (c) a resident of the State for at
least 10 years at any time before the date of application.
Rule 9(1) provides that seats other than those reserved
under r. 4 shall be distributed university-wise, i.e., seats
in colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University shall be
allotted to persons passing from colleges affiliated to that
university, and seats in colleges affiliated to Bangalore
and Mysore universities shall respectively be allotted to
persons passing from colleges affiliated to each such
university. That rule, however, has a proviso which lays
down that not more than 20% of the seats in colleges
affiliated to any university ’may in the discretion of the
Selection Committee be allotted to students passing from
colleges affiliated to. :any other university in the State
or elsewhere in India. Thus, candidates applying for
selection fall into two categories: (1) those having passed
the P.U.C. examination from colleges affiliated to that
university to which a medical college in which admission is
sought is affiliated, and (2) those having passed the P.U.C.
examination or an equivalent examination held by other
universities in Mysore State or even elsewhere. The
petitioner, therefore, belonged to the second category-
inasmuch as she was a candidate who had passed her P.U.C.
examination not through a college affiliated to the Karnatak
University, but one who had passed the P.U.C. examination
from a university to which none of the medical colleges in
Karnatak was affiliated. Therefore, the proviso to r. 9(1)
would be applicable to her and she would be ,eligible for
selection only from out of the 20% of the seats at the most
left in the discretion of the selection committee.
No question relating to r. 9, however, was raised. The
case, placed before us on behalf of the petitioner, was that
she was a person who had a domicile in Mysore State and had
resided in the State during the period prescribed by r. 3
and was, therefore, entitled to be considered along with the
rest of the candidates. Even assuming that to be so, the
question is whether she satisfied the conditions ’of r. 3 as
regards residence.
Annexed to her application for selection, dated July 22,
1970, was a certificate from the Tehsildar, Bellary,
certifying that she had not only her domicile in Mysore
State but that she had also resided in the State for a
period of 10 years prior to the date of
624
her application. In column 13 of the application, where
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particulars of institutions where the candidate had studied
had to be given, it was stated that the petitioner had
studied in Bellary during the years 1959 to 1963, and
thereafter, from 1963-64 to 196869 in different institutions
in Andhra Pradesh. We will assume, though her father was in
Andhra Pradesh where he served from 1954 to June 1970, that
she was kept in her infancy in Bellary, the total period of
her residence would prima facie come to little less than 9
years, i.e., from August 2, 1954, her date of birth, to
1963. Therefore, the certificate obtained from the
Tehsildar, certifying that she had resided in Mysore for 10
years at any time prior to the date of her application,
would appear not to be factually correct.
This difficulty, however, was sought to be got over by the
affidavit in rejoinder filed by her father in which it was
stated that though the petitioner had been studying in
Andhra Pradesh after 1963, she used to come to the family
house in Bellary during her vacations, and therefore, she
must be deemed to have resided all throughout at Bellary.
Such an explanation, however, suffers from two defects : (1)
that such a plea was made for the first time in the
affidavit in rejoinder in answer to the counter affidavit
filed by the respondents, and (2) that residence as con-
templated by r. 3 must prima facie have an element of
continuity or regularity in residence and would not mean an
intermittent stay such as during the vacations. It would
thus appear that the petitioner did not, notwithstanding the
certificate of residence issued by the Tehsildar, comply
with the requirement of 10 years’ residence under r. 3.
However, for the reasons stated hereafter it is not
necessary to go into these questions either as regards the
facts relating to her residence In Bellary or the validity
of r. 3 sought to be challenged in this petition.
It is true that the petitioner obtained in the P.U.C.
examination held by Venkateswara University, 150 out of 200
marks in optional subjects taken by her, but as her
application itself shows, the total number of marks secured
by her in that examination were 3 89 out of 600 marks, i.e.,
65 %. Even according to her, the last student who secured
selection for the Bellary Medical College had secured 295
out of, 450 marks, i.e., 65.6%. The same percentage of marks
was also secured by the last student admitted to the
Karnatak Medical College, Hubli, both these students having
passed the P.U.C. examination held by the Karnatak
University. Therefore, even irrespective of the fact
whether she had qualified herself or not under r. 3, she
could not have been selected for either of these two
colleges in Karnatak.
The argument that she had been discriminated against in the
sense that though she had secured 75 % marks she was not
625
selected and others, with lesser number of marks than those
secured by her were selected for medical colleges affiliated
to the Karnatak University was founded on a wrong premise.
For comparison between herself and the said two candidates
she took her marks in optional subjects only and apparently
compared them with the total marks obtained by the said two
students in the whole of the P.U.C. examination. There was
thus no comparison between person equally situated even as
regards the number of marks secured by them. But apart from
that, the result obtained by a student in an examination
held by one university cannot be regarded as comparable with
the result obtained by another candidate in an examination
held by another university. Even assuming that a conscious
effort is made to equalise standards obtaining in different
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universities, such standards depend on several human
factors, methods of teaching and examining, the syllabus in
such universities etc. even though the subjects taught and
examined were to be the same. It is well settled that a
question of discrimination can only arise in the case of
persons equally situated. That the petitioner and those
whom the Selection Committee selected were equally situated
cannot, from the facts above stated, be assumed.
Consequently, the argument that r. 3. by prescribing the 10
years’ residence in Mysore State as a qualification for
eligibility, is arbitrary and discriminatory becomes
academic and need not be gone into in the present writ
petition as the petitioner, even without insisting on that
qualification, was not entitled to be selected.
In this view the petition cannot succeeded and has to be
dismissed.
Writ Petition No. 622 of 1970
The petitioner is a science graduate having passed her B.
Sc. examination held by the Bangalore University in 1969.
In that examined, she secured 505 out of 1000 marks, i. e.,
50.5%. On July 23, 1970, she applied for being admitted to
the Pre-Professional Course in Medicine. Her name did not
appear in the list of selected candidates issued by the
Selection Committee under the Rules for Selection of
Candidates for Admission, 1970 framed by the State
Government. Aggrieved by the non-inclusion of her name, the
petitioner filed this writ petition.
Besides raising several disputes which are common to other
writ petitions in the present batch, she raised an
additional issue. challenging the validity of r. 4(h) of the
said Rules. As already stated, the rule provides for
reservation of seats for different categories of candidates
applying for selection and cl. (h) reserves 4 seats each in
the medical colleges at Bangalore, Mysore and Hubli, and 3
seats in the Medical College at Bellary,
40- 1 S.C. India/71
626
in all 15 seats, for the "Children of Political Sufferers".
The petitioner did not challenge the reservation of seats
made in this rule for other categories of persons, such as
children of Defence Personnel and Ex-Defence Personnel, etc.
The challenge to the validity of cl. (h) was two fold. It
was firstly, said that the expressions "political sufferer"
and "the national movement for the emancipation of India" in
the definition of a "political sufferer" are so vague
ambiguous that it would be impossible to identify the
category of persons for whose benefit cl. (h) was framed,
and consequently, there would be ample room for those
administering these rules to resort to partiality,
discrimination and favouritism. The second objection was
that the category of children of political sufferers was
merely fanciful, politically oriented and without any
intelligible differentia, and as such the classification had
no reasonable nexus with the object of these rules. A
number of decisions of different High Courts dealing with
similar admission rules were cited for reinforcing the
argument against the validity of cl. (h) of r. 4.
So far as the first part of the argument is concerned, it
is difficult to envisage the danger apprehended by counsel
or to see the kind of vagueness or ambiguity complained of
by him. The rule contains the definition of a "political
sufferer" as meaning a person who "on account of
participation in the national movement for the emancipation
of India" had suffered imprisonment or detention for a
period of at least six months, or had been awarded capital
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punishment, or had died while undergoing imprisonment or
detention or was killed or became permanently incapacitated
by police or military firing or lathi charge, or lost his
"job, property or other means of livelihood". The
definition is couched in clear and unambiguous language,
besides containing sufficient details, so as to
distinctively identify the persons who would fall within it.
The person must have suffered incarceration, whether as
imprisonment or detention, for a period of at least six
months or been awarded capital punishment, or must have died
while actually in detention or undergoing imprisonment, or
killed or incapacitated permanently by firing or lathi
charge by the police or by the military, or must have lost
employment, property or other means of livelihood. ’These
should have been the consequences of his having participated
in the national movement for the emancipation of India. The
"national movement" must obviously mean the late struggle
for the freedom of the country from the alien British rule.
The ambiguity, counsel complained of, in these words in the
definition is difficult to comprehend. There are ample
details in the definition not to leave any scope for
arbitrariness or discrimination in its application to a
candidate
627
who claims to be a child of the political sufferer envisaged
by cl. (h) of the rule. We, therefore, turn to the second
part of the .argument without detaining ourselves any
further on the grievance of ambiguity in the definition.
The argument is that the category of children of political
sufferers is arbitrary in the sense that it is entirely
politically oriented, is without any rational differentia
and has no nexus with the object of the rules. In support
of the argument against such a category, the case of
Surendrakumar v. State (1) was cited as an illustration
where a similar category had been struck down. The State
Government there had made reservation of seats which was
incorporated in the prospectus issued by each of the five
medical colleges run by the Government. The reservation was
,challenged on the ground of its infringing Art. 14. The
reservation was in respect of 5 categories of candidates,
namely, (1) for foreign private students, cultural scholars’
and private students of .Indian origin domiciled abroad, (2)
students migrating from Burma ;(3) candidates from Scheduled
Castes and Tribes belonging to Rajasthan, (4) children of
Defence personnel belonging to Rajasthan, and (5) children
of political sufferers who are or were bona fide residents
of Rajasthan and who had been to jail in any part ,of India.
Among other things, the reservation for children of
political sufferers was made the target of the challenge.
The High Court upheld the challenge on the grounds (1) that
if the ,object was to afford facilities to political
sufferers, there was no reason why the benefit was
restricted to the residents of Rajasthan only, (2) that the
expression ’political sufferer’ not being a term of art,
opinions might honestly differ as to what sacrifices would
be sufficient to clothe a person with the status of
political sufferer, (3) that the independence movement came
to an end several years ago, and therefore, if any
facilities were to be afforded to these who had suffered by
their participation in it they could be given once only, and
(4) that there was no justification for such a
classification as the only valid classification could be for
obtaining the best material for medical profession and such
a reservation could not achieve but on the contrary defeat
that object.
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In two other decisions, Umesh Chandra v. V. N. Singh(2) and
Kerala v. Jacob, (3) a provision authorising special
preference to the children of the employees of the
University who had rendered meritorious service to the
University, and a provision for reservation for children of
registered medical practitioners in modem medicine were
struck down, the first on the ground that it would lead to
favouritism and patronage, and the second on
(1) A. I. R. 1969 Raj. 182. (2) [1967] 1 L. R. 46 Put. 616.
(3) A. I. R. 1964 Ker. 316.
628
the ground that the classification was not a rational one.
Ram chandra v. State (1) is yet another case where the High
Court, dealing with rules providing for 3% of the seats for
children of bona fide political sufferers as defined in M.
P. Freedom Fighters Pension Rules, 1959, observed, though it
declined to set them aside on other grounds, that "the
preferential treatment accorded to them (the children of
political sufferers) is based upon irrelevant and wholly
extraneous considerations because there is no rational
relation between the political suffering of a person and the
education imparted to his descendants in a medical college
with the object of promoting efficiency in the medical
profession".
On account of paucity of institutions imparting training in
technical studies and the increasing number of candidates
seeking admission therein, there is obviously the need for
classification to enable fair and equitable distribution of
available seats. The very decisions relied on by counsel
for the petitioner implicitly recognise the need for
classification and the power of those who run such
institutions to lay down classification. In Rajendran’s case
(5 this Court impliedly accepted two sources of recruitment
made under the rules there challenged, namely, (1) those
competing for seats in the general pool, and (2) those from
the socially and educationally backward classes for whom
reservation permitted under Art. 15(4) was made. What was
struck down there was the districtwise distribution based on
sheer residence as that would defeat the very object of the
rules, namely, the selection of the best and the most
meritorious from the two sources of recruitment. The power
to lay down sources from which selection would be made was
expressly conceded to the Government in Chitra Ghosh v.
Union of India, (3) this Court observing in that connection
at pp. 418 and 419 of the report that since it was the
Government which bore the financial burden of running the
medical college, it could lay down the criteria for
eligibility and that from the very nature of things it was
not possible to throw the admission open to students from
all over the country. Consequently, the Government could
not be denied the right to decide from what sources
admissions would be made. The Court at the same time
emphasised that if the sources were properly classified,
whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable
basis, the Court would refuse to interfere with the manner
and method of making the classification. The classification
there made were in relation to candidates from Union
territories other than Delhi, children of Central Government
servants posted in Indian missions abroad, candidates under
the Colombo Plan and other international arrangements,
scholars from Jammu & Kashmir, etc. These classifications
were found justifiable on one
(1) A. I. R. 1961 M.P. 247.
(3) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413-
(2) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 22
629
ground or the other and as based on intelligible differentia
which distinguished candidates falling within them from the
rest. The Mysore High Court, in Subhashini v. State (1)
similarly recognized that there could be valid reservations,
apart from those permissible under Art. 15 (4), that such
reservations did not necessarily infringe the equality
protection under Art. 14 and held that classification based
on a lawful State policy was-not violative of that Article.
It upheld on this principle the reservation for children of
Defence Personnel, Ex-Defence personnel as being clearly in
national interest. (See also Anil Kumar v. Mysore (2):
Once the power to lay down classifications or categories of
persons from whom admission is to be given is granted, the
only question which would remain for consideration would be
whether such categorisation has an intelligible criteria and
whether it has a reasonable relation with the object for
which the Rules for admission are made. Rules for admission
are inevitable so long as the demand of every candidate
seeking admission cannot be complied with in view of the
paucity of institutions imparting training in such subjects
as medicine. The definition of a ’political sufferer’ being
a detailed one and in certain terms, it would be easily
possible to distinguish children of such political sufferers
from the rest as possessing the criteria laid down by the
definition. The object of the rules for admission can
obviously be to secure a fair and equitable distribution of
seats amongst those seeking admission and who are eligible
under the University Regulations. Such distribution can be
on the principle that admission should be available to the
best and the most meritorious. But an equally fair and
equitable principle would also be that which secures ad-
mission in a just proportion to those who are handicapped
and who, but for the preferential treatment given to them,
would not stand a chance against those who are not so
handicapped and are, therefore, in a superior position. The
principle underlying Art. 15 (4) is that a preferential
treatment can validly be given because the socially and
educationally backward classes need it, so that in course of
time they stand in equal position with the more advanced
sections of the society. It would not in any way be impro-
per if that principle were also to be applied to those who
are handicapped but do not fall under Art. 15(4). It is on
such a principle that reservation for children of Defence
personnel and Ex-Defence personnel appears to have been
upheld. The criteria for such reservation is that those
serving in the Defence forces or those who had so served are
and were at a disadvantage in giving ,education to their
children since they had to live, while discharging their
duties, in difficult places where normal facilities avail-
(1) A. I. R. 1966 Mys. 40.
(2) 1969 17 L. R. (Mysore) 110.
630
able elsewhere are and were not available. In our view it
is not unreasonable to extend that principle to the children
of political sufferers who in consequence of their
participation in the emancipation struggle became unsettled
in life; in some cases economically ruined, and were
therefore, not in a position to make available to their
children that class of education which would place them in
fair competition with the children of those who did not
suffer from that disadvantage. If that be so, it must
follow that the definition of ’political sufferer’ not only
makes the children of such sufferers distinguishable from
the rest but such a classification has a reasonable nexus
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with the object of the rules which can be nothing else than
a fair and just distribution of seats. In our view, neither
of the two contentions raised by counsel for the petitioner
can be accepted, with the result that the writ
petition .fails and is dismissed.
Writ petitions Nos. 618 and 620 of 1970 raise questions
similar to those dealt with hereinbefore. In accordance
with the reasons hereinbefore given, they fail and are
dismissed.
The result is that all the five petitions are dismissed. In
the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs
in any one of them.
Dua, J.-I have read the judgment prepared by my learned
brother Shelat, J., and I agree that all the writ petitions
should be dismissed with no order as to costs. I should,
however, like, as at present advised, to refrain from
expressing any considered opinion on the validity of r. 4(h)
of the Mysore Medical Colleges (Selection for Admission)
Rules, 1970. The category of persons in whose favour seats
in the Medical Colleges mentioned in this sub-rule are
reserved are described as "children of political sufferers".
The expression "political sufferer" is defined in Expla-
nation (ii) to mean:
"a person who on account of participation in
the national movement for the emancipation of
India-
(a) has suffered imprisonment or detention
for a period of not less than six months, the
said period being calculated taking into
account the period of remission, if any,
granted for good conduct and other like
reasons, or had been awarded capital
punishment or had died while undergoing
imprisonment or detention; or
(b) was killed or became permanently
incapacitated by police or military firing or
lath charge or
631
(c) lost his job, property or other means of
livelihood."
The petitioner’s learned counsed relied on several decisions
in support of his challenge to the validity of this sub-rule
on the ground that this reservation has no rational nexus
with the object of selecting the most meritorious or
suitable candidates for medical education so that they may
be able both to serve the people as doctors with the
requisite efficiency and to find adequate means of
livelihood for themselves. According to the petitioner’s
argument the mere fact that the parents of such candidates
had before 1947, as a result of their participation in
national movement for the emancipation of India from the
foreign rule, suffered imprisonment, detention, disablement,
or loss of property or job, does not necessarily clothe them
with an intelligible differentia distinguishing them as a
separate class in 1970 for admission to the Medical
Colleges. It was contended that what may have happened more
than 23 years ago (as no question of the national movement.
for the emancipation of India could arise after Indian inde-
pendence) is far too remote in point of time for serving as
a rational differentia for sustaining the present
classification in favorite of the children of such political
sufferers. It was not denied that the Government could and
should extend all help needed to rehabilitate such sufferers
in order, so far as reasonably possible, to undo or minimise
the effect of, or to compensate them for, their suffering
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during the national movement. But that is quite different
from giving their children preference over other candidates
otherwise equally placed in the matter of admission to
Medical Colleges in 1970, unless there are cogent grounds
for holding that because of their parents’ suffering prior
to 1947 the children have been so handicapped as to require
a favoured treatment in this respect. The case of the
children of defence personnel, it was urged, clearly stands
on a different footing, as in their case from the very
nature of the duties of the defence personnel their children
are generally speaking likely to suffer from handicaps
justifying preferential treatment. Minor P. Rajendran v.
State of Madras (1) was cited in support of the submission
that the fact that classification by itself is reasonable is
not enough to support it, unless there is a nexus between
the classification and object to be achieved and also that
the object to be achieved in a case of admission to the
Medical Colleges is to get the best talent for admission to
professional colleges.
The learned Attorney-General, however, drew our attention to
Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India (2) in which after approving
the view taken in Minor P. Rajendran’s case (1), it was
added that the object of selecting the best possible
material can be
(2) [1970] 1 S. C. R. 413.
(1) [1968]2 S.C.R. 786.
632
achieved by making proper rules for admission. Permissible
classification, according to the petitioner’s argument, must
be founded on an intelligible differentia distinguishing
persons grouped together from others left out of the group,
and the differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the provision in question.
It was emphasized that what has to be seen is the
distinguishing feature existing at the time of the admission
and the fact that the parents of the candidates had suffered
by their patriotic activities admittedly more than 23 years
ago does not reasonably lead to an inference that in 1970
also the children of such political sufferers constituted a
class by itself requiring preference over other candidates
seeking admission to the Medical Colleges.
The learned Attorney-General apart from relying on the case
of Chitra Ghosh (1) submitted that the petitioner in Writ
Peti-No. 622 of 1970 (R. Jayashree), in which case alone
this sub-rule was challenged, had obtained marks which were
lower than the last candidate admitted from the category of
the children of political sufferers. On this ground it was
submitted that, even assuming r. 4(h) to be invalid, the
petitioner could not claim admission, because her marks were
admittedly lower than those of the last candidate admitted
from the category of the children of political sufferers.
Those children, even ignoring r. 4(h), had a preferential
right as against the petitioner R. Jayashree. In that
situation the learned Attorney-General contended the ques-
tion of the invalidity of r. 4(h) loses all importance and
would hardly be material.
I must confess that from the very beginning it entertained
some doubt about the validity of r. 4(h), and that doubt has
not been dispelled even after hearing the arguments
addressed at the Bar. The object of selection for admission
to the Medical Colleges, considered in the background of the
directive principles of State policy contained in our
Constitution, appears to be to select the best material from
amongst the candidates in order not only to provide them
with adequate means of livelihood, but also to provide the
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much needed medical aid to the people and to improve public
health generally. As already observed, I am not quite sure
if it can be confidently said that there is a reasonable
nexus between the differentia on which the children of
political sufferers are classified as a distinct group and
the object of admission to the Medical Colleges. In view,
however, of the admitted fact that the marks secured by the
petitioner R. Jayashree were lower than the marks secured by
the last candidate admitted from the category of the
children of political sufferers, the petitioner was not
entitled to claim admission, even if the children of
political sufferers were not given any priority. On this
ground alone the
(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413.
633
present Writ Petition (No. 622 of 1970) deserves to be
dismissed. I according consider it unnecessary to go into
the question of the invalidity of r. 4(h) in this case. I
would thus confine the order of dismissal of Writ Petition
No. 622 of 1970 only on this ground without expressing any
considered opinion on the question of the validity of r.
4(h). Except for my reservation on this point, I am in
respectful agreement with all that has been said by my
learned brother Shelat, J.
G.C. Petition dismissed.
634