Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
CHAIRMAN, TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, MADRAS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
T.N. GANAPATHY
DATE OF JUDGMENT07/02/1990
BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
RAMASWAMY, K.
CITATION:
1990 AIR 642 1990 SCR (1) 272
1990 SCC (1) 608 JT 1990 (1) 172
1990 SCALE (1)134
ACT:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 1 Rule 8 --Suit
filed in representative capacity--Interest to be common or
common grievance to be redressed--Persons need not have same
cause of action.
HEADNOTE:
In pursuance of a Housing Scheme the Tamil Nadu Housing
Board, Madras had allotted residential plots over the land
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, to different groups
of applicants including the low-income group on terms and
conditions stipulated in the lease deed Exh. B-3 sometime in
the year 1963. After a lapse of more than a decade of the
allotment, fresh demands were made from the allottees in
1975. Objecting to the same, the respondent herein filed a
suit for self and on behalf of all the allottees of low-
income group settled in the Colony named Ashok Nagar, pray-
ing for a permanent injunction restraining the Board from
enforcing the demand.
The defendant-Board questioned the very maintainability
of the suit in a representative capacity and also pleaded
that it was entitled to finally determine the correct prices
for the plots after taking into account the final award of
the compensation for acquired land and until then the prices
were tentative. The trial court negatived the objection to
the maintainability of the suit but dismissed it on merits.
The first appellate court confirmed the decree. On second
appeal, the High Court reversed the finding on merits. The
High Court held that it was open to the Board to determine
within a reasonable time what portion of the demand included
the excess on account of compensation awarded by the courts
for acquisition of the land and realize the same after
serving fresh demand notices. But since the impugned demand
included both the excess amount of compensation as also the
additional developmental charges injunction was granted in
regard to the entire demand as the two amounts were not
separately mentioned. Dismissing the appeal of the Board,
this Court,
HELD: The provisions of Order 1 of Rule 8 have been
included in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid
multiplicity of litigation. The condition necessary for
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application of the provisions is that the
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persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have
the same interest. In other words either the interest must
be common or they must have a common grievance which they
seek to get redressed. [276C-D]
The Court, while considering whether leave under the
Rule should be granted or not, should examine whether there
is sufficient community of interest to justify the adoption
of the procedure provided under the Rule. [276E]
Persons who may be represented in a suit under Order I,
Rule 8 need not have the same cause of action. [277F]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3002 of
1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.8.1982 of the
Madras High Court in S.A. No. 83 of ’1982.
G. Ramaswamy (N.P.), Mrs. Anjani and K. Ramkumar for the
Appellant.
P.S. Poti and K.V. Sreekumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a
suit filed by the respondent in representative capacity for
permanent injunction against the appellant Tamil Nadu Hous-
ing Board from demanding and collecting from the allottees
any additional amount for settlement of lands with buildings
in the colony Ashok Nagar fully described in the plaint.
2. In pursuance of a Housing Scheme the appellant-Board
proceeded to settle a large number of residential plots to
different groups of applicants including one described as
low-income group. A number of allottees, including the
plaintiff-respondent, were selected and settlement in their
favour was made in 1963.A copy of the document executed
separately in respect to the plots is on the record of this
case as Exh. B-3, setting out the terms and conditions of
the lease. The term as mentioned in the 15th clause, which
is quoted below, has been referred to by the parties in
support of their respective cases:
"15. The Lessor agrees to sell the property more particu-
274
larly described in the schedule hereunder to the Lessee for
such price as the Administrative Officer of the Lessor may
at any time in his sole discretion fix, and at which time
the Administrative Officer of the Lessor is entitled to
consider details regarding development charges, cost of
amenities, cost of buildings, etc., and whether the price of
the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act together
with suitable modifications thereto by the local laws has
become final by a conclusive adjudication thereon by the
concerned Tribunals and Courts. The final decision of the
Administrative Officer of the Lessor as to the final price
of the property as determined under these presents is con-
clusive and binding on the Lessee and the Lessee agrees to
purchase the property from the Lessor at the said price on
the terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned.
Excepting the fixation of price with reference to
the claim or compensation adjudicated or awarded by courts
finally and conclusively with regard to the lands acquired
under the scheme, the Lessor shall fix the price of the
property after taking into consideration the development
charges, cost of amenities and buildings etc.. within a
period of three years from the date of allotment and which
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price is subject only to a revision on account of excess
compensation if any awarded by courts for the lands as
aforesaid."
Tentative price for the property was fixed, subject to a
final determination within a stipulated period under the
agreement and the allottees occupied the properties on that
basis. After a lapse of more than a decade fresh demands
were made in 1975 threatening dispossession in case of non-
payment, which led to the filing of the suit. It is stated
in the plaint that the cases of all the allottees in low-
income group of Ashok Nagar made under the lease deeds are
identical and the plaintiff was representing them in asking
for permanent injunction restraining the Board from enforc-
ing the belated supplementary demands.
3. Besides, objecting to the maintainability of the
suit, the defendant-Board pleaded that it was entitled in
law to finally determine the correct price for the settle-
ment of the properties even belatedly, and the challenged
demands were perfectly valid. It was stated that the land
for the scheme had been acquired under the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, and until the final award of the
275
compensation for the acquired lands was made, the value of
the lands was not capable of being ascertained. The trial
court overruled the technical pleas, but, dismissed the suit
on merits. The first appellate court confirmed the decree.
4. The plaintiff filed a second appeal to the Madras
High Court, and the Housing Board a cross-objection against
the adverse findings. The High Court while confirming the
maintainability of the suit reversed the finding on merits
and passed a decree. The impugned demand included the excess
compensation awarded by courts for acquisition of the land
as also the development charges, cost of amenities and
buildings, etc., without splitting up the two demands. The
High Court held that it was open to the Board to determine
within a reasonable time what portion of the additional
demand represented the excess compensation awarded for the
lands and to take steps for its realisation after service of
a demand notice on the allottee, but, granted a decree for
injunction in regard to the entire demand at the present
stage as the two amounts have not been separately mentioned.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has pressed two
points in support of the appeal, namely, the decision of the
High Court on the merits of the dispute is erroneous and
that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in any event are not applicable to the case and
the suit, as a representative suit, is not maintainable.
6. The second paragraph of clause 15 of the lease deed
explicitly directs the Board to assess the final amount on
account of the development charges, cost of amenities and
buildings, etc. within a period of three years from the date
of the allotment, and there does not appear to be any reason
for construing the provisions differently. The High Court at
considerable length considered this aspect, pointing out the
unexplained long delay of about a decade after completion of
the constructions, etc. on the part of the Board. There was
no difficulty at all in making the final calculation in
time, and taking steps for recovery of the same. We entirely
agree with the view of the High Court. ’The Court was also
right in permitting the Board to make a fresh additional
demand in regard to the enhancement in the compensation for
the acquired lands and the respondents do not have any
objection to that part.
7. On the question of maintainability of the suit in a
representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of
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Civil Procedure, it has been contended that since the injury
complained of is in regard to
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demand of money and that too by a separate demand against
each’ of the allottees, giving rise to different causes of
action, the Rule 1 has application. The learned counsel
proceeded to say that it is not known whether each of the
allottees in Ashok Nagar had been even served with an addi-
tional demand before the suit was filed; and further empha-
sised that those who had been so served are interested in
defeating only the demand individually referable to each of
them. Each one of them is not interested in what happens to
the others. It is, therefore, suggested that only such of
the allottees who have already been served with additional
demands are entitled to maintain an action in court, and
they also should do it by filing separate suits. We do not
find any merit in the argument. The provisions of Order 1 of
Rule 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest
so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The condition
necessary for application of the provisions is that the
persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have
the same interest. In other words either the interest must
be common or they must have a common grievances which they
seek to get redressed. In Kodia Goundar and Another v.
Velandi Goundar and others, |LR 1955 Madras 339, a Full
Bench of the Madras High Court observed that on the plain
language of Order 1, Rule 8, the principal requirement to
bring a suit within that Rule is the sameness of interest of
the numerous person on whose behalf or for whose benefit the
suit is instituted. The Court, while considering whether
leave under the Rule should be granted or not, should exam-
ine whether there is sufficient community of interest to
justify the adoption of the procedure provided under the
Rule. The object for which this provision is enacted is
really. to facilitate the decision of questions, in which a
large number of persons are interested, without recourse to
the ordinary procedure. The provision must, therefore,
receive an interpretation which will subserve the object for
its enactment. There are no words in the Rule to limit its
scope to any particular category of suits or to exclude a
suit in regard to a claim for money or for injunction as the
present one.
8. Coming to the relevant circumstances in the present
case it will be seen that all the allotments in Ashok Nagar
were made under the same Scheme and all the relevant facts
are common. The basis of the impugned demand of the appel-
lant is equally applicable to all the allottees and the plea
of the plaintiff is available to all of them. The trial
court was, therefore, perfectly right in permitting the
plaintiff to proceed under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Nobody in this situation can complain of
any inconvenience or injustice. On the other hand, the
appellant is being saved from being
277
involved in unnecessary repeated litigation.
9. It is true that each of the allottees is interested
individually in fighting out the demand separately made or
going to be made on him and, thus, separate causes of action
arise in the case, but, that does not make Order 1. Rule 8
inapplicable. Earlier there was some doubt about the Rule
covering such a case which now stands clarified by the
Explanation introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 1976, which reads as follows:
"Explanation--For the purpose of determining whether the
persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same inter-
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est in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such
persons have the same cause of action as the persons on
whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or
defend the suit, as the case may be."
The objects and reasons for the amendment were stated below:
"OBJECTS AND REASONS: Clause 55; sub-clause (iv),--Rule 8
of Order 1 deals with representative suits. Under this rule,
where there are numerous persons having the same interest in
one suit, one or more of them may, with the permission of
the Court, sue or be sued, on behalf of all of them. The
rule has created a doubt as to whether the party represent-
ing others should have the same cause of action as the
persons represented by him. The rule is being substituted by
a new rule and an explanation is being added to clarify that
such persons need not have the same cause of action."
There is, therefore, no doubt that the persons who may be
represented in a suit under Order 1, Rule 8 need not have
the same cause of action. The trial court in the present
case was right in permitting the respondent to sue on behalf
of all the allottees of Ashok Nagar. We, therefore, do not
find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.
Before closing, however, we would like to point out that the
plaintiff has represented only those in the low income group
in Ashok Nagar who will be governed by this judgment, and
nothing what has been said or decided in this case is ap-
plicable to any other group or colony.
R.N.J. Appeal dismissed.
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