Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1215 OF 2011
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.26391/10)
M. Nagabhushana ...Appellant(s)
- Versus -
State of Karnataka & Others ...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1. Leave granted.
2.
This appeal is directed against the
rd
judgment and order dated 23 July 2010
passed by Division Bench of the High Court
of Karnataka whereby the learned Judges
dismissed the W.A. No.1192 of 2007 which
was filed impugning an acquisition
proceeding to the State of Karnataka. It
1
may also be noted that while dismissing the
appeal, the Division Bench affirmed the
judgment of the learned Single Judge dated
th
28 May 2007.
3. From the perusal of the judgment of learned
Single Judge it appears that the appellant
claims to be the owner of the land bearing
Sy. No.76/1 and Sy. No.76/2 of
Thotadaguddadahalli Village, Bangalore
North Taluk. The appellant alleged that
these two plots of land were outside the
purview of the Framework Agreement (FWA)
and notification issued under Sections
28(1) and 28(4) of Karnataka Industrial
Areas Development Act (KIAD Act). While
dismissing the writ petition, the learned
Single Judge held that the acquisition
proceedings in question were challenged by
the writ petitioner, the appellant herein,
in a previous writ petition No.46078/03
2
which was initially accepted and the
acquisition proceedings were quashed. Then
on appeal, the Division Bench (in writ
appeal Nos.713/04 and 2210/04) reversed the
judgment of the learned Single Judge.
Thereafter, the Division Bench order was
upheld before this Court and this Court
approved the acquisition proceedings.
4. Therefore, the writ petition, out of which
this present appeal arises, purports to be
an attempt to litigate once again, inter
alia, on the ground that the aforesaid
blocks of land were outside the purview of
FWA dated 3.4.1997. The learned Judges of
the Division Bench held the second round of
litigation is misconceived inasmuch as the
acquisition proceedings were upheld right
upto this Court. The Division Bench in the
impugned judgment noted the aforesaid facts
which were also noted by the learned Single
3
Judge. Apart from that the Division Bench
also noted that another batch of public
interest litigation in W.P. No.45334/04 and
connected matters were also disposed of by
this Court directing the State of Karnataka
and all its instrumentalities including the
Housing Board to forthwith execute the
project as conceived originally and upheld
by this Court and it was also directed that
FWA be implemented. The Division Bench,
however, noted that on behalf of the
appellant an additional ground has been
raised that the acquisition stood vitiated
since no award was passed as contemplated
under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act (hereinafter “the said Act”).
5. One of the contentions raised before the
Division Bench on behalf of the appellant
was that the question of principle of
Constructive Res Judicata is not applicable
4
to a writ petition. This contention was
raised in the context of alleged non-
publication of award and the consequential
invalidation of the acquisition proceeding.
Even though that contention was raised for
the first time before the Division Bench.
The Division Bench, after referring to
several judgments of this Court, held that
the said contention is not tenable in law.
The Division Bench also noted that in the
earlier round of litigation the contentions
relating to the land falling outside the
area of FWA being acquired, were raised and
were repelled. In fact the contentions,
raised in the previous round of litigation,
have been noted expressly in para 17 of the
impugned judgment, which are as under:
“Most of the lands in question fall
outside the area required for peripheral
road etc. and they are fully developed.
The acquisition for the benefit of private
company like the NICE Ltd. could not be
termed as public purpose.”
“The acquisition for peripheral road etc.
would be illegal notwithstanding the
5
definition of infrastructural facilities
as incorporated under Section 2 (8a) of
the Act. The proposed acquisition is in
respect of the alleged contract between
the State and M/s. NICE Ltd. which is
stated to be based on agreement dated
3.4.1997.”
“It amounts to colorable exercise of power
and fraud on power and in such an event,
the entire acquisition proceedings are to
have been quashed by the learned Single
Judge.”
“On reading of para 23(2) of the impugned
order, it is clear that the proposed
acquisition of land as notified under
Section 28(1) of the Act is different from
the alleged purpose, which are quite
different and from the same, it is clear
that the acquisition initiated is not
bonafide, but the same is as a result of
colorable exercise of power coupled with
exercise of fraud on power and on this
count also, the notification issued under
Section 28(1) also ought to have been
quashed.”
“The Government did not apply its mind to
the acquisition proceedings and there is
total non application of mind by the
government to the relevant facts in
initiating the acquisition proceedings
under the KIADB Act.”
“There was a total change in the stand of
the opponents with regard to the ‘public
purpose’ which was stated in the
preliminary notification vis-à-vis their
statement of objection filed before the
Court and moreover the conduct of M/s.
NICE Company in allotting certain extent
of lands to the Association of India
Machine Tool Manufacturers (AIMTM) to put
6
up a big conventional centre, even before
the acquisition proceedings are complete,
disentitles them from supporting the
acquisition of lands.”
“Since admittedly no industrial area was
being framed in the lands proposed to be
acquired, the KIADB could never be
permitted to acquire lands for the
formation of infrastructural facility
without there being any industries.”
6. In the impugned judgment at para 18, the
findings of the previous Division Bench, on
the contentions extracted above, were also
noted. Relevant parts of it are extracted:
“In so far as the appeals filed by the
appellant – Indian Machine Tools
Manufacturers Association in Writ Appeal
Nos.3326-27/2004 are concerned, we find
that there is considerable force in the
submission made by the learned counsel for
the appellant that the writ petition filed
by the respondents 1 and 2 itself was not
maintainable. In fact the learned Senior
Counsel for the contesting respondent
fairly conceded the same. The writ
nd
petition filed by the 2 respondent M.
Nagabhushan in W.P. No.39559/2003 came to
be dismissed by this court holding that he
had purchased the land in question from
its previous owner D.R. Raghavendra
subsequent to final notification issued
under Sec.28(4) of the Act and that
further the previous owner D.R.
Raghavendra had already handed over
possession of the land in question to the
7
Land Acquisition Officer by accepting the
award.”
“Therefore apart from the fact that there
is no merit in any of the contentions
urged on behalf of the land owners, we
find that the appeals filed by the
appellant – Indian Machine Tool
Manufacturers Association has to succeed
on the ground that the writ petition filed
by the respondents 1 and 2 itself was not
maintainable. Since the appellant – IMTMA
was not a party before the learned Single
Judge, the leave sought for is granted.”
7. Challenging the aforesaid judgment, the
present appellant filed a special leave
petition before this Court, which, on grant
of leave, was numbered as Civil Appeal
No.3878/2005. The grounds which were
substantially raised by the present
appellant in the previous appeal
(No.3878/2005) have been raised again in
this appeal. The alleged grounds in the
present appeal about acquisition of land
beyond the requirement of FWA were raised
by the present appellant in the previous
appeal No.3878/2005 also.
8
8.
On those contentions, a three-judge Bench
of this Court, while dealing with several
appeals including the one filed by the
present appellant, rendered a judgment in
State of Karnataka and another Vs. All
India Manufacturers Organisation and others
– (2006) 4 SCC 683, wherein the said three-
judge Bench held:
“The next contention urged on behalf of
the landowners is that the lands were not
being acquired for a public purpose. The
counsel who have argued for the landowners
have expatiated in their contention by
urging that land in excess of what was
required under the FWA had been acquired;
land far away from the actual alignment of
the road and periphery had been acquired;
consequently, it is urged that even if the
implementation of the highway project is
assumed to be for a public purpose,
acquisition of land far away therefrom
would not amount to a public purpose nor
would it be covered by the provisions of
the KIAD Act.”
(Paragraph 76, page 711 of the report)
9. In paragraph 77 of the said report, it was
further held:
9
“In our view, this was an entirely
misconceived argument. As we have pointed
out in the earlier part of our judgment,
the Project is an integrated
infrastructure development project and not
merely a highway project. The Project as
it has been styled, conceived and
implemented was the Bangalore-Mysore
Infrastructure Corridor Project, which
conceived of the development of roads
between Bangalore and Mysore, for which
there were several interchanges in and
around the periphery of the city of
Bangalore, together with numerous
developmental infrastructure activities
along with the highway at several points.
As an integrated project, it may require
the acquisition and transfer of lands even
away from the main alignment of the road.”
10. In paragraph 79 at page 712 of the report,
this Court affirmed the previous judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court in
the following words:
“The learned Single Judge erred in
assuming that the lands acquired from
places away from the main alignment of the
road were not a part of the Project and
that is the reason he was persuaded to
hold that only 60% of the land acquisition
was justified because it pertained to the
land acquired for the main alignment of
the highway. This, in the view of the
Division Bench, and in our view, was
entirely erroneous. The Division Bench was
right in taking the view that the Project
was an integrated project intended for
public purpose and, irrespective of where
the land was situated, so long as it arose
from the terms of the FWA, there was no
1
question of characterising it as
unconnected with a public purpose. We are,
therefore, in agreement with the finding
of the High Court on this issue.”
11. The Division Bench judgment of the High
Court was further affirmed by this Court in
clear and express words in paragraph 81 of
the report:
“In summary, having perused the well-
considered judgment of the Division Bench
which is under appeal in the light of the
contentions advanced at the Bar, we are
not satisfied that the acquisitions were,
in any way, liable to be interfered with
by the High Court, even to the extent as
held by the learned Single Judge. We agree
with the decision of the Division Bench
that the acquisition of the entire land
for the Project was carried out in
consonance with the provisions of the KIAD
Act for a public project of great
importance for the development of the
State of Karnataka. We do not think that a
project of this magnitude and urgency can
be held up by individuals raising
frivolous and untenable objections
thereto. The powers under the KIAD Act
represent the powers of eminent domain
vested in the State, which may need to be
exercised even to the detriment of
individuals’ property rights so long as it
achieves a larger public purpose. Looking
at the case as a whole, we are satisfied
that the Project is intended to represent
the larger public interest of the State
and that is why it was entered into and
implemented all along.”
1
12. We find that disregarding the aforesaid
clear finding of this Court, the appellant,
on identical issues, further filed a new
writ petition out of which the present
appeal arises. That writ petition, as noted
above, was rejected both by the learned
Single Judge and by the Division Bench in
clear terms.
13. It is obvious that such a litigative
adventure by the present appellant is
clearly against the principles of Res
Judicata as well as principles of
Constructive Res Judicata and principles
analogous thereto.
14. The principles of Res Judicata are of
universal application as it is based on two
age old principles, namely, ‘interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ which
1
means that it is in the interest of the
State that there should be an end to
litigation and the other principle is ‘nemo
debet his ve ari, si constet curiae quod
sit pro un aet eademn cause’ meaning
thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice
in a litigation if it appears to the Court
that it is for one and the same cause.
This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to
all civilized system of jurisprudence to
the extent that a judgment after a proper
trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction
should be regarded as final and conclusive
determination of the questions litigated
and should for ever set the controversy at
rest.
15. That principle of finality of litigation is
based on high principle of public policy.
In the absence of such a principle great
oppression might result under the colour
1
and pretence of law in as much as there
will be no end of litigation and a rich and
malicious litigant will succeed in
infinitely vexing his opponent by
repetitive suits and actions. This may
compel the weaker party to relinquish his
right. The doctrine of Res Judicata has
been evolved to prevent such an anarchy.
That is why it is perceived that the plea
of Res Judicata is not a technical doctrine
but a fundamental principle which sustains
the Rule of Law in ensuring finality in
litigation. This principle seeks to
promote honesty and a fair administration
of justice and to prevent abuse in the
matter of accessing Court for agitating on
issues which have become final between the
parties.
16.
Justice Tek Chand delivering the unanimous
Full Bench decision in the case of
1
Mussammat Lachhmi Vs. Mussammat Bhulli (ILR
Lahore Vol.VIII 384) traced the history of
this doctrine both in Hindu and Mohammedan
jurisprudence as follows:-
“In the Mitakshra (Book II, Chap.
I, Section V, verse 5) one of the four
kinds of effective answers to a suit
is “a plea by former judgment” and in
verse 10, Katyayana is quoted as
laying down that “one against whom a
judgment had formerly been given, if
he bring forward the matter again,
must be answered by a plea of Purva
Nyaya or former judgment” (Macnaughten
and Colebrooke’s translation, page
22). The doctrine, however, seems to
have been recognized much earlier in
Hindu Jurisprudence, judging from the
fact that both the Smriti Chandrika
(Mysore Edition, pages 97-98) and the
Virmitrodaya (Vidya-Sagar Edition,
page 77) base the defence of Prang
Nyaya (=former decision) on the
following text of the ancient law-
giver Harita, who is believed by some
Orientalists to have flourished in the
th
9 Century B.C. and whose Smriti is
now extant only in fragments:-
“The plaintiff should be non-
suited if the defendant avers: ‘in
this very affair, there was litigation
between him and myself previously,’
and it is found that the plaintiff had
lost his case”.
There are texts of Prasara (Bengal
Asiatic Society Edition, page 56) and
of the Mayukha (Kane’s Edition, page
15) to the same effect.
1
Among Muhammadan law-givers
similar effect was given to the plea
of “Niza-i-munfasla” or “Amar Mania
taqrir mukhalif.” Under Roman Law, as
administered by the Proetors’ Courts,
a defendant could repel the
plaintiff’s claim by means of
‘exceptio rei judicatoe” or plea of
former judgment. The subject received
considerable attention at the hands of
Ruman jurists and as stated in Roby’s
Roman Private Law (Vol.II, page 338)
the general principle recognised was
that “one suit and one decision was
enough for any single dispute” and
that “a matter once brought to trial
should not be tried except, of course,
by way of appeal”.
(Page 391-392 of the report)
17. The learned Judge also noted that in
British India the rule of Res Judicata was
first introduced by Section 16 of the
Bengal Regulation, III of 1973 which
prohibited the Zilla and City Courts from
entertaining any cause which, from the
production of a former decree or the record
of the Court, appears to have been heard
and determined by any Judge or any
Superintendent of a Court having competent
1
jurisdiction. The learned Judge found that
the earliest legislative attempt at
codification of the law on the subject was
made in 1859, when the first Civil
Procedure Code was enacted, whereunder
Section 2 of the Code barred every Court
from taking cognizance of suits which, on
the same cause of action, have been heard
and determined by a Court of competent
jurisdiction. The learned Judge opined,
and in our view rightly, that this was
partial recognition of the English rule in
so far as it embodied the principles
relating to Estoppel by judgment or Estopel
by record.
18. Thereafter, when the Code was again revised
in 1877, the operation of the rule was
extended in Section 13 and the bar was no
longer confined to the retrial of a dispute
relating to the same cause of action but
the prohibition was extended against
1
reagitating an issue, which had been heard
and finally decided between the same
parties in a former suit by a competent
court. The learned Judge also noted that
before the principle assumed its present
form in Section 11 of the Code of 1908, the
Section was expanded twice. However, the
learned Judge noted that Section 11 is not
exhaustive of the law on the subject.
19. It is nobody’s case that the appellant did
not know the contents of FWA. From this it
follows that it was open to the appellant
to question, in the previous proceeding
filed by it, that his land which was
acquired was not included in the FWA. No
reasonable explanation was offered by the
appellant to indicate why he had not raised
this issue. Therefore, in our judgment,
such an issue cannot be raised in this
1
proceeding in view of the doctrine of
Constructive Res Judicata.
20.
It may be noted in this context that while
applying the principles of Res Judicata the
Court should not be hampered by any
technical rules of interpretation. It has
been very categorically opined by Sir
Lawrence Jenkins that “the application of
the rule by Courts in India should be
influenced by no technical considerations
of form but by matter of substance within
the limits allowed by law”. [See Sheoparsan
Singh Vs. Rammanandan Prasad Singh , (1916)
1 I.L.R. 43 Cal. 694 at page 706 (P.C.)].
21. Therefore, any proceeding which has been
initiated in breach of the principle of Res
Judicata is prima-facie a proceeding which
has been initiated in abuse of the process
of Court.
1
22.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in
Devilal Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam
& Ors. – AIR 1965 SC 1150, has explained
this principle in very clear terms:
“But the question as to whether a citizen
should be allowed to challenge the
validity of the same order by successive
226
petitions under Art. , cannot be
answered merely in the light of the
significance and importance of the
citizens' fundamental rights. The general
principle underlying the doctrine of res
judicata is ultimately based on
considerations of public policy. One
important consideration of public policy
is that the decisions pronounced by courts
of competent jurisdiction should be final,
unless they are modified or reversed by
appellate authorities; and the other
principle is that no one should be made to
face the same kind of litigation twice
over, because such a process would be
contrary to considerations of fair play
and justice, vide : Daryao Vs. State of
U.P., 1962-1 SCR 575; (AIR 1961 SC 1457).”
23.
This Court in All India Manufacturers
Organisation (supra) explained in clear
terms that principle behind the doctrine of
2
Res Judicata is to prevent an abuse of the
process of Court.
24.
In explaining the said principle the Bench
in All India Manufacturers Organisation
(supra) relied on the following formulation
of Lord Justice Somervell in Greenhalgh
Vs. Mallard – (1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA):
“I think that on the authorities to which
I will refer it would be accurate to say
that res judicata for this purpose is not
confined to the issues which the court is
actually asked to decide, but that it
covers issues or facts which are so
clearly part of the subject-matter of the
litigation and so clearly could have been
raised that it would be an abuse of the
process of the court to allow a new
proceeding to be started in respect of
them .”
25.
The Bench also noted that the judgment of
the Court of Appeal in “Greenhalgh” was
approved by this Court in State of U.P . Vs.
Nawab Hussain – (1977) 2 SCC 806 at page
809, para 4.
2
26.
Following all these principles a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct
Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn . Vs.
State of Maharashtra – (1990) 2 SCC 715
laid down the following principle:
“……an adjudication is conclusive and final
not only as to the actual matter
determined but as to every other matter
which the parties might and ought to have
litigated and have had decided as
incidental to or essentially connected
with subject matter of the litigation and
every matter coming into the legitimate
purview of the original action both in
respect of the matters of claim and
defence. Thus, the principle of
constructive res judicata underlying
Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code
of Civil Procedure was applied to writ
case. We, accordingly hold that the writ
case is fit to be dismissed on the ground
of res judicata”
27. In view of such authoritative pronouncement
of the Constitution Bench of this Court,
there can be no doubt that the principles
of Constructive Res Judicata, as explained
in explanation IV to Section 11 of the CPC,
are also applicable to writ petitions.
2
28.
Thus, the attempt to re-argue the case
which has been finally decided by the Court
of last resort is a clear abuse of process
of the Court, regardless of the principles
of Res Judicata, as has been held by this
Court in K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi and Ors . –
(1998) 3 SCC 573. In paragraph 44 of the
report, this principle has been very
lucidly discussed by this Court and the
relevant portions whereof are extracted
below:
“One of the examples cited as an abuse of
the process of the court is relitigation.
It is an abuse of the process of the court
and contrary to justice and public policy
for a party to relitigate the same issue
which has already been tried and decided
earlier against him. The reagitation may
or may not be barred as res judicata...”
29. In coming to the aforementioned finding,
this Court relied on the Supreme Court
Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell.
The relevant principles laid down in the
2
aforesaid practice and which have been
accepted by this Court are as follows:
“This term connotes that the process of
the court must be used bona fide and
properly and must not be abused. The court
will prevent improper use of its machinery
and will in a proper case, summarily
prevent its machinery from being used as a
means of vexation and oppression in the
process of litigation. ... The categories
of conduct rendering a claim frivolous,
vexatious or an abuse of process are not
closed but depend on all the relevant
circumstances. And for this purpose
considerations of public policy and the
interests of justice may be very
material.”
30.
In the premises aforesaid, it is clear that
the attempt by the appellant to re-agitate
the same issues which were considered by
this Court and were rejected expressly in
the previous judgment in All India
Manufacturers Organisation (supra), is a
clear instance of an abuse of process of
this Court apart from the fact that such
issues are barred by principles of Res
2
Judicata or Constructive Res Judicata and
principles analogous thereto.
31. The other point which has been argued by
the appellant is that notification dated
30.3.2004 issued under Section 28(4) of
KIAD Act stands vitiated in view of the
provisions of Section 11A of the said Act
inasmuch as no award was passed within two
years from the date of the notification.
32. This Court is unable to accept the
aforesaid contention for the following
reasons.
33. It may be noted that the said question was
not urged by the appellant in its writ
petition before the learned Single Judge.
Of course, this was urged before the
Division Bench of the High Court
unsuccessfully. Apart from that we also
2
find no substance in the aforesaid
contentions.
34. If we compare the provisions of Sections
28(4) and 28(5) of KIAD Act with the
provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the said
Act, we discern a substantial difference
between the two.
35. In order to appreciate the purport of both
Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act,
they are to be read together and are set
out below:
“28. Acquisition of land-
xxx xxx
(4) After orders are passed under
sub-Section (3), where the State
Government is satisfied that any
land should be acquired for the
purpose specified in the
notification issued under sub-
section(1), a declaration shall,
by notification in the official
Gazette, be made to that effect.
(5) On the publication in the
official Gazette of the
2
declaration under sub-section
(4), the land shall vest
absolutely in the State
Government free from all
encumbrances.”
36. The appellant has not challenged the
validity of the aforesaid provisions.
Therefore, on a combined reading of the
provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of
the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the
publication of the notification under
Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from
30.3.2004, the land in question vested in
the State free from all encumbrances by
operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act,
whereas the land acquired under the said
Act vests only under Section 16 thereof,
which runs as under:
“16. Power to take possession:- When the
Collector has made an award under section
11, he may take possession of the land,
which shall thereupon vest absolutely in
the Government free from all encumbrances”
2
37. On a comparison of the aforesaid
provisions, namely, Sections 28(4) and
28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of
the said Act, it is clear that the land
which is subject to acquisition proceeding
under the said Act gets vested with the
Government only when the Collector makes an
award under Section 11, and the Government
takes possession. Under Sections 28(4) and
28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes
place by operation of law and it has
nothing to do with the making of any award.
This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of
the KIAD Act are vitally different from
Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act.
38.
A somewhat similar question came up for
consideration before a three-judge Bench of
this Court in Pratap and Another Vs. State
of Rajasthan and Ors . – (1996) 3 SCC 1. In
that case the acquisition proceedings
2
commenced under Section 52(2) of Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and the same
contentions were raised, namely, that the
acquisition notification gets invalidated
for not making an award within a period of
two years from the date of notification.
39. Repelling the said contention, the learned
Judges held that once the land is vested in
the Government, the provisions of Section
11A are not attracted and the acquisition
proceedings will not lapse. (para 12 at
page 8 of the report)
40.
In Munithimmaiah Vs. State of Karnataka and
others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 326 this
Court held that the provisions of Sections
6 and 11A of the said Act do not apply to
the provisions of Bangalore Development
Authority Act, 1976 (BDA Act). In paragraph
15 at page 335 of the report this Court
made a distinction between the purposes of
2
the two enactments and held that all the
provisions of said Act do not apply to BDA
Act.
41.
Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd.
Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and
Ors., reported in 2011 (1) SCALE 533 – 574,
held that Section 11A of the said Act does
not apply to acquisition under BDA Act.
42. The same principle is attracted to the
present case also. Here also on a
comparison between the provisions of said
Act and KIAD Act, we find that those two
Acts were enacted to achieve substantially
different purposes. In so far as KIAD Act
is concerned, from its Statement of Objects
and Reasons, it is clear that the same was
enacted to achieve the following purposes:
3
“It is considered necessary to make
provision for the orderly establishment
and development of Industries in suitable
areas in the State. To achieve this
object, it is proposed to specify suitable
areas for Industrial Development and
establish a Board to develop such areas
and make available lands therein for
establishment of Industries.”
43.
KIAD Act is of course a self contained
code. The said Act is primarily a law
regulating acquisition of land for public
purpose and for payment of compensation.
Acquisition of land under the said Act is
not concerned solely with the purpose of
planned development of any city. It has to
cater to different situations which come
within the expanded horizon of public
purpose. Recently the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Girnar Traders Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Others , reported in 2011 (1)
SCALE 223 held that Section 11A of the said
Act does not apply to acquisition under the
3
provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966.
44.
The learned counsel for the appellant has
relied on the judgment of this Court in the
case of Mariyappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka and others reported in (1998) 3
SCC 276. The said decision was cited for
the purpose of contending that Section 11A
is applicable to an acquisition under KIAD
Act. In Mariyappa (supra) before coming to
hold that provision of Section 11A of the
Central Act applies to Karnataka
Acquisition of Land for Grant of House
Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter “1972 Act”),
this Court held that the 1972 Act is not a
self-contained code. The Court also held
that the 1972 Act and the Central Acts are
supplemental to each other to the extent
that unless the Central Act supplements the
Karnataka Act, the latter cannot function.
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The Court further held that both the Acts,
namely, 1972 Act and the Central Act deals
with the same subject. But in the instant
case the KIAD Act is a self-contained code
and the Central Act is not supplemental to
it. Therefore, the ratio in Mariyappa
(supra) is not attracted to the facts of
the present case.
45. Following the aforesaid well settled
principles, this Court is of the opinion
that there is no substance in the
contention of appellant that acquisition
under KIAD Act lapsed for alleged non-
compliance with the provisions of Section
11A of the said Act.
46. For the reasons aforesaid all the
contentions of the appellant, being without
any substance, fail and the appeal is
dismissed.
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47.
For the reasons indicated hereinabove, this
Court holds that the filing of this appeal
before this Court is an instance of an
abuse of the process of Court. The main
purpose was to hold up, on one or other
pretext, the land acquisition proceeding
which, as held by this Court in All India
Manufacturers Organisation (supra), was
initiated to ‘achieve a larger public
purpose’.
48. In that view of the matter, this court
makes it clear that the State Government
should complete the project as early as
possible and should not do anything,
including releasing any land acquired under
this project, as that may impede the
completion of the project and would not be
compatible with the larger public interest
which the project is intended to serve.
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49. This Court, therefore, dismisses this
appeal with costs assessed at Rs.10 Lacs,
to be paid by the appellant in favour of
Karnataka High Court Legal Services
Authority within a period of six weeks from
date. In default, a proceeding will be
initiated against the appellant on a
complaint by the Karnataka High Court Legal
Services Authority by the appropriate
authority under the relevant Public Demand
Recovery Act for recovery of this cost
amount as arrears of land revenue.
50. The appeal is, thus, dismissed with costs
as aforesaid. Interim orders, if any, are
vacated.
.......................J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
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.......................J.
New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
February 02, 2011
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