Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BHARAT SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MANAGEMENT OF NEW DELHI TUBERCULOSIS CENTRE, JAWAHARLALNEHRU
DATE OF JUDGMENT04/04/1986
BENCH:
KHALID, V. (J)
BENCH:
KHALID, V. (J)
OZA, G.L. (J)
CITATION:
1986 AIR 842 1986 SCR (2) 169
1986 SCC (2) 614 1986 SCALE (1)637
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1988 SC 587 (12)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - S. 17-B - Statutory
interpretation of - Applicability of to awards passed prior
to August 21, 1984.
Statutory interpretation - Duty of Court - Evolve the
concept of purposive interpretation.
HEADNOTE:
Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 came
into force with effect from August 21, 1984. It provided
that where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of a workman and
the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a
High Court or the Supreme Court the employer shall be liable
to pay such workman during the pendency of such proceedings
in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last
drawn by him, if the workman had not been employed in any
establishment during such period.
The Labour Court in its award dated September 28, 1983
held that the termination of services of the appellant, was
wrongful and illegal and that he was entitled to be
reinstated with continuity of service. It directed that the
appellant would be entitled to back wages at the rate at
which he was drawing them when his services were terminated.
The management challenged the award on January 31, 1984
by filing a writ petition before the High Court. On December
12, 1984 the appellant moved an application under s. 17-B of
the Act for a direction to the management to pay him full
wages last drawn by him during the pendency of the writ
petition. The High Court held that the section was
applicable only to cases where the awards were passed after
its commencement, and since the award in this case was
passed prior to August 21, 1984 the section had no
application.
170
In this appeal by special leave it was contended on
behalf of the management that a section which imposes an
obligation for the first time cannot be made retrospective.
Such sections should always be considered prospective.
Allowing the appeal, the Court,
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^
HELD : 1. Section 17-B applies even to awards passed
prior to August 21, 1984 if they have not become final. It
gives a mandate to the courts to award wages where the
following three ingredients are present: (i) the Labour
Court has directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the
employer has preferred proceedings against such award in the
High Court or the Supreme Court, (iii) the workman has not
been employed in any establishment during such period.[181
E; 176 A; 174 E]
2. Section 17-B is a progressive social beneficial
legislation. It codifies in a statutory form a right
available to the workmen to get wages. There are no words in
the section to compel the court to hold that it cannot
operate retrospectively. The section on its terms does not
say that it would bind awards passed prior to the date when
it came into force. Before s. 17-B was introduced there was
no bar on courts for awarding wages. The workmen, of course,
had no right to claim it. The section recognises such a
right.[176 D; 181 C-D; 176 C; 181 D]
3.(i) The objects and reasons of the Industrial
Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 clearly spell out that the
delay in implementation of awards was due to the contests by
employers which consequently caused hardship to workmen. The
enactment intended to do away with this hardship by
providing for the payment of wages to the workman from the
date of the award till the final disposal of the case. If
that be the object then it would be inconsistent with the
progressive social philosophy of our laws to deny to the
workman the benefits of s. 17-B simply because the award was
passed, for example, just a day or two before it came into
force. It would be not only defeating the rights of the
workmen but also going against the spirit of the
enactment.[175 F; 176 G; 175 D-E, F-G]
(ii) The Court has to evolve the concept of purposive
interpretation. Though objects and reasons cannot be the
ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes, it often times
aids in finding out what really persuaded the legislature to
171
enact a particular provision. The Court should give such
construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or
object of the Act. [176 D; 175 E-F; 176 F]
(iii) Where the words of a statute are plain and
unambiguous, effect must be given to them, but where the
intention of the legislature is not clear from the words or
where two constructions are possible, it is the court’s duty
to discern the intention in the context of the background in
which a particular section is enacted. Once such an
intention is ascertained, the Courts have necessarily to
give the statute a purposeful or a functional
interpretation. [176 E-F]
4. Section 11-A confers a jurisdiction on the Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to act in a particular
manner which jurisdiction it did not have prior to the
coming into force of s. 11-A. The conferment of a new
Jurisdiction can take effect only prospectively except when
a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute.
That is not the case with s. 17-B. It does not confer a new
jurisdiction. [181 A-C]
Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt.
Ltd. v. The Management & Ors., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 587 and
Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation v. P.H. Brahmbhatt,
[1974] 2 S.C.R. 128 distinguished.
Rustom & Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam, [1976] 1
S.C.R. 119 referred to.
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1251 of
1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18th April, 1985 of
the Delhi High Court in C.M. No. 4006 of 1984.
M.K. Ramamurthi, M.A. Krishnamurthy and Mrs. Chandan
for the Appellant.
G.B. Pai, Vineet Kumar, Rakesh Sahni, N.D.B. Raju and
Ms. Arshi Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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KHALID, J. Special leave granted.
Section 17-B was inserted in the Industrial Disputes
Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 46
of 1982). This Act received the assent of the President on
August 31, 1982. It was directed that the commencement of
the Act would be on such date as the Central Government may,
by a Notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. The
Central Government appointed the 21st day of August, 1984,
as the date on which the Act would come into force. The
question that falls to be decided in this appeal by special
leave by the workman is, whether Section 17-B applies to
awards passed prior to 21st day of August, 1984. The Delhi
High Court held, in the Judgment under appeal, that the
Section applied only to awards that were passed subsequent
to the coming into force of this Section, namely 21st
August, 1984.
The appellant joined the Management of New Delhi
Tuberculosis Centre, Jawaharlal Nehru Marg, New Delhi, as a
Peon against a permanent regular post. He was thereafter
promoted as a Daftry. By a Memorandum dated September 13,
1975, the Management informed the appellant that his
services were not required with effect from September 13,
1975 afternoon and his services were thus terminated. He was
paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The appellant
kept quite for three years, obviously because the Management
Hospital, as per the law as it then stood, was not an
industry. It was in the year 1978, that this Court gave the
Judgment in Bangalore Water Supply case. Subsequent to that
the appellant raised an industrial dispute. The Delhi
Administration, as per its Order dated August 6, 1979
referred the following dispute for adjudication :
"Whether termination of the services of the
workman Shri Bharat Singh is justified and/or
illegal and if so to what relief is he entitled?"
|The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, in his award
dated September 28, 1983, held that the termination of the
services of the appellant was wrongful and illegal and that
he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service.
The Labour Court directed that the appellant would be
entitled to back wages with effect from 19th May, 1979 only,
at the rate
173
|at which he was drawing them when his services were
terminated. The award was published in the Gazette by
Notification dated November 2, 1983.
On January 31, 1984, the Management moved the Delhi
High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
challenging the award and applied for stay of the operation
of the award. The High Court directed stay of the operation
of the award, during the pendency of the writ petition on
condition that the Management deposited 25 per cent of the
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amount as determined by the Labour Court, Delhi, in respect
of the back wages. The High Court permitted the appellant to
withdraw the amount on furnishing security; (we are told
that the amount was not withdrawn by the appellant since he
could not furnish security). On December 12, 1984, the
appellant moved an application under Section 17-B of the Act
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for a
direction to the Management to pay him full wages last drawn
by him, during the pendency of the writ petition. His case
was that Section 17-B mandated the Court to award full wages
if the conditions in that Section were satisfied. This was
opposed by the Management. The High Court after considering
the rival contentions came to the conclusion that Section
17-B had application only to cases where the awards were
passed after the commencement of Section 17-B; in other
words, after August 21, 1984, and that since the award in
this case was prior to August 21, 1984, it had no
application. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the
petition filed by the workman. Hence this appeal by special
leave at the instance of the workman.
We are here concerned only with the interpretation of
Section 17-B. The appellant’s learned counsel relied upon a
decision of this Court in Rustom & Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B.
Kadam, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 119 where this Court construed the
language of Section 2-A of the Act; while the learned
counsel for the Management strongly relied upon two
decisions of this Court which construed the language of
Section 11-A and which according to him, was in pari materia
with Section 17-B. The cases are Workmen of Firestone Tyre &
Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Management and Others,
[1973] 3 S.C.R. 587 and Gujarat Mineral Development
Corporation v. Shri P.H. Brahmbhatt, [1974] 2 S.C.R. 128.
174
Before we deal with the rival contentions, it would be
useful to read Section 17-B with which we are concerned.
"17B. Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal
or National Tribunal by its award directs
reinstatement of workman and the employer prefers
any proceedings against such award in a High Court
or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable
to pay such workman, during the period of pendency
of such proceedings in the High Court or the
Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him,
inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible
to him under any rule if the workman had not been
employed in any establishment during such period
and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to
that effect in such Court :
Provided that where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme
Court that such workman had been employed and had
been receiving adequate remuneration during any
such period or part thereof, the Court shall order
that no wages shall be payable under this section
for such period or part, as the case may be."
The three necessary ingredients for the application of this
Section are (i) the Labour Court should have directed
reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the employer should have
preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court
or in the Supreme Court, (iii) that the workman should not
have been employed in any establishment during such period.
The question now before us is whether a workman would
be denied the benefit of this Section, even if all the above
three conditions are satisfied, if the award was passed
prior to August 21, 1984? We may, even at this stage, say
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that in cases where the award had become final prior to
August 21, 1984, Section 17-B cannot be pressed into service
to reopen the same. It is only when the award is challenged
and the challenge is pending, that the Section becomes
operative.
It is common knowledge that even before Section 17-B
was enacted, Courts were, in their discretion, awarding
wages to
175
workmen when they felt such a direction was necessary but
that was only a discretionary remedy depending upon Court to
Court. Instances are legion where workmen have been dragged
by the employers in endless litigation with preliminary
objections and other technical pleas to tire them out. A
fight between a workman and his employer is often times an
unequal fight. The legislature was thus aware that because
of the long pendency of disputes in Tribunals and Courts, on
account of the dilatory tactics adopted by the employer,
workmen had suffered. It is against this background that the
introduction of this Section has to be viewed and its
effects considered.
The objects and reasons for enacting the Section is as
follows :
"When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement,
these are often contested by an employer in the
Supreme Court and High Courts. It was felt that
the delay in the implementation of the award
causes hardship to the workman concerned. It was,
therefore, proposed to provide the payment of
wages last drawn by the workman concerned, under
certain conditions, from the date of the award
till the case is finally decided in the Supreme
Court or High Courts."
The objects and reasons give an insight into the
background why this Section was introduced. Though objects
and reasons cannot be the ultimate guide in interpretation
of statutes, it often times aids in finding out what really
persuaded the legislature to enact a particular provision.
The objects and reasons here clearly spell out that delay in
the implementation of the awards is due to the contests by
the employer which consequently cause hardship to the
workmen. If this is the object, then would it be in keeping
with this object and consistent with the progressive social
philosophy of our laws to deny to the workmen the benefits
of this Section simply because the award was passed, for
example just a day before the Section came into force? In
our view it would be not only defeating the rights of the
workman but going against the spirit of the enactment. A
rigid interpretation of this Section as is attempted by the
learned counsel for the respondents would be rendering the
workman worse off after the
176
coming into force of this Section. This section has in
effect only codified the rights of the workmen to get their
wages which they could not get in time because of the long
drawn out process caused by the methods employed by the
Management. This Section, in other words, gives a mandate to
the Courts to award wages if the conditions in the Section
are satisfied.
In interpretation of statutes, Courts have steered
clear of the rigid stand of looking into the words of the
Section alone but have attempted to make the object of the
enactment effective and to render its benefits unto the
person in whose favour it is made. The legislators are
entrusted with the task of only making laws. Interpretation
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has to come from the Courts. Section 17-B on its terms does
not say that it would bind awards passed before the date
when it came into force. The respondents’ contention is that
a Section which imposes an obligation for the first time,
cannot be made retrospective. Such sections should always be
considered prospective. In our view, if this submission is
accepted, we will be defeating the very purpose for which
this Section has been enacted. It is here that the Court has
to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation which has
found acceptance whenever a progressive social beneficial
legislation is under review. We share the view that where
the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must
be given to them. Plain words have to be accepted as such
but where the intention of the legislature is not clear from
the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the
Court’s duty to discern the intention in the context of the
background in which a particular Section is enacted. Once
such an intention is ascertained the Courts have necessarily
to give the statute a purposeful or a functional
interpretation. Now, it is trite to say that acts aimed at
social amelioration giving benefits for the havenots should
receive liberal construction. It is always the duty of the
Court to give such a construction to a statute as would
promote the purpose or object of the Act. A construction
that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be
preferred to a literal construction. A construction which
would defeat the rights of the havenots and the underdog and
which would lead to injustice should always be avoided. This
Section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain
cases. It would be doing injustice to the Section if we were
to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two
before it came into force.
177
The learned counsel for the appellant invited our
attention to a decision of this Court in Rustom & Hornsby
(I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam, where this Court was considering the
scope of Section 2-A of the Act. Section 2-A provides thus :
"where any employer discharges, dismisses,
retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of
an individual workman, any dispute or difference
between that workman and his employer connected
with, or arising out of, such discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be
deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding
that no other workman nor any union of workmen is
a party to the dispute."
Before this section was enacted, there was a bar for
individual workman to raise an industrial dispute. It was
this bar that the management put forward in that case.
It was contended that the reference was bad since the
dismissal took place before December 1, 1965, on which date
the Section came into force. This Court did not accept this
plea. The appellant’s counsel submits that Section 2-A and
Section 17-B are more or less similar in their phraseology
and when this Court gave Section 2-A retrospectivity,
Section 17-B should also be treated alike. This is what this
Court said while dealing with Section 2-A:
"When the Section uses the words ’where any
employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or
otherwise terminates the services of an individual
workman’ it does not deal with the question as to
when that was done; it refers to a situation or a
state of affairs. In other words where there is a
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination
of service otherwise the dispute relating to such
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discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination
of service becomes an industrial dispute. It is no
objection to this to say that this interpretation
would lead to a situation where the disputes would
be reopened after the lapse of many years and
referred for adjudication under Section 10. The
question of creation of new right by Section 2A is
178
also not very relevant. Even before the
introduction of Section 2A a dispute relating to
an individual workman could become an industrial
dispute by its being sponsored by a labour union
or a group of workmen. Any reference under Section
10 would be made only sometime after the dispute
itself has arisen. The only relevant factor for
consideration in making a reference under Section
10 is whether an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended. There cannot be any doubt that on the
day the reference was made in the present case, an
industrial dispute as defined under Section 2A did
exist."
The appellant’s counsel relied upon the above
observation and contended that even though the words used
are in the future tense, denoting something to happen in
future, the Section was held to operate retrospectively also
and that similar is the case with Section 17-B. The learned
counsel for the respondents met this argument with the plea
that Section 2-A was only a definition Section and no
support could be drawn from the above Judgment for the
purpose of this case. In our view the principle, laid down
in the above decision, cannot be dismissed so lightly,
because this Court extended the benefit of this Section to a
dispute that existed before the Section came into force,
notwithstanding the fact that the Section used future tense
regarding the dispute. We agree that Section 2-A is a
definition Section. Still this Court gave it a retrospective
construction. We feel, some support is available to the
appellant from this decision.
The respondents’ counsel relied heavily upon two
decisions of this Court, referred above, dealing with
Section 11-A of the Act. Section 11-A reads as follows :
"Where an industrial dispute relating to the
discharge or dismissal of a workman has been
referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal for adjudication and in the course of the
adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be,
is satisfied that the order of dsicharge or
dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award,
179
set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and
direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms
and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give
such other relief to the workman including the
award of any lesser punishment in lieu of
discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the
case may require :
Provided that in any proceeding under this section
the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal,
as the case may be, shall rely only on the
meterials on record and shall not take any fresh
evidence in relation to the matter."
By this Section, Tribunals were conferred with a new
jurisdiction. The question arose whether this jurisdiction
conferred for the first time by Section 11-A, could be
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extended retrospectively. While dealing with Section 11-A,
this Court stated as follows in Workmen of Messrs Firestone
Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Management and
Others.
"...We have pointed out that this position has now
been changed by Section 11A. The section has the
effect of altering the law by abridging the rights
of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the
Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a
finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as
well as the punishment imposed by him. Hence in
order to make the section applicable even to
disputes, which had been referred prior to the
coming into force of the section, there should be
such a clear express and manifest indication in
the section. There is no such express indication.
An inference that the section applies to
proceedings, which are already pending, can also
be gathered by necessary intendment. In the case
on hand, no such inference can be drawn as the
indications are to the contrary. We have already
referred to the proviso to section 11A which
states ’in any proceeding under this section’. A
proceeding under the section can only be after the
section has come into force. Further the section
itself was brought
180
into force some time after the Amendment Act was
passed. These circumstances as well as the scheme
of the section and particularly the wording of the
proviso indicate that section 11-A does not apply
to disputes which had been referred prior to 15-
12-1971. The section applies only to disputes
which are referred for adjudication on or after
15-12-1971. To conclude, in our opinion, section
11A has no application to disputes referred prior
to 15-12-1971. Such disputes have to be dealt with
according to the decisions of this Court already
referred to........"
This Court approved this conclusion in Gujarat Mineral
Development Corporation v. Shri P.H. Brahmbhatt thus :
"....The next question is whether Section 11A of
the Act is applicable to this case. That section
provides that where an industrial dispute relating
to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has
been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal for adjudication and in the
course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case
may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge
or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its
award, set aside the order of discharge or
dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman
on such terms and conditions, if any as it thinks
fit, or give such other relief to the workman
including the award of any lesser punishment in
lieu of discharge of dismissal as the
circumstances of the case may require. We are,
however, not concerned with the several questions
which may arise thereunder, because the section
itself will not apply to an industrial dispute
referred prior to December 15, 1971, when section
11A was brought into operation. It was held by
this Court in the Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre &
Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management
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and Others, (1973 - 1 - LLJ 278) that this section
has no retrospective operation on the pending
references......"
181
According to the respondents’ counsel, these two
decisions clearly cover the question involved in this appeal
also. We feel that this submission cannot be accepted for
more than one reason. Section 11-A, confers a jurisdiction
on the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to act in
a particular manner which jurisdiction it did not have prior
to the coming into force of Section 11-A. This is the reason
why this Court held that Section 11-A cannot apply to
proceedings before it came into force. The conferment of a
new jurisdiction can take effect only prospectively except
when a contrary intention appears on the face of the
statute. Section 11-A plainly indicates its prospective
operation. This is made clear in the proviso to the section
when it says "provided that in any proceeding under this
Section". This can only mean something relatable to a stage
after the Section came into being. That is not the case with
Section 17-B. Here it is not the conferment of a new
jurisdiction but the codification in statutory form of a
right available to the workmen to get back-wages when
certain given conditions are satisfied. There are no words
in the Section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot
operate retrospectively. Before Section 17-B was introduced
there was no bar for Courts for awarding wages. Of course
the workmen had no right to claim it. This Section
recognizes such a right. To construe it in a manner
detrimental to workmen would be to defeat its object.
In our considered view, therefore, the High Court was
in error in holding that the legislature did not intend to
give retrospective effect to Section 17-B. We hold that
Section 17-B applies even to awards passed prior to August
21, 1984, if they have not become final. We set aside the
Judgment of the High Court and allow this appeal with costs,
quantified at Rs. 3,000.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.
182