Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 475
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 25076 of 2024)
ANN SAURABH DUTT ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SAURABH IQBAL
BAHADUR DUTT ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 28451 OF 2024
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
Civil Appeal @ SLP(Civil) No. 25076 of 2024
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
st
3. We are well into the 21 Century, and yet an
attempt by a qualified woman to pursue her
professional career and to secure a safe and stable
Digitally signed by
SHIPRA NARANG
Date: 2026.05.12
17:08:45 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
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environment for the upbringing of her child has been
treated as an act of cruelty and desertion by the
Courts below. We are constrained to observe that the
approach adopted by the learned Family Court, as
affirmed by the High Court, is not only legally
unsustainable but also deeply disquieting. The
endeavour of the appellant to establish her own
dental clinic at Ahmedabad, rather than allowing the
professional qualification she had earned through
years of effort to lie dormant and go waste, has been
viewed with disapproval, merely because her stance
did not conform to the expectation of the husband
and the in-laws that she must abandon her
aspirations and reside with her husband at a remote
location on account of his posting as an Army Officer.
4. The reasoning which permeates the impugned
judgments appears to be founded upon deeply
entrenched archaic societal assumptions that a wife’s
professional identity is subject to an implied spousal
veto; that her autonomy must yield to the
geographical and occupational demands of her
husband; and that her decision to secure a safer and
more conducive environment for the upbringing of
her child, even at the cost of living separately for
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certain periods, would construe as a matrimonial
default. Such assumptions, rooted in a conservative
patriarchal understanding of marital roles, are wholly
incompatible with the progressive evolution of
society, where dignity, autonomy, and equal
participation of women in all spheres are increasingly
recognised as fundamental to social advancement.
5. It must be emphasised that a well-educated and
professionally qualified woman cannot be expected to
be confined within the rigid boundaries of
matrimonial obligations alone. Marriage does not
eclipse her individuality, nor does it subjugate her
identity under that of her spouse. It is for both the
husband and the wife to balance their marital ties in
a manner that respects mutual aspirations, and not
for one to unilaterally dictate the life choices of the
other. As has been recognised in the evolving
discourse on matrimonial jurisprudence, a woman
can no longer be treated as a mere appendage to the
household of the husband, and her independent
intellectual and professional identity and aspirations
must receive due credence and respect.
6. What is portrayed as defiance in the impugned
judgments is, in truth, an assertion of independence;
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what is labelled as desertion is, on a closer scrutiny,
a consequence of circumstances shaped by
professional commitments, the welfare of the minor
child, and the realities of life. To characterise such
conduct as cruelty or desertion is to effectively
penalise the appellant for exercising choices that are
integral to her dignity and personhood. The
expectation that a woman must invariably sacrifice
her career and conform to traditional notions of an
obedient wife meant for cohabitation, irrespective of
her own aspirations or the welfare of the child,
reflects a line of reasoning that is archaic, ultra-
conservative, and cannot be countenanced in the
present day scenario when women are leading
various professional fields from the forefront.
7. The factual matrix, as it unfolds from the
record, would demonstrate that the conduct
attributed to the appellant as cruelty or desertion
was, in reality, a manifestation of legitimate choices
made in pursuit of professional fulfilment and
responsible parenthood. It is in this backdrop and
keeping in view the need to harmonise matrimonial
obligations with the constitutional guarantee of
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individual autonomy, that the present lis warrants
adjudication with a fine balance.
Background: -
8. The appellant and the respondent were married
rd
on 3 September, 2009. The appellant is a qualified
dentist, and the respondent was serving in the Indian
Army and was posted at Pune.
9. The appellant started her own private dental
clinic at Pune in the month of June, 2010. A year
later, the respondent came to be posted at Kargil.
The appellant sacrificed her dental practice to be
besides her husband (respondent) and shifted to
Kargil. Both stayed together at Kargil for over four
months. During this period, the appellant conceived.
Finding the circumstances not conducive to her
pregnancy, particularly in view of the limited medical
facilities at Kargil, the place of posting of the
respondent, the appellant returned to Ahmedabad
and started living with her in-laws.
10. However, as per the appellant, owing to the
difference in religious background from which the
parties hail (the appellant is a Christian and the
respondent is a Hindu), the relationship between
them started going southwards. The appellant
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thereafter moved to her parental home at
th
Ahmedabad. She gave birth to a female child on 12
April, 2012, who continues to be in her care and
custody.
11.
After the birth of the daughter, the appellant
went to Kargil to stay with the respondent, where the
child developed certain medical complications, to be
specific, seizure episodes, and was required to be
admitted to the military hospital. As the condition of
the child did not show improvement and in view of
the limited specialized medical facilities available at
Kargil, the parties returned to Ahmedabad with the
child so that she could be provided proper further
treatment.
12. The aforesaid sequence of events precipitated
severe discord between the spouses. The appellant
thereupon approached the competent Army
authorities seeking maintenance for herself and the
minor child. The Army authorities, vide order dated
th
12 May, 2014, allowed the application and directed
the respondent to pay 22% of his salary to the
appellant and 5.5% to the minor daughter. It appears
that the said order was passed in terms of the
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applicable Army instructions governing maintenance
to dependents.
13. The order granting maintenance was challenged
by the respondent before the Armed Forces Tribunal,
Lucknow. The matrimonial strife between the parties
escalated, leading to initiation of multiple
proceedings before different fora, including the
learned Family Court No.2 of Ahmedabad City at
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Ahmedabad . During the pendency of such
proceedings, efforts were made to bring about a
reconciliation between the parties; however, the same
th
did not fructify. Thereafter, by order dated 11
February, 2022, the learned Family Court granted
interim maintenance to the tune of Rs.55,000/- per
month (Rs.35,000/- to the appellant and
Rs.20,000/- to the minor daughter).
14. In revision preferred by the respondent before
the High Court for assailing the said order, the
quantum of interim maintenance was modified and
the amount payable to the appellant was scaled down
to Rs.25,000/- per month, while the amount of
Rs.20,000/- per month awarded to the minor
1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Family Court”.
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daughter as maintenance was maintained. The same
terms of maintenance were finalized by the learned
th
Family Court vide final order dated 30 September,
2022.
15.
In the intervening period, the respondent had
also filed Family Suit No. 2361 of 2017 seeking
dissolution of marriage. During the course of the said
proceedings, he also moved an application under
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Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973
read with Section 340 CrPC (Exh. 54), alleging that
the appellant had made false statements on oath in
proceedings relating to interim maintenance, and
sought her prosecution for perjury. The learned
th
Family Court, vide judgment and decree dated 30
September, 2022, decreed the suit for divorce on the
grounds of cruelty and desertion attributed to the
appellant and simultaneously, by the same
judgment, rejected the aforesaid application of the
respondent (Exh.54).
16. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred a First
3
Appeal to the High Court at Gujarat at Ahmedabad
challenging the decree of divorce, whereas the
2
For short, ‘CrPC’.
3
Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
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respondent preferred a separate First Appeal
challenging the rejection of his application filed under
Section 195 of the CrPC read with Section 340 CrPC.
17. While pressing the appeal, the appellant simply
urged for expunging of the observations and findings
pertaining to desertion and cruelty while not
contesting the grant of divorce, whereas the
respondent pressed hard for acceptance of his appeal
and prosecution of the appellant for perjury.
18. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
th
both the appeals by judgment dated 12 August,
2024 which is assailed by both the parties in this
appeal by special leave.
19. We have heard the learned counsel for the
appellant and the respondent, who appeared in-
person, and have considered the submissions
advanced. The appellant Ms. Ann has just prayed for
expungement of the findings of desertion and cruelty
which prayer was hotly contested by the respondent
Saurabh Dutt. Thus, we have perused and gone
through the findings of the Family Court on these
issues and find the same to be appalling and totally
unacceptable.
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20. At this stage, we would like to extract the
findings recorded by the learned Family Court, while
granting divorce and dissolving the marriage of the
parties, which are as below:-
(i) That the appellant was not inclined to
continue with the marriage, as she gave
precedence to her career by operating a
dental clinic at Ahmedabad;
(ii) That the appellant got invitation cards
printed for the opening of her dental clinic
and circulated the same without the
knowledge of the respondent and his family,
which, according to the learned Family
Court, amounted to cruelty, as it was
expected of a wife or daughter-in-law that any
such step be taken with the knowledge of the
husband or his family;
(iii) That the setting up of the dental clinic
without informing the family was not
reflective of healthy family relations and,
according to the learned Family Court, such
conduct, amounted to disregard for the
emotions and feelings of the family;
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(iv) That the request made by the appellant that,
during visits to Ahmedabad, she be permitted
to stay at her parental home was also treated
as an act of cruelty, as, according to the
learned Family Court, a married woman is
expected to reside with her husband at the
matrimonial home;
(v) That whenever the parties came to
Ahmedabad, they resided separately, as the
appellant stayed at her parental home while
the respondent stayed at his own residence;
(vi) That the allegation of the respondent that, on
one occasion, the appellant did not permit his
mother to take the minor daughter in her lap
or to touch her, allegedly on account of fear
of infection, was also treated to be indicative
of cruelty;
(vii) It was observed by the learned Family Court,
in paragraph 26 of the judgment, that it was
the bounden duty of a wife to reside with her
husband wherever he may choose to reside,
and that the husband could not be deprived
of his conjugal rights except under special
circumstances which absolved the wife of
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such duty. The appellant’s attempt to run her
own dental clinic was held to be indicative of
an intent not to reside with the respondent at
his place of posting and was accordingly
treated as desertion;
(viii) In paragraph 27 of the judgment, the learned
Family Court observed that the marriage
between the parties had irretrievably broken
down and that a decree of divorce was
warranted on account of such breakdown,
resulting from acts of cruelty and desertion
on the part of the appellant.
21. Having gone through the above findings
recorded by the learned Family Judge, we find the
approach of the Presiding Judge to be pedantic and
regressive, to say the least. The endeavour on the part
of the appellant to choose a more secure place for
bringing up her minor daughter, who suffered from a
concerning medical condition, could not have been
construed as an act of desertion under any
circumstances.
22. True it is that, in ideal conditions, an army
officer’s wife would be expected to accompany her
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husband even if the posting is at difficult locations.
However, merely because the wife decided to reside at
Ahmedabad with the primary intention to provide a
safer environment and better health care to her
daughter, where she could also pursue her
professional career, branding such conduct as
constituting cruelty or desertion was atrocious to say
the least.
23. It reflects an ultra-conservative and myopic
approach of the Presiding Officer. To brandish the
effort of the wife to pursue her own career goals as
acts of cruelty, as the same may have hurt the
sentiments of the husband or the in-laws, is highly
objectionable and deplorable in the era where the
society proudly talks of women empowerment.
24. The learned Family Judge laid much emphasis
on the incident wherein the appellant inaugurated
her dental clinic without informing the respondent or
her in-laws. The said act was held to be an act of
cruelty. Looking to the approach that the respondent
has displayed all throughout the proceedings, it is
apparent that his attitude was of male chauvinism
claiming an exalted status on account of Army service
and never to promote or support the career of his own
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wife, herself a qualified Dentist. Under such
circumstances, if at all, the appellant opened the
dental clinic without disclosing the same to the
respondent, it must have been a decision taken out
of sheer compulsion and to deter her husband from
obstructing her rightful pursuit of a professional
career.
25. Needless to state that the appellant must have
put in great efforts and expenditure for acquiring the
degree in Dentistry. Thus, the approach of the Family
Court was clearly meant to convey that the wife even
though having a degree in Dentistry, should have
sacrificed her own career to go and stay with her
husband at his place of posting and failure to do so,
tantamounted to committing cruelty by deserting her
husband. This approach can never be countenanced
and deserves to be deprecated.
26. In the present world, where women are making
strides in leaps and bounds, merely because the
husband was an Army Officer posted in a remote
location, the expectation that the wife could not even
think of pursuing her career in Dentistry, is
indicative of regressive and feudalistic mindset. We
are afraid that the learned Family Court would never
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have taken the same view if there was a role reversal
and the wife was serving in the Army while the
husband was a medical professional. In such
circumstances the husband would never be expected
to sacrifice his career merely to remain by the side of
his wife; his failure to do so would certainly not be
branded as cruelty and desertion.
27. We are of the firm view that in such a situation,
striking a balance is necessary. If, at all, the wife
intended to pursue her medical career, then the same
should have been supported rather than deterring
her efforts. The husband should have taken pride in
the fact that his wife was in pursuit of her career
goals rather than holding her responsible for
breakdown of the marriage on the ground that she
did not join him at Kargil by sacrificing her career. If
the lady, having acquired the degree in Dentistry, did
not utilise the same, that, in our opinion, would be a
sinful wastage of talent and resources because the
seat against which she had acquired the degree,
would go abegging.
28. It also appears that the Courts below gave much
credence to the assertion of the respondent to the
effect that the appellant sought to coerce him to
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convert to Christianity and that such conduct
amounted to cruelty. In this regard, it may be noted
that the material on record does not indicate any
clear or credible evidence substantiating such
allegations, which seem to arise in the backdrop of
competing claims made by the parties during the
course of intense matrimonial discord. The only
circumstance that emerges with some degree of
consistency is that the respondent had accompanied
the appellant to the Velankanni Church in Tamil
Nadu, which, by itself, would not constitute coercion
or cruelty. This aspect may also be viewed in the
context of the fact that the marriage between the
parties was a love marriage, solemnised in
accordance with the customs and rites of both Hindu
and Christian faiths, and was subsequently
registered under the Special Marriage Act.
29. Having observed the approach of the
respondent during the course of hearings and the
thrust of his submissions seeking prosecution of the
appellant, we are convinced that he has an attitude
of domineering and control, which must have been
the probable cause for the appellant taking the steps
for gaining independence and pursuing her career
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goals. The steps so taken by the appellant Ms. Ann
were absolutely justified in view of the prevailing facts
and circumstances.
30. Furthermore, the learned Family Court also
attributed the irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage to the so-called acts of cruelty and desertion
on the part of the appellant. In view of the findings
recorded supra , the said observations are absolutely
baseless and unsustainable.
31. The judgment of the learned Family Court has
been affirmed by the High Court vide judgment dated
th
12 August, 2024. Suffice it to say that having found
the observations made by the learned Family Court
regarding cruelty and desertion attributed to the
appellant to be unjustified and untenable in the eyes
of law, we are convinced that the same deserved to be
expunged and scored off the record.
32. As the learned counsel for the appellant has, on
instructions, stated that the appellant is no longer
hopeful of a patch-up or resumption of matrimony
with the respondent, and as the respondent has
reportedly remarried, we are not inclined to disturb
the decree of divorce passed by the learned Family
Court and affirmed by the High Court. The same is
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accordingly upheld, with the observations regarding
cruelty and desertion being expressly expunged and
set aside. The decree shall be deemed to have been
passed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of
marriage.
33. The appeal is thus partly allowed.
34. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
SLP(Civil) No. 28451 of 2024
35. We have heard the petitioner, who appeared in-
person, in support of his special leave petition
assailing the rejection of his application filed under
Section 195 of CrPC read with Section 340 CrPC,
seeking prosecution of the respondent for perjury.
36. Having given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions of Shri Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur
Dutt, the petitioner appearing in-person and after
going through the impugned orders and the other
material placed on record, we are of the firm opinion
that the allegations made by the petitioner seeking
prosecution of his ex-wife, the respondent herein,
appear to be instigated by personal vendetta and
spiteful approach. The same also seems to be fuelled
by anger and pent-up frustration owing to multiple
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cases and complaints filed by the respondent against
him and his family members.
37. In view of the order passed by us in Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP (Civil) No.25076 of 2024, and upon
thoughtful consideration of the submissions
advanced by the petitioner appearing in-person, as
also upon perusal of the impugned orders and the
material placed on record, we are of the firm opinion
that the allegations made by him do not disclose the
necessary ingredients of the offence of perjury or
giving false evidence so as to direct prosecution of the
respondent. The grievances sought to be projected
appear to stem from a hyper-technical dissection of
the material on record, in the backdrop of multiple
disputes between the parties arising from escalated
matrimonial acrimony. Concurrent findings have
been recorded by the Courts below in rejecting the
application and the appeal of the petitioner and thus,
we do not find any justifiable reason to entertain the
prayer made in this petition seeking prosecution of
the respondent, by taking recourse to the procedure
provided under Section 195 CrPC read with Section
340 CrPC.
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38. The special leave petition lacks merit and is
dismissed as such.
39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 12, 2026.
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