RAMGOPAL vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1489 of 2012

WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1488 of 2012

JUDGMENT Surya Kant, J. These two Criminal Appeals, No. 1489 of 2012 emanating from th the judgment and order dated 27  November, 2009 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench and No. 1488 of 2012 arising out Signature Not Verified th of judgment and order dated 9   January, 2009 passed by the High Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2021.09.29 16:39:41 IST Reason: Court   of   Karnataka,   though,   pertain   to   two   different   and   distinct Page  | 1 occurrences, but are proposed to be disposed of by way of a common order as the short question of law involved in both these appeals is identical.  B RIEF  F ACTS   OF  C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O . 1489  OF  2012 rd 2. The prosecution version, arising out of FIR dated 3  November 2000,   Police   Station   Ambah,   Morena,   M.P.   is   that   on   account   of certain   monetary   dispute,   the   Appellants   abused   and   assaulted Padam Singh (Complainant). Appellant No.1 is alleged to have struck the Complainant with a   , which resultantly cut off the little pharsa finger of his left hand. Appellant No.2 also struck lathi blows on the body of the Complainant. Appellants were thereafter committed  for trial under Sections 294, 323 and 326 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code,   1860   (hereinafter,   ‘IPC’)   and   Section   3   of   the   Prevention   of Atrocities (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1989. Upon analyzing the evidence, the Learned Judicial Magistrate(FC), Ambah, convicted the Appellants under Sections 294, 323 and 326 read with 34 IPC with a maximum sentence of three years under Section 326 read with 34 IPC. They were acquitted of the remaining charges. The   Appellants   assailed   their   conviction   before   the   Court   of 3. Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Ambah.   During   the   pendency   of   that Appeal,   the   Appellants   and   the   Complainant   reconciled   their Page  | 2 th difference(s)   and   a   compromise   ensued   between   them   on   13 September   2006.   Learned   Sessions   Judge   took   notice   of   the settlement, moved jointly by the parties, and compounded the offences under   Sections   294   and   323   read   with   34   IPC,   acquitting   the Appellants   of   the   same.   The   Court,   nevertheless,   maintained   their conviction under Section 326 read with 34 IPC, since the said offence is   `non­compoundable’   within   the   scheme   of   Section   320   Cr.P.C. Learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   taking   into   consideration   the settlement between the parties, reduced the quantum of sentence from Rigorous Imprisonment of three years to one year. Still aggrieved, the Appellants  preferred  a Criminal  Revision  before  the  High  Court   of Madhya   Pradesh,   Gwalior   Bench,   challenging   their   conviction   and sentence. Alternatively, they  sought  compounding  of offence under Section 326 IPC in light of the compromise. However, such a prayer was not acceded to by the High Court, re­iterating that the offence is ‘non­compoundable’.  The High Court, even so, further reduced the duration   of   imprisonment   to   the   period   already   undergone   by   the Appellants.  The   Appellants   are   now   before   this   Court,   seeking compounding of their  Actus Reus  under Section 326 IPC in view of the settlement between parties. B RIEF  F ACTS   OF  C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O . 1488  OF  2012 Page  | 3 4. The incident is charted from FIR No. 24 of 1995, Police Station th Thirthahalli, Shimoga, Karnataka, dated 28   January 1995. As per the allegations, the Appellants and the other accused persons, all of whom   belong   to   the   same   family,   were   aggrieved   against   the Complainant as he had imparted some inculpatory information to the Forest Department officials, which had caused financial loss to them. The disgruntled Appellants lured the Complainant to their house and assaulted him with weapons after tying his hands to a window. It is further alleged that Accused Nos. 5 to 7 instigated the Appellants to assault the Complainant, besides kicking him with fists and legs. The Complainant’s family members found him semi­conscious lying in a pit near their house. 5. The Appellants, together with Accused Nos. 5 and 7 were tried and convicted under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 342, 324 and 326 read with 149 IPC and the maximum sentence awarded to them was two   years   simple   imprisonment   under   Section   326   IPC.   The   trial against Accused No. 6 was split after filing of the chargesheet, since he remained   absconding.   The   Appellants   along   with   the   co­accused, approached the High Court of Karnataka, challenging their conviction and sentence. The High Court acquitted Accused Nos. 5 & 7 finding insufficient evidence to sustain their involvement in the subject crime, but maintained the conviction and sentence   qua   the Appellants. In Page  | 4 this case as well, the parties entered into a compromise.   The said compromise was, however, not placed on record before the Trial Court or the High Court. The Appellants are now seeking ‘compounding of the offences’ and their consequential acquittal on the basis of the compromise reached between them and the Complainant­victim. When   both   these   appeals   came   up   for   hearing,   a   two­Judge 6. st Bench of this Court,   vide   common order dated 21   September 2012 granted leave to appeal. The Bench further directed the appeals to be listed after the disposal of reference made in  Gian Singh vs. State of 1 Punjab , where a 3­Judge Bench of this Court, at that point in time, was considering the issue as to whether `non­compoundable’ offences can be `compounded’ by a Court or in the alternative, whether the High   Court   in   exercise   of   its   inherent   powers   under   Section   482 Cr.P.C.   could   quash   non­compoundable   offences,   based   on   a compromise/settlement   arrived   at   between   the   accused   and   the victim­complainant, and if so, under what circumstances.  7. The Appellants, in both  the appeals, thus seek the Court to invoke powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice to them. NALYSIS A : 1 (2012) 10 SCC 303 Page  | 5 8. We   have   heard   learned   Counsels   for   the   Appellants   and   the State(s) at a considerable length. The questions of law concerning the power of a High Court to quash proceedings emanating from non­ compoundable offences which have no impact or depraving effect on the society at large, on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the victim­complainant, are no longer   res integra   and the same have been authoritatively settled by this Court in affirmative .  Learned Counsel for the Appellants and Complainant(s) in both the appeals have,   therefore,   heavily   counted   on   the   compromise/settlement between the parties and seek quashing of the criminal prosecution in its entirety, Learned State Counsel(s) without controverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such a recourse and asserted that no substantial question of law is involved in these appeals. Before scrutinizing the facts of these cases and rephrasing the 9. scope   of   powers   exercisable   by   a   High   Court   under   Section   482 Cr.P.C., it would be apropos to illuminate the following principles laid down by a 3­Judge Bench of this Court in  Gian Singh (Supra)  case: “61. …the   power   of   the   High   Court   in   quashing   a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.  Inherent power   is   of   wide   plenitude   with   no   statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : Page  | 6 (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power   to   quash   the   criminal   proceeding   or complaint   or   FIR   may   be   exercised   where   the offender   and   the   victim   have   settled   their dispute   would   depend   on   the   facts   and circumstances of each case and no category can be   prescribed.   However,   before   exercise   of   such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in   nature   and   have   a   serious   impact   on   society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender   in   relation   to   the   offences   under   special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing   criminal   proceedings   involving   such offences.   But   the   criminal   cases   having overwhelmingly   and   predominatingly   civil flavour   stand   on   a   different   footing   for   the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry,   etc.   or   the   family   disputes   where   the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and   the   parties   have   resolved   their   entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may   quash   the   criminal   proceedings   if   in   its view,   because   of   the   compromise   between   the offender   and   the   victim,   the   possibility   of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great   oppression   and   prejudice   and   extreme injustice   would   be   caused   to   him   by   not quashing   the   criminal   case   despite   full   and complete   settlement   and   compromise   with   the Page  | 7  In other words, the High Court must consider victim. whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation   of   the   criminal   proceeding   would tantamount   to   abuse   of   process   of   law   despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the   wrongdoer   and   whether   to   secure   the   ends   of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” (Emphasis Applied) 10. The   compendium   of   these   broad   fundamentals   structured   in more than one judicial precedent, has been recapitulated by another 3­Judge Bench of this Court in  State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi 2 Narayan & Ors .  elaborating: “(1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non­ compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can   be   exercised   having   overwhelmingly   and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; (2)   Such   power   is   not   to   be   exercised   in   those prosecutions   which   involved   heinous   and   serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; (3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public 2 (2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15 Page  | 8 servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; (4) xxx  xxx xxx (5)  While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non­compoundable offences, which are private   in   nature   and   do   not   have   a   serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise   between   the  victim  and the   offender,   the   High   Court   is   required   to consider   the   antecedents   of   the   accused;   the conduct   of   the   accused,   namely,   whether   the accused   was   absconding   and   why   he   was absconding,   how   he   had   managed   with   the ” complainant to enter into a compromise, etc. (Emphasis Applied) 11. True it is that offences which are ‘non­compoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under   Section   320   Cr.P.C.   Any   such   attempt   by   the   court   would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out as non­compoundable.   Nevertheless,   the   limited   jurisdiction   to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court Page  | 9 vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the   peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   a   case   and   for   justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. 12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.,   even   if   the   offences   are   non­ compoundable.   The   High   Court   can   indubitably   evaluate   the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system. 13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non­heinous offences or where the offences are pre­dominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without   saying,   that   the   cases   where   compromise   is   struck   post­ conviction,   the   High   Court   ought   to   exercise   such   discretion   with Page  | 10 rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for   exercising   the   extra­ordinary   power   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A   restrictive   construction   of   inherent   powers   under   Section   482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice.  On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against   perpetrators,   no   such   benefit   ought   to   be   extended,   as cautiously observed by this Court in   Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. 3 State of Punjab & Ors.  and Laxmi Narayan (Supra) . In   other   words,   grave   or   serious   offences   or   offences   which 14. involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit 3 (2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29 Page  | 11 to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.” 15. Given these settled parameters, the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, to the extent it holds that the High Court does not have power to compound a non­compoundable offence, is in ignorance of its inherent powers   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.   and   is,   thus,   unsustainable. th However, the judgment and order dated 9  January, 2009 of the High Court of Karnataka, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No. 1488 of 2012 cannot be faulted with on this count for the reason that the parties did not bring any compromise/settlement to the notice of the High Court. Let us now delve into the nature of powers vested in this Court 16. under Article 142 of the Constitution, with an intent to do complete justice. It would be  ad rem  to outrightly cite the Constitution Bench decision in  Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India & 4 , where this Court has ruled as follows: Ors. “83. It   is   necessary   to   set   at   rest   certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1)   of   the   Constitution.   These   issues   are 4 (1991) 4 SCC 584, 83 Page  | 12 matters   of   serious   public   importance.   The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective   of   the   importance   of   the   public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the   powers   of   the   apex   Court   under   Article   In 142(1)   is   unsound   and   erroneous. both Garg [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885, 899­900 : AIR 1963 SC 996] as well as Antulay cases [(1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] the point was one of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations   as   to   the   effect   of   inconsistency   with statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights.  We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article   142   insofar   as   quashing   of   criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 CrPC or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an   entirely   different   level   and   of   a   different quality .  Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act   as   prohibitions   or   limitations   on   the constitutional   powers   under   Article   142.   Such prohibitions   or   limitations   in   the   statutes   might embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking   into   account   the   nature   and   status   of   the authority or the court on which conferment of powers —   limited   in   some   appropriate   way   —   is contemplated.   The   limitations   may   not   necessarily reflect   or   be   based   on   any   fundamental considerations of public policy. Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg case [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885, 899­900 : AIR 1963 SC 996] , said that limitation   on   the   powers   under   Article   142   arising from “inconsistency with express statutory provisions of   substantive   law”   must   really   mean   and   be understood as some express prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the   expression   ‘prohibition’   is   read   in   place   of ‘provision’ that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also Page  | 13 be   shown   to   be   based   on   some   underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory   prohibitions.   That   would   convey   the   idea that   statutory   provisions   override   a   constitutional provision.  Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the   idea   is   that   in   exercising   powers   under Article   142   and   in   assessing   the   needs   of “complete justice” of a cause or matter, the apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some   fundamental   principles   of   public   policy and   regulate   the   exercise   of   its   power   and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142,   but   only   to   what   is   or   is   not   ‘complete justice’ of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise .” (Emphasis Applied) 17. The afore­quoted precept has been consistently followed by this Court   in   numerous   subsequent   decisions,   including   in   Monica 5 Kumar & Anr. vs. State of U.P. , Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Union 6 7  and  , of India Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India inter­alia, reiterating that: 

5 (2008) 8 SCC 781, ¶ 45 6 (2014) 2 SCC 532, ¶ 43 7 (1998) 4 SCC 409, ¶ 47 Page  | 14

(Emphasis Applied) 18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that the plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot   ipso facto  be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section   482   Cr.P.C.   conferring   powers   on   the   Supreme   Court   to abrogate   and   set   aside   criminal   proceedings,   the   jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to Page  | 15 secure complete justice.  In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching   objective   of   sentencing   in   the   criminal   justice   system, which   is   grounded   on   the   sub­lime   philosophy   of   maintenance   of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation. We   thus   sum­up   and   hold   that   as   opposed   to   Section   320 19. Cr.P.C.   where   the   Court   is   squarely   guided   by   the   compromise between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the extra­ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C.  Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide   amplitude   ought   to   be   exercised   carefully   in   the   context   of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:  (i)  Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society;  (ii)  Seriousness of the injury,   if   any ;   (iii)   Voluntary   nature   of   compromise   between   the accused and the victim; &  (iv)  Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations. 20. Having   appraised   the   afore­stated   para­meters   and   weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before Page  | 16 us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal   proceedings   and   consequently   set   aside   the   conviction   in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that: , the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorized Firstly as   purely   personal   or   having   overtones   of   criminal   proceedings   of private nature; Secondly , the nature of injuries incurred, for which the Appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest;   , given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial Thirdly that   the   trial   against   the   Appellants   had   been   concluded   or   their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed; Fourthly , the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a  quietus  to their dispute(s); Fifthly , the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years   2000   and   1995,   respectively.   There   is   nothing   on   record   to evince   that   either   before   or   after   the   purported   compromise,   any untoward incident transpired between the parties; Page  | 17 , since the Appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of Sixthly the   same   village(s)   and/or   work   in   close   vicinity,   the   quashing   of criminal   proceedings   will   advance   peace,   harmony,   and   fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill­will and have no vengeance against each other;  and Seventhly ,   the   cause   of   administration   of   criminal   justice   system would remain un­effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the Appellants; more so looking at their present age. CONCLUSION :  C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O .1489  OF  2012 21. Consequently, and for the reasons stated above, read with the th settlement dated 13  September 2006, we find it appropriate to invoke our   powers   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   and   quash   the criminal proceedings in the aforesaid case. As a sequel thereto, all offences emanating out of the FIR leading to Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 stand annulled, and the judgment and orders passed by the trial   court,   appellate   court   and   the   High   Court   are   set   aside. Resultantly, the Appellants shall be deemed to have been acquitted of the charged offences for all intents and purposes.  Page  | 18 C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O .1488  OF  2012 22. In so far as this appeal is concerned, we note that even though the Learned Counsel(s) for the Appellants and the Complainant­victim have jointly stated before this Court that the parties have settled their dispute(s), but no formal settlement has either been brought on record nor has it been even clarified that such a deed of settlement has been recorded. Admittedly, the factum of compromise/settlement between the parties has been raised for the first time before this Court. In the absence of any proof of settlement, we find ourselves hard­pressed to take cognizance of the asseverated compromise. We, therefore, direct both the Appellants as well as the complainant­victim to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga and submit their settlement, if any, in writing within a period of three months. The C.J.M. shall send a Report to this Court immediately, recording his satisfaction with regard to the genuineness of the compromise. In the event, the said Report would reflect a   bona­fide   settlement between the parties, the present appeal shall also be deemed to have been disposed of in same terms   as   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1489   of   2012,   referred   to   above. Further, the incontrovertible corollary in such event would be that the Appellants shall be treated to have been acquitted of all the charged offences for all intents and purposes.  On the other hand, if no formal settlement   is   placed   before   C.J.M.,   Shimoga   within   the   stipulated Page  | 19 period or the Report reflects to the contrary, the criminal appeal shall stand as dismissed as no other substantial question of law is raised or involved in this appeal.  23. Both the Criminal Appeals are    in above terms. disposed of ……………………….. CJI. (N.V. RAMANA) ………..………………… J. (SURYA KANT) NEW DELHI DATED : 29.09.2021 Page  | 20