Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 597
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).3324 OF 2024
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.4965/2023)
YUGAL SIKRI & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
1. Leave granted.
FACTS
2. By impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the petition
filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Cr. PC”). The
petition was filed to quash a complaint filed in a criminal
Court by the second respondent alleging the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 29 read with Sections 32 and 34
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the ID Act”).
Cognizance was taken of the alleged offence on the said
complaint. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the
High Court has dismissed the petition without considering the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHISH KONDLE
Date: 2024.08.09
17:49:56 IST
Reason:
merits of the challenge to the complaint.
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
3. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants
submitted that Section 29 of the ID Act is attracted when there
is a breach of any settlement or award binding on the accused
under the provisions of the ID Act. He submitted that there is
no averment in the complaint about the breach of any particular
settlement or award. He further submitted that under Section
34(1) of the ID Act, cognizance of any offence punishable under
the ID Act can be taken based only on a complaint made by or
under the authority of the appropriate Government. He submitted
that no private person can be authorised under Section 34(1) of
the ID Act to file a complaint. He pointed out that the order
under Section 34 of the ID Act does not refer to any violation
of Section 29 at all, and it only refers to the breach of an
affidavit and the provisions of Section 9A of the ID Act.
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the
second respondent submitted that in paragraph 8 of the
complaint, it is specifically alleged that an agreement was
incorporated in the joint affidavit of the parties filed before
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the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 9 December 2015
and what is alleged is the violation of the said agreement. He
submitted that what is stated in the affidavit is an agreement
and, therefore, what was alleged was the violation of the
agreement incorporated in the joint affidavit of the parties.
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He further submitted that the High Court dealing with a petition
under Section 482 of the Cr.PC should be very slow in
interfering with the order of the issue of process.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
5. Sections 29 and 34 of the ID Act are material which read
thus:
“29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award.-
Any person who commits a breach of any term of
any settlement or award, which is binding on him
under this Act, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine, or with both and where the
breach is a continuing one, with a further fine
which may extend to two hundred rupees for every
day during which the breach continues after the
conviction for the first and the Court trying
the offence, if it fines the offender, may
direct that the whole or any part of the fine
realised from him shall be paid by way of
compensation, to any person who, in its opinion,
has been injured by such breach.”
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
“34. Cognizance of offences- (1) No Court shall
take cognizance of any offence punishable under
this Act, or of the abetment of any such
offence, save on complaint made by or under the
authority of the appropriate Government.
(2) No Court inferior to that of 1[a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate
of the first class shall try any offence
punishable under this Act.”
(underlines supplied)
6. Section 29 is applicable when any person commits a breach of
any term of any settlement or award binding on him under the ID
Act. Therefore, in the complaint alleging the commission of an
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offence punishable under Section 29 of the ID Act, there must be
a specific averment regarding the existence of a settlement or
award binding on the accused under the ID Act and how the same
has been breached. Settlement is defined under Section 2(p) of
the ID Act.
7. Before we go into the joint affidavit relied upon by the
learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, we must
refer to the statement of the second respondent recorded under
Section 200 of the Cr.PC on the complaint. The statement
contains a vague reference to “my settlement made in 2015”, the
settlement for the online reporting and MTP, and the settlement
of the expenses bill in an Excel sheet. Further allegations are
of change of conditions of service alleging a breach of Section
9A of the ID Act. In the verification statement under Section
200 of the Cr.PC, the second respondent, has not referred to the
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settlement in the form of the joint affidavit dated 9 December
2015 filed before the High Court. He has not stated whether the
settlements he referred therein were in writing. Apart from the
said statement of the second respondent, the statement of one
Rajiv Kumar Bhatnagar was also recorded under Section 202 of the
Cr.PC by the criminal Court. Even in this statement, the
witness does not allege a breach of the agreement incorporated
in the joint affidavit dated 9th December 2015. Therefore, the
learned Magistrate could not have issued a process for the
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offence punishable under Section 29 of the ID Act based on the
statement made by the second respondent under Section 200 of the
Cr. PC. It is well-settled that the object of recording a
statement of the complainant under Section 200 of the Cr.PC is
to bring the truth on record.
8. Now, we come to the joint affidavit, which is relied upon by
the second respondent. We have perused the said affidavit. The
affidavit refers to a written memorandum of settlement dated
th
30 August 1996. The affidavit vaguely refers to a settlement
arrived at between the parties. The memorandum of settlement
th
dated 30 August 1996 referred to in the joint affidavit is not
even referred to and relied upon in the complaint. A copy of
the same has not been produced along with the complaint.
9. Section 2(p) of the ID Act reads thus:
“Settlement” means a settlement arrived at
in the course of conciliation proceeding
and includes a written agreement between
the employer and workmen arrived at
otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding where such
agreement has been signed by the parties
thereto in such manner as may be prescribed
and a copy thereof has been sent to an
officer authorised in this behalf by the
appropriate Government and the conciliation
officer.”
Therefore, on a plain reading of the complaint, there is no
doubt that the second respondent has not been able to place on
record, along with the complaint, any written settlement within
the meaning of Section 2(p) of th e ID Act between the parties
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which is binding under the ID Act. It is not even the case made
out in the complaint that there is any breach of any award by
the appellants. Thus, on a plain reading of the complaint, the
statement of the second respondent recorded under Section 200 of
the Cr.PC and the statement of a witness of the second
respondent recorded under Section 202 of the Cr.PC, we find that
the second respondent made out no case of breach of any
settlement.
10. Moreover, the order purportedly passed in the exercise of
powers under Section 34(1) of the ID Act does not even refer to
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 29 of the
ID Act. The grant of authority under Section 34(1) is a
condition precedent for filing a complaint under Section 34(2)
of the ID Act. The authority granted under Section 34(1) must be
in respect of a specific offence for which a complaint is
intended to be filed. The order refers only to a violation of
Section 9A of the ID Act. The complaint alleges a violation of
Section 29 of the ID Act. But still, there is no reference to a
violation of Section 29 in the order. Therefore, while
exercising power under Section 34(1) of the ID Act of
granting authority, there is a complete non-application of mind.
If such authority is issued without any application of mind, the
very object of providing a safeguard in the form of Section
34(1) will be frustrated. The object of the provision is to
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prevent frivolous complaints from being filed. Grant of
authority is not an empty formality. We are not going into the
wider question of whether an authority could have been conferred
on the second respondent to file a complaint. In the facts of
the present case, it is unnecessary for us to go into the
question.
DUTY OF THE COURT
11. The learned Magistrate should have considered the averments
made in the complaint and the statements of the second
respondent and his witness recorded by him before deciding
whether a prima facie case of commission of an offence
punishable under Section 29 of the ID Act is made out. He ought
to have verified whether a lawful authority was granted to the
second respondent to file a complaint alleging a violation of
Section 29 of the ID Act. Setting criminal law in motion has
serious consequences. It cannot be done casually by the learned
Magistrate. Therefore, careful application of mind by the
learned Magistrate was necessary before deciding to take
cognizance. However, that was not done in the present case.
ORDER
12. Hence, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
and quash the proceedings of Complaint Case No.85479 of 2022
(CNR No.UPKN040875842022) pending in the Court of the learned
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.
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Consequently, the summoning order will stand set aside. We,
however, make it clear that remedies, if any, available in law
to the second respondent are expressly kept open.
13. The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
..........................J.
(ABHAY S. OKA)
..........................J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 30, 2024.
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