Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 174 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Pramod Mandal
RESPONDENT:
State of Bihar
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/09/2004
BENCH:
P. VENKATARAMA REDDI & B.P. SINGH
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
B.P. SINGH, J.
In this appeal by special leave the sole appellant is
Pramod Mandal who alongwith six others was put up for trial
before the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur in Sessions
Case No. 739 of 1990 charged of the offence under Section 396
IPC. It is not necessary to refer to the charges framed against
the remaining accused since they are not appellants before us.
The trial court by its judgment and order of April 24, 1995
found the appellant guilty of the offence under section 396 IPC
and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10
years. The appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.125 of
1995 before the High Court of Judicature at Patna which was
dismissed by the High Court by its impugned judgment and
order of April 5, 2002.
We may only observe that of the seven persons put up for
trial before the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge one
Deepak Yadav was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted.
One Parsuram Paswan was sentenced to life imprisonment both
under sections 396 and 302 IPC, while Rajesh Kumar Yadav
was sentenced to life imprisonment under section 396 IPC. The
remaining accused were sentenced to 10 years rigorous
imprisonment under section 396 IPC. The appeals preferred by
the remaining accused have also been disposed of by the High
Court by the impugned judgment.
The case of the prosecution is that the informant Dr.
Balmiki Singh is a resident of Mohalla Sahebganj, Nathnagar.
On January 13, 1989 at 2010 hours he lodged a first
information report at P.S. Nathnagar in which he stated that on
that date at about 7.30 p.m. while he was watching the
television, other members of the family were in the house. His
son Priyadarshi Ashok, PW-1 had gone to the fields and had not
returned. While he was watching the television he saw that
three persons entered his house with concealed faces. Of them
two were armed with pistols and they demanded the keys from
him. He could identify accused Parsuram Paswan by his voice,
stature and eyes. He then heard the cries of his daughter-in-law
coming from another room and when he rushed to her room he
found that two other persons were threatening her, of whom one
was armed with country made pistol. His daughter-in-law
handed over to them whatever ornaments she was wearing at
that time. Two other persons then entered the room who picked
up some articles. Those two persons had not concealed their
faces. Some other dacoits also entered the room of his
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daughter-in-law and started making demands from her. A
relative of his, namely Rajiv Kumar Mishra, PW-4, who was
residing with him, told his daughter-in-law to handover the
keys to the dacoits. Thereafter the dacoits asked Rajiv to open
the almirah but he was unable to do so. One of the dacoits
threatened to kill him if he did not open the almirah. Seeing
this, the informant rushed and caught that hand of the dacoit in
which he was holding the pistol and pushed him towards the
verandah. Thereafter the informant’s daughter, Rani Purnashri
started raising alarm. Some of the dacoits were in the courtyard
of the house and he recognized one of them as Rajesh Yadav
who was armed with a pistol. Rajesh Yadav exhorted
Parshuram to fire and thereafter Parshuram fired hitting his
daughter Rani Purnashri. The dacoits also exploded bombs.
The informant claimed to have recognized one of the
miscreants as Deepak Yadav who assaulted him on his back
with the barrel of his pistol as a result of which his grip over
one of the dacoits, whom he had caught, loosened and that
dacoit slipped away. Thereafter the dacoits fled away. His
daughter Rani Purnashri succumbed to her injuries. By this
time his son Priyadarshi Ashok, PW-1 had also come. He
mentioned in his report that Aruni, Rajiv Kumar Mishra, PW-4
and Madan Sriharsha, PW-2 were also injured. In the report he
also gave descriptions of other dacoits whom he had not
recognized.
A motive was suggested in the report itself. The
informant stated that he had a dispute with Rajesh Yadav and
Deepak Yadav over the demolition of a ridge in his field. An
incident took place in August, 1988 when he had been
threatened by them.
PW.11 Indradeo Singh the investigating officer was
examined by the prosecution. Dr. Kailash Jha, PW-6 was the
doctor who had conducted the post-mortem examination on the
body of the deceased. PWs-8, 9 and 10 were the three
Magistrates who conducted Test Identification Parades on
different dates. Apart from these witnesses, several eye
witnesses were examined, namely PW-1, Priyadarshi Ashok,
son of the informant, PW-2, Madan Sriharsha, another son of
the informant, PW-3 Vijayshree, daughter of the informant and
PW-4 Rajiv Kumar Mishra, relative of the informant. PW-5,
Dr. Balmiki Singh is the informant himself. All the witnesses
have supported the case of the prosecution and there is nothing
in the evidence to discredit them. The trial court as well as the
High Court have carefully scrutinized the evidence of these
witnesses and have concluded that the prosecution had proved
that a dacoity took place in the house of the informant at about
7.30 p.m. on January 13, 1989 and in the course of the
commission of the dacoity the daughter of the informant was
shot dead by one of the dacoits.
Learned counsel for the appellant did not even attempt to
persuade us to hold that the prosecution case was false and such
an occurrence had not taken place at all. He rightly drew our
attention to the evidence on record in support of the defence
that on the date of occurrence there was no electricity supply in
that area between 6.55 p.m. and 7.55 p.m. and, therefore,
identification of the appellant in electric light was not possible,
and that there was no light from any other source which could
have made his identification possible. It was further submitted
that the conviction of the appellant is based on the sole
identification by PW-4 Rajiv Kumar Mishra. It is not safe to
convict the appellant on the basis of his identification.
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We shall first consider the evidence adduced by the
defence to establish that on the date of occurrence between 6.55
p.m. and 7.55 p.m. there was no supply of electrical energy to
Mohalla Sahebganj in Nathnagar. To prove this fact DW-1
Naval Kishore Yadav was examined. He was a correspondence
clerk in the Area Electricity Board, Nathnagar, Bhagalpur. He
produced a register and claimed that supply of electricity to
different areas was noted in the said register by the Switch
Board Operator, Arun Kumar Sah. From the register it
appeared that from 6.55 p.m. to 7.55 p.m. on the date of
occurrence there was no supply of electricity to the area in
question. The entry referred to by him was in the handwriting
of Mr. Arun Kumar Sah. He further stated that the entry had
been certified by the Assistant Engineer Shri B.K. Srivastava.
This witness admitted in cross-examination that the entry sheets
were not bound. He also admitted that the register did not show
in which areas electricity was being supplied.
The High Court has attached no weight to the evidence of
this witness. He was neither the author of the entry in the
register nor was he the certifying officer. The Switch Board
Operator who is stated to have made the entry and the Assistant
Engineer who is stated to have certified that entry were not
examined. There was overwhelming evidence of witnesses to
the effect that there was supply of electricity at the time when
the occurrence took place. Indeed PW-5 stated that he was
watching the television when the dacoits entered his house.
The High Court, therefore, rejected the evidence of DW-1 and
held on the basis of the evidence on record that there was
supply of electricity at the time when dacoity was committed in
the house of PW-5 and the witnesses, therefore, had sufficient
light and opportunity to identify the dacoits.
The next question is whether the evidence of PW-4 Rajiv
Kumar Mishra must be accepted. The courts below have
concurrently found Rajiv Kumar Mishra, PW-4 to be a reliable
and trustworthy witness. It has been noticed that Rajiv Kumar
Mishra had suffered as many as 5 injuries in the course of the
occurrence, three of them being incised injuries and the
remaining two were abrasions. This has been proved by Dr.
Mirtunjay Kumar, PW-7 who examined PW-4. It will thus
appear that PW-4 was in the forefront trying to defend the
members of the family from the onslaught of the dacoits. It is
in that process that he was severely injured by the dacoits.
Obviously he had sufficient opportunity to notice the features of
the dacoits from close quarters. He has been mentioned in the
first information report as the person who had advised the
informant’s daughter-in-law to handover the keys to the dacoits.
It is also stated that thereafter the dacoits wanted him to open
the almirah and when he was not able to open the almirah, he
was threatened with death by the dacoits. We are, therefore,
quite clear in our mind that Rajiv Kumar Mishra, PW-4, being a
young man tried his level best to resist the dacoits to the extent
possible in the circumstances and in that process he was
severely assaulted.
So far as the appellant is concerned, PW-4 had a special
reason to remember his features. He deposed that he identified
the dacoits in the light of electric bulb. He further deposed that
Tuntun Choudhary had assaulted him on his left leg. Similarly
the appellant Pramod Mandal had tried to assault him with an
iron rod. It also appears from the record that this witness had
stated these facts before the Judicial Magistrate who conducted
the Test Identification Parade and this fact had been noted by
the Magistrate in the Identification Chart. It cannot, therefore,
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be said that the role assigned to the appellant by PW-4 was an
after thought.
It was then submitted that the appellant was arrested on
January 17, 1989 and he was put up for Test Identification
Parade on February 18, 1989. Thus there was a delay of one
month in holding the Test Identification Parade and, therefore,
the identification by witnesses in such an identification parade
belatedly held was not reliable, particularly when there was
only one identifying witness against the appellant.
Shri B.B. Singh, learned counsel for the State submitted
that the evidence in this case discloses that the witnesses had
ample opportunity to see the accused in electric light since the
place of occurrence was the house of PW-5. They had
abundant opportunity to notice their features from close
quarters and, therefore, it could not be said that only a month
after the occurrence their memory faded to such an extent
that they could not have identified the culprits on account of
lapse of time. Secondly it is submitted that in this case, having
regard to the evidence on record, the quality of evidence of PW-
4 is such that even if the Test Identification Parade was not
held, his identification in court could be acted upon. Lastly he
submitted that there is no complaint by the appellant that he
was either shown to the witness before the holding of the Test
Identification Parade or that there was any irregularity in the
holding of the Test Identification Parade. He further
emphasized the fact that having regard to the nature of
occurrence, it was not as if the witnesses had only a fleeting
glimpse of the accused. The evidence on record proves that the
occurrence continued for about 25 minutes and, therefore, the
witnesses had ample opportunity to notice the physical
features of the dacoits which must have got imprinted in their
memories. So far as PW-4 is concerned, he submitted that this
witness had deposed in court, and had also earlier stated before
the Magistrate conducting the Test Identification Parade, that
the appellant Pramod Mandal had attempted to assault him with
an iron rod. This statement was not even challenged in his
cross-examination.
The parties have relied upon the decisions of this Court
which we shall consider hereafter.
Learned counsel for the appellant placed considerable
reliance on the decisions of this Court in 1981 (Supp.) SCC 28 :
Wakil Singh and others vs. State of Bihar. In that case the trial
court had acquitted the appellants but the High Court on appeal
reversed the order of acquittal and convicted them. The
judgment of the High Court was impugned before this Court.
Wakil Singh, the first appellant in the appeal, had been
convicted by the High Court on the basis of the testimony of
PW-9 who was the sole identifying witness. This Court noticed
that the Test Identification Parade was held about 3 = months
after the dacoity and observed that in view of such a long lapse
of time it is not possible for a human being to remember the
features of the accused and he is, therefore, very likely to
commit mistakes. In these circumstances unless the evidence is
absolutely clear, it would be unsafe to convict the accused for
such a serious offence on the testimony of a single witness.
This Court also noticed the fact that though PW-9, the
identifying witness was present on September 4, 1965 when a
Test Identification Parade was held, he was not asked to
identify the appellant, but the witness identified the accused
four days later. This circumstance also threw some doubt on
the complicity of the appellant. Moreover it was observed that
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since the High Court was reversing an order of acquittal it
failed to consider the fact that there being only one witness who
identified the accused concerned, the view taken by the trial
court could not be said to be not a reasonable possible view.
This Court, therefore, upheld the order of acquittal.
It will thus be observed that this Court in the aforesaid
judgment has not laid down an invariable rule that if Test
Identification Parade is held after 3 = months or if there is only
one identifying witness, "it would be unsafe to convict the
accused" because the court prefaced this observation by the
words "In these circumstances unless the evidence is absolutely
clear". It is well settled that it is open to a court of fact to
assess the quality of evidence and to determine whether the
evidence on record justifies a conviction. If the court comes to
the conclusion that the evidence does not prove conclusively
the guilt of the accused the court may order his acquittal. Such
an order of acquittal cannot be set aside by a court sitting in
appeal unless it records a finding that the view taken by the trial
court was not a possible reasonable view of the evidence on
record. In Wakil Singh’s case this Court found that the view of
the trial court could not be said to be not a reasonable possible
view and, therefore, interference by the High Court was not
justified. It also noticed the fact that the identifying witness
though present was not asked to identify on the first day, but
was asked to do so on the fourth day. Moreover, the
Test Identification Parade was held after 3-1/2 months. These
features which existed in the case of Wakil Singh (supra) are
absent in the instant case and, therefore, the said decision is
clearly distinguishable.
Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the
decision of this Court in (1987) 3 SCC 331 : Subhash and Shiv
Shankar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, wherein this Court held
that a long interval of nearly 4 months before the Test
Identification Parade was held, made it doubtful whether inspite
of this interval of time the witnesses were able to have a clear
image of the accused in their minds and identify him correctly
at the Test Identification Parade. In the instant case the Test
Identification Parade was held only a month after the
occurrence and not after four months as in the case of Subhash
and Shiv Shankar (supra). The delay in the instant case is not
such as would cast a doubt on the ability of the witnesses to
identify the accused.
Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the
decision of this Court in (1982) 3 SCC 368 : Soni vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh. The said judgment is a brief judgment where on
the facts of the case the court doubted the identification by the
witnesses in view of the delay in holding of the Test
Identification Parade. However, this judgment does not lay
down any principle of law which may be applied to the facts of
the present case. It is a decision on the facts of the case and
cannot be treated as a binding precedent. In fact the said
judgment was noticed by this Court in (2003) 3 SCC 569 : Anil
Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and this Court after
extracting the relevant part of the judgment observed :-
"It is to be seen that apart from stating
that delay throws a doubt on the
genuineness of the identification parade
and observing that after lapse of such a
long time it would be difficult for the
witnesses to remember the facial
expressions, no other reasoning is given
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why such a small delay would be fatal."
Learned counsel for the State submitted that in the instant
case there was no inordinate delay in holding the Test
Identification Parade so as to create a doubt on the genuineness
of the Test Identification Parade. In any event he submitted that
even if it is assumed that there was some delay in holding the
Test Identification Parade, it was the duty of the accused to
question the investigating officer and the Magistrate if any
advantage was sought to be taken on account of the delay in
holding the Test Identification Parade. Reliance was placed on
the judgment of this Court in (1973) 3 SCC 896 : Bharat Singh
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. In the aforesaid judgment this
Court observed thus :-
"In Hasib v. State of Bihar AIR
1972 SC 283; it was observed by the
Court that identification parades belong
to the investigation stage and therefore it
is desirable to hold them at the earliest
opportunity. An early opportunity to
identify tends to minimize the chances of
the memory of the identifying witnesses
fading away due to long lapse of time.
Relying on this decision, counsel for the
appellant contends that no support can be
derived from what transpired at the
parade as it was held long after the arrest
of the appellant. Now it is true that in the
instant case there was a delay of about
three months in holding the identification
parade but here again, no questions were
asked of the investigating officer as to
why and how the delay occurred. It is
true that the burden of establishing the
guilt is on the prosecution but that theory
cannot be carried so far as to hold that
the prosecution must lead evidence to
rebut all possible defences. If the
contention was that the identification
parade was held in an irregular manner or
that there was an undue delay in holding
it, the Magistrate who held the parade
and the Police Officer who conducted the
investigation should have been cross-
examined in that behalf".
In the instant case we find that the defence has not imputed any
motive to the prosecution for the delay in holding the Test
Identification Parade, nor has the defence alleged that there was
any irregularity in the holding of the Test Identification Parade.
The evidence of the Magistrates conducting the Test
Identification Parade as well as the Investigating Officer have
gone unchallenged. Learned counsel for the State is, therefore,
justified in contending that in the facts and circumstances of
this case the holding of the Test Identification Parade, about
one month after the occurrence, is not fatal to the case of the
prosecution as there is nothing to suggest that there was any
motive for the prosecution to delay the holding of the Test
Identification Parade or that any irregularity was committed in
holding the Test Identification Parade.
Learned counsel for the State has also relied upon the
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decision of this Court in (2003) 3 SCC 569 : Anil Kumar vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh wherein the Test Identification Parade
was held 47 days after the arrest of the appellants. This Court
after considering several decisions of this Court including the
decisions in (1994) 1 SCC 413 : Brij Mohan vs. State of
Rajasthan ; (2001) 3 SCC 468 : Daya Singh vs. State of
Haryana and (2000) 1 SCC 471 : State of Maharashtra vs.
Suresh concluded that since the identifying witness was
attacked by the assailants including the appellant and another,
he had a clear look at the assailants. When his younger brother
came to save him he was killed by the assailants while the
witness also received serious injuries. These were
circumstances which would impress upon the mind of the
witness the facial expressions of the assailants and this
impression would not diminish or disappear within a period of
47 days. Similar was the case of the father and the mother of
the identifying witness who had seen the assailants attacking
their sons and one of their sons getting killed. In their memory
also the facial expressions of the assailants will get embossed.
A mere lapse of 47 days would not erase the facial expressions
from their memory.
It is neither possible nor prudent to lay down any
invariable rule as to the period within which a Test
Identification Parade must be held, or the number of witnesses
who must correctly identify the accused, to sustain his
conviction. These matters must be left to the Courts of fact to
decide in the facts and circumstances of each case. If a rule is
laid down prescribing a period within which the Test
Identification Parade must be held, it would only benefit the
professional criminals in whose cases the arrests are delayed as
the police have no clear clue about their identity, they being
persons unknown to the victims. They therefore, have only to
avoid their arrest for the prescribed period to avoid conviction.
Similarly, there may be offences which by their very nature
may be witnessed by a single witness, such as rape. The
offender may be unknown to the victim and the case depends
solely on the identification by the victim, who is otherwise
found to be truthful and reliable. What justification can be
pleaded to contend that such cases must necessarily result in
acquittal because of there being only one identifying witness?
Prudence therefore demands that these matters must be left to
the wisdom of the courts of fact which must consider all aspects
of the matter in the light of the evidence on record before
pronouncing upon the acceptability or rejection of such
identification.
Lastly in (2003) 5 SCC 746 : Malkhansingh and others
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh a three Judge Bench of this Court
of which one of us (B.P. Singh, J.) was a Member, after
considering various decisions of this Court observed thus :-
"It is trite to say that the substantive
evidence is the evidence of identification
in court. Apart from the clear provisions
of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the
position in law is well settled by a catena
of decisions of this Court. The facts,
which establish the identity of the
accused persons, are relevant under
Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a
general rule, the substantive evidence of
a witness is the statement made in court.
The evidence of mere identification of
the accused person at the trial for the first
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time is from its very nature inherently of
a weak character. The purpose of a prior
test identification, therefore, is to test and
strengthen the trustworthiness of that
evidence. It is accordingly considered a
safe rule of prudence to generally look
for corroboration of the sworn testimony
of witnesses in court as to the identity of
the accused who are strangers to them, in
the form of earlier identification
proceedings. This rule of prudence,
however, is subject to exceptions, when,
for example, the court is impressed by a
particular witness on whose testimony it
can safely rely, without such or other
corroboration. The identification parades
belong to the stage of investigation, and
there is no provision in the Code of
Criminal Procedure which obliges the
investigating agency to hold, or confers a
right upon the accused to claim a test
identification parade. They do not
constitute substantive evidence and these
parades are essentially governed by
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Failure to hold a test
identification parade would not make
inadmissible the evidence of
identification in court. The weight to be
attached to such identification should be
a matter for the courts of fact. In
appropriate cases it may accept the
evidence of identification even without
insisting on corroboration".
Learned counsel for the State submitted that having
regard to the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions it
was open to him to contend that even in the absence of the Test
Identification Parade the conviction of the appellant would be
fully justified on the basis of the evidence of PW-4 alone who
identified him in court. In this case, however, his identification
in court is corroborated by his identification in the Test
Identification Parade.
We find considerable force in the submission advanced
by the learned counsel for the State. This is not a case where
the testimony of PW-4 in court is not corroborated by an earlier
identification in test identification proceeding. Since we have
found no irregularity or unfairness in the holding of the Test
Identification Parade, it must be held that the evidence of PW-4
is amply corroborated by the result of the test identification
proceeding. Moreover we have found that the occurrence did
take place in the house of PW-5. PW-4, is an eye witness,
being a relative of PW-5, residing with him. There was
sufficient light to enable the witnesses to identify the dacoits.
The presence of PW-4 cannot be disputed because he bore the
brunt of the attack by the dacoits having suffered three incised
wounds and two other injuries. No reason has been suggested
why this witness should have falsely implicated the appellant.
The dacoity took place for about 25 minutes and PW-4, being
in the forefront of the defence, had ample opportunity to notice
the appearance and physical features of the culprits. So far as
the appellant is concerned, PW-4 categorically stated that he
had attempted to hit him with an iron rod. This fact he also
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stated before the Magistrate who conducted the Test
Identification proceeding. We, therefore, find no reason to
suspect the truthfulness and credibility of this witness. He
appears to be a witness on whom the court can place implicit
reliance. The courts below have found his evidence to be
reliable after critical scrutiny of his testimony. The traumatic
experience of that fateful day in which a young girl lost her life
within his view, must have left the faces of the assailants
imprinted in his memory which certainly would not have
diminished or got erased within a period of only 30 days. There
is, therefore, no reason to doubt either the genuineness of the
Test Identification proceeding or the veracity of the witness.
We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same
is accordingly dismissed.