Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1283 of 2002
PETITIONER:
RANGE FOREST OFFICER
RESPONDENT:
S.T. HADIMANI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/02/2002
BENCH:
B.N. KIRPAL & ARIJIT PASAYAT
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2002 (1) SCR 1080
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
Leave granted.
In the instant case, dispute was referred to the Labour Court that the
respondent and worked for 240 days and his service had been terminated
without paying him any retrenchment compensation. The appellant herein did
not accept this and contended that the respondent had not worked for 240
days. The Tribunal vide its award dated 10th August, 1998, came to the
conclusion that the service had been terminated without giving retrenchment
compensation. In arriving at the conclusion that the respondent had worked
for 240 days, the Tribunal stated that the burden was on the Management to
show that there was justification in termination of the service and that
the affidavit of the workman was sufficient to prove that he had worked for
240 days in a year.
For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as
to whether the appellant is an "industry" or not, though reliance is placed
on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Narsinh
Parmar, JT (2001) 3 SC 326. In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in
placing the onus on the Management without first determining on the basis
of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in
the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he
had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for
the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240
days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only
his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman
had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary
or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for
this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is
liable to be set aside. However, Mr. Hegde appearing for the Department
states that the State is really interested in getting the law settled and
the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate grounds on the
same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two
months from today.
The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.