Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.14661467 OF 2008
Ashok Kumar Mehra & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The State of Punjab ETC. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. These appeals are directed against the final
judgment and order dated 21.07.2008 passed by
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh
in Criminal Appeal No.681DBA of 2000 and
Criminal Revision No.1242 of 2000 whereby the
High Court allowed the criminal appeal filed by
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2019.04.15
16:52:58 IST
Reason:
respondent No.1(State) herein and the criminal
1
revision filed by respondent No.2(Complainant)
herein by setting aside the judgment dated
06.06.2000 passed by the Sessions Judge,
Rupnagar in Sessions Case No.10 of 1998 and
convicted both the appellants for the offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(hereinafter referred
to as “IPC”) and sentenced them to undergo
imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/
each. In default of payment of fine, they shall
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period
of six months each.
A f
2. ew facts need mention hereinbelow for the
disposal of these appeals.
3. Appellant No.1Ashok Kumar Mehra is the
father of appellant No.2Kushwant@Sukhwant
Kumar Mehra. Both the appellants, i.e., father and
son were prosecuted for commission of the offence
2
of committing murder of one Inderjit Dhiman. The
Sessions Judge by judgment/order dated
06.06.2000 passed in Sessions Case No.10/1998
acquitted both the appellants.
4. The State and the Complainant both felt
aggrieved and filed criminal appeal and criminal
revision in the High Court. By impugned order, the
High Court allowed the criminal appeal as well as
the criminal revision and while reversing the
judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge,
convicted both the appellants and awarded them life
sentence, which has given rise to filing of these
appeals by both the accused persons, i.e., father
and son.
5. Heard Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel
for the appellants and Mr. Ankit Swarup & Ms.
Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel for the
respondents.
3
6. Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the
appellants, at the outset, stated that so far as the
appellant No.1Ashok Kumar Mehra, i.e., father is
concerned, he has expired during the pendency of
these appeals. Learned counsel then brought to our
notice that so far as appellant No.2Kushwant @
Sukhwant Kumar Mehra, i.e., son is concerned, he
was juvenile on the date of commission of the
offence.
7. In our opinion, so far as appeal filed by
appellant No.1Ashok Kumar Mehra, i.e., father is
concerned, the same stands abated on account of
his death. In this view of the matter, the appeal
filed by appellant No.1 is accordingly dismissed as
abated.
8. Now so far as the appeal filed by appellant
No.2 Sukhwant Kumar, i.e., son is concerned, the
same, in our view, deserves to be allowed in the
4
light of law laid down by this Court in a recent
decision of this Court in vs.
Raju The State of
Haryana, 2019(4) SCALE 398 wherein a similar
question was involved. This is what was held by
this Court (Three Judge Bench) in Paras 9, 10, and
25 as under:
“9. It is by now wellsettled, as was held in
Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan , (2009) 13
SCC 211, that in light of Sections 2(k), 2(I),
7A read with Section 20 of the 2000 Act as
amended in 2006, a juvenile who had not
completed eighteen years on the date of
commission of the offence is entitled to the
benefit of the 2000 Act (also see Mohan Mali
v. State of Madhya Pradesh , (2010) 6 SCC
669; Daya Nand v. State of Haryana , (2011)
2 SCC 224; Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi
(supra); Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 193).
It is equally wellsettled that the claim of
juvenility can be raised at any stage before
any Court by an accused, including this
Court, even after the final disposal of a case,
in terms of Section 7A of the 2000 Act (see
Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi , (supra),
Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal ,
(2012) 10 SCC 489; Jitendra Singh @ Babboo
Singh v. State of UP , (supra); Abdul Razzaq v.
State of Uttar Pradesh , (2015) 15 SCC 637).
5
10. In light of the above legal position, it is
evident that the Appellant would be entitled
to the benefit of the 2000 Act if his age is
determined to be below 18 years on the date
of commission of the offence. Moreover, it
would be irrelevant that the plea of juvenility
was not raised before the Trial Court, in light
of Section 7A. As per the report of the
inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial)
of this Court, in this case, the Appellant was
below 18 years of age on the date of
commission of the offence. The only question
before us that needs to be determined is
whether such report may be given
precedence over the contrary view taken by
the High Court, so that the benefit of the
2000 Act may be given to the Appellant.
25. Criminal Appeal hereby stands allowed
and the order of the High Court affirming the
conviction and sentence of the Appellant
under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC is set
aside. Seeing that the Appellant has already
spent 6 years in imprisonment, whereas the
maximum period for which a juvenile may be
sent to a special home is only 3 years as per
Section 15(1)(g) of the 2000 Act, and since
the Appellant has already been enlarged on
bail by virtue of the order of the Court dated
09.05.2014, he need not be taken into
custody. His bail bonds stand discharged and
all proceedings against him, so far as they
relate to the present case, stand terminated.”
9. When we examine the facts of the case of
appellant No.2 in the light of law laid down in the
6
case of Raju (supra), we find that appellant No.2
was born on 14.06.1980 whereas the date of
commission of the offence is 04.01.1998.
10. It is, therefore, an admitted fact that appellant
No. 2 was a juvenile (he was below the age of 18
years, i.e., he was 17 years and 5 months) on the
date of the commission of the offence (04.01.1998).
In other words, appellant No. 2 had not completed
the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the
offence, i.e., on 04.01.1998.
11. Though this fact was neither brought to the
notice of the Sessions Judge and nor the High Court
and was brought to the notice of this Court for the
first time by appellant No. 2 in this appeal, yet in
the light of law laid down by this Court in several
decisions referred to in Para 10 of the decision in
Raju (supra), appellant No. 2 is entitled to raise this
plea even in this appeal.
7
12. Now, so far as the issue relating to the
genuineness of the date of birth of appellant No. 2 is
concerned, firstly, it is not in dispute that appellant
No.2 had filed his date of birth certificate in the
Sessions Court; Secondly, the prosecution did not
object to the correctness of the birth certificate
before the Sessions Judge; Thirdly, this Court by
order dated 11.07.2011 granted bail to appellant
No. 2 on this ground observing therein that since he
was juvenile at the time of commission of the
offence and was below 18 years, which was not
disputed by the respondentState; and lastly, even
at the time of hearing of this appeal, learned
counsel for the respondentState did not dispute the
date of birth certificate of appellant No.2.
13. In the light of these four reasons, we are of the
view that it is not necessary to hold any further
inquiry on this question.
8
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of
the considered opinion that since appellant No.2
was a juvenile on the date of commission of the
offence and though till date he has already
undergone considerable jail sentence partly as an
undertrial and partly as a convict, yet the appeal
filed by appellant No. 2 has to be allowed as was
done in the case of Raju (supra) without going into
the merits of the case and passing any other
consequential order in that regard.
15. The appeal of appellant No. 2 is accordingly
allowed. The impugned order qua appellant No.2 is
set aside.
.………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
April 15, 2019
9