Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5574 OF 2009
Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji
Framji & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Union of India & Anr. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 17.06.2009 passed by the High
Court of Bombay at Mumbai Writ Petition No.4386
of 2001 whereby the Division Bench of the High
Court dismissed the said writ petition filed by
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHOK RAJ SINGH
Date: 2019.03.15
18:02:26 IST
Reason:
appellants herein.
1
2. Though the controversy involved in this appeal
is short, in order to appreciate as to how it arose, it
is necessary to set out its background facts in detail
. The facts are stated from the SLP paper books
infra
and the List of Dates furnished by the parties.
3. The appellants herein are the writ petitioners
and the respondents herein are the respondents in
the writ petition out of which this appeal arises.
4. The dispute relates to a property, which is
situated at Survey No.417, Bungalow No.17, Dr.
Coyaji Road (formerly known as “Elphinstone Road”)
Pune411001. The property consisted of a main
bungalow, a cottage, outhouses, garages, and an
open plot of land (garden) admeasuring around 1.52
acres (hereinafter referred to as “the suit property”).
5. One Burjorji Goostadji and Cooverbai Homi
Karani were the owners of the suit property. They
sold the suit property to one Mr. Mohammad
Hajjibhoy by indenture of conveyance dated
2
01.03.1920 pursuant to the order of the District
Judge made on a Misc. Application No.5 of 1919
granting sanction for the sale in favour of Mr.
Mohammad Hajjibhoy.
6. Mr. Mohammad Hajjibhoy then sold the suit
property to one Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji by
indenture of conveyance dated 28.11.1923. Mr.
Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji then in turn leased out
the suit property on 10.10.1929 to the Government
of India for a period of five years on a rent of
Rs.110/ per month.
7. Even after the lease having come to an end by
efflux of time, the lessee i.e. the Government of
India continued to remain in possession of the suit
property. However, Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji
then executed another lease deed on 19.04.1940 in
favour of the Government of India for a further
period of five years. In the year 1939, the lessor i.e.
Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji applied to the
3
Cantonment Board, Pune for giving permission to
undertake certain building work in the suit
property. After exchange of some letters, the
Cantonment Board granted the permission to Mr.
Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji.
8. On 30.04.1941, Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji
expired leaving behind his son Mr. Kavasji K Framji
who inherited the suit property. By order dated
08.06.1943, the then Collector, Poona requisitioned
the suit property under Rule 75 A (i) of the Defense
of India Rules and handed over its possession to the
Military Authorities.
9. However, after three years on 23.03.1946, the
suit property was derequisitioned and the
possession was handed over back to Mr. Kavasji K
Framji. On 05.08.1948, the Collector again
requisitioned the suit property under Section 5 (1)
of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. In this
4
order it was mentioned that Mr. Kavasji K Framji is
the owner of the suit property.
10. Mr. Kavasji K Framji filed Writ Petition
No.2783 of 1983 in the Bombay High Court seeking
inter alia a relief for restoration of possession of the
suit property. By order dated 14.01.1985, the
Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and
directed restoration of possession of the suit
property to Mr. Kavasji K Framji. The Government
of India, however, did not vacate the suit property
but undertook to vacate it by 30.04.1985.
11. Reverting to the events to complete the
narration of facts in chronology, on 21.01.1971, the
Union of India issued a resumption notice in
relation to the portion of the suit property (about
22,168 sq. feet). The notice was founded on the
allegations inter alia that the suit property was held
under “old grant” which empowered the Union of
India to resume the subject land. The notice
5
contained that on the expiry of 30 days period after
its service, all private rights, and interest of Mr.
Kavasji K Framji would be ceased. The notice
offered to Mr. Kavasji a sum of Rs.4765/ by way of
compensation towards the value of various
structures standing on the subject land. A cheque
of Rs.4765/ was sent to Mr. Kavasiji K Framji by
letter dated 23.01.1971 who, in turn, declined to
accept the said amount and sent his reply on
27.01.1971 objecting therein to the notice and its
contents.
12. Felt aggrieved by the notice and the letter, Mr.
Kavasji K Framji filed Writ Petition No.364/1971 in
the Bombay High Court challenging both the notice
and the letter. The writ petition was filed on the
allegations inter alia that the subject land was a free
hold tenure and was never held by Mr. Kavasji K
Framji under any Grant or Licence from the Union
of India or from any department of the Union of
6
India and hence it is not resumable at the instance
of the Central Government.
13. Besides Mr. Kavasji K Framji, several other
persons including one person namely Mr. PT
Anklesaria also got similar notices from the Union of
India in relation to their land. Mr. PT Anklesaria,
Mr. Kavasji K Framji and others felt aggrieved and
they filed writ petitions (SCA No.1286/1972) in the
Bombay High Court questioning the legality and
validity of the notices sent to them by the Union of
India.
14. By the judgment/order dated 05.02.1979 in
Phiroze Temulji Anklesaria vs. H.C. Vashistha ,
AIR 1980 Bombay 9, the High Court allowed the
writ petition and declared the notice as illegal and
issued without authority of law and accordingly
restrained the Union of India from giving any effect
to the impugned notice. The High Court held inter
alia as under:
7
“26. On a consideration of all the material
that has been placed before us by the
petitioner as well as the respondents, it is
clear to us that there is no evidence
whatsoever of the Government's right to
resume the land in possession of the
petitioners; there is no evidence of the terms
under which that right of resumption, if any,
could be exercised and most important, there
is no evidence whatsoever of the right or
power of the Government to acquire the
structure standing upon the land in question
by determining arbitrarily or unilaterally its
compensation. All these three rightsthe
right of resumption, the right to resume upon
particular terms and the right to take
possession of the houses situated on the land
which are mentioned in the impugned notice
are found to be nonexisting. The impugned
notice, therefore, is patently without any
authority of law and is not supportable by the
terms of the grant which itself has not been
proved.”
15. The Union of India felt aggrieved and filed
appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court
(Special Civil Application No.364/1971). The
Division Bench dismissed the appeals in the case of
Kavasji Kaikhoshrou Framji vs. D.Krishnamunny
with the following observations:
8
“5…….The respondents have also raised two
preliminary contentions as to the
maintainability of the petition viz., (1) that
the petitioner had not established his title to
the property to enable him to maintain the
petition and (2) that the petition involved
disputed questions of facts and law as to title
and therefore the court should not determine
the same in a petition under Art.226 of the
Constitution but direct the petitioner to file
a suit for that purpose.
We find that in this case all the contentions
raised and submissions made by both the
sides are the same as those made in Special
Civil Application No.1286 of 1972. In that
petition, by our reasoned judgment delivered
on 521979, we have negatived the
respondents’ said contentions and held
accepting the contentions of the petitioner
that the resumption by the Government of
the petitioner’s land and bunglow were
without any authority of law and therefore
the impugned notice was invalid. On the
very same reasoning in this case also we
negative all the contentions of the
respondents and uphold the contentions of
the petitioners inter alia that the resumption
of the petitioner’s land by the Government
was without any authority of law and
therefore the impugned notice was invalid.”
16. In all, 14 special leave petitions were filed by
the Union of India in this Court against the
judgment/order of the High Court.
9
17. It may here be mentioned that in the
meantime, Mr. PT Ankelesaria had also filed civil
suits in the Court of District Judge, Poona in the
light of observations made by the Bombay High
Court in (AIR 1980 Bombay page 9) and prayed for
grant of relief of possession of the subject land. The
District Judge, Poona decreed these suits in
plaintiff’s favour. The Union of India felt aggrieved
and filed First Appeals in the Bombay High Court
whereas the plaintiff filed crossobjections in these
appeals (608621/1980). These appeals were later
transferred to this Court at the instance of the
Union of India for their disposal and were re
numbered as (6772/1985 and 1112/1987).
18. By consent order dated 20.07.1988, this Court
remitted the appeals to the Bombay High Court for
their disposal as directed therein. The order reads
as under:
10
“2. While considering the case, if the High
Court finds that the trial Court or the first
appellate Court has placed reliance or made
any reference to the aforesaid judgment of
the Division Bench, it shall ignore that
judgment, to that extent, and the High Court
shall decide the matter afresh in accordance
with law without taking into consideration or
being influenced by the aforesaid judgment of
the Division Bench.
3. The parties will be at liberty to adduce
additional evidence before the High Court
within the period fixed by the High Court.
4. The High Court will make every effort to
dispose of the cases within six months from
the date of the receipt of the record.”
19. The remaining appeals were disposed of by
another order dated 25.03.1992 of this Court, which
reads as under:
“The Appeals are dismissed as infructuous in
terms of the signed order placed on the file.”
20. The aforesaid order dated 25.03.1992 was
later recalled by this Court on a review petition filed
by the Union of India by order dated 13.01.1995.
The Review Petition was allowed by this Court on
the ground that the consent order was passed only
in relation to Mr. PT Ankelesaria’s case by which his
11
appeals alone were remitted to the High Court for
their disposal, whereas the other appeals could not
have been dismissed as having rendered
infructuous in the light of the said order.
21. In the meantime, Mr. Kavasji K Framji died
and his legal representatives (appellants herein)
were brought on record of the case to continue the
lis .
22. This Court then by order dated 04.08.1998
disposed of the aforementioned appeals after
recording the statement of the Solicitor General of
India in the following terms:
“Learned Solicitor General states that the
Union of India would seek dispossession of
the respondentoccupants from the
properties involved, in accordance with law
and if need be, through a Civil Court by filing
suit. In case such steps are taken, any
observations made by the High Court which
would tend to defeat the remedies sought
would not stand in its way. On such stance
of the Union of India, Civil Appeals as also
the special leave petitions stand disposed of
accordingly.”
12
23. It is with these background facts which began
from 01.03.1920 and ended with the order of this
Court passed on 01.08.1998, Respondent No.2
Estate Officer issued a notice on 31.07.2001 under
Sub(1) and Clause (b) (ii) of SubSection 2 of
Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short “the
PP Act”) to the appellants. The present appeal is
concerned with the legality and correctness of this
notice.
24. The notice in question was founded on the
allegations inter alia that the appellants are in
unauthorized occupation of the public premises
mentioned in the schedule in the notice i.e the suit
property and therefore the appellants should vacate
the suit property. The contents of the notice read as
under:
“Whereas the nature of Holder’s rights on
the land is limited only to its occupancy,
therefore, being the property of the Govt. the
land is liable to be resumed, in terms of
13
conditions obtaining under the old grant
terms. Accordingly the Govt. of India,
Ministry of Defence resumed the land and
building after giving one month’s notice vide
Order no.701/71/L/L & C/70/12030/D
st
(lands) 21 January 1971 on payment of
Rs.4,765/ (Rupees Four Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixty Five only) towards resumption
cost of authorized super structure standing
thereon which has been accepted by you,
albeit, under protest.”
25. The appellants felt aggrieved by the issuance of
the aforementioned notice to them by Respondent
No.2 and filed a writ petition in the High Court of
Bombay questioning its legality and correctness and
sought its quashing. The appellants challenged the
notice on several factual and legal grounds as is
clear from the grounds enumerated in the writ
petition.
26. The respondents filed their counter and
defended issuance of the notice to the appellants
including its contents. By impugned order, the High
Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the
issuance of notice to the appellants under the PP
14
Act, which has given rise to filing of this appeal by
way of special leave in this Court by the
unsuccessful writ petitioner.
27. Heard Mr. Darius Khambata, learned senior
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Aman Lekhi,
learned ASG for the respondents.
28. Mr. Darius Khambata, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants (writ petitioner) has
mainly argued the following eight points.
29. His first submission was that the High Court
erred in dismissing the writ petition and thereby
erred in upholding the impugned notice issued
under Section 4 of the PP Act.
30. His second submission was that keeping in
view the backgrounds facts stated above coupled
with the orders passed by the High Court and this
Court in judicial proceedings, which emanated from
these facts, it is prima facie clear that respondent
No.2 Estate Officer had no jurisdiction over the
15
suit property for invoking his powers under Section
4 of the PP Act against the appellants for their
summary eviction and treating them to be
unauthorized occupants of the suit property.
31. In other words, the submission was that the
facts stated above would, in no uncertain terms, go
to show that the suit property never belonged to the
Union of India and on the other hand it all along
belonged to the appellant’s predecessors and then to
the appellants and therefore respondent No.2
Estate Officer had no jurisdiction to treat the suit
property to be belonging to the Union of India for
initiating proceedings against the appellants for
their summary eviction under the PP Act.
32. His third submission was that from the facts
narrated above, it is clear that there does exist a
“ bona fide dispute” between the appellants and the
Union of India (respondent No.1) in relation to the
16
suit property as to who is its real owner the
appellants or the Union of India.
33. According to the learned counsel, in a
situation where there arises a dispute
bona fide
between the two rival claimants over a property
about their ownership such as the one which has
arisen in the case at hand, the remedy of the parties
lies in filing a civil suit in the civil court and seek a
declaration of their ownership over the property in
accordance with law but not to take recourse to any
summary remedy to evict a person, such as the one
done by the respondents under the PP Act against
the appellants only because one of the rival
claimants, i.e., respondent No.1 happens to be the
Union of India.
34. His fourth submission was that, respondent
No.1 through their counsel (Solicitor General)
having made a statement in this Court on
04.08.1998, that respondent No.1 (Union of India)
17
would take steps in filing civil suit in the Civil Court
against the appellants for their dispossession from
the suit property, and this Court disposing of the
appeals of the Union of India in the light of such
statement, respondent No.1 is bound by their own
statement. It is therefore, urged that the Union of
India must take recourse to the remedy of filing civil
suit against the appellant in relation to the suit
property in the civil court, which is otherwise a
proper remedy available in law for claiming the
relief.
35. His fifth submission was that even otherwise,
looking to the nature of documents filed by the
appellants and the manner in which the appellants
have traced their title to the suit property, the
appellants could not prima facie be regarded as
trespassers in the suit property and nor could they
be regarded as the persons in its unauthorized
occupation by respondent No.1 (Union of India) so
18
as to empower them to take recourse to the
provisions of the P.P. Act.
36. In other words, the submission was that the
documents relied upon by the appellants
prima
facie proved that the appellants were/are and have
all along been the owners of the suit property to the
exclusion of all persons including respondent No.1
(Union of India) and, therefore, no one has a right to
disturb their long established possession over the
suit property except by following the “due process of
law”.
37. His sixth submission was that the provisions
of the PP Act are made applicable only to those
properties which are admittedly belonging to the
Central Government or the State Government as the
case may be and therefore proceedings under the PP
Act can be initiated against any person when he is
found to be in its unauthorized occupation without
any lawful authority from its real owner i.e. the
19
Central/State Government. Such is not the case
here.
38. His seventh submission was that, if
respondent No.1 (Union of India) claims themselves
to be the owner of the suit property (which they are
not), then as urged earlier, their remedy lies in filing
civil suit in the Civil Court and establish their claim
of ownership over the suit property qua the
appellants in terms of the order of this Court dated
04.08.1998 and recover possession of the suit
property from the appellants.
39. His eighth submission was that since the
appellants succeeded in the High Court in the first
round of litigation against respondent No.1 (Union
of India) wherein the High Court quashed the
resumption notice dated 21.01.1971 by order dated
05.02.1979 (AIR 1980 Bombay 9), this order still
continues to hold good because none of the finding
20
recorded therein are either set aside or modified by
this Court by its order dated 04.08.1998.
40. Learned counsel while elaborating his
aforementioned submissions placed reliance on the
decisions in Express Newspapers vs. U.O.I. , (1986)
1 SCC 133,
State of Orissa vs. Ram Chandra Dev,
AIR 1964 SC 685, Western Coalfields Ltd. & Anr.
vs. Ballapur Collieries Company & Ors. (judgment
dated 11.12.2018 in C.A. Nos.44874488/2009),
M/s. Ballapur Collieries Company & Ors. vs.
(Judgement dated
Estate Officer & Ors.
22.01.2007 of the Bombay High Court(Nagpur
Bench) in Civil Revision Application No.801 of 2002
and Civil Revision Application No.803 of 2003,
State of U.P. & Anr. vs. Zia Khan , (1998) 8 SCC
483, State of A.P. vs. Thummala Krishna Rao ,
(1982) 2 SCC 134 and State of Rahasthan vs.
Padmavatidevi , 1995 Suppl(2) SCC 872.
21
41. In reply, learned Additional Solicitor, Mr.
Aman Lekhi while supporting the reasoning and the
conclusion of the High Court in the impugned order
contended that none of the submissions urged by
the learned counsel for the appellants have any
merit.
42. It was his submission that having regard to the
previous factual history, it does not take away the
jurisdiction of the Estate Officer under the PP Act to
issue notice under Section 4 of the PP Act and since
the suit property belonged to the Union of India, a
notice under Section 4 of the PP Act could always be
issued by respondent No.2 and in such a situation,
the remedy of the appellants would be to submit to
the authority of the Estate Officer and file reply to
enable the Estate Officer to proceed with the matter
on merits and pass appropriate order.
43. In other words, his submission was that the
Estate Officer possesses the jurisdiction to issue
22
notice in question and also possesses a jurisdiction
to hold an inquiry under the Act in relation to the
disputes sought to be raised by the appellants and
therefore the appellants should have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer rather than to
pursue the extraordinary remedy of filing the writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. It is these submissions, which the learned
Additional Solicitor General elaborated while
opposing the appeal.
44. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case
including the written submissions, we find force in
the submissions urged by the learned counsel for
the appellants (writ petitioners).
45. Before we examine the facts of the case, it is
necessary to take note of the law, which deals with
the issues arising in this Case. Indeed, if we may
say so, it is fairly well settled.
23
46. This Court (Three Judge Bench) has succinctly
dealt with the issues arising in this case in
Express
Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India &
Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 133.
47. Though, in case (supra)
Express Newspaper
several other issues relating to Fundamental Rights
conferred on the citizens under Article 19 (1) (a) and
(g) of the Constitution and its violation qua State fell
for consideration and were decided, this Court was
also called upon to decide the legality and
correctness of the notice issued by the Government
of India through their officers in their capacity as
the lessors of the land in question demanding
therein a right of reentry under the terms of the
lease deed on the demised land from the lessee (writ
petitioner of the case).
48. It is this issue, which was extensively dealt in
the context of civil law as also the special laws,
which provides for taking recourse to the summary
24
remedy by the State to take possession of the State
land from its occupants. The learned Judge A.P. Sen
J. speaking for the Bench in his inimitable style of
writing answered the question in paras 86/87 as
under:
“86. The Express Buildings constructed by
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. with the
sanction of the lessor i.e. the Union of India,
Ministry of Works and Housing on plots Nos.
9 and 10, Bahadurshah Zafar Marg demised
on perpetual lease by registered leasedeed
dated March 17, 1958 can, by no process of
reasoning, be regarded as public premises
belonging to the Central Government under
Section 2(e). That being so, there is no
question of the lessor applying for eviction of
the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. under
Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction
of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 nor
has the Estate Officer any authority or
jurisdiction to direct their eviction under
subsection (2) thereof by summary process.
Due process of law in a case like the present
necessarily implies the filing of suit by the
lessor i.e. the Union of India, Ministry of
Works & Housing for the enforcement of the
alleged right of reentry, if any, upon
forfeiture of lease due to breach of the terms
of the lease.
87. Nothing stated here should be construed
to mean that the Government has not the
power to take recourse to the provisions of
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
25
Occupants) Act, 1971 where admittedly there
is unauthorised construction by a lessee or
by any other person on Government land
which is public premises within the meaning
of Section 2(e) and such person is in
unauthorised occupation thereof.”
49. The other two learned Judges, namely, E.S.
Venkataramiah J. and R.B. Mishra J. also
concurred with the reasoning and the conclusion
reached by Justice A.P. Sen on this question and
supplemented their individual concurring reasoning
in the following words:
“Venkataramiah, J.— I have gone through the
judgment which my learned Brother Justice
A.P. Sen has just now delivered.
………………………………………………………………
202. The rest of the questions relate truly to
the civil rights of the parties flowing from the
leasedeed. Those questions cannot be
effectively disposed of in this petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions
arising out of the lease, such as, whether
there has been breach of the covenants under
the lease, whether the lease can be forfeited,
whether relief against forfeiture can be
granted etc. are foreign to the scope of
Article 32 of the Constitution. They cannot
be decided just on affidavits. These are
matters which should be tried in a regular
26
civil proceeding. One should remember that
the property belongs to the Union of India
and the rights in it cannot be bartered away
in accordance with the sweet will of an
officer or a Minister or a Lt. Governor but
they should be dealt with in accordance with
law. At the same time a person who has
acquired rights in such property cannot also
be deprived of them except in accordance
with law. The stakes in this case are very
high for both the parties and neither of them
can take law into his own hands.
205. I allow the petitions accordingly. The
costs of Petitioner 1 shall be paid by the
Union Government and the Lt. Governor of
Delhi. There shall be no order as to costs
against the other respondents. The other
petitioners shall bear their costs.”
“R.B. Misra, J.— I have perused the judgment
prepared by brother Justice A.P. Sen as also
the judgment of brother Justice E.S.
Venkataramiah. While I agree that the
impugned notices threatening reentry and
demolition of the construction are invalid
and have no legal value and must be quashed
for reasons detailed in the two judgments,
which I do not propose to repeat over again. I
am of the view that the other questions
involved in the case are based upon
contractual obligations between the parties.
These questions can be satisfactorily and
effectively dealt with in a properly instituted
proceeding or suit and not by a writ petition
on the basis of affidavits which are so
discrepant and contradictory in this case.
27
208. I accordingly allow the writ petitions
with costs against the Union Government and
the Lt. Governor of Delhi and quash the
impugned notices.”
50. At this stage, it is necessary to deal with one
objection raised by learned Additional Solicitor
General on the aforementioned statement of law laid
down in case (supra).
Express Newspaper
51. The objection of learned counsel for the
respondent was that the view expressed by A.P. Sen
J. in Paras 8687 could at best be regarded as his
own view but not the view of the Court by majority
because other two learned Judges (E.S.
Venkataramiah J. and R.B. Mishra J.) did not
express any opinion on this question. It is for this
reason the learned counsel submits that this Court
should not place any reliance on the statement of
law laid down in Paras 8687.
52. We find no merit in this objection for more
than one reason. We, however, consider it apposite
to refer to one classic decision of the Queen's Bench
28
reported in 1889 (Vol. XXIV) page 117 ( The
Guardians of the Poor of the West Derby Union
.
vs The Guardians of the Poor of the Atcham
Union ) on this subject which was rightly relied on
by the learned counsel for the appellants in answer
to this question.
53. The question arose before the Queens Bench
in The Guardians case (supra) as to how the Court
should read a decision to find out the ratio
decidendi laid down in the decision when such
decision is delivered by the Bench of more than one
Judge (as in that case by four Judges of the House
of Lords) and especially when all the Judges have
authored their individual opinions on the subject.
54. Lord Esher M.R. in his distinctive style of
writing succinctly explained this question in the
following words:
“The question is, what is the true
construction of the 35th section of the Act of
Parliament which is before us, and, when we
29
have got at the true construction, what is the
application of it to this
case?............................................................
The House of Lords heard the cases, and did
not give judgment at once, but considered
the matter carefully, and four of the learned
judges in the House of Lords gave judgment.
Now we know that each of them considers the
matter separately, and they then consider
the matter jointly, interchanging their
judgments, so that every one of them has
seen the judgments of the others. If they
mean to differ in their view, they so openly
when they come to deliver their judgments,
and if they do not do this, it must be taken
that each of them agrees with the judgments
of the others.
We have then four judgments. The most
elaborate of these is, no doubt, that of Lord
Watson; but Lord Watson’s judgment must
have been read by the Lord Chancellor, and
the Lord Chancellor must have discussed
with Lord Watson whether he agreed with or
not, and he must have agreed with it. Lord
FitzGerald in terms, says, “I have read the
judgment of Lord Watson, and I agree with
it;” that is, he agrees not only with the result
but with the mode in which the result is
arrived at. Lord Macnaghten had read Lord
Watson’s judgment, and he does not attempt
to express the smallest difference of opinion
about it; he adopts the reasoning of Lord
Watson and agrees with it, but he adds
another reason of his own.
What is import today is what is the view
taken by the House of Lords of the
interpretation of the third part of the 35th
section. It is plain that Lord Watson has
30
taken a distinct and clear view, and has
stated it clearly, of what is the effect, to a
certain extent at all events, of the third
clause……………………………………………………..
I am clear that they decided the point which
is before us: that Lord Watson’s judgment
deals with it most specifically, that the
judgment is really agreed with by the Lord
Chancellor and by Lord FitzGerals, and by
Lord Macnaghten, but that Lord Macnaghten
has also given another reason for coming to
the same conclusion.”
55. The other two learned Judges Lindley LJ and
Lopes LJ agreed with Lord Esher M.R.
56. Keeping in view the reasoning of Lord Esher
M.R., when we examine the statement of law laid
down in Express Newspaper decision (supra), we
are of the considered view that the reasoning of A.P.
Sen J. contained in Paraa 8687 is the law laid
down on behalf of all the three Judges. It is a law
by majority and is thus a law laid down by the
Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.
57. It is for the reason that first, though the lead
judgment was authored by A.P. Sen J., the other
31
two Judges concurred with the view and the
reasoning of A.P. Sen J. Second, both the
concurring Judges also expressed their individual
views on the question on the same lines on which
A.P. Sen J. expressed his view and the Third, there
is no dissent inter se Lordships on any issue much
less on the issue with which we are concerned in
this appeal.
58. It is for these reasons, we are of the considered
view that law laid down in the lead judgment in
Express Newspaper (supra) is the law by three
Hon’ble Judges who constituted the Bench and thus
binds all the Courts in the country under Article
141 of the Constitution. It satisfies the test laid
down by Lord Esher M.R. in the case of The
Guardian (supra).
59. The question involved in Express Newspaper
case (supra) in relation to remedy of the State qua
person in possession of the land was again
32
considered by a Bench consisted of three Judges in
a case reported in vs.
State of Rajasthan Padavati
Devi [supra].
60. In that case also, the question arose as to
whether the State Government can take recourse to
a summary remedy of eviction of a person under the
State Revenue Laws from the land when such
person raises a dispute about his right to
bona fide
remain in occupation over such land. Their
Lordship held that in such a situation, the
summary remedy to evict such person under the Act
couldn’t be resorted to.
61. Justice S.C. Agrawal speaking for the Bench
held in Para 6 in the following words:
“6. As noticed earlier Section 91 of the Act
prescribes a summary procedure for eviction
of a person who is found to be in
unauthorised occupation of Government
land. The said provisions cannot be invoked
in a case where the person in occupation
raises bona fide dispute about his right to
remain in occupation over the land. Dealing
with similar provisions contained in Section
33
6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment
Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P. v.
Thummala Krishna Rao1 has laid down that
the summary remedy for eviction provided by
Section 6 of the said Act could be resorted to
by the Government only against persons who
are in unauthorised occupation of any land
which is the property of the Government and
if the person in occupation has a bona fide
claim to litigate he could not be ejected save
by the due process of law and that the
summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was
not the kind of legal process which is suited
to an adjudication of complicated questions
of title. For the same reasons, it can be said
that summary remedy available under
Section 91 of the Act is not the legal process
which is suited for adjudication of
complicated questions of title where the
person sought to be evicted as an
unauthorised occupant makes a bona fide
claim regarding his right to be in possession.
In such a case the proper course is to have
the matter adjudicated by the ordinary courts
of law.”
62. This view was reiterated in the case reported in
[1998 (8) SCC 483].
State of U.P. vs. Zia Khan
63. At this stage we consider apposite to take note
of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court
wherein this Court after examining and upholding
the constitutional validity of the PP Act in KaiserI
34
Hind Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Textile Corp.
(Maharashtra North) Ltd. [(2002) 8 SCC 182]
reiterated the view taken by this Court in an earlier
decision of .
Northern India Caterers (P) Ltd vs.
State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1581) that the PP Act
does not create any new right of eviction but it only
creates a remedy for a right which already exists
under the general law. In other words, it was held
that it only provides a remedy which is speedier
than the remedy of a suit under the general law.
64. Keeping in view the statement of law laid down
by this Court in cited decisions supra , when we
examine the facts of the case in hand, we have no
hesitation in holding that the appellants have raised
a dispute on the question of ownership of
bona fide
the suit property qua respondent No.1 (Union of
India).
65. A fortiori , in such case, respondent No. 2 has
no jurisdiction to invoke the powers under section 4
35
of the PP Act by resorting to a summary procedure
prescribed in the PP Act by sending a notice under
Section 4 of the PP Act for appellant’s eviction from
the suit property. This we say for the following six
reasons.
66. First, the facts set out above and the
documents filed in their support, in no uncertain
terms, establish that there exists a bona fide long
standing dispute as to who is the owner of the suit
property the appellants or Respondent No.1 (Union
of India).
67. Second, respondent No.1 itself admitted that
there exists a bona fide dispute between the
appellants and respondent No.1 (Union of India)
over the suit property involving disputed questions
of facts (see Paras 7, 8 & 18 of the Review Petition
filed by Respondent No.1 in Civil Appeal Nos.608
612 against the appellants in respect of suit
property in this Court).
36
68. Third, respondent No.1 (Union of India) itself
stated in this Court in earlier round of litigation
while disposing of their Civil Appeal Nos.609, 611
613, 614 and 621 of 1980 that they would seek
dispossession of the appellants from the property in
question in accordance with law and, if need be, by
filing civil suit in the Civil Court. The respondents
cannot now be permitted to go back from their
statement and take recourse to a remedy of
summary procedure under the PP Act, which is
otherwise not available to them.
69. Fourth, this Court while granting special leave
to appeal on 03.08.2009 had also granted liberty to
respondent No.1 (Union of India) to file civil suit
against the appellants, if they are so advised. It was,
however, not resorted to.
70. Fifth, the effect of quashing the resumption
notice dated 21.01.1971 issued by the respondents
by the High Court vide order dated
37
05.02.1979/06.02.1979 in relation to the suit
property was that respondent No.1 (Union of India)
was not entitled to resort to any kind of summary
remedy to evict the appellants from the suit
property not only under the Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948 but also under the PP Act
because the PP Act also provides similar summary
remedy of eviction.
71. Sixth, the Civil Court alone could try and
decide the question of declaration of ownership of
any immovable property between the parties and
such disputes could not be decided in summary
proceedings under the PP Act.
72. This takes us to examine another question
raised by the respondents as to whether judgment
rendered by the Bombay High Court dated
06.02.1979 stood merged in the order of this Court
dated 04.08.1998. In our view, it does not merge.
38
73. In our view, the principle of merger is fairly
well settled. For merger to operate, the superior
court must go into the merits of the issues decided
by the subordinate court and record finding/s one
way or other on its merits. If this is not done by the
superior court, a plea of merger has no application
in such a case and the order of subordinate court
would continue to hold the field (see Shanmugaval
Nadar vs. State of Tamil Nadu [1989 (4) SCC 187].
74. In our view, this court while disposing of the
appeals by its order dated 04.08.1998, did not go
into the merits of the various contentions which
were decided by the High Court in its order dated
06.02.1979 and disposed of the appeal on the
statement made by the respondents through the
Solicitor General that respondent No.1 (Union of
India) would take recourse to the remedy of the civil
court by filing a civil suit.
39
75. Indeed, in the light of such statement made by
the respondents (who were appellants in the
appeal), which resulted in disposal of their appeal,
the respondents themselves did not call upon this
Court to examine the merits of the issues raised by
them in their appeals. In such a situation, there
was no occasion for this Court to apply the mind to
the merits much less to record any finding on any of
the issues arising in the appeal. In this view of the
matter, the principle of merger could not operate.
76. Now coming to another argument, the learned
counsel for the respondents contended that there
lies a distinction between the two types of Tribunals
one which exercises powers only when it is shown
that certain state of facts exist and other which has
jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary
state of facts exists as well as it has the jurisdiction
to proceed further to do something more as
explained in the case reported in Chaube Jagdish
40
Prasad vs. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi 1959 (supp)
1 SCR 733 pages 743744.
77. It is on the basis of this submission, learned
counsel contended that the Estate Officer has
jurisdiction to examine the facts of this case in
Section 4 proceedings under the Act.
78. We do not agree. In our opinion, once the
Constitution Bench in the case of
KaiserI Hind
(supra) after examining the provisions of the PP Act
has laid down the law as to how the PP Act operates
and needs to be applied, all the issues arising under
the PP Act has to be examined in the light of the law
which deals with the PP Act.
79. The law laid down in Chaube Jagdish Prasad
(supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the
respondents was entirely on different context and
has no application for deciding the issue involved in
this appeal.
41
80. Yet, last submission of the learned counsel for
the respondents that the writ petition was not
maintainable to challenge the notice issued under
Section 4 of the PP Act has no merit and deserves
rejection. Suffice it to say, firstly, the High Court
having entertained the writ petition and dismissing
it on merits, this objection does not survive for
consideration and second, in the light of long line of
decisions on this question, a writ petition to
question the legality and correctness of the notice
issued under any Act is no bar in entertaining the
writ petition in appropriate case. The case at hand
was regarded as an appropriate case for
entertaining the writ petition [see Siemens Ltd.
vs. State of Maharashtra 2006 (12) SCC 33 and
Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1].
81. Before parting, we consider it apposite to
mention that we have set out the facts of the case
42
only for the purpose of appreciating and deciding
the legal issue arising in the appeal namely the
validity of issuance of notice under Section 4 of the
PP Act and not beyond it. We have not examined
the rival claims of the parties over the property in
question on merits and nor have recorded any
finding on the rival claims.
82. In this view of the matter, whenever the
question of ownership of the rights of the parties
will be gone into by the concerned court, it shall
decide the said question/s strictly on the basis of
pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties
in accordance with law uninfluenced by any
observations made by the High Court and this
Court.
83. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the
appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The
impugned order is set aside. As a consequence, the
writ petition filed by the appellants is allowed and
43
the notice dated 31.07.2001 issued by respondent
No.2 (Annexure P34) impugned in the writ petition
is quashed by issuance of writ of certiorari.
…………………………………J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
....…..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
March 15, 2019.
44