Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1114 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Usha Agarwal
RESPONDENT:
Union of India & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/11/2006
BENCH:
S. H. Kapadia & R. V. Raveendran
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3012/2006)
(With W.P. (Crl.) No. 191 of 2006 (D-14072/2006)
R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.
Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No.3012/2006.
The preventive detention of one Sandip Agarwal (’detenu’ for short)
under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention
of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (’COFEPOSA Act’ for short) is under
challenge in these two matters, namely, criminal appeal by special leave
against the judgment dated 21.4.2006 in Writ Petition No.23908/2005 of the
Calcutta High Court and a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Both have been filed by the mother of
the detenu.
2. The facts, in brief, leading to the preventive detention of the detenu,
as gathered from the grounds of detention, are as follows - Sandip Agarwal,
the detenu, was the Director in-charge of the management of M/s Sandip
Exports Ltd., the other Directors being his family members. On receipt of
information about irregularities committed by the detenu, a search of the
premises of Sandip Exports Ltd. was conducted by the Directorate of
Revenue Intelligence on 7.11.2003. The search and the investigations
disclosed that M/s. Sandip Exports Ltd. had obtained two Annual Advance
Licences dated 28.3.2001 and 22.3.2002 on actual user conditions from the
Director General of Foreign Trade, Kolkata, as manufacturer-exporter. The
said Annual Advance Licences issued under the Duty Exemption
Entitlement Certificate Scheme (’DEEC Scheme’ for short) enabled the
Licensee to import goods free of duty subject to the condition that the
Licensee shall manufacture and export products (by utilizing the imported
goods) within 18 months, the quantity and value being as specified in the
licences in terms of Customs Notification No. 48/99 dated 29.4.1999 as
amended from time to time. The detenu imported different types of polyester
and silk yarn/fabric, duty free, under the scheme by using the said licences
of Sandip Exports Ltd. The duty foregone on importations made under the
said two Advance Licences was Rs.14 crores. Instead of utilizing such
imported materials in the manufacture of products for exports, he diverted
and disposed of the imported goods in the domestic market, and did not
fulfil the export obligation. He falsely claimed that the goods for export
were manufactured from out of the imported goods through a non-existing
manufacturing unit, and through alleged job-workers; and he also falsely
claimed that the products so manufactured out of goods imported by Sandip
Exports Ltd. were exported through M/s Karan Exports (India) Ltd., another
company owned and controlled by detenu’s family. In this manner, the
detenu indulged in a systematic and organized import-export fraud by
importing goods duty-free, under the ’DEEC Scheme’ and diverting them to
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domestic market.
3. At the instance of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (the
Sponsoring Authority), the Detaining Authority (Government of India,
Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, represented by its Joint
Secretary) passed an order of detention dated 19.8.2004 under Section 3(1)
of the COFEPOSA Act. In the grounds in support of the detention order, the
detaining authority stated that the action of the detenu in diverting duty free
imported goods into the domestic market in violation of the DEEC Scheme
Licences, amounted to "smuggling" of goods. The detaining authority also
stated that the nature and gravity of the offence and the dubious and
fraudulent modus operandi employed by the detenu showed his propensity
and potentiality to indulge in such illegal activities in future, necessitating
detention to prevent him from continuing such activities.
4. The detention order could not be executed as the detenu absconded.
As a consequence, an order dated 29.3.2004 was issued under Section 7(1)
of the Act. On the basis of a situation report filed under Section 7(1)(a) of
the Act on 26.10.2004, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, passed
an order dated 18.11.2004 for proclamation by proceeding under Section 82
Cr.P.C. The detenu filed a writ petition challenging the order of detention.
The said pre-execution challenge was rejected by the High Court on
10.6.2005. Ultimately, on 11.11.2005, the detenu was taken into custody and
the detention order and the grounds in support of the detention were served
on him. The copies of the documents relied upon by the detaining authority
in making the order of detention, were furnished to the detenu on
14.11.2005. As the detenu claimed that he had no working knowledge of
Hindi, English translations were furnished to him on 16.11.2005.
5. The detenu made a representation against his detention to the
detaining authority on 25.11.2005. The said representation was rejected by
the Detaining Authority on 7.12.2005 and the same was communicated to
the detenu on 13.12.2005. On 14.12.2005, the detenu’s mother filed W.P.
No.23908/2005 in the High Court of Calcutta, seeking quashing of the
detention order dated 19.8.2004 and release of the detenu.
6. The detenu made a representation to the Advisory Board constituted
under the COFEPOSA Act on 16.1.2006. The Advisory Board gave a
hearing on 19.1.2006 and recommended confirmation of the detention. On
receiving a copy of the representation to the Advisory Board along with the
report of the Advisory Board on 27.1.2006, the Central Government
confirmed the detention on 1.2.2006. The representation dated 16.1.2006,
copies of which were furnished to the detaining authority and Central
Government, was also independently considered by them. The Detaining
Authority by order dated 10.2.2006 rejected the representation of the detenu
dated 16.1.2006. The Central Government (Special Secretary and Director
General, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau) also rejected the said
representation of the detenu by order dated 13.2.2006. These orders of
rejection were served on the detenu on 17.2.2006. The detenu made another
representation dated 7.2.2006 against his detention to the Central
Government. By order dated 22.2.2006 the Central Government rejected the
said representation and a copy thereof was served on the detenu on
18.3.2006.
7. The events subsequent to filing of the writ petition were placed on
record in the pending writ petition and the order of detention was challenged
on the following grounds :
a) Relevant materials were withheld by the sponsoring authority
from the Detaining Authority.
b) The Detaining Authority had considered and relied on non-
existent and irrelevant material in making the order of
detention.
c) The translations of Hindi documents were belatedly supplied.
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d) Copies of the documents which were relied upon by the
Detaining Authority furnished to the detenu, contained several
sheets which were illegible thereby preventing the detenu from
making an effective representation.
e) There was inordinate delay in considering the representation
made by the detenu to the Central Government and serving the
same on the detenu.
f) The order of detention was based on a solitary incident. There
was no material to show that there was any possibility of the
detenu indulging in smuggling activities in future.
g) The allegations against the detenu did not amount to
’smuggling’ and therefore the order of detention was not
justified.
A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court rejected all these contentions
and consequently, dismissed the writ petition by judgment dated 21.4.2006.
The said judgment of the Calcutta High Court is challenged in this appeal by
special leave. Simultaneously, the petition under Article 32 has also been
filed before this Court, challenging the detention.
8. Though several contentions were raised in the special leave petition
and the writ petition, during arguments the challenge to the detention was
restricted to the following three grounds:
(i) The sponsoring authority had withheld from the detaining
authority a relevant material (Order dated 15/20.4.2004
stopping EXIM benefits to Sandip Exports Ltd made under
Rule 7 of the Foreign Trade (Regulations) Rules, 1993). The
detaining authority could not therefore apply his mind to all
relevant material before making the order of detention.
(ii) Several sheets among the copies of the documents supplied to
the detenu, were illegible and this came in the way of the
detenu making an effective representation for his release.
(iii) There was inordinate delay in considering the representation
dated 7.2.2006 by the detenu submitted to the Central
Government and communicating the decision to the detenu.
Re : Point No. (i)
9. A detention under COFEPOSA Act is anticipatory and preventive. It
is neither punitive nor curative. Preventive detention being one of the two
exceptions to the constitutional protection under Article 22 against arrest and
detention, certain procedural safeguards are provided in respect of exercise
of the power to direct preventive detention. The procedural safeguards under
the Constitution have been interpreted, to require every material which is
relevant, having a bearing on the question as to whether a person should be
detained under the Act, to be placed before the detaining authority, as the
decision to detain a person is rendered by a detaining authority on his
subjective satisfaction as to the existence of the grounds for such detention.
The sponsoring authority should not undertake any exercise of examination
and interpretation of the available material with a view to place the
documents selectively before the detaining authority. It is not for the
sponsoring authority to decide as to which of the relevant documents should
be placed before the detaining authority, or which of the documents are
likely to help, or not help, the prospective detenu. Consequently, the
sponsoring authority cannot exclude any particular document from the
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material to be placed before the detaining authority. If the relevant facts or
documents which may influence the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority on the question whether or not to make the detention order, are not
placed before the detaining authority, or are not considered by the detaining
authority, it may vitiate the detention order itself. It is no answer to say that
the exclusion of a relevant document did not affect the decision to detain a
person, in view of the other documents that were placed before the detaining
authority or that the detaining authority would have come to the same
conclusion even if he had considered the said document \026 vide Attorney
General of India vs. Amratlal Prajivandas [1994 (5) SCC 54], Ashadevi vs.
K. Shivraj, Addl. Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Gujarat [1979 (1) SCC
222], Sita Ram Somani vs. State of Rajasthan [1986 (2) SCC 86]; Ayya alias
Ayub vs. State of U.P. [1989 (1) SCC 374] and Ahamed Nassar vs. State of
Tamil Nadu [1999 (8) SCC 473].
10. Let us examine the facts, keeping in view the said principles. In this
case, the detention order was made on the ground that the detenu had
diverted the goods, imported duty free for manufacture of goods for export,
into domestic market and thereby indulged in ’smuggling’ as defined in
section 2(39) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the facts and circumstances
showed the propensity and potentiality on the part of the detenu to continue
such prejudicial activities in future. The grievance of the detenu is that the
sponsoring authority did not place the order dated 15/20.4.2004 of the Joint
Director-General of Foreign Trade, Kolkata (made under Rule 7 of Foreign
Trade Regulation Rules 1993, stopping the grant of all EXIM benefits to M/s
Sandip Exports Limited till finalization of the proposed action against the
said company), before the detaining authority. According to him, it was a
relevant document and the non-consideration of the said document vitiated
the order of detention. The fact that the said document was available in the
records of the sponsoring authority, but was not placed before the detaining
authority, is not disputed by the respondents. Though the High Court has
referred to the contention relating to the said document (order dated
15/20.4.2004), it did not specifically deal with it.
11. A document is relevant for considering the case of a person for
preventive detention if it relates to or has a bearing on either of the following
two issues : (a) Whether the detenu had indulged in smuggling or other
activities prejudicial to the State, which the COFEPOSA Act is designed to
prevent; and (b) Whether the nature of the illegal and prejudicial activity and
the manner in which the detenu had indulged in such activity, gave a
reasonable indication that he would continue to indulge in such activity. In
other words, whether he had the propensity and potentiality to continue the
prejudicial activity necessitating an order of detention.
12. The document in question did not prove any smuggling/prejudicial
activity on the part of the detenu. It only shows that the Department of
Foreign Trade had stopped all EXIM benefits to Sandip Exports Ltd.,
pending further action, as certain illegal activities of that company had come
to its notice. The said document was, therefore, neither relevant nor
necessary to decide whether the detenu had indulged in smuggling or other
prejudicial activity. The detaining authority obtained satisfaction in regard to
that aspect from the material that was placed by the sponsoring authority to
show illegal activities which amounted to smuggling.
13. The said document was also not relevant to establish propensity or
potentiality of the detenu to continue his illegal activities. The export-import
violations, which amount to smuggling, involve considerable planning,
organization and establishing a network. The propensity is deducible from
the modus operandi adopted by the violator, the inclination of the violator to
indulge in such activities and the further opportunity to commit such illegal
activities. Persons indulging in such prejudicial activities routinely create
’front’ companies and firms. The fact that a particular ’front’ company is
denied the EXIM benefits will not deter a violator from continuing such
activities, as he can always operate through other ’front’ companies/firms.
The contention of the detenu that as the said order dated 15/20.4.2004,
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stopped the EXIM benefits to Sandip Exports Ltd., he could not have
continued the alleged illegal activity, and therefore, the detention order was
not warranted, is untenable. The EXIM benefits were stopped with reference
to only one company namely, Sandip Exports Ltd., and that too till
finalization of further action. The investigation and search by the Directorate
of Revenue Intelligence, had disclosed that the detenu had other ’front’
companies. In fact the detention order makes reference to a similar violation
by the detenu by using M/s. Scandia Investments (P) Ltd. which was another
’front’ company controlled by him and his family. When the benefits of
illegal activity are stopped to a particular company, the brain behind the
violation, would merely shift the operations to another ’front’ company or
start the activities through a new company. It should also to be noted that
whenever any irregularities/violations in regard to export/ import comes to
the attention of the department, the benefits are stopped in the normal
course, pending finalization of further action.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the document whereby EXIM benefits to
one of the companies controlled by the detenu was stopped, was a ’relevant’
document, non-consideration of which would vitiate the detention order. The
first contention is therefore rejected.
Re : Point No. (ii)
14. It is contended on behalf of the detenu that several sheets in the copies
of documents furnished to him, were illegible and that prevented him from
making an effective representation. It is submitted that the procedural
safeguard under clause (5) of Article 22 requires the grounds of detention to
be communicated to the detenu and this would mean not only the grounds
but also the documents on which reliance was placed to formulate the
grounds that led to the detention. It is further submitted that the documents
required to be furnished, should be legible and in a language known to the
detenu so as to enable the detenu to give an effective representation against
the detention; that if the documents are not legible or in a language not
known to the detenu, then it is as bad as not furnishing the documents; and
that furnishing of copies of documents is not a mere formality but an integral
part of the right of the detenu assured under the Constitution. It is contended
that the order of detention is vitiated on account of the following pages of
the documents furnished to the detenu being not legible :-
Page Nos. 124-128, 160-178, 186, 254, 255, 257, 350, 352, 357, 358, 360,
362, 368-371. 371A, 371B, 493, 497, 500, 508, 510, 515, 516, 523, 534,
538, 543, 550, 551, 608, 611, 616-21, 623-37, 682-701, 745, 750, 755,
760, 765, 769-70, 777, 780, 821, 841-43, 857-65, 872, 874, 882, 884, 887
and the last page.
15. In Dharmishta Bhagat vs. State of Karnataka [1989 Supp.(2) SCC
15], this Court has held that ’refusal’ on the part of the detaining authority to
supply legible copies of ’relevant’ documents to the detenu for making an
effective representation infringes the detenu’s right under Article 22(5) of
the Constitution. This Court observed :
"Therefore, it is imperative that the detaining authority has to serve the
grounds of detention which include also all the relevant documents which
had been considered in forming the subjective satisfaction by the detaining
authority before making the order of detention and referred to in the list of
documents accompanying the grounds of detention in order to enable the
detenu to make an effective representation to the Advisory Board as well
as to the detaining authority. Therefore, the non-supply of legible copy of
this vital document i.e. panchnama dated February 12, 1988 in spite of the
request made by the detenu to supply the same renders the order of
detention illegal and bad."
In Manjit Singh Garewal @ Gogi vs. Union of India [1990 Supp. SCC 59],
this Court has held that where copies supplied at the request of the detenu
were illegible, the constitutional safeguards were violated and the order of
detention is liable to be quashed.
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16. The High Court has examined the copies that were furnished to the
detenu. In regard to the grievance relating to illegible copies occurring
between pages 493 and 887 and the last page, the High Court found that
these were copies of the documents which were supplied by the detenu
himself, and the department could do no better than to furnish the copies
thereof. If the documents furnished by the detenu to the department
contained some portions or pages which were illegible, obviously the copies
thereof furnished by the detaining authority to the detenu will also contain
such illegible portions. The learned counsel for the appellant contented that
if really any document furnished by the detenu was illegible, it could not
have been used against the detenu.. But this contention overlooks the fact
that a document may contain several sheets and illegibility of some sheets or
parts of some sheets will not come in the way of the authorities making use
of the legible portions of the documents furnished by the detenu,
supplemented by other documents secured during investigation. There is
nothing strange in the department making use of partially legible documents
furnished by detenu. Therefore, illegibility of portions of documents which
are copies of documents furnished by the detenu, cannot be a ground for
grievance by the detenu. Insofar as the allegation that some of the sheets
between pages 124 to 371B were illegible, the High Court after having gone
through the copies of documents furnished to the detenu, has found no
substance in the contention. In fact, while acknowledging the copies of
documents, the detenu has made an endorsement that they were legible.
17. The entire issue of furnishing of illegible copies is with reference to
the question whether detenu’s right to make an effective representation
against his detention is hampered by non-supply of legible copies. The High
Court after an examination of the copies of documents found that the detenu
was not so hampered. Having gone through the representations made by the
detenu against his detention, we also find that he was in no way hampered
by the fact that a few of the sheets/copies of documents were partly illegible.
We therefore find no merit in the second condition, nor any reason to
interfere with the finding of the High Court in this behalf.
Re : Point No. (iii)
18. The scope of Clause (5) of Article 22 which provides that when any
person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing
for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as
may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has
been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a
representation against such order, has been examined in several decisions.
Interpreting the said provision, this Court in Sk. Abdul Karim vs. the State of
West Bengal [AIR 1969 SC 1028], held as follows :-
"Apart from these enabling and. disabling provisions certain procedural
rights have been expressly safeguarded by Clause (5) of Article 22. A
person detained under a law of preventive detention has a right to obtain
information as to the grounds of detention and has also the right to make a
representation protesting against an order of preventive detention. Article
22(5) does not expressly say to whom the representation is to be made and
how the detaining authority is to deal with the representation. But it is
necessarily implicit in the language of Article 22(5) that the State
Government to whom the representation is made should properly consider
the representation as expeditiously as possible. The constitution of an
Advisory Board-under Section 8 of the Act does not relieve the State
Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of the
detenu as soon as it is received by it. On behalf of the respondent It was
said’ that there was no express language in Article 22(5) requiring the
State Government to consider the representation of the detenu. But it is a
necessary implication of the language of Article 22(5) that the State
Government should consider the representation made by the detenu as
soon as it is made, apply its mind to It and, if necessary, take appropriate
action. In our opinion, the constitutional right to make a representation
guaranteed by Article 22(5) must be taken to include by necessary
implication the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the
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representation by the authority to whom it is made. The right of
representation under Article 22(5) is a valuable constitutional right and is
not a mere formality."
In Sk. Rashid vs. State of West Bengal [AIR 1973 SC 824], this Court
interpreting the words ’as soon as may be’ occurring in clause (5) of Article
22, held as follows :
"The use of the Words "as soon as may be" is important. It reflects the
anxiety on the part of the framers of the Constitution to enable the detenu
to know the grounds on which the order of detention has been made so
that he can make an effective representation against it at the earliest. The
ultimate objective of this provision can only be the most speedy
consideration of his representation by the authorities concerned, for,
without its expenditious consideration with a sense of urgency the basic
purpose of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation is
likely to be defeated. This right to represent and to have the representation
considered at the earliest flows from the constitutional guarantee of the
right to personal liberty - the right which is highly cherished in our
Republic and its protection against arbitrary and unlawful invasion.
Now, whether or not the State Government has in a given case considered
the representation made by the detenu as soon as possible, in other words,
with reasonable dispatch, must necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of that case, it being neither possible nor advisable to lay
down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases. The Court
has in each case to consider judicially on the available material if the gap
between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the State
Government is so unreasonably long and the explanation for the delay
offered by the State Government so unsatisfactory as to render the
detention order thereafter illegal"
In Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel vs. Union of India [1995 (4) SCC 51],
this Court observed thus :-
"Construing the provisions of Article 22(5) we have explained that the
right of the person detained to make a representation against the order of
detention comprehends the right to make such a representation to the
authority which can grant such relief, i.e., the authority which can revoke
the order of detention and set him at liberty and since the officer who has
made the order of detention is competent to revoke it, the person detained
has the right to make a representation to the officer who made the order of
detention. The first premises that such right does not flow from Article
22(5) cannot, therefore, be accepted."
This Court has also repeatedly held that though there can be no specific or
mechanical test for determining whether there has been undue delay, where
there is an unexplained delay in either making the order or serving the order,
it would vitiate the order of detention.
19. The order of detention states that detenu can make representations to
(i) Detaining Authority, (ii) Central Government, and (iii) Advisory Board,
in regard to the detention. The detenu has a constitutional as also statutory
right to make a representation against detention not only to the Detaining
Authority but to any authority which can revoke the order of detention. He
can also represent to the Advisory Board constituted under section 8 of
COFEPOSA Act. Such representations no doubt should be disposed of by
the concerned authority as early as possible. The fact that the Detaining
Authority or the Advisory Board have rejected the representation of the
detenu does not discharge the Central Government from its responsibility to
consider and dispose of the representation expeditiously.
20. The grievance of the detenu is in respect of the representation to the
Central Government on 7.2.2006 which was rejected by the Central
Government and the detaining authority, by two separate orders dated
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22.2.2006. The Central Government in its counter-affidavit has satisfactorily
explained how the time between 7.2.2006 and 22.2.2006 was spent. But the
said orders dated 22.2.2006 rejecting the representation was served on the
detenu only on 18.3.2006. The reason why the rejection orders dated
22.2.2006 were not served till 18.3.2006 on the detenu remains unexplained.
In fact the respondents have admitted this unexplained delay in their counter
filed in this Court. We extract below the relevant portion :-
"In this connection, it is submitted that the Superintendent, Presidency
Correctional Home, Kolkata was requested to serve the original of the said
two memorandums on the detenu and obtain signature thereon which he
did on 18th March, 2006. IG (Prisons) and Chief Secretary, Government of
West Bengal, have been asked to look into the circumstances leading to
delayed submission of rejection memos to the detenu."
21. The grievance of the detenu is in regard to the delay in
communicating the decision dated 22.2.2006 of the Central Government till
18.3.2006. The learned counsel for the respondent however relied on the
decision of this Court in Abdul Razak Dawood Dhanani vs. Union of India
[2003 (9) SCC 652], to contend that delay on the part of the Central
Government in considering the detenu’s representation or the delay in
communication of such decision on the detenu will not be material, where
the Central Government has already considered the representation of the
detenu and rejected it and what is delayed is the decision on the second
representation. In that case, the representation dated 12.4.2002 given by the
detenu to the three authorities namely, Advisory Board, Detaining Authority
and Central Government were rejected respectively by orders dated
19.4.2002, 06.5.2002 and 08.5.2002. In addition to the first representation
dated 12.4.2002, the detenu had submitted a further representation dated
19.4.2002 to the Central Government and the grievance was that the second
representation had not been disposed of by the Central Government by a
separate order. This Court rejected the contention on the ground that the
second representation dated 19.4.2002 contained the same grounds and same
material as contained in the first representation dated 12.4.2002 and in the
absence of any fresh ground or material or subsequent event justifying the
consideration of the second representation, the Central Government was not
bound to pass separate order disposing of the second representation. The
ratio of that decision squarely applies to this case.
22. In this case we find that the first representation dated 16.1.2006 was
disposed of by the Advisory Board, Detaining Authority and Central
Government on 27.1.2006, 10.2.2006 and 13.2.2006. The second
representation dated 7.2.2006 given to the Central Government is nothing
but a reiteration of the representation that was given to the Advisory Board
on 16.1.2006 copies of which were given to detaining authority and Central
Government. The representation dated 16.1.2006 had already been
considered and rejected by the Central Government by order dated
13.2.2006. Therefore applying the principle in Abdul Razak Dawood
Dhanani (supra), any delay in disposing of the subsequent representation
dated 7.2.2006 or any delay in communicating the decision on such
representation will not vitiate the order of detention. The third contention is
also therefore rejected.
23. As a result, we dismiss the appeal as also the writ petition as having
no merit.