Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1099 OF 2008
Smt. P. Leelavathi (D) by LRs .. Appellant
Versus
V. Shankarnarayana Rao (D) by LRs .. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka
at Bangalore dated 06.09.2007 in RFA No. 220 of 1991, by
which the High Court has dismissed the said First appeal
preferred by the original plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi (now
deceased and represented through her legal heirs) and has
confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2019.04.09
18:07:35 IST
Reason:
trial Court dismissing the suit, the legal heirs of the original
plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi have preferred the present appeal.
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2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are
as under:
That Smt. P. Leelavathi instituted Original Suit No. 1248 of
1980 in the Court of the XIV Additional City Civil Judge at
Bangalore against the original defendants – V.
Shankaranarayan Rao (now deceased and represented
through his legal heirs) and two others for partition and for
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recovery of 1/4 share of the plaintiff in the plaint scheduled
properties. That the original plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi and
the original defendants are the sister and brothers and the
daughter and sons of Late G. Venkata Rao, who died on
08.10.1974.
2.1 It was the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that her
father Late G. Venkata Rao was an Estate Agent and he was
doing money lending business in his name and also in the
names of his sons and he was purchasing properties in the
names of his sons, though his father was funding those
properties. According to the plaintiff, at the time of his
death, G. Venkata Rao was in possession of a large estate
comprising of immoveable properties, bank deposits etc.
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shown in the plaint schedule. It was the case on behalf of
the original plaintiff that the suit schedule properties were as
such joint family properties and/or they were purchased in
fact by their late father G. Venkata Rao and the same was
funded by their father. That, it was the case on behalf of the
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original plaintiff that the plaintiff was entitled to 1/4 share
in all the said properties belonging to her father. It was the
case on behalf of the original plaintiff that as the defendants
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refused to give her 1/4 share and gave an evasive reply,
which prompted the plaintiff to demand in writing her share
and for early settlement. That, thereafter she got a notice
dated 18.07.1975 issued demanding partition and amicable
settlement. But the defendants have failed to settle the
matter. Therefore, the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit
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for partition and for recovery of her 1/4 share in the plaint
schedule properties.
3. That the original defendants resisted the suit by filing
the written statement. It was the case on behalf of the
original defendants that the plaint schedule properties are
exclusively owned by the defendants in their individual
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rights. Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule i.e., premises No.
32/1, Aga Abbas Ali Road is the personal property of
defendant No. 3. Item (b) of schedule 1 belongs to defendant
No. 2 and Item (c) belongs to defendant No. 1. These
properties never belonged to their deceased father G. Venkata
Rao and they do not form part of his estate. Coming to Item
No. II, the three fixed deposits were the personal properties of
each of the defendants. There was a joint saving bank
account in the Syndicate Bank, Cantonment Branch in the
joint names of the deceased and defendant No. 2. There is a
small amount still lying in the said account. At any rate,
there is no outstanding of Rs.10,000/ in the said account.
Regarding Item No. III, there were no debts due and payable
to the deceased. 939 shares were in the joint names of the
deceased and the plaintiff. 840 shares were in the names of
the deceased and defendant No. 1. Another 840 shares were
in the names of the deceased and defendant No. 2. 949
shares were in the names of the deceased and defendant No.
3. The plaintiff had major share which were purchased by
the deceased in the names of himself and the plaintiff. Late
G. Venkata Rao was a head clerk attached to an advocate’s
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office in Civil Station, Bangalore. On retirement, the
deceased indulged in and acted as an estate agent in a most
casual manner. At any rate, he was not doing money
lending business nor did he purchase properties as is sought
to be made out in the plaint. The deceased was at no point of
time in affluent circumstances. The solvency of the deceased
was at a very low ebb at the time of his death and he left no
jewellery. Even the furniture available at Premises No. 138,
Aga Abbas Ali Road, Bangalore was not worth mentioning
inasmuch as the pieces left could be counted on finger tips.
The value of the entire hold effects would not exceed
Rs.400.00. Only Items 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and 22 out of the
said premises were valuable articles of the deceased. The
other items never existed at any point of time. The plaintiff
had the best of things from her father while he was alive.
She was the recipient of favours shown by her father from
time to time. The deceased stretched his generosity even to
his soninlaw, the husband of the plaintiff. The deceased in
fact emptied his resources at the calls of her daughter and
her husband. The soninlaw also collected cash from the
deceased. The plaintiff and her husband are also due in a
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sum of Rs.3000/ borrowed by them under a pronote dated
11.06.1966 from the deceased and defendant No. 3. They
are also due a sum of Rs.1500/ under another pronote
dated 29.11.1966 payable to the deceased. The above
amounts also carry interest at stipulated rates. The
defendants serve their right to recover the said amounts
through proper legal remedies. The plaintiff constructed a
house bearing No. 150, Veerapillai Street with the said and
financial assistance of her father. The plaintiff in active
connivance with her husband ransacked the house No. 138,
Aga Abbas Ali Road during the absence of the deceased and
defendant No. 2 who had gone to Tirupathi and Madras.
The plaintiff had made wrongful gains about this time
somewhere in 1963. The plaintiff stayed with her husband at
Chicmagalur only for about three months after her marriage.
Thereafter she came with her husband to Bangalore and
stayed with her father for nearly six years. The plaintiff is
enjoying the special privilege and she has benefits bestowed
on her, her husband and her children almost regularly. In
addition to her father, defendant No. 2 was also looking after
the needs of the plaintiff’s family at considerable expenses.
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All the defendants are residing in rented houses. The claim
of the plaintiff in respect of Item A to C in the plaint schedule
is not tenable, in view of provisions of Section 2 of Benami
Transactions (Prohibition of Right to Recover Property)
Ordinance, 1988, the plaintiff has no cause of action and no
relief can be given to her. The suit is therefore liable to be
dismissed with costs.
3.1 That the trial Court framed the following issues:
1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule
immovable and movable properties as described in
Schedule I to V are the selfacquire properties?
2) Whether the suit schedule I(a) vacant site bearing
No. 32/1, Aga Abbas Ali Road, Civil Station,
Bangalore, is the self acquired property of defendant
No. 3?
3) Whether the suit schedule I(b) vacant site bearing
No. 32/1, Aga Abbas Ali Road, Civil Station.
Bangalore, is the self acquired property of defendant
No. 2?
4) Whether the suit schedule I(c) property is the self
acquired property of defendant No. 1?
5) Whether the defendants prove that the suit schedule
II Bank deposits are the personal properties of each
of the defendants?
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6) Whether the defendants prove that there were
furniture mentioned as Items 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of suit Schedule V in page5 of the plaint, hardly
worth Rs.400/ in premises No. 138/A (New No. 6)
Armstrong Road, Civil Station, Bangalore?
7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to partition and
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possession of her 1/4 share in the suit schedule
properties?
8) Whether there is cause of action for the suit?
9) To what reliefs is the plaintiff entitled?
Additional Issue: Is the claim of the plaintiff barred by
Section 2 of the Benami Transaction
(Prohibition of Right to Recover
Property) Ordinance, 1988 as alleged?
3.2 That the learned trial Court dismissed the suit by
holding that the suit schedule properties are not the self
acquired properties of Late G. Venkata Rao; suit Item Nos.
I(a), I(b) and I(c) are the properties of original defendant Nos.
1 to 3; the bank deposits mentioned in Scheduled II of the
plaint are the personal properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3.
The learned trial Court further observed and held that in
respect of moveable properties mentioned in Schedule V as
suit Item Nos. 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and 22, the plaintiff is
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entitled for 1/4 share and therefore the learned trial Court
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granted the decree for recovery of 1/4 share to the plaintiff
which was hardly worth Rs.400/ (sic) available in the
premises bearing No. 138/A (New No. 6) Armstrong Road,
Civil Station, Bangalore.
4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment
and decree passed by the learned trial Court dismissing the
suit and holding that the suit schedule properties were not
the selfacquired properties of Late G. Venkata Rao and they
were the properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3, the original
plaintiff preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High
Court vide judgment and order dated 26.02.1999 set aside
the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court
holding that all though the properties were in the names of
the original defendants, the transactions, in question, were
benami in nature and in that view of the matter, the plaintiff
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had inherited 1/4 share therein.
4.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment
and order passed by the High Court dated 26.02.1999
allowing the appeal and quashing and setting aside the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and,
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consequently decreeing the suit and holding that the plaintiff
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had inherited 1/4 share in the said schedule properties, the
legal representatives of the original defendants approached
this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 7117 of 2000.
4.2 That by judgment and order dated 11.05.2007, this
Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the
High Court observing that the High Court has not properly
appreciated and/or considered whether the transaction in
question is benami or not.
4.3 That thereafter, on remand, the High Court has by the
impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal
confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned
trial Court dismissing the suit, by specifically observing that
the purchase/transaction in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 3
with respect to the suit schedule properties were not the
benami transactions and that they were the selfacquired
properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and, therefore, the
plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the suit schedule
properties. The High Court has further observed and held
that the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)
Act, 1988 are retroactive in application.
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5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court in dismissing
the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree passed
by the trial Court dismissing the suit, the original plaintiff
(now the deceased and represented through the legal heirs)
has preferred the present appeal.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
has vehemently submitted that, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a
grave error in dismissing the appeal and confirming the
judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the
suit.
6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the Courts below
have materially erred in not accepting the case of the plaintiff
that the suit properties acquired in the names of defendant
Nos. 1 to 3 were benami in nature.
6.2 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that the findings recorded by the
learned trial Court and confirmed by the High Court that the
suit properties acquired in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to
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3 were not benami in nature, but were the selfacquired
properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are contrary to the
evidence on record.
6.3 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that it has come in evidence that the
sale consideration was paid by the father of the plaintiff and
defendant Nos. 1 to 3. It is submitted that DW1 admitted
that he had borrowed a sum of Rs.1,030/ from his father
Late G. Venkata Rao and that Late G. Venkata Rao sent a
demand draft for a sum of Rs.1,030/ directly to the Tamil
Nadu Housing Board. It is submitted that even the entire
consideration for acquisition of suit properties Item Nos.
1(a) to 1(c) were paid by Late G. Venkata Rao.
6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant that the High Court having
concluded that the purchase money of suit properties Item
Nos. 1(a) to 1(c) came from Late G.Venkata Rao, thereafter,
the High Court is not justified in concluding that the plaintiff
was required to give further evidence to establish that the
suit properties were acquired for the benefit of defendants or
Late G. Venkata Rao had other reasons to acquire the suit
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properties in the names of his sons – original defendant Nos.
1 to 3. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Thakur
(1980) 3 SCC 72, it is
Bhim Singh v. Thakur Kan Singh
vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that, as held by this Court in the
aforesaid decision, if it is proved that the purchase money
came from a person other than the person in whose favour
the property was transferred, the purchase is prima facie
assumed to be for the benefit of person who supplied the
purchase money, unless there is an evidence to the contrary.
6.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant that both the Courts below have
materially erred in observing and consequently holding that
the plaintiff was not a member of the joint family.
6.6 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the
present appeal and quash and set aside the judgment and
decree passed by both the Courts below and consequently to
decree the suit.
7. Shri G. V. Chandrashekar, learned advocate appearing
on behalf of the original defendants, while opposing the
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present appeal, has vehemently submitted that the finding
recording by the learned trial Court, confirmed by the High
Court that the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) were not
benami transactions, are on appreciation of evidence. It is
submitted that, as rightly observed by the High Court, merely
because some financial assistance might have been given by
the father to the defendants while purchasing the suit
properties, the same would not become a benami transaction,
unless the contrary intention is established and proved.
7.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the defendants that, in the present
case, all the three suit properties were purchased by
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 by registered sale deeds and some
financial assistance was given by the father Late G. Venkata
Rao, which was given to the plaintiff also. It is submitted
that, in the present case, it has come on record that the
plaintiff married with PW1 in the year 1954; the marriage of
the plaintiff was performed by Late G. Venkata Rao; and that
after the marriage of the plaintiff, Late G. Venkata Rao and
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were living together. It is submitted
that it has also come on record that Late G. Venkata Rao
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provided the financial assistance to the plaintiff to acquire
the house bearing No. 150, Veerapillai Street, Civil Station,
Bangalore. It is submitted that even the evidence on record
would disclose that after the marriage, the plaintiff and her
husband were maintained by her father for a period of 10
years. It is submitted that, considering the aforesaid
circumstances, as rightly observed by the High Court, the
intention of Late G. Venkata Rao in providing financial
assistance to his sons for acquisition of properties was to
provide shelter to his sons and, therefore, the acquisition of
the suit properties – Items I(a) to I(c) by defendants, out of the
financial assistance provided by their father Late G. Venkata
Rao, did not involve any benami transaction.
7.2 It is further submitted on behalf of the defendants that,
as such, the provisions of the Benami Transactions
(Prohibition) Act would not be applicable retrospectively. It
is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the original defendants that, as observed and held
by this Court in the case of Binapani Paul v. Pratima
Ghosh (2007) 6 SCC 100, the burden of proving of benami
nature of transaction lies on the person who alleges the
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transaction to be a benami. It is submitted that in the
aforesaid decision, it is further observed and held by this
Court that the source of money can never be the sole
consideration and it is merely one of the relevant
considerations, but not determinative in character. It is
submitted that, in the present case, the plaintiff has failed to
establish and prove that the purchase of the properties – Item
Nos. I(a) to 1(c) were benami in nature and/or that the
intention of Late G. Venkata Rao was to purchase the suit
properties for and on behalf of the family, but were
purchased in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3. It is
submitted that, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, the High Court has rightly dismissed the appeal
and has rightly confirmed the judgment and decree passed by
the learned trial Court dismissing the suit, by specifically
observing and holding that the suit properties – Items I(a) to
I(c) were not benami in nature. Therefore, it is prayed to
dismiss the present appeal.
8. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length. In the present case, the original
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plaintiff instituted the suit claiming 1/4 share in the suit
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properties, including the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to
I(c). Admittedly, the suit properties were purchased by
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 respectively. However, it was the case
on behalf of the plaintiff that the purchase of the suit
properties was benami transaction as the sale consideration
was paid by their father Late G. Venkata Rao. The aforesaid
is not accepted by the High Court and the High Court has
observed and held that the plaintiff has failed to establish
and prove by leading cogent evidence that the intention of
Late G. Venkata Rao to purchase the suit properties in the
names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 was to purchase for and on
behalf of the family and, therefore, the transaction cannot be
said to be benami in nature.
8.1 Therefore, the short question that is posed for
consideration of this Court is, whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case and merely because some financial
assistance has been given by the father to the sons to
purchase the properties, can the transactions be said to
benami in nature?
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9. While considering the aforesaid question, few decisions
of this Court on the benami transactions/transactions of
benami nature, are required to be referred to:
9.1 In the case of (supra), it is
Thakur Bhim Singh
observed and held by this Court that while considering a
particular transaction as benami, the intention of the person
who contributed the purchase money is determinative of the
nature of transaction. It is further observed by this Court as
to what the intention of the person who contributed the
purchase money, has to be decided on the basis of the
surrounding circumstance; the relationship of the parties;
the motives governing their action in bringing about the
transaction and their subsequent conduct etc. In the
aforesaid decision, this Court considered the earlier decision
of this Court in
Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (Mst.)
(1974) 1 SCC 3, more particularly para 6, and thereafter
summed up in para 17 and para 18. Paras 17 and 18 of that
judgment are as under:
“ 17. The principle enunciated by Lord
Macmillan in the case of Manmohan Das [AIR
1931 PC 175 : 134 IC 66 9 : 1931 ALJ 550] has
been followed by this Court in Jaydayal
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| Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (Mst) [(1974) 1 SCC 3 :<br>(1974) 2 SCR 90] where Sarkaria, J., observed<br>thus: (SCC p. 6, para 6) | |
|---|---|
| “It is wellsettled that the burden of<br>proving that a particular sale is benami and<br>the apparent purchaser is not the real<br>owner, always rests on the person asserting<br>it to be so. This burden has to be strictly<br>discharged by adducing legal evidence of a<br>definite character which would either<br>directly prove the fact of benami or<br>establish circumstances unerringly and<br>reasonably raising an inference of that fact.<br>The essence of a benami is the intention of<br>the party or parties concerned; and not<br>unoften, such intention is shrouded in a<br>thick veil which cannot be easily pierced<br>through. But such difficulties do not relieve<br>the person asserting the transaction to be<br>benami of any part of the serious onus that<br>rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of<br>mere conjectures or surmises, as a<br>substitute for proof. The reason is that a<br>deed is a solemn document prepared and<br>executed after considerable deliberation,<br>and the person expressly shown as the<br>purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts<br>with the initial presumption in his favour<br>that the apparent state of affairs is the real<br>state of affairs. Though the question<br>whether a particular sale is benami or not,<br>is largely one of fact, and for determining<br>this question, no absolute formulae or acid<br>tests, uniformly applicable in all situations,<br>can be laid down; yet in weighing the<br>probabilities and for gathering the relevant<br>indicia, the courts are usually guided by<br>these circumstances:(1) the source from<br>which the purchase money came; (2) the<br>nature and possession of the property, after<br>the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving |
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| the transaction a benami colour; (4) the<br>position of the parties and the relationship<br>if any, between the claimant and the alleged<br>benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds<br>after the sale and (6) the conduct of the<br>parties concerned in dealing with the<br>property after the sale.”<br>18. The principle governing the<br>determination of the question whether a transfer<br>is a benami transaction or not may be summed<br>up thus: (1) the burden of showing that a<br>transfer is a benami transaction lies on the<br>person who asserts that it is such a transaction;<br>(2) it is proved that the purchase money came<br>from a person other than the person in whose<br>favour the property is transferred, the purchase<br>is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the<br>person who supplied the purchase money, unless<br>there is evidence to the contrary; (3) the true<br>character of the transaction is governed by the<br>intention of the person who has contributed the<br>purchase money and (4) the question as to what<br>his intention was has to be decided on the basis<br>of the surrounding circumstances, the<br>relationship of the parties, the motives governing<br>their action in bringing about the transaction<br>and their subsequent conduct, etc.” | the transaction a benami colour; (4) the<br>position of the parties and the relationship<br>if any, between the claimant and the alleged<br>benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds<br>after the sale and (6) the conduct of the<br>parties concerned in dealing with the<br>property after the sale.” | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 18. The principle governing the<br>determination of the question whether a transfer<br>is a benami transaction or not may be summed<br>up thus: (1) the burden of showing that a<br>transfer is a benami transaction lies on the<br>person who asserts that it is such a transaction;<br>(2) it is proved that the purchase money came<br>from a person other than the person in whose<br>favour the property is transferred, the purchase<br>is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the<br>person who supplied the purchase money, unless<br>there is evidence to the contrary; (3) the true<br>character of the transaction is governed by the<br>intention of the person who has contributed the<br>purchase money and (4) the question as to what<br>his intention was has to be decided on the basis<br>of the surrounding circumstances, the<br>relationship of the parties, the motives governing<br>their action in bringing about the transaction<br>and their subsequent conduct, etc.” | |||
| 9.2 In Binapani Paul case (supra), this Court again had an<br>occasion to consider the nature of benami transactions. After<br>considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point,<br>this Court in that judgment observed and held that the<br>source of money had never been the sole consideration. It is | |||
| merely one of the relevant considerations but not |
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| determinative in character. This Court ultimately concluded | |
|---|---|
| after considering its earlier judgment in the case of | |
| Valliammal v. Subramaniam | (2004) 7 SCC 233 that while |
| considering whether a particular transaction is benami in | |
| nature, the following six circumstances can be taken as a | |
| guide: | |
| guide: |
“(1) the source from which the purchase money
came;
(2) the nature and possession of the property,
after the purchase;
(3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a
benami colour;
(4) the position of the parties and the
relationship, if any, between the claimant and
the alleged benamidar;
(5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale;
and
(6) the conduct of the parties concerned in
dealing with the property after the sale.
( Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (supra), SCC p. 7,
para6)”
10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of
the opinion that the High Court has rightly come to the
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conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the
purchase of the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the
names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were benami in nature. It is
true that, at the time of purchase of the suit properties – Item
Nos. I(a) to I(c), some financial assistance was given by Late
G. Venkata Rao. However, as observed by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions, that cannot be the sole determinative
factor/circumstance to hold the transaction as benami in
nature. The plaintiff has miserably failed to establish and
prove the intention of the father to purchase the suit
properties for and on behalf of the family, which were
purchased in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3. It is
required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff – daughter
has not stepped into the witness box and that the evidence
on behalf of the plaintiff has been given by her husband who,
as such, can be said to be an outsider, so far as the joint
family is concerned. Apart from that, it has come on record
that the plaintiff and her husband were maintained by Late
G. Venkata Rao. The financial assistance was also given to
the plaintiff and her husband to purchase the residential
house at Bangalore. Late G. Venkata Rao, therefore,
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provided a shelter to his daughter and, as observed herein
above, also gave the financial assistance to purchase the
residential house at Bangalore. It has also come on record
that Late G. Venkata Rao even purchased the share
certificates and his daughteroriginal plaintiff was also given
certain number of shares. Therefore, considering the
aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, Late G.
Venkata Rao also must have given the financial assistance to
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 – sons and helped them in purchase of
the properties. Therefore, the intention of Late G. Venkata
Rao to give the financial assistance to purchase the
properties in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be
said to be to purchase the properties for himself and/or his
family members and, therefore, as rightly observed by the
High Court, the transactions of purchase of the suit
properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the names of the
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be said to be benami in nature.
The intention of Late G. Venkata Rao was to provide the
financial assistance for the welfare of his sons and not
beyond that. None of the other ingredients to establish the
transactions as benami transactions, as held by this Court in
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the aforesaid decisions, are satisfied, except that some
financial assistance was provided by Late G. Venkata Rao. In
the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the
evidence on record, the purchase of the suit properties – Item
Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot
be said to be benami transactions and, therefore, as rightly
observed and held by the learned trial Court and confirmed
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by the High Court, the plaintiff has no right to claim 1/4
share in the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) which were
purchased by the sons in their names by separate sale deeds.
We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the
High Court.
11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed. No costs.
........................................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
........................................J.
[M. R. SHAH]
New Delhi,
April 9, 2019.