Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8
PETITIONER:
SHYAMARAJU HEGDE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
U. VENKATESHA BHAT & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT25/09/1987
BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
DUTT, M.M. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2323 1988 SCR (1) 340
1987 SCC Supl. 321 JT 1987 (3) 663
1987 SCALE (2)646
CITATOR INFO :
1987 SC 203 ()
E 1988 SC 812 (2,3,13,14,18,19,26,27,29,32)
ACT:
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961: s. 50(1) & (2)/(Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908: s. 115-Revision order made by
District Judge under s. 50(2)-Whether revisable under s.
50(1) of the Act read with s. I 15 of the Code.
Constitution of India, Art. 141-Judicial propriety
warrants that decisions of the Supreme Court must be taken
as wholly binding on the High Courts.
HEADNOTE:
Sub-section (1) of s. SO of the Karnataka Rent Control
Act, 1961 confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court
in respect of orders passed or proceedings taken by the
Court of Small Causes or the Court of Civil Judge under the
Act while sub-s. (2) empowers the District Judge to revise
the orders passed or proceedings taken by the Court of
Munsif and makes his order final.
A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Krishnaji
Venkatesh Shriodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram Kavalekar & ORS.,
(ILR 1978 Kar. 1585), following the decisions of this Court
in Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation. Indore, [1977]
2 SCR 871 and Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala
Shetty, (SLP No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th Feb., 1978)
held that the fact that the order of the District Judge
under s. SO(2) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 is
made final, does not affect the jurisdiction of the High
Court under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise
such orders of the District Judge, in the absence of any
express words in the statute taking away such jurisdiction.
Later this Court, in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad,
[1980] 3 SCR 32 while interpreting s. 25 of the Provincial
Small Causes Courts Act, as amended by the U.P. Amendment
Act, 1978, under which the revisional jurisdiction was
shared between the District Court and the High Court, took
the view that the High Court was not vested with revisional
jurisdiction under s. 115 CPC in respect of a revisional
order made by the District Court under that section. A
similar view was also
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8
341
taken in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203
while construing s. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1965 .
Relying on the aforesaid two decision a Full Bench of
the High Court of Karnataka in M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant,
(ILR 1987 Kar. 1286 took a contrary view to Krishnaji’s
case.
The appellant’s revision petition having been dismissed
by a Single Judge of the High Court following the Full Bench
decision in Yaragatti’s case, he preferred an appeal to this
Court by special leave.
Allowing the appeal,
^
HELD: 1. A revision application is maintainable under
s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with s. 50(1) of
the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 when a District Judge
has made an order in his revisional jurisdiction under s.
50(2) of the Act.
Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore,
[1977] 2 SCR 871 and Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala
Shetty, (S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th of February,
1978, referred to.
Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32; Aundal
Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203; South Asia
Industries Private Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh & ors.J [1965] 2
SCR 756 and National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James
Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., [1953] SCR 1028. distinguished.
Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram
Kavalekar & ors.. ILR 1978 Kar. 1585 approved.
M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, ILR 1987 Kar. 1286 overruled.
2. The decision of a Full Bench of the High Court
consisting of three Judges rendered in Krishnaji’s Case was
binding on a bench of equal strength unless that decision
had directly been overruled by this Court or by necessary
implication became unsustainable. There is no such
overruling of Krishnaji’s decision by this Court. It cannot
also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein
supported by the direct authority of this Court stood
superseded. [349B-C]
3. Judicial propriety warrants that decisions of the
Supreme
342
Court must be taken wholly binding on the High Courts. That
is the necessary outcome of the tier system. Article 141 of
the Costitution unequivocally states that the law declared
by this Court shall be binding on all courts within the
territory of India. A coordinate Bench of the High Court,
therefore, should not have chosen to overrule an earlier
judgment of that Court based upon a decision of this
Court.[349C-F]
Broom v. Cassell & Co., [19721 1 AER 801, referred to.
4. It is one of the essential requirements of the
administration of justice that judgments rendered by
superior courts and particularly with the approval of the
apex court should not be frequently changed so as to
unsettle settled positions. The fact that the State
Legislature has not thought it necessary to amend the law
and set at naught the decisions in Krishnaji’s case or
Bhatija’s case is indicative or the position that this Court
had not taken a wrong view of the legislative intention
[349H: 350A]
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL No. 1324 of
1987.
From the Judgment and order dated 15.4.1987 of the
Karnataka High Court in C.R.P. No. 3030 of 1985.
R.B. Datar and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellant.
B. Krishna Prasad and K.R. Nagaraja for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal by special leave is
directed against the order made by a learned Single Judge of
the Karnataka High Court in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction. The High Court relied upon the ratio of its
Full Bench decision in M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant, ILR (1987)
Kar. 1286 and dismissed the revision petition as not
maintainable.
The short question for consideration in this appeal is
as to whether a revision application is maintainable under
section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section
50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 when a
District Judge has made an order in his revisional
jurisdiction under section 50(2) of the Act. This very
question had come up for consideration before a Full Bench
of the
343
Karnataka High Court in the case of Krishnaji Venkatesh
Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar & Ors., ILR (1978)
Kar. 1585. Venkataramiah, J., as he then was, speaking for
the Full Bench held:-
"The second for consideration is whether the
declaration made in section 50(2) that the order of the
District Judge shall be final takes away the
jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its powers of
revision under section 115 CPC. A doubt about the above
question arose in view of some observations made by a
Division Bench of this Court in Diwakar Hegde v.
Karkala Taluk Agriculture Produce Cooperative Marketing
Society Ltd., [1975] 2 Kar. L.J. 390 to the effect that
when a statute declares that the decision of an
authority shall be final, it cannot be questioned
either in appeal or revision under the statute. The
doubt however stands resolved by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal
Corporation, Indore, [ 1977] 2 SCR 871. In that case
section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation
Act, 1956 which provided that the decision of the
district court in an appeal filed against an order of
the Municipal Commissioner was final came up for
consideration. Rejecting the contention that the said
provision debarred the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court under section 115 CPC over the order of the
district court passed in appeal, the Supreme Court
observed-
’The second contention is based on section
149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation
Act, 1956. It provides that an appeal shall lie
from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to
the district court when any dispute arises as to
the liability of any land or building to
assessment. Sub-section (i) of section 149
provides that the decision of the district court
shall be final. It was submitted that the decision
of the district court was therefore final and that
the High Court was in error in entertaining a
revision petition. This plea cannot be accepted
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8
for, under section 115 of the CPC the High Court
has got power to revise the order passed by courts
subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the
district court is a subordinate court and is
liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court .......... ’ "
344
The Full Bench also relied upon a brief decision of this
Court in Krisnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty
(dead) by Lrs., (Special Leave Petition No. 913 of 1978
dated 13th of February, 1978) where referring to the very
provision, this Court observed:-
"The petitioner contends that the order of the
High Court. is without jurisdiction because under
section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a
revision does not lie to the High Court. We do not
agree. Section 115 CPC gives powers to the High Court
to revise any order from the district court, subject of
course to the limitations set out therein. The narrow
point then is as to whether the District Judge can be
equated with a district court. The High Court,
following its own earlier decisions, has held so. We
agree that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act,
the District Judge and the district court are
interchangeable expressions and nothing turns on the
mere fact that the section uses the expression
’District Judge’. Section 115 CPC therefore applies and
the revisional jurisdiction is vested in the High
Court."
The Full Bench thereafter stated:-
"In view of the above decision of the Supreme
Court it has to be held that the fact that the order of
the District Judge under section SO(2) is made final,
does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court under
section 115 of the CPC to revise the orders of the
District Judge made under section SO(2) in the absence
of any express words in the statute taking away such
jurisdiction."
As we have mentioned earlier the learned Single Judge
has relied upon a later Full Bench decision of the High
Court in the case of M.M. Yaragatti (supra). Two
questions had been referred to the Full Bench for
opinion, namely:-
(I) Whether a revision under section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure lies to the High Court
from a revisional order made by a District Judge
under sub-section (2) of section SO of the
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1967, as substituted
by Karnataka Act 3 1 of 1975? and
(2) Whether the ruling of the Full Bench of
that Court in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad
Shivaram Kavelekar, (supra) requires reconsideration in view
of the ruling of the
345
Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad?, AIR
1987 SC 203.
The learned Chief Justice of the High Court who spoke for
the Full Bench noticed the decision in Krishnaji’s case as
also the view expressed by this Court while disposing of the
special leave petition and stated:-
If the matter had rested here, there would not
have been any controversy, but after the decision of
the Full Bench in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar’s case,
two decisions of the Supreme Court have been rendered,
i.e., one in Vishesh Kumar’s case and the other in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 203. It
was on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Vishesh Kumar’s case that the questions posed by the
Division Bench had to be referred for decision to a
larger Bench. After the reference, the latest judgment
of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal’s case has also
been rendered. It is in the wake of these two judgments
that we are required to decide whether the law laid
down in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar’s case still
survives"
The Full Bench on the authority of those two decisions came
to the conclusion that the decision in Krishnaji Venkatesh
Shirodkar’s case (supra) did not survive and a second
revision to the High Court was not maintainable.
A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vishesh Kumar’s case
was considering whether the High Court possessed revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under
Section 115 disposing of a revision petition and whether the
High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under Section
115 against an order of District Court under Section 25 of
the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as amended by the
Uttar Pradesh Amendment Act 1978. The amendment shows that
the District Court had also revisional jurisdiction under
Section 115 and the revisional jurisdiction under that
Section was shared between the High Court and the District
Court by providing that the High Court has exclusive
revisional jurisdiction in cases arising out of original
suits or other proceedings of the value of Rs.20,000 and
above and the District Court alone had such jurisdiction in
any other case. This Court after discussing this provision
and some authorities of the Allahabad High Court
346
reached the conclusion that the High Court was not vested
with revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure in respect of a revisional order may by
the District Court under that Section.
This conclusion was obviously reached-and in our view
very rightly-on account of the fact that the power under
Section 115 of the Code had clearly indicated the revisional
jurisdiction of the District Court and the High Court and
vested that jurisdiction exclusively in either the District
Court or the High Court depending upon the pecuniary
valuation of the dispute.
This Court then proceeded in Vishesh Kumar’s case to
examine the second question. Section 25 of the Provincial
Small Cause Courts Act vested revisional jurisdiction in the
High Court and that provision was amended in its application
of Uttar Pradesh from time to time. By amendment it vested
revisional jurisdiction in the District Judge and by a later
amendment provided that in relation to any case decided by a
District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising
jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes, the power of
revision under Section 25 would vest in the High Court. In
that case the District Judge had exercised revisional power
under Section 25 and the question arose as to whether the
High Court could entertain a further revision under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court took the view
by analysing Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act that it was a self-contained Code and Section 25
provided the whole revisional jurisdiction and, therefore,
the question of invoking the revisional jurisdiction under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not at all
arise. The answer to the second question was in the
negative. The two conclusions reached in Vishesh Kumar’s
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8
case on the facts thereof were certainly correct but we are
concerned with a different set of facts and law. The ratio
of the decision in Vishesh Kumar’s case is not directly
applicable to the present facts.
The other case of this Court upon which reliance has
been placed by the Full Bench is that of Aundal Ammal v.
Sadasivan Pillai, (supra). A two-Judge Bench in that case
was considering the tenability of a second revision under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the High Court
in view of the provision of Section 20 of the Kerala
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (2 of 1965). That
Section provides:
"(1) In cases where the appellate authority
empowered
347
under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, District
Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at
any time, on the application of any aggrieved
party, call for and examine the records relating
to any order passed or proceedings taken under
this Act by such authority for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity
or propriety of such order in reference thereto as
it thinks fit .. . .. "
With reference to that provision a Full Bench of the
Kerala High Court had held that a second revision lay. This
Court stated in its judgment:
"It was contended by Shri Poti, learned counsel
for the appellant, that no revision lay to the
High Court. He submitted that Section 185 read
with Section 20 of the Act has completely ousted
the High Court’s jurisdiction to interfere in this
matter under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure"
That contention was examined by this Court. It may be
relevant to briefly refer Section 18 which provided for
appeal against the order of the Rent Control Court. Sub-
section (5) thereof provides:-
"The decision of the appellate authority, and
subject to such decision, an order of the Rent
Control Court shall be final and shall not be
liable to be called in question in any Court of
law, except as provided in Section 20."
In construing the meaning and effect of the word final,
reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in South
Asia Industries Private Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh & Ors.,
[1965] 2 SCR 756. In that case the question arose as to
whether in view of the provision in Section 43 of the Delhi
Rent Control Act attaching finality to the judgment in
Second Appeal by the High Court, a Letters Patent Appeal
could be entertained. Several authorities were referred to
and the conclusion in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v.
James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., []953] SCR 1028 was approved.
Relying upon that decision as also the decision in Vishesh
Kumar’s case, this Court held that jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
excluded.
On the analysis presented above, the two cases upon
which the Full Bench has placed reliance are really not
direct authorities on the
348
point. We have already noticed that in Krishnaji‘s case the
earlier Full A Bench had re1ied upon the decision of this
Court in Chhagan Lal’s case. A three-Judge Bench in that
case broadly dealt with a similar contention as arising
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8
here. At page 875 of the Reports it is stated that:
"The second contention is based on Section 149 of
the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act,
1956. It provides that any appeal shall lie from
the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the
District Court, when any dispute arises as to the
liability of any land or building to assessment.
Sub-section (1) of Section 149 provides that the
decision of the District Court shall be final. It
was submitted that the decision of the District
Court was there fore final and that the High Court
was in error in entertain in a Revision Petition.
This plea cannot be accepted for, under Section
115 of the Civil Procedure Code the High Court has
got a power to revise the order passed by courts
subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the
District Court is a subordinate court and is
liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court .. "
It is this observation in that judgment which had been
followed in Krishnaji’s case. We may point that the judgment
of the Full Bench in Krishnaji’s case was delivered by our
learned Brother Venkataramiah, J. as a member of the Full
Bench then and incidentally he was one of the members of the
two-Judge Bench in Aundal Ammal’s case where a contrary view
has been taken. If this Court really intended to reverse the
effect of the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji’s case to
which our learned Brother was a party, one would have
expected reference to Chhagan Lal as also Krishnaji.
As against the two authorities of this Court, namely,
the cases of Vishesh Kumar and Aundal Ammal dealing with
provisions of different statutes, there is a direct decision
of this Court in the case of Krishnadas Bhatija which has
already been quoted. This Court was dealing with the very
provision after its amendment in 1975 and the very question
which now falls for consideration was before this Court. In
Krishnaji’s case the decision of this Court had been relied
upon as a binding authority and it was concluded that the
High Court has powers to entertain a revision under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the revisional
order of a District Court. It is conceded that the impugned
provision which was being considered by this Court in
Krishnadas Bhatija’s case continues to be the same. Though
the deci
349
sion rendered in Bhatija’s case (supra) by this Court is not
a detailed one, the conclusion on the point is clear and
admits of no ambiguity. The Full Bench in the impugned
judgment clearly went wrong in holding that the two-Judge
Bench of this Court referred to by it had brought about a
total change in the position and on the basis of those two
judgments. Krishnaji’s case would be no more good law. The
decision of a Full Bench consisting of three Judges rendered
in Krishnaji’s case was binding on a bench of equal strength
unless that decision had directly been overruled by this
Court or by necessary implication became unsustainable.
Admittedly there is no overruling of Krishnaji’s decision by
this Court and on the analysis indicated above it cannot
also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein
supported by the direct authority of this Court stood
superseded. Judicial propriety warrarants that decisions of
this Court must be taken as wholly binding on the High
Courts. That is the necessary outcome of the tier system. We
may briefly refer to the observations of the Lord Chancellor
in Broom v. Cassell & Co., [1972] 1 AER 801. where the Lord
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8
Chancellor administered a warning by saying: "I hope it will
never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical
system of courts which exists in this country, it is
necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of
Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher
tiers". This has been approved by this Court on more than
one occasion. Added to the above is the provision of Article
141 of the Constitution which unequivocally states that the
law declared by this Court shall be binding on all courts
within the territory of India. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court should not have
taken into itself, the responsibility of saying that its
earlier Full Bench judgment based upon a decision of this
Court in the circumstances indicated above had lost its
binding authority in view of two other judgments rendered in
different situations and setting. We are really not in a
position to appreciate the manner in which a coordinate
Bench of the High Court has chosen to overrule an earlier
judgment of that Court.
On the view we have taken, it must follow that we too
are bound by the decision taken by this Court in Krishnadas
Bhatija’s case. Krishnaji’s case was rendered under the
Karnataka Rent control (Amendment) Act, 1975 and has held
the field for over a decade. No justification has been
pointed out by the High Court why that should be discarded.
It is one of the essential requirements of the
administration of justice that judgments rendered by
superior courts and particularly with the approval of the
apex court should not be frequently changed so as to
unsettle settled positions. The fact that the State
Legislature
350
has not thought it necessary to amend the law and set at
naught Krishnaji or Bhatija is indicative of the position
that this Court had not taken a wrong view of the
legislative intention. In these circumstance we feel advised
not to enter into an analysis of the provisions of the Act
for a fresh look at the matter and prefer to follow Bhatija.
We make it clear that we have not felt it necessary to
examine whether the ratio of Aundal Ammal is binding or
requires reconsideration in the presence of Bhatija in the
field as a direct authority.
For the reasons we have indicated above, we allow the
appeal, set aside the judgment of the Karnataka High Court
and declare that the earlier Full Bench decision in
Krishnaji’s case holds the field. This appeal became
necessary on account of the wrong view taken by the High
Court. We do nat think it is proper to saddle the respondent
with costs of the
appeal.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.
351