Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4998 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Government of India & Anr
RESPONDENT:
George Philip
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/11/2006
BENCH:
G.P. Mathur & Dalveer Bhandari
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.2023 of 2006)
G. P. MATHUR, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 10.8.2005 of High Court of Kerala, by
which the writ petition filed by the appellants challenging the order
dated 17.9.1999 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam
Bench, was disposed of with a direction that if Shri George Philip,
respondent in the present appeal, reports for duty within a period of
six months, he shall be reinstated in service but will not be entitled to
any back wages and thereby order of the Tribunal which had awarded
full back wages was modified.
3. Before dealing with the issue raised, it is necessary to mention
the essential facts. The respondent herein, Shri George Philip, was
working as Scientific Officer in Plasma Physics Division, Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Mumbai (for short ’BARC’). He
applied for and was granted Commonwealth Scholarship by the
Ministry of Education for advance research training in Plasma
Physics. He moved an application in the prescribed proforma seeking
permission of the Central Government for being given leave for two
years for the said purpose. The application form contained several
columns and in the column "duration and purpose of visit" it was
mentioned \026 "about two years \026 for advance research training in
Plasma Physics" and again in the column meant for aims and objects,
the same thing was repeated viz. "advance research training in Plasma
Physics". The department of Atomic Energy, Government of India,
vide order dated 8.2.1982 granted permission to the respondent to
accept the Commonwealth Scholarship for a period of two years and
he was granted extraordinary leave for the said period, subject to the
conditions laid down in the Ministry of Finance O.M. No.11(1)-
E(B)/67 dated June 25, 1970. The order has some bearing and,
therefore, it is being reproduced below :-
"Government of India
Department of Atomic Energy
C.S.M. Marg
Bombay -400 039
Sub : Commonwealth Scholarship offered by the Govt.
of Canada - Shri George Philips SO(C), Plasma
Physics Section.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9
Reference is invited to BARC ID Note
No.9/20/TSC/80/4922 dated 7.12.1981 on the above
subject.
The proposal to permit Shri George Philips,
SO(SC), BARC to accept the Commonwealth
Scholarship awarded by the Ministry of Education for a
period of 2 years is approved in the Department. He
will be granted extraordinary leave for the said period
subject to the conditions laid down in the Ministry of
Finance O.M. No.11(1)-E(B)/67 dated June 25, 1970 as
amended from time to time.
Sd/-
( P.B. Desai )
Director
Secretary, TC & TSC, BARC, Bombay \026 400 085
DAE ID No.36/1/81-BARC Vol. II dated February 4,
1982
...
Government of India
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
TC & TSC
Ref: 9/20/TSC/80/540 February 8, 1982
Copy forwarded to :
1. Head, Plasma Physics Section \026 Leave order
granting EOL for two years may be issued under
intimation to this section subject to the condition
that Shri George Philips should not register for
Ph.D. degree and that no extension of leave
beyond two years will be granted. An undertaking
to this effect may please be obtained from Shri
George Philips and forwarded to this section for
record. A service bond for Rs.10,000/- in the
enclosed form may also please be obtained in
triplicate and forwarded to this section.
2. ...........................
3. ...........................
4. ...........................
5. Shri George Philips, SO (SC)
Plasma Physics Section.
Sd/- 8.2.82
(G. Sethuraman)
Secretary, TC & TSC"
In accordance with the order issued by the Government of
India, the respondent gave an undertaking on 9.2.1982, which reads as
under :-
"UNDERTAKING
Consequent to the acceptance of the scholarship awarded
by the Ministry of Education (Department of Education)
for training in Canada and the grant of extra ordinary
leave for a period of two years, this undertaking is given
that I am not registering for a Ph.D. degree and will not
request extension beyond the leave granted during the
training abroad.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9
Signature Sd/-
Name : George Philip
Designation : SO(SC)
Comp. Code : G602/114
Dated : 9.2.82
Trombay, Bombay."
Thereafter, the respondent proceeded on leave with effect from
24.8.1982 and the leave was to expire on 23.8.1984. The Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre of Government of India issued a leave order
on 6.9.1982, which specifically mentioned that the grant of leave to
the respondent is subject to the conditions laid down in the Ministry of
Finance O.M. No.11(1)-E(B)/67 dated June 25, 1970 as amended
from time to time and as approved by Department of Atomic Energy
vide its ID No. 36/1/81-BARC Vol. II dated February 4, 1982. The
period of leave of two years from 24.8.1982 to 23.8.1984 was to be
treated as extraordinary leave. It was further mentioned that but for
proceeding on leave Shri George Philip would have continued to
officiate on the said post and that the period of leave will count for
increment. The respondent, however, did not return to India and did
not report for duty after expiry of leave on 23.8.1984. He applied for
extension of leave which was refused and he continued to overstay the
leave. The department sent him as many as 8 notices and telegrams
wherein it was clearly mentioned that his request for extension of
leave had been refused and he should immediately report back for
duty. After more than two years of expiry of leave, he came back to
India and reported for duty on 10.12.1986. He was placed under
suspension pending enquiry by the order dated 2.1.1987. An enquiry
was accordingly held under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification and Control of Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short
’CCS(CCA) Rules’) on the ground that by overstaying the leave w.e.f.
24.8.1984 onwards, the respondent is acting in a manner unbecoming
of a government servant and had thereby contravened the provisions
of Sub-rule (1)(iii) of Rule 3 of Central Civil Services (Conduct)
Rules, 1964. Shri George Philip submitted his written statement of
defence wherein it was mentioned that he had enrolled himself for a
Ph.D. degree in the University of Alberta and as he had not been able
to complete his work for award of the degree, he had not returned to
India and had not joined duty. In the departmental enquiry copies of
all the documents were supplied to the respondent and he was
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined on
behalf of the department. After a detailed consideration of the material
on record, the enquiry officer gave his findings on 15.11.1989 to the
effect that the respondent had overstayed the leave granted to him and
the charge was fully established. The Secretary, Government of India,
exercising powers under Rule 15(4) of CCS(CCA) Rules, after taking
into consideration the representation made by the respondent and after
consultation with Union Public Service Commission, imposed a
penalty of removal from service with immediate effect upon the
respondent by order dated 18.12.1990.
4. The respondent filed O.A. No.56 of 1992 before Central
Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (for short ’Tribunal’)
challenging the punishment awarded to him. The Tribunal recorded a
finding that there can be no doubt that the respondent did not report
for duty as he should have at the end of the period of leave and that he
is guilty of abandoning the post of duty. However, it was of the
opinion that having regard to the facts of the case the punishment
imposed upon the respondent was harsh. Accordingly, the Tribunal
by its order dated 6.1.1994 held "that the punishment imposed upon
the respondent is quashed while the findings of facts are affirmed"
and further directed that if the respondent moves the competent
authority under Rule 29-A of the CCS(CCA) Rules within one month,
the competent authority will consider the question of quantum of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9
punishment afresh. The appellants herein filed a review petition
before the Tribunal but the same was dismissed on 2.8.1994. The
Secretary to the Government of India, thereafter, passed a fresh order
on 3.4.1996 after consultation with the Union Public Service
Commission imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement from
service upon the respondent with effect from the date when the
original order of punishment was passed i.e. 18.12.1990. This order
was again challenged by the respondent by filing O.A. No.1127 of
1996 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 17.9.1999
allowed the O.A., set aside the penalty of compulsory retirement from
service imposed upon the respondent and directed his reinstatement
with full back wages for the period between the date of removal from
service and reinstatement and treating the said period as duty for all
purposes. It was also observed in the operative part of the order that
the appellants may pass an appropriate order awarding penalty to the
respondent commensurate with the proved misconduct keeping in
view the observations made in this regard. The appellants challenged
the aforesaid order of the Tribunal before the High Court of Kerala by
filing a writ petition which was disposed of by the impugned order
dated 10.8.2005, whereby it was directed that if the respondent reports
for duty within a period of six months, he shall be reinstated in
service, but he will not be entitled to any back wages. The present
appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 17.9.1999 passed by
the Tribunal and the order dated 10.8.2005 passed by the High Court
in the writ petition filed by the appellants.
5. Shri Vikas Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, has
submitted that while seeking prior permission of the Central
Government for availing the Commonwealth Scholarship awarded by
the Ministry of Education, the respondent had stated in unambiguous
terms that he was going to join a University in Canada for advance
research training in Plasma Physics and the duration of the said
training was about two years. He had never indicated at any point of
time that he wanted to enroll himself for a Ph.D. degree. The
Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, had by order
dated 8.2.1982 sanctioned leave to the respondent for a period of two
years. In the said order it was clearly mentioned that the extraordinary
leave was being granted for a period of two years subject to the
condition that the respondent should not register himself for Ph.D.
degree and that no extension of leave beyond two years will be
granted and an undertaking in that regard may be obtained. The
respondent gave an undertaking on the very next day i.e. on 9.2.1982,
wherein he clearly stated that "I am not registering for a Ph.D. degree
and will not request extension beyond the leave granted during the
training abroad." However, the respondent did not report for duty
after his leave expired on 23.8.1984 and he requested for extension of
leave on the ground that he had enrolled himself for Ph.D. degree and
his work was not complete. The request of the respondent was turned
down and the department sent him 8 notices and telegrams asking him
to report for duty, but he did not comply with the directions issued and
instead reported for duty on 10.12.1986, after more than two years of
expiry of leave. In the departmental enquiry the respondent was held
guilty of the charges and accordingly the punishment of removal from
service was imposed by the competent authority on 18.12.1990. The
Tribunal in its judgment and order dated 6.1.1994 had affirmed the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer but had merely quashed the
order of punishment, as in its opinion, it was disproportionate to the
charge and had directed for a fresh consideration limited to the
question of punishment. Thereafter, an order of compulsory retirement
from service was passed against the respondent. This order was also
challenged by the respondent before the Tribunal and curiously
enough this time the Tribunal passed an order of reinstatement with
full back wages treating the period of removal from service till
reinstatement as period spent on duty for all purposes. Learned
counsel has submitted that the Tribunal having affirmed the findings
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9
recorded by the enquiry officer in its first order dated 6.1.1994, it was
not open to the Tribunal to take a contrary view at the second stage
when the order of compulsory retirement was challenged by the
respondent and it could not have gone into the merits of the case.
Learned counsel has further submitted that having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case the punishment of compulsory
retirement form service imposed upon the respondent could not be
said to be disproportionate to the gravamen of the charge and the High
Court erred in setting aside the said order and directing reinstatement
of the respondent.
6. Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel for the
respondent, has submitted that the respondent had joined for a Ph.D.
degree in a University in Canada and as he had not been able to
complete the work required for the said degree, he had no option but
to stay there even after expiry of leave. Learned counsel has
submitted that it was a case of helplessness of a scientist who was
keen to do research work and to get a Ph.D. degree and if the
respondent had obtained the said degree, it would have been of
immense value to Bhabha Atomic Research Centre as well. Learned
counsel has thus submitted that the requirement of discipline will be
satisfied by the order passed by the High Court, whereby the penalty
of compulsory retirement has been set aside and the respondent has
been directed to be reinstated but without any back wages.
7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions
made by learned counsel for the parties. It requires to be noticed that
while seeking permission of the Central Government to proceed to
Canada, the respondent had clearly mentioned that the purpose of his
visit was "for advance research training in Plasma Physics" and the
duration of the training was "two years". In the order dated 8.2.1982
passed by the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, it
was clearly mentioned that the respondent is being sanctioned
extraordinary leave for a period of two years and this was subject to
the condition that he should not register for Ph.D. degree and that no
extension of leave beyond two years will be granted. The respondent
also gave an undertaking on 9.2.1982 that he would not register
himself for a Ph.D. degree and that he would not request extension of
leave during the training abroad. In fact, the leave order dated
6.9.1982 clearly specified that the period of leave was from 24.8.1982
to 23.8.1984 and the said period of leave will count for increment.
The fact that the respondent enrolled himself for a Ph.D. degree shows
that he did not state the correct facts while moving the application to
the Ministry of Education for award of Commonwealth Scholarship
and while seeking permission to go abroad and applying for leave.
His intention right from the beginning was to somehow get a
scholarship in order to join a University in Canada for award of a
Ph.D. degree. There can be no manner of doubt that he violated the
undertaking given by him that he would not register for a Ph.D.
degree and would not request for extension of leave. Though as
many as 8 notices and telegrams were sent to the respondent refusing
his request for extension of leave and asking him to report for duty,
but he chose to overstay the leave by over two years. In the enquiry
the charges were found to have been proved and this finding was
affirmed by the Tribunal in its first order dated 6.1.1994. It is indeed
surprising that when the respondent challenged the order of
compulsory retirement passed thereafter, the Tribunal went into the
question as to whether the charges are proved or not and after
examining the evidence again which it was not entitled to do, directed
for reinstatement with full back wages and issued a further direction
that the period of his absence shall be counted as period on duty for all
purposes. This is clearly illegal as the order dated 6.1.1994 passed by
the Tribunal affirming the findings recorded in the enquiry had not
been challenged by the respondent and the only issue before the
Tribunal was the quantum of punishment which had been imposed
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9
upon the respondent as a consequence of the direction issued in the
first order of the Tribunal dated 6.1.1994. The High Court has
observed that the benefit granted by the Tribunal cannot be denied to
the respondent since it did not find any illegality in its approach
excepting the direction regarding the wholesale back wages. With
respects, the High Court failed to notice that the findings in enquiry
having been affirmed by the Tribunal at the first stage, it was not open
to the Tribunal while hearing the O.A. challenging the award of
punishment of compulsory retirement, to go into the question
regarding establishment of charge against the respondent. Thus, the
second order of the Tribunal dated 17.9.1999 and the order passed by
the High Court dated 10.8.2005 in that regard are clearly illegal.
8. Another question which arises for consideration is whether in
view of the findings recorded in the enquiry, which were affirmed by
the Tribunal in its first order dated 6.1.1994 that the respondent
violated the undertaking given by him by registering himself for a
Ph.D. degree and further in not reporting for duty after expiry of leave
on 23.8.1984 and overstaying his leave by more than two years, the
punishment of compulsory retirement imposed upon him can be said
to be suffering from such illegality which may warrant interference
either by the Tribunal or by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. It is trite that the Tribunal or the High Court exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution are not hearing an
appeal against the decision of the disciplinary authority imposing
punishment upon the delinquent employee. The jurisdiction exercised
by the Tribunal or the High Court is a limited one and while
exercising the power of judicial review, they cannot set aside the
punishment altogether or impose some other penalty unless they find
that there has been a substantial noncompliance of the rules of
procedure or a gross violation of rules of natural justice which has
caused prejudice to the employee and has resulted in miscarriage of
justice or the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the
gravamen of the charge. The scope of judicial review in matters
relating to disciplinary action against employees has been settled by a
catena of decisions of this Court and reference to only some of them
will suffice. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749,
it was observed as under in para 18 of the reports :-
"18. A review of the above legal position would
establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the
appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have
exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to
maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion
to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the
magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High
Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial
review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on
penalty and impose some other penalty. If the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief,
either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to
reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the
litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases,
impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in
support thereof."
In Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386, after
considering large number of cases, the principle was summarized as
under in para 71 of the reports:-
"71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9
it must be held that where an administrative decision
relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned
as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the court is confined to
Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing
authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a
primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental
freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies
in such a context. The court while reviewing punishment
and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are
violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the
administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of
punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long
delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings
and in the time taken in the courts, and in such extreme
or rare cases can the court substitute its own view as to
the quantum of punishment."
In Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & Anr. v. Munna
Lal Jain (2005) 10 SCC 84, it was observed that the Court should not
interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or
suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or
moral standards. The Court would not go into the correctness of the
choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should
not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of
judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process
and not the decision.
In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade (2005) 3
SCC 134, the respondent was dismissed from service on the charge of
having used abusive and filthy language against his supervisor. The
labour Court on the finding that the punishment of dismissal was
harsh and improper, directed his reinstatement with continuity of
service and two-third back wages. The writ petition filed by the
employer was dismissed both by the learned Single Judge and also by
the Division Bench of the High Court. In appeal a three Judge Bench
of this Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and also the
award of the labour Court and upheld the order of the disciplinary
authority dismissing the respondent from service. In Bharat Forge Co.
Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate (2005) 2 SCC 489, the respondent
workman was found sleeping at about 11.40 a.m. while he was on
duty in the first shift. On some earlier occasions also he was found
guilty of similar misconduct. After domestic enquiry wherein he was
found guilty, he was dismissed from service. The labour Court held
that the punishment of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate and
no reasonable employer could impose such punishment for the proved
misconduct and accordingly directed reinstatement with fifty per cent
back wages. There was a revision to the Industrial Tribunal and then
a writ petition and finally in letters patent appeal the Division Bench
of the High Court modified the award of the labour Court by directing
the employer to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to the workman. In
appeal this Court, after referring to large number of earlier decisions,
set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restored the order
passed by the employer.
10. There are several decisions of this Court wherein the order of
disciplinary authority directing removal or dismissal of an employee
on the ground of long absence or overstay of leave has been upheld.
In Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 309, the
appellant who was constable in Railway Protection Special Force left
duty without leave being granted and returned after 25 days and then
sought leave. The order of removal from service passed by the
authorities was set aside by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition
filed by the employee who directed that some punishment other than
order of removal or dismissal or compulsory retirement from service
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9
may be passed. The Division Bench of the High Court restored the
order passed by the disciplinary authority and the said judgment was
affirmed by this Court in appeal on the ground that the scope of
interference with punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is
very limited and unless the punishment is shockingly
disproportionate, the Court cannot interfere with the same and the
employee having failed to show any mitigating circumstances in his
favour, the punishment awarded by the authorities could not be
characterized as disproportionate or shocking. In Delhi Transport
Corporation v. Sardar Singh (2004) 7 SCC 574, several cases of
conductors involving absence from duty ranging from 45 days to 294
days without sanctioned leave were considered. The order of the
Single Judge of the High Court holding that the employer was
justified in passing the order of termination/removal was affirmed by
this Court reversing the order of Division Bench of the High Court,
wherein the order of the Industrial Tribunal refusing to accord
approval to the punishment had been approved. In Union of India &
Ors. v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat (2005) 13 SCC 228, the order of removal
from service passed against the respondent, who was a constable in
CRPF on the ground that he had overstayed his leave by 315 days was
affirmed by this Court reversing the decision of the High Court, by
which it was held that the misconduct alleged called for a minor
punishment and not a punishment of removal from service. In State
of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Mohd. Ayub Naz (2006) 1 SCC 589, the
respondent who was an employee of cooperative department remained
absent for about 3 years and his service was terminated after a
departmental enquiry. The learned Single Judge of the High Court
took the view that the facts and circumstances of the case called for a
lesser punishment and thus directed that the employee shall be
deemed to have retired after having put in 20 years of service with all
retiral benefits, which order was affirmed in letters patent appeal
before the Division Bench. This Court set aside the order of the High
Court with the observation that while considering the quantum of
punishment, the role of administrative authority is primary and that of
Court is secondary, confined to see if discretion exercised by the
disciplinary authority caused extensive infringement of rights and held
that the punishment of removal was absolutely correct.
11. The contention of Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior
counsel that respondent was in a dilemma as he had not been able to
complete the research work for award of a Ph.D. degree and,
therefore, he could not return to India to join duty and also that if the
respondent had completed his Ph.D., he would have been more useful
and advantageous to BARC, cannot be accepted. Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre is a premier scientific institution of the country
where research is conducted in the field of atomic energy. The work
is basically of experimental nature for which very expensive
equipment has to be acquired. If the employees of BARC are allowed
to proceed on long leave in order to acquire some higher degree or
expertise which may advance their own career prospects, the ultimate
sufferer would be BARC as the equipment on which they are working
would lie idle for a long period. The nature of work being highly
specialized, there would not be many people in the organisation who
may carry on the work in that particular field unlike a factory where
one workman may be substituted by another to work on a particular
machine. By the time the employee returns for work, the equipment
may become obsolete resulting in wastage of public money. The fact
that while sanctioning leave a specific undertaking was sought from
the respondent that he would not register for a Ph.D. degree and that
he would not ask for extension of leave, clearly shows that BARC was
guarding against such a contingency as for completing Ph.D. in the
field of atomic energy and related subjects requires considerable
amount of practical work, which cannot normally be completed in two
years. At any rate, the respondent being fully aware of the conditions
under which he was sanctioned leave, viz., that he was not to register
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9
for Ph.D. degree and was not to make a request for extension of leave
beyond two years, it was not open to him to enroll himself for Ph.D.
and then seek extension of leave on the ground that he had not been
able to complete the research work for award of the degree and should
not be compelled to leave his work midway.
12. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the punishment of compulsory retirement
imposed upon the respondent cannot be held to be disproportionate,
much less shockingly disproportionate, and there was absolutely no
ground on which the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with
the order passed by the appellants.
13. Before parting with the case we consider it our duty to refer to a
rather unusual one-sided approach of the High Court. In the
penultimate paragraph of the judgment, the High Court has observed
"that the respondent was not personally representing himself in the
proceedings and he had authorized throughout his power of attorney
holder, obviously indicating that he was not available for being
considered for employment". Then in the operative portion of the
order six months’ time is granted to the respondent to report for duty.
It appears that this long period of time was granted to the respondent
as he was not present in India and was abroad. In a case involving
overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to
join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is
wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization. Article
51A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every
citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and
collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of
endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the
employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should
not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit
and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution has the tendency to
negate or destroy the same.
14. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment
and order dated 17.9.1999 of the Tribunal and the judgment and order
dated 10.8.2005 of the High Court are set aside and the order of
compulsory retirement passed by the appellants is affirmed.