Full Judgment Text
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[REPORTABLE]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION( C) No. 33644/2011
Satya Pal Anand ….Petitioner
Vs.
State of M.P. & Anr. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A.K.SIKRI,J.
1. The petitioner herein had filed Writ Petition under Article 226
of the Constitution in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal
Seat at Jabalpur, in the nature of Public Interest Litigation. In
that petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity of Section
3 of the M.P. State Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter
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referred to as the Act) to the extent this provision permits the
State Government to appoint the Registrar of the Co-operative
Society, as well as Additional Registrar, Joint Registrar, Deputy
Registrar, Assistant Registrar etc. The petitioner also challenged
proviso added to Section 77 (3)(b) and Section 77 (6) of the Act as
unconstitutional. To put it succinctly, the grievance of the
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petitioner was that these provisions provide for appointment of
persons not having any education in law, though discharging the
judicial function, which was impermissible and ex-facie violative
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given suggestion to the effect that the appointments of these
presiding officers be made in manner presiding officers of the
labour courts are appointed.
2. The Writ Petition was contested by the respondents on
various grounds. In the first place, the very maintainability of the
Writ Petition was assailed on the ground that the petitioner had
not approached the High Court with clean hands and had
suppressed the fact that he was a chronic litigant whose various
cases were pending before the Cooperative Court. Therefore, he
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had personal interest in the matter. As such, he was not
competent to file the Writ Petition in the nature of PIL. On merits,
it was submitted that such Registrar, Addl. Registrar etc. function
under the supervision of M.P. State Cooperative Tribunal (in short
‘the Tribunal’). The Chairman of the Tribunal is a judicial officer.
Again, both these authorities function under the over all
superintendence of the High Court under Art.227 of the
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Constitution. In several other enactments the administrative
officers perform such quasi judicial functions.
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the aforesaid provisions of the Act and dismissed the Writ Petition
filed by the petitioner.
4. Against the aforesaid judgment, present Special Leave
Petition is preferred under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The
petitioner has appeared in person and filed written submissions.
At the time of arguments, he referred to and read out certain
portion of those written submissions and submitted that he did
not have to say anything more than what is contained therein.
The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand relied
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upon the reasoning given by the High Court in the impugned
judgment to justify the said order. We have perused the judgment
minutely and have also gone through the written submissions of
the petitioner.
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5. Before adverting to these submissions, we would like to
reproduce the provisions of the Act which are subject matter of
the present challenge:
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(1) The State Government shall appoint a
person to be the Registrar of Co-operative Societies
for the State and may appoint one or more officers of
the following categories to assist him, namely:
(a) Additional Registrar of Co-operative
Societies;
(b) Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies;
(c) Deputy Registrar of Co-operative
Societies;
(d) Assistant Registrar of Co-operative
Societies;
(e) Such other categories of officers as may
be prescribed.
xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx”
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77. Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative
Tribunal.
(3) (b) Of the other two members, one shall
be an officer of Co-operative Department not below
the rank of Joint Registrar and the other shall be non-
official closely associated with co-operative
movement or an Advocate or a Pleader having
practical experience for a period of not less than
fifteen years:
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Provided that if the State Government thinks
fit, the Tribunal may consist of a single person.
xxxx xxxxx xxxxx
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Provided that no appointment shall be
terminated under this sub-section unless the person
whose appointment is proposed to be terminated is
given reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against such termination.”
6. With this, now let us first deal with the argument pertaining
to the validity of Section 3 of the Act. As is clear from the above,
Section 3 deals with appointment of the Registrar of Co-operative
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Societies as well as Additional Registrar, Joint Registrar, Deputy
Registrar, Assistant Registrar etc. As mentioned above, the plea
of the petitioner is that since Registrar and other officers are
performing judicial function under the Act, any person to be
appointed as Registrar, Joint Registrar etc. has to be necessarily a
law person, namely, a person who has education in law and is well
equipped to discharge such adjudicatory functions.
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7. In order to appreciate this contention, we will have to look
into the functioning of the Office of Registrar under the Act. It is
elaborately explained in the impugned judgment of the High
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that portion of the judgment explaining the scheme of the Act.
Therefore, we can briefly restate the same. Registrar under the
provisions of the Act is the executive head of the cooperative
movement which is intended to provide strength to the weaker
sections of the community and is based on contribution through
an open door policy. The Registrar is supposed to be “the friend
philosopher and guide” and is required to see that the
cooperative movement remains within prescribed limit. Sections 8
and 9 of the Act empower the Registrar to deal with the question
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of registration of a society. Under Section 10 of the Act, the
Registrar has the power to classify the societies whereas Sections
11 and 12 of the Act deal with the power of Registrar with regard
to amendment of bye-laws of the society. Section 18 empowers
the Registrar to direct cancellation of registration of the society
whereas under Section 18-A of the Act the Registrar can order de-
registration of societies. Under Section 19-A of the Act, the
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Registrar may declare a person ineligible for membership of the
society. Section 49-D of the Act deals with the power of the
Registrar to give direction to the society to make regulations.
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suppression of the committee of the society in the contingencies
mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 53. Under the aforesaid
provisions, thus, the Registrar is discharging pure administrative
functions. Section 57 of the Act deals with the power of Registrar
to seize records of the society in the circumstances which have
been specified in sub-section (1) of Section 57. Section 58 deals
with the power of Registrar to audit or cause to be audited by a
person authorized by Section 59 of the Act empowers the
Registrar to conduct an enquiry into the affairs of the society in
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the circumstances enumerated in Section 59(1).
8. However, limited powers are given to the Registrar to
entertain certain kinds of disputes and take decision thereupon as
well. One such provision is Section 55 of the Act which, inter-alia,
provides that regarding terms of employment, working conditions
and disciplinary action taken by a Society, if a dispute arises
between a Society and its employees, the Registrar or any officer
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appointed by him (not below the rank of Assistant Registrar) shall
decide the dispute. Likewise, Section 64 of the Act provides that
the Registrar shall decide the dispute touching upon the
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employment of a Society or the liquidation of the Society.
9. The question that falls for consideration is whether it
becomes imperative to appoint a Registrar with legal and/or
judicial backdrop keeping in view the aforesaid Scheme of the
Act? In an endeavour to justify the appointment of a legal person
to man this office, the petitioner submitted that the very nature
and significance of the functions discharged by the Registrar or
his nominee, would manifest that knowledge of law and practice
is dispensable to effectively carry out those functions inasmuch
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as such presiding officer is supposed to be conversant with the
provisions of Civil Procedure Code, Law of Evidence, Indian Penal
Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, etc. It was further submitted
that the functions are such that authority discharging such
function is to be classified as “court” and it is so held by this
Court in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi
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Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1494. This
decision is followed subsequently in Mukri Gopalan v.
Cheppilat Puthampurayil Aboobacker AIR 1995 SC 2272 and
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10. The petitioner also submitted that the Bombay High Court in
the case of Maharashtra Co-operative Courts Bar
Association, Bombay & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
1990 Mah.L.J. 1064 has held that presiding officer of the
cooperative court form cadre of subordinate courts as understood
by Art.234 of the Constitution of India and State Government will
have to take action to make appointment of these presiding
officer in accordance with the direction contained in the said
Article. In other words, it would mean that they can be selected
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by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission in consultation
with the High Court. On that basis, the petitioner pleads that
State Government should not be given right to appoint any
person as the Registrar etc. The petitioner also went to the extent
of describing these functionaries as the “Cooperative Courts”
while discharging these duties through no such nomenclature is
provided in the Act. He also submitted that in the State of M.P.
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functioning of these authorities was dismal, creating unfortunate
and painful situation which was because the reason that persons
appointed were blissful ignorant about the legal aspects. They
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independence of judiciary was the hallmark of the basic structure
of the Constitution. He argued that with such appointments
impartiality, independence, fairness and reasonableness is
threatened and compromised. In support of this argument, the
petitioner has referred to the following judgments.
(2010) 11 SCC 11 : UOI v. R.Gandhi President Madras Bar
Assn.
(2012) 10 SCC 353: State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue
Tribunal Bar Assn.
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(2013) 1 SCC 745: Namit Sharma v. UOI.
11. We have already taken note of the Scheme of the Act and
the role and functioning of the office of the Registrar under the
said Scheme. Most of the powers of the Registrar are
administrative in nature. While exercising those powers the
Registrar is not deciding any lis. He is one of the main
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administrative functionaries for the purposes of carrying out the
objectives of the said Act. At the same time, the Registrar is also
give some quasi-judicial powers. He, also for that matter
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two hats, with predominant role of the administrators. It is not the
case of the petitioner that the judicial function should be taken
away from the Registrar and assigned to some other authority.
The petitioner has pleaded for appointment of a person with legal
background as Registrar etc. to enable him to decide the dispute
between the parties more effectively, as according to him, any
person with no legal/judicial background is incapable of deciding
those cases. However, same arguments can be pressed by other
side in a reverse situation. If a person with legal background is
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appointed to any of these posts, then his appointment can be
challenged on the ground that such a person though would be fit
to discharge the quasi judicial duties, but totally unfit to discharge
other administrative duties which are the primary and day to day
duties attached to the said office.
12. We would have still given some weightage to the argument
of the petitioner, had it been a case where order of the Registrar,
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deciding the dispute, was made final. That is not so. In fact,
under Chapter X of the Act, M.P. State Cooperative Tribunal is
constituted. This Tribunal consists of the Chairman and two other
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unambiguously provides that no person shall be qualified to be
the Chairman of the Tribunal unless he had been a Judge of a
High Court or has held the office of a District Judge for not less
than 5 years. Likewise, in respect of two Members of the Tribunal,
Section 77 (3) (b) contains a clear stipulation that one of them
shall be an officer of Cooperative Department not below the rank
of Joint Registrar, and the other shall be non-official closely
associated with the cooperative movement or an Advocate or a
pleader having practical experience for a period of not less than
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15 years. With such a composition of the Tribunal, which is given
power to hear appeals from the orders of the Registrar or his
nominee, the apprehension of the petitioner is adequately taken
care of . We find that in addition to hearing the appeals from the
orders of the Registrar, the Tribunal is also given power of
revision and review. Similar schemes are provided in various
other statutes wherein at the first ladder of the lis, powers are
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given to the administrative authorities to decide the same with
provision for appeal against those orders. One example is Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971. In such
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the Estate Officer is made amenable to challenge before the
District Judge under Section 9 of that Act. Similar position can be
found under the Land Reforms Act and various other Acts.
13. We emphasize, at the cost of repetition, that most of the
functions are in the sphere of administration and governance with
few additional duties having quasi judicial character. In such a
situation and more particularly when a Tribunal is constituted with
all the trappings of a court, we do not find any fault with the
provision of Section 3 of the Act empowering the Government to
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appoint persons as Registrars, Joint Registrars, Deputy Registrars
and Assistant Registrars etc. necessarily with legal/judicial
background. Challenge to the vires of Section 3 of the Act is,
therefore, rejected, upholding the judgment of the High Court on
this issue for our own reasons given hereinabove.
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14. In so far as the provisions of Section 77 (3) (b) and Section
77 (6) of the Act are concerned, we hardly see any reason to hold
these provisions as unconstitutional. Section 77 deals with the
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consists of a Chairman and two other Members. Chairman is to
be a person with judicial background. No person is qualified to be
the Chairman of the Tribunal unless he had been a Judge of a
High Court or who held the office of the District Judge for not less
than 5 years. Two Members of the tribunal are to be appointed as
per the impugned provisions namely Section 77 (3) (b) of the Act.
Scheme shows that out of the two, one would be ‘administrative
member’ and other may be a ‘judicial member’ though such
nomenclature is not specifically assigned. However, it becomes
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clear from the provision which provides that one of the members
would be the person not below the rank of Joint Registrar. It
clearly shows that he would be a person who would have worked
as Joint Registrar and in that capacity gained experience on
administrative side about the functioning of the cooperative
societies. In that capacity, he would have also gained some
experience of deciding the disputes between the parties which
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could be assigned to him. Other member is to be non-official and
he/ she could be the person who is closely associated with the
cooperative movement or an Advocate or a pleader with practical
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members can be a person with legal background. In nutshell, the
tribunal consists of a former Judge as Chairman, one member who
has held high office of Joint Registrar in the department and the
other member either with the legal background or a person
closely associated with cooperative movement. We, thus, do not
find any fault with this provision as well.
15. In so far as Section 77 (6) of the Act is concerned, it gives
power to the State Government to terminate the appointment of
the Chairman or a member if, in its opinion, such Chairman or
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Member is unable or unfit to perform the duty of his office. Thus,
this power is given only when the State Government forms such
an opinion about the inability or unfitness of such Chairman or
Member to perform the duties of his office. This opinion may be
subjective but has to be based on objective
consideration/material on record. Since the State Government is
the appointing authority, power to remove has to necessarily vest
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in the appointing authority. It is not an omnibus or
unguided/uncanalyzed power conferred upon the Government.
Further, the decision is always subject to judicial review. In a
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material on the basis of which such an opinion is formed, it can be
remedied by the court of law. It is further significant to mention
that proviso to this sub-section (6) of Section 77 provides an
additional safeguards which mandates following procedure in
consonance with principle of natural justice by giving reasonable
opportunity of show cause against such termination. Thus, when
such an action is contemplated, the Government is under an
obligation to issue show cause notice which would necessarily
contain the reasons/material on the basis of which, a belief is
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nurtured that such Chairman or Member would be unable or unfit
to continue to perform the duties of his office. It would be open to
the noticee to refute the same by giving suitable reply. Final
opinion would be formed only after eliciting and considering the
defence. Therefore, we see no reason to hold such a provision as
unconstitutional. In fact, in the written submissions filed by the
petitioner, there is no plea or ground taken by the petitioner on
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the basis of which the petitioner seeks to condemn these
provisions. We, therefore, reject the prayer of the petitioner qua
on Section 77 (3) (b) and Section 77 (6) of the Act as well.
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arguments raised by the petitioner based on the judgments cited
by him are of no benefit as those judgments have no applicability.
No doubt the Registrar exercising powers under Section 48 of the
Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act is held to be a Court. It
was so stated in the following manner :
“It will be noted from the above that the
jurisdiction of the ordinary civil and revenue
Courts of the land is ousted under S.57 of the
Act in case of disputes which fell under S.48. A
Registrar exercising powers under S.48 must,
therefore, be held to discharge the duties
which would otherwise have fallen on the
ordinary civil and revenue Courts of the land.
The Registrar has not merely the trappings of
a Court but in many respects he is given the
same powers as are given to ordinary civil
Courts of the land by the Code of Civil
Procedure including the power to summon and
examine witnesses on oath, the power to order
inspection of documents, to hear the parties
after framing issues, to review his own order
and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of
Courts mentioned in S.151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In such a case there is no difficulty
in holding that in adjudicating upon a dispute
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referred under S.48 of the Act, the Registrar is
to all intents and purposes, a Court
discharging the same functions and duties in
the same manner as a Court of law is expected
to do.”
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exercising such powers has to be necessarily a person with
judicial/legal background. That was not even an issue in the
aforesaid case.
17. In so far as judgment in the case of Mukrigopalan is
concerned, the Court therein discussed the power of the appellate
authority constituted under Section 18 under Kerala Building
Lease Rent Control Act. In the instant case, the appellate
authority is the tribunal which is headed by a judicial person. The
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judgment in R.Gandhi (supra) again pertains to the National
Company Law Tribunal and the law stated therein, emphasizing
the need for person with judicial background, is in the context of a
tribunal. Same is the position in the matter of Gujarat Revenue
Tribunal Bar Association case (supra). In so far as Namit Sharma
(supra) is concerned, much of what is stated therein is watered
down in the decision dated September 3, 2013 rendered in the
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Review Petition (C) No. 2309 of 2012 titled Union of India v.
R.Gandhi. The Court has gone to the extent of holding that CIC is
not discharging judicial duties.
are given even to the Election Commission under the
Representation of People Act, 1951 in a matter where it decides
as to whether to register a political party or not. This was so made
clear in the case of Indian National Congress (I) vs. Institute
of Social Welfare & Ors. 2002 (5) SCC 685. Notwithstanding
that Election Commission under Section 29-A of the said Act is
required to act judicially and the act of Commission, in that
capacity, is quasi judicial, nobody has ventured to say that such
functions be discharged only by a person with judicial/legal
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background.
19. Having determined the question raised, we would like to
emphasize the need for appointment of suitable persons not only
as Registrar, Joint Registrar etc. but as Chairman and members of
the tribunal as well. While discharging quasi-judicial functions
Registrar, Joint Registrars etc. have to keep in mind that they
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have to be independent in their functioning. They are also
expected to acquire necessary expertise to effectively deal with
the disputes coming before them. They are supposed to be
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and fairly and to pass the orders which are legally sustainable. In
this behalf, we would like to refer to judgment dated 3.9.2013
passed in the Review Petition (C) No.2309/2012 (Namit Sharma
case). In that case, one unfortunate feature that was noted was
that experience over the years has shown that the orders passed
by Information Commissions have, at times, gone beyond the
provisions of the Right to Information Act and that Information
Commissions have not been able to harmonise the conflicting
interests indicated in the preamble and other provisions of the
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Act. The reasons for this experience about the functioning of the
Information Commissions could be either that the persons who do
not answer the criteria mentioned in Sections 12(5) and 15(5)
have been appointed as Chief Information Commissioner or that
the persons appointed even when they answer the aforesaid
criteria, they do not have the required mind to balance the
interests indicated in the Act. It was therefore insisted that
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experienced suitable persons should be appointed who are able
to perform their functions efficiently and effectively. In this behalf
certain directions were given and one of the directions was that
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Information Commissioners the Selection Committee must
mention against name of each candidate recommended the facts
to indicate his eminence in public life ( which is the requirement
of the provision of that Act), his knowledge and experience in the
particular field and these facts must be accessible to the citizens
as part of their right to information under that Act, after the
appointment is made.
20. Taking clue from the aforesaid directions, and having gone
through the similar dismal state of affairs expressed by the
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petitioner in the instant petition about the functioning of the
cooperative societies, we direct that the State Government shall,
keeping in mind the objective of the Act, the functions which the
Registrar, Joint Registrar etc. are required to perform and
commensurate with those, appointment of suitable persons shall
be made. Likewise, having regard to the fact that the Chairman of
the Tribunal is to be a judicial person, namely, Former Judge of
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the High Court or the District Judge, we are of the opinion that for
appointment of the Chairman and the Members of the Tribunal,
the respondent-State is duty bound to keep in mind and follow the
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R.Gandhi (supra). Thus, for appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, the selection to these posts should
preferably be made by the Public Service Commission in
consultation with the High Court.
21. As a result, subject to the aforesaid directions, this Special
Leave Petition is dismissed.
………………………………………J.
(Anil R. Dave)
…………………………………….J.
(A.K.Sikri)
JUDGMENT
New Delhi,
Dated: May 6, 2014
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