Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C)NO.10482 OF 2020
T.K. DAVID ...PETITIONER (S)
VERSUS
KURUPPAMPADY SERVICE
CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
This special leave to appeal has been filed
against the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala
High Court dated 06.02.2020 rejecting the Review
Petition No. 805 of 2018 filed by the petitioner in
Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014.
2. Brief facts necessary to consider this special
leave petition need to be noted.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MEENAKSHI KOHLI
Date: 2020.10.05
16:29:07 IST
Reason:
3. The petitioner was an employee of Kuruppampady
Service Co-operative Bank. Petitioner was suspended
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and disciplinary inquiry was conducted by the Bank.
The Bank vide order dated 20.03.2003 dismissed the
petitioner consequent to domestic enquiry. There has
been series of litigation between the petitioner and
the Bank and thereafter Cooperative Arbitration Court
by order dated 18.08.2010 gave award by which
punishment of dismissal was modified as reduction to
a lower rank. Against the order dated 18.08.2010 both
the petitioner as well as the Bank filed Appeal No.
78 of 2010 and No. 81 of 2010 respectively. The
Cooperative Tribunal vide its judgment dated
16.08.2011 disposed of both the appeals by which the
punishment of compulsory retirement on 20.03.2003 was
imposed with terminal benefits subject to liability,
if any, duly assessed. Against the order of the
Cooperative Tribunal a writ petition was filed by the
petitioner before the learned Single Judge of the
Kerala High Court, which writ petition was dismissed
by judgment dated 31.07.2013 against which judgment
Writ Appeal No. 1313 of 2013 was filed by petitioner
before the Division Bench. The Division Bench of the
High Court vide its judgment dated 11.03.2015
dismissed the writ appeal filed by the petitioner.
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Aggrieved by the Division Bench judgment dated
11.03.2015, the petitioner filed a Special Leave
Petition No. 24231 of 2015 before this Court, which
was dismissed by order dated 21.08.2015, which is as
follows:-
“Heard.
Delay condoned.
We do not see any merit in this special
leave petition which is hereby dismissed.”
4. After dismissal of special leave petition, a
Review Petition No. 1521 of 2016 was filed in this
Court, which too was dismissed on 02.03.2016. The
petitioner also filed a Curative Petition No. 245 of
2016, which also was dismissed on 12.05.2016. After
the aforesaid proceedings in this Court, the
petitioner filed a Review Petition, R.P. No. 805 of
2018 in Writ Appeal No.399 of 2014, which review
petition has been dismissed by the High Court vide
its judgment dated 06.02.2020. Aggrieved with the
judgment dated 06.02.2020, this special leave
petition has been filed.
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5. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenging
the order on the review submits that earlier
dismissal of the special leave petition on 21.08.2015
shall not operate as res judicata. He further
submits that the petitioner was dismissed on petty
charges due to political vendetta. He further
contends that Cooperative Arbitration Court, which
has imposed punishment of reduction in rank was
wrongly substituted by compulsory retirement by the
Cooperative Tribunal. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has also referred to judgment of this
Court in Kunhayammed and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and
Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner
and have perused the records.
7. The earlier Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24231
of 2015 was filed by the petitioner challenging the
Division Bench judgment dated 11.03.2015 by which his
Writ Appeal was dismissed. The Review Petition No.
805 of 2018 giving rise to this special leave
petition has been filed to review the judgment dated
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11.03.2015 of the Division Bench. A review petition
as well as curative petition was filed by the
petitioner after dismissal of his earlier special
leave petition. The judgment of this Court in
Kunhayammed and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Anr.
(supra) laid down that where the special leave
petition is dismissed there being no merger, the
aggrieved party is not deprived of any statutory
right of review, if it was available and he can
pursue it. In paragraph 34, this Court made
following observations:-
“ 34. ................But where the
special leave petition is dismissed —
there being no merger, the aggrieved
party is not deprived of any statutory
right of review, if it was available
and he can pursue it. It may be that
the review court may interfere, or it
may not interfere depending upon the
law and principles applicable to
interference in the
review..................”
8. The Division Bench of the High Court by the
impugned judgment dated 06.02.2020 has not dismissed
the review petition as not maintainable. The High
Court proceeded to meticulously examine the question
and after consideration came to the conclusion that
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there is no mistake or omission amounting to error
apparent on the face of the record. In paragraphs 8
and 9 of the judgment, High Court held:-
“ 8. This Court in paragraph Nos.11 and
12 of the judgment passed in writ
appeal, elaborately considered the
conversion of punishment to compulsory
retirement with sufficient reasonings
and justified the Co-operative Tribunal
for setting aside the punishment of
reduction to lower rank and imposing
compulsory retirement. The aforesaid
findings are made consciously after
making due deliberations on the
materials on record and the findings of
the single Bench of this Court. The
findings of this Court are supported by
the decisions of the Apex Court in
Hussain Sasansaheb Kaladgi v. State of
Maharashtra [AIR 1987 SC 1627] and
J.K.Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P.Agarwal and
Another [(2007) (2) SCC 433].
9. So there is no omission to consider
the legality or correctness of the
punishment or power of the Co-operative
Tribunal to impose such a punishment of
compulsory retirement. There is no
mistake or omission amounting to error
apparent on the face of the record, as
contended by the revision petitioner.
In view of the legal proposition laid
down by the Supreme Court in the
decisions referred above, this Court is
not inclined to rehear or reconsider
the above findings, as the review is
not an appeal in disguise. Hence, the
review petition fails and is dismissed
accordingly.”
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9. The review petition filed by the petitioner,
thus, was rejected on merits.
10. The first question, which need to be considered
is as to whether the present special leave petition
challenging the above review order dated 06.02.2020
is maintainable when the Division Bench judgment
dated 11.03.2015 has neither been challenged nor can
be challenged in this special leave petition. The
consequence of the rejection of the review petition
is that the High Court has refused to review the
judgment of the Division Bench dated 11.03.2015
passed in Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014. As noted
above, the Division Bench judgement dated 11.03.2015
was questioned by petitioner by special leave
petition in this Court, which was dismissed on
21.08.2015. When the Special Leave Petition No.
24231 of 2015 challenging the earlier judgment has
already been dismissed, such dismissal has become
final between the parties. In this special leave
petition, the petitioner cannot challenge the earlier
order dated 11.03.2015 against which he
unsuccessfully has earlier filed the special leave
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petition. When the order dated 11.03.2015 is
unassailable by the petitioner in this special leave
petition, no relief can be granted to petitioner,
which may have effect in any manner diluting,
modifying or reversing the earlier judgment dated
11.03.2015.
11. This Court had earlier considered the question as
to whether the special leave petition challenging the
order rejecting review petition is maintainable when
the main judgment of the High Court is not under
challenge. We may refer to judgment of this Court in
Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Yashwant Singh
Negi, (2013) 2 SCR 550 . In the above case, a special
leave petition was preferred against an order
rejecting the review petition. A preliminary
objection was raised that special leave petition is
not maintainable since the main judgment is not
challenged. In paragraph 1 of the judgment, facts
have been noticed, which are to the following
effect:-
“ 1. This special leave petition has
been preferred against the order dated
11.09.2009 passed by the High Court of
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Delhi in Review Petition No. 79 of 2009
in LPA No. 1233 of 2006. Mr. Nidhesh
Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing
for the Respondent raised a preliminary
objection that the special leave
petition is not maintainable since the
main judgment rendered by the High
Court on 5.11.2008 in LPA No. 1233 of
2006 was not challenged.”
12. This Court after considering the earlier judgment
of this Court held that special leave petition is not
maintainable. In paragraphs 3 and 4 following was
laid down:-
“3. We find ourselves unable to agree
with the views expressed by this Court
in Eastern Coalfields Limited (supra).
In our view, once the High Court has
refused to entertain the review petition
and the same was dismissed confirming
the main order, there is no question of
any merger and the aggrieved person has
to challenge the main order and not the
order dismissing the review petition
because on the dismissal of the review
petition the principle of merger does
not apply. In this connection reference
may be made to the Judgment of this
Court in Manohar S/o Shankar
Nale v. Jaipalsing S/o Shivlalsing
Rajput (2008) 1 SCC 520 wherein this
Court has taken the view that once the
review petition is dismissed the
doctrine of merger will have no
application whatsoever. This Court
in DSR Steel (Private) Limited v. State
of Rajasthan (2012) 6 SCC 782 also
examined the various situations which
might arise in relation to the orders
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| passed in review petitions. Reference to<br>paragraphs 25, 25.1, 25.2 and 25.3 is<br>made, which are extracted below for<br>ready reference: | ||
|---|---|---|
| “25. Different situations may<br>arise in relation to review<br>petitions filed before a court<br>or tribunal. | ||
| 25.1. One of the situations<br>could be where the review<br>application is allowed, the<br>decree or order passed by the<br>court or tribunal is vacated and<br>the [pic]appeal/proceedings in<br>which the same is made are<br>reheard and a fresh decree or<br>order passed in the same. It is<br>manifest that in such a<br>situation the subsequent decree<br>alone is appealable not because<br>it is an order in review but<br>because it is a decree that is<br>passed in a proceeding after the<br>earlier decree passed in the<br>very same proceedings has been<br>vacated by the court hearing the<br>review petition. | ||
| 25.2. The second situation that<br>one can conceive of is where a<br>court or tribunal makes an order<br>in a review petition by which<br>the review petition is allowed<br>and the decree/order under<br>review is reversed or modified.<br>Such an order shall then be a<br>composite order whereby the<br>court not only vacates the<br>earlier decree or order but<br>simultaneous with such vacation<br>of the earlier decree or order,<br>passes another decree or order<br>or modifies the one made |
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| earlier. The decree so vacated<br>reversed or modified is then the<br>decree that is effective for the<br>purposes of a further appeal, if<br>any, maintainable under law. | ||
|---|---|---|
| 25.3. The third situation with<br>which we are concerned in the<br>instant case is where the<br>revision petition is filed<br>before the Tribunal but the<br>Tribunal refuses to interfere<br>with the decree or order earlier<br>made. It simply dismisses the<br>review petition. The decree in<br>such a case suffers neither any<br>reversal nor an alteration or<br>modification. It is an order by<br>which the review petition is<br>dismissed thereby affirming the<br>decree or order. In such a<br>contingency there is no question<br>of any merger and anyone<br>aggrieved by the decree or order<br>of the Tribunal or court shall<br>have to challenge within the<br>time stipulated by law, the<br>original decree and not the<br>order dismissing the review<br>petition. Time taken by a party<br>in diligently pursing the remedy<br>by way of review may in<br>appropriate cases be excluded<br>from consideration while<br>condoning the delay in the<br>filing of the appeal, but such<br>exclusion or condonation would<br>not imply that there is a merger<br>of the original decree and the<br>order dismissing the review<br>petition.” | ||
| 4. We are in complete agreement with the<br>principle laid down by this Court in DSR |
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Steel (Private) Limited (supra) and
rd
applying the 3 situation referred to
therein in paragraph 25.3, we are
inclined to dismiss this special leave
petition. We find force in the
contention made by the learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent
that this SLP is not maintainable, since
the main order was not challenged but
only the order passed in the review
petition alone was challenged in this
SLP. Hence, the SLP is, therefore, not
maintainable and the same is dismissed.
13. We may also notice another elaborate judgment of
this Court in Bussa Overseas and Properties Private
Limited and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Anr., (2016)
4 SCC 696. In the above case also special leave
petition was filed against the Division Bench
judgment of the High Court rejecting the review
petition. Facts have been noticed in paragraph 1,
which is to the following effect:-
| “...............The present appeal is | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| directed against the judgment and order | |||||||||
| dated 14-9-2004 passed by the Division | |||||||||
| Bench of the High Court of Judicature | |||||||||
| at Bombay in | Bussa Overseas & | ||||||||
| Properties (P) Ltd. | v. | Union of | |||||||
| India | [Notice of Motion No. 62 of 2004, | ||||||||
| decided on 14-9-2004 (Bom)] whereby the | |||||||||
| High Court while dealing with an | |||||||||
| application of review has declined to | |||||||||
| condone the delay of 129 days in | |||||||||
| preferring the application for review | |||||||||
| and also opined that the application | |||||||||
| for review was totally devoid of merit. |
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| The expression of the said view led to | |
|---|---|
| dismissal of the application for | |
| review.” |
14. In the above case, this Court noticed several
earlier judgments and accepting the preliminary
objection held that the special leave petition is not
maintainable. Following was held in paragraphs 29 to
32:-
“29. Needless to state that when the
prayer for review is dismissed, there
can be no merger. If the order passed
in review recalls the main order and a
different order is passed, definitely
the main order does not exist. In that
event, there is no need to challenge
the main order, for it is the order in
review that affects the aggrieved
party.
30. The decisions pertaining to
maintainability of special leave
petition or for that matter appeal have
to be seemly understood. Though in the
decision in Shanker Motiram
Nale [ Shanker Motiram
Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput ,
(1994) 2 SCC 753] the two-Judge Bench
referred to Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code
of Civil Procedure that bars an appeal
against the order of the court
rejecting the review, it is not to be
understood that the Court has curtailed
the plenary jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution by taking
recourse to the provisions in the Code
of Civil Procedure. It has to be
understood that the Court has evolved
and formulated a principle that if the
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| basic judgment is not assailed and the<br>challenge is only to the order passed<br>in review, this Court is obliged not to<br>entertain such special leave petition.<br>The said principle has gained the<br>authoritative status and has been<br>treated as a precedential principle for<br>more than two decades and we are<br>disposed to think that there is hardly<br>any necessity not to be guided by the<br>said precedent. | ||
|---|---|---|
| 31. In this context, we may profitably<br>reproduce a passage from State of<br>A.P. v. A.P. Jaiswal [(2001) 1 SCC 748]<br>wherein a three-Judge Bench has<br>observed thus: (SCC p. 761, para 24) | ||
| “24. Consistency is the<br>cornerstone of the<br>administration of justice. It<br>is consistency which creates<br>confidence in the system and<br>this consistency can never be<br>achieved without respect to<br>the rule of finality. It is<br>with a view to achieve<br>consistency in judicial<br>pronouncements, the courts<br>have evolved the rule of<br>precedents, principle of stare<br>decisis, etc. These rules and<br>principle are based on public<br>policy….” | ||
| 32. In view of the aforesaid analysis,<br>the submission of Mr. Gulati that all<br>the subsequent judgments are per<br>incuriam as they have not taken into<br>consideration the decision rendered<br>in Thungabhadra Industries<br>Ltd. [Thungabhadra Industries<br>Ltd. v. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372<br>: (1964) 5 SCR 174] is not correct. |
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Consequently, the appeal, being not
maintainable, stands dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs.”
15. The rationale for not entertaining a special
leave petition challenging the order of High Court
rejecting the review petition when main order in the
writ petition is not challenged can be easily
comprehended. Against the main judgment the SLP
having been dismissed earlier the same having become
final between the parties cannot be allowed to be
affected at the instance of petitioner. When the main
judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any
manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the
special leave petition filed against order rejecting
review application to review the main judgment of the
High Court. This Court does not entertain a special
leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It
is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa
Overseas and Properties Private Limited and Anr.
(supra) has held that principle of not entertaining
special leave petition against an order rejecting the
review petition when main judgment is not under
challenge has become a precedential principle. We
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reiterate the above precedential principle in this
case again.
16. The special leave petition against the Division
Bench judgment dated 11.03.2015 having been dismissed
by this Court earlier on 21.08.2015 and the review
petition filed by the petitioner to review the
judgment having been dismissed by the impugned
judgment, we see no reason to entertain this special
leave petition. The special leave petition is
accordingly dismissed.
......................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
( R. SUBHASH REDDY )
......................J.
( M.R. SHAH )
New Delhi,
October 05, 2020.