Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.73 OF 2007
| V/ | s |
| … | |
| V/s<br>STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.<br>With<br>CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1437 OF 2013<br>SHRI G. KAMALAKAR<br>V/s<br>M/S SURANA SECURITIES LTD. & ANR.<br>J U D G M E N T<br>SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. |
As the question of law involved is common in both the
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appeals, they are heard together and disposed of by this common
judgment.
Criminal Appeal No.73 of 2007
Brief facts of the case are as follows:
2.
The accused–appellant,A.C. Narayanan challenged the common
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order dated 29 November, 2000 passed by the Additional Chief
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Metropolitan Magistrate, 9 Court, Bandra, Mumbai (hereinafter
referred to as the, ‘Trial Court’) by filing applications u/s 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the High Court.
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By the said common order the applications preferred by the
appellant-A.C.Narayanan for discharge/recalling process against
him was rejected by the Trial Court. The High Court by impugned
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judgment dated 12 August, 2005, dismissed the applications
| ant and | upheld |
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Trial Court.
3. The appellant is the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of
the Company M/s Harvest Financials Ltd. (hereinafter referred to
as the “Company”) having its registered office at Bombay. Under a
scheme of investment, the appellant collected various amounts
from various persons in the form of loans and in consideration
thereof issued post-dated cheques either in his personal capacity
or as the signatory of the Company which got dishonoured.
Respondent No. 2-Mrs. Doreen Shaikh is the power of attorney
4.
holder of six complainants, namely Mr.Yunus A. Cementwalla, Smt.
Fay Pinto, Mr. Mary Knoll Drego, Smt. Evelyn Drego, Mr. Shaikh
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Anwar Karim Bux and Smt. Gwen Piedade. On 16 December, 1997,
Respondent No.2 on behalf of the six complainants filed
Complaint Case Nos.292/S/1998, 293/S/1998, 297/S/1998,
298/S/1998, 299/S/1998 and 300/S/1998 respectively against the
appellant herein under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘N.I.
Act’) before the Trial Court. The said Respondent No. 2 verified
the complaint in each of those cases as Power of Attorney Holder
of the complainants. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
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vide order dated 04 April, 1998 issued process against the
appellant u/s 204 of the Cr.P.C for the offences punishable under
Sections 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act.
The appellant, being aggrieved moved an application for
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| ess in e | ach of t |
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applications filed by the appellant.
6. The appellant being aggrieved preferred applications being
Criminal Application Nos.797, 798, 799, 801, 802 and 803 of 2002
before the High Court for calling for the records of the case
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pending in the Trial Court. By impugned order dated 12 August,
2005 the said applications were dismissed by the High Court.
Criminal Appeal No.1437 of 2013
The brief facts of the case is as follows:
7.
This appeal has been preferred by the accused-G. Kamalakar
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against the judgment and order dated 19 September, 2007 passed
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by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh of Hyderabad in
Criminal Appeal No. 578 of 2002. By the impugned judgment, the
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High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the 1 respondent- M/s
Surana Securities Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Company’)
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set aside the judgment of acquittal dated 30 October, 2001
passed by the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in CC
No.18 of 2000 convicted the appellant under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act and sentenced the appellant to pay a fine of Rs.
6,10,000/-, out of which an amount of Rs. 6,00,000/- was to be
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paid to the complainant towards compensation and in default to
suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month.
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8. The 1 respondent - M/s Surana Securities Ltd. is the
complainant and is a limited Company carrying on business of
| appella | nt-G. Ka |
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the course of business, the appellant-G. Kamalakar became liable
to pay an amount of Rs. 7,21,174/- towards the respondent-
Company. In order to discharge the said liability, the
appellant issued six cheques amounting to Rs. 1,00,000/- each and
another cheque for Rs. 1,21,174/- of different dates. When
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first six cheques were presented for encashment on 18 September,
1997, the same got dishonoured with an endorsement “funds
insufficient”. Upon receiving such information, the Company
issued a legal notice to the appellant to pay the amount but the
same was not paid by the appellant.
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9. The Board of Directors of the 1 respondent-Company, by a
resolution authorized its Managing Director to appoint an agent
to represent the Company. Pursuant thereto, one Shri V. Shankar
Prasad was appointed as an agent by executing a General Power of
Attorney. Later, he was substituted by one Shri Ravinder Singh
under another General Power of Attorney. The respondent-Company
filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act being CC No.
1098 of 1997 in the Court of XIth Metropolitan Magistrate,
Secunderabad. The complaint was transferred to the Court of
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XVIIIth Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad by order dated 3 May,
2000 and was registered as CC No. 18 of 2000. By judgment dated
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30 October, 2001, the Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the
complaint filed by the respondent-Company u/s 138 of the N.I.
Act.
10. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent-Company filed an
appeal being Criminal No. 578 of 2002 before the High Court of
Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. By the impugned judgment
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dated 19 September, 2007, the High Court allowed the appeal,
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set aside the judgment dated 30 October, 2001 passed by the
XVIIIth Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad and convicted the
appellant u/s 138 of the N.I. Act. Against the aforesaid order of
conviction, the present appeal has been preferred.
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On 4 January, 2007, in view of the difference of opinion
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among various High courts as also decisions of this Court in
M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr. vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma(P) Ltd.
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and Anr., (2002) 1 SCC 234 and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr.
vs. Indusind Bank Ltd. and Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 217 referred the
matter to larger bench. The entire order of reference reads as
under:
“Delay in filing counter affidavit is
condoned.
Leave granted.
Interpretation and/or application of
Section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881, (“NI Act”) is in question in this
appeal which arises out of a judgment and
order dated 12.8.2005 passed by a learned
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Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay.
The basis fact of the matter is not in
dispute.
| The comp<br>ditional<br>ndra, M | laint pe<br>Chief<br>umbai. |
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“This Court has, as far back as, in
the case of Vishwa Mitter v. O.P. Poddar,
(1983) 4 SCC 701 held that it is clear that
anyone can set the Criminal law in motion by
filing a complaint of facts constituting an
offence before a Magistrate entitled to take
cognizance on the sole ground that the
complainant was not competent to file the
complaint. It has been held that if any
special statute prescribes offences and makes
any special provision for taking cognizance
of such offences under the statute, then
the complainant requesting the Magistrate to
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| on beh<br>a late | alf of<br>r judgm |
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“Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC empowers the
holder of power of attorney to ‘act’ on
behalf of the principal. In our view the
word ‘acts’ employed in Order 3 Rules 1 and 2
CPC confines only to in respect of ‘acts’
done by the power-of-attorney holder in
exercise of power granted by the instrument.
The term ‘acts’ would not include deposing
in place and instead of the principal. In
other words, if the power of attorney holder
has rendered some ‘acts’ in pursuance of
power of attorney, he may depose for the
principal in respect of such acts, but he
cannot depose for the principal for the acts
done by the principal and not by him.
Similarly, he cannot depose for the
principal in respect of the matter of which
only the principal is entitled to be cross-
examined.”
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“on the question of power of attorney,
the High Courts have divergent views. In
the case of Shambhu Dutt Shastri vs. State of
Rajasthan [1986 2 WLN 713 (Raj.)] it was
held that a general power-of- attorney holder
can appear, plead and act on behalf of the
party but he cannot become a witness on
behalf of the party. He can only appear in
his own witness box on behalf of himself.
To appear in a witness box is altogether a
different act. A general power-of-attorney
holder cannot be allowed to appear as a
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witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the
capacity of the plaintiff.”
| contain<br>constru<br>ney holde | ed in O<br>ed to d<br>r to de |
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It is not in dispute that there is a
conflict of opinion on this issue amongst
various High Courts, including the decision
of Bombay High Court in Mamtadevi
Prafullakumar Bhansali vs. Pushpadevi
Kailashkumar Agrawal & Anr. [2005 (2) Mah.
L.J. 1003) on the one hand and a decision of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S.P.
(2002)
Sampathy vs. Manju Gupta and Anr.
Crl.L.J. 2621), on the other. One of the
questions which would arise for
consideration is as to whether the
eligibility criteria prescribed by Section
142(a) of the NI Act would stand satisfied
if the complaint petition itself is filed in
the name of the payee or the holder in due
course of the cheque and/or whether a
complaint petition has to be presented
before the Court by the payee or the holder
of the cheque himself.
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Another issue which would arise for
consideration is as to whether the payee
must examine himself in support of the
complaint petition keeping in view the
insertion of Section 145 of the Said Act (Act
No. 55 of 2002).
In our opinion, in view of difference of
opinion amongst various High Courts as also
the decisions of this Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd.
(Supra) and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra),
particularly in view of the fact that in the
later case the earlier one was not noticed,
an authoritative pronouncement is necessary
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to be given in this regard. We, therefore,
are of the opinion that the matter should be
considered by a larger Bench.”
12 . The matter was considered by a larger Bench of three Judges.
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By judgment dated 13 September, 2013 reported in 2013 (11) SCALE
| s. State | of Maha |
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(i) Whether a Power of Attorney holder can
sign and file a complaint petition behalf of the
complainant? Whether the eligibility criteria
prescribed by Section 142(a) of NI Act would stand
satisfied if the complaint petition itself is
filed in the name of the payee or the holder in
due course of the cheque?
(ii) Whether a Power of Attorney holder can
be varied on oath under Section 200 of the Code?
(iii) Whether specific averments as to the
knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder in the
impugned transaction must be explicitly asserted
in the complaint?
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(iv) If the Power of Attorney holder fails to
assert explicitly his knowledge in the complaint
then can the Power of Attorney holder verify the
complaint on oath on such presumption of
knowledge?
(v) Whether the proceedings contemplated
under Section 200 of the Code can be dispensed
with in the light of Section 145 of the N.I. Act
which was introduced by an amendment in the year
2002?
13 . The first question relating to the eligibility of Power of
Attorney holder to sign and file a complaint petition on behalf
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of the complainants and whether eligibility criteria prescribed
by Section 142(a) of N.I. Act is satisfied, if the complaint
petition itself is filed in the name of the payee or the holder
in due course of the cheque, was answered by larger Bench in
| gment in | A.C. |
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follows:
“19) As noticed hereinabove, though Janki
, relates to powers of
Vashdeo Bhojwani(supra)
Power of Attorney holder under CPC but it was
concluded therein that a plaint by a Power
of Attorney holder on behalf of the original
plaintiff is maintainable provided he has
personal knowledge of the transaction in
question. In a way, it is an exception to a
well settled position that criminal law can
be put in motion by anyone [vide Vishwa
Mitter (supra) ] and under the Statute, one
stranger to transaction in question, namely,
legal heir etc., can also carry forward the
pending criminal complaint or initiate the
criminal action if the original complainant
dies [Vide vs.
Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas State of
Maharashtra (1967) 1 SCR 807]. Keeping in
mind various situations like inability as a
result of sickness, old age or death or
staying abroad of the payee or holder in due
course to appear and depose before the Court
in order to prove the complaint, it is
permissible for the Power of Attorney holder
or for the legal representative(s) to file a
complaint and/or continue with the 21 Page 22
pending criminal complaint for and on behalf
of payee or holder in due course. However, it
is expected that such power of attorney
holder or legal representative(s) should
have knowledge about the transaction
in question so as to able to bring on record
the truth of the grievance/offence,
otherwise, no criminal justice could be
achieved in case payee or holder in due
course, is unable to sign, appear or depose
as complainant due to above quoted reasons.
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Keeping these aspects in mind, in MMTC
(supra), this Court had taken the view that
if complaint is filed for and on behalf of
payee or holder in due course, that is good
enough compliance with Section 142 of N.I.
Act. “
| n relati<br>as pres | ng to v<br>cribed u |
|---|
Code was answered as follows:-
“20) The stand of the appellant in Criminal
Appeal No. 73 of 2007 is that no complaint
can be filed and no cognizance of the
complaint can be taken if the complaint is
by the power of attorney holder, since it is
against Section 200 of the Code and deserves
to be rejected. There is no dispute that
complaint has to be filed by the complainant
as contemplated by Section 200 of the Code,
but the said Section does not create any
embargo that the attorney holder or legal
representative(s) cannot be a complainant.
22) From a conjoint reading of Sections 138,
142 and 145 of the N.I. Act as well as
Section 200 of the Code, it is clear that it
is open to the Magistrate to issue process on
the basis of the contents of the complaint,
documents in support thereof and the
affidavit submitted by the complainant in
support of the complaint. Once the
complainant files an affidavit in support of
the complaint before issuance of the process
under Section 200 of the Code, it is
thereafter open to the Magistrate, if he
thinks fit, to call upon the complainant to
remain present and to examine him as to the
facts contained in the affidavit submitted by
the complainant in support of his
complaint. However, it is a matter of
discretion and the Magistrate is not bound to
call upon the complainant to remain present
before the Court and to examine him upon
oath for taking decision whether or not to
issue process on the complaint under Section
138 of the N.I. Act. For the purpose of
issuing process under Section 200 of the
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| support<br>n the fo<br>s of the | there<br>rm of af<br>view th |
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23) In the light of the discussion, we are
of the view that the power of attorney
holder may be allowed to file, appear and
depose for the purpose of issue of process
for the offence punishable under Section 138
of the N.I. Act. An exception to the above is
when the power of attorney holder of the
complainant does not have a personal
knowledge about the transactions then he
cannot be examined. However, where the
attorney holder of the complainant is in
charge of the business of the complainant
payee and the attorney holder alone is
personally aware of the transactions, there
is no reason why the attorney holder cannot
depose as a witness. Nevertheless, an
explicit assertion as to the knowledge of
the Power of Attorney holder about the
transaction in question must be specified in
the complaint. On this count, the fourth
question becomes infructuous.
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24) In view of the discussion, we are of the
opinion that the attorney holder cannot file
a complaint in his own name as if he was the
complainant, but he can initiate criminal
proceedings on behalf of his principal. We
also reiterate that where the payee is a
proprietary concern, the complaint can be
filed (i) by the proprietor of the
proprietary concern, describing himself as
the sole proprietor of the “payee”; (ii) the
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proprietary concern, describing itself as a
sole proprietary concern, represented by its
sole proprietor; and (iii) the proprietor or
the proprietary concern represented by the
attorney holder under a power of attorney
executed by the sole proprietor.
| substan<br>appeal<br>4 of 2008 | tial qu<br>arising<br>, which |
|---|
JUDGMENT
While holding that there is no serious conflict between the
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decisions in “ and Janki ,
MMTC (supra) Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra)”
the larger Bench clarified the position and answered the
questions framed in the following manner:
“(i) Filing of complaint petition under
Section 138 of N.I Act through power of
attorney is perfectly legal and competent.
(ii) The Power of Attorney holder can depose
and verify on oath before the Court in order
to prove the contents of the complaint.
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However, the power of attorney holder must
have witnessed the transaction as an agent of
the payee/holder in due course or possess due
knowledge regarding the said transactions.
| of attorn<br>plicitly<br>attorne | ey holde<br>in the<br>y holde |
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(iv) In the light of section 145 of N.I Act,
it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the
verification in the form of affidavit filed
by the complainant in support of the
complaint under Section 138 of the N.I Act
and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily
obliged to call upon the complainant to
remain present before the Court, nor to
examine the complainant of his witness upon
oath for taking the decision whether or not
to issue process on the complaint under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
(v) The functions under the general power of
attorney cannot be delegated to another
person without specific clause permitting the
same in the power of attorney. Nevertheless,
the general power of attorney itself can be
cancelled and be given to another person.”
JUDGMENT
Case of A.C. Narayanan
In this case Magistrate had taken cognizance of the
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complaint without prima facie establishing the fact as to whether
the Power of Attorney existed in first place and whether it was
in order. It is not in dispute that the complaint against the
appellant was not preferred by the payee or the holder in due
course and the statement on oath of the person who filed the
complaint has also not stated that he filed the complaint having
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been instructed by the payee or holder in due course of the
cheque. Since the complaint was not filed abiding with the
provisions of the Act, it was not open to the Magistrate to take
cognizance.
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or a reference to the Power of Attorney in the body of the said
complaint nor was it exhibited as part of the said complaint.
Further, in the list of evidence there is just a mere mention of
the words at serial no.6 viz. “Power of Attorney”, however there
is no date or any other particulars of the Power of Attorney
mentioned in the complaint. Even in the verification statement
made by the respondent no.2, there is not even a whisper that she
is filing the complaint as the Power of Attorney holder of the
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complainant. Even the order of issue of process dated 20
February, 1998 does not mention that the Magistrate had perused
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any Power of Attorney for issuing process.
18. The appellant has stated that his Advocate conducted search
and inspection of the papers and proceedings of the criminal
complaint and found that no Power of Attorney was found to be a
part of that record. This has not been disputed by the
respondents. In that view of the matter and in light of decision
of the larger Bench, as referred above, we hold that the
Magistrate wrongly took cognizance in the matter and the Court
below erred in putting the onus on the appellant rather than the
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complainant. The aforesaid fact has also been overlooked by the
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High Court while passing the impugned judgment dated 12 August,
2005.
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In the result, the impugned judgment dated 12 August, 2005
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| t of Jud | icature |
| at Bombay a<br>the Addit<br>a, Mumbai a | |
|---|---|
| dated 29th November, 2000 passed by<br>Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court, Bandra<br>and the proceedings in question again<br>quashed.<br>Case of G. Kamalakar<br>20. In this case it is not in dispute<br>filed by one Shri V. Shankar Prasad claim<br>of Attorney of the complainant company.<br>Ravinder Singh gave the evidence on behal | a |
the General Power of Attorney given by the complainant Company.
The complaint was not signed either by Managing Director or
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Director of the Company. It is also not in dispute that PW-1 is
only the employee of the Company. As per Resolution of the
Company i.e. Ex.P3 under first part Managing Director and
Director are authorized to file suits and criminal complaints
against the debtors for recovery of money and for prosecution.
Under third part of the said Resolution they were authorized to
appoint or nominate any other person to appear on their behalf in
the Court and engage lawyer etc. But nothing on the record
suggest that an employee is empowered to file the complaint on
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behalf of the Company. This apart, Managing Director and
Director are authorized persons of the Company to file the
complaint by signing and by giving evidence. At best the said
persons can nominate any person to represent themselves or the
| . In th | e prese |
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Deputy General Manager of the Company i.e. PW-1 gave evidence as
if he knows everything though he does not know anything. There
is nothing on the record to suggest that he was authorized by the
Managing Director or any Director. Therefore, Magistrate by
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judgment dated 30 October, 2001 rightly acquitted the appellant.
In such a situation, the case of the appellant is fully covered
by decision by the larger bench of this Court passed in the
present appeal. We have no other option but to set aside the
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impugned judgment dated 19 September, 2007 passed by the High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal
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Appeal No.578 of 2002. The judgment and order dated 30 October,
2001 passed by the Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad in C.C.No.18 of 2000 is upheld.
The appeals are allowed accordingly.
21.
………………………………………………………………………… J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
…………………………………………………………………………
J.
NEW DELHI, (S.A. BOBDE)
JANUARY 28, 2015.
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