Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/12/1972
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION:
1973 AIR 674 1973 SCR (3) 169
1973 SCC (1) 579
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1977 SC2134 (17)
ACT:
Punjab Municipal Act, 1911-S. 66 and 67-Whether NDMC can
include a building retrospectively in the assessment list by
amendment.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant is the owner of No. 5 Parliament Street, New
Delhi. The building was not entered in the assessment list
to be operative during April 1, 1958 to March 31, 1959,
although it was occupied after completion on July 1, 1968.
Under S. 67 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the NDMC by a
resolution dated November 20, 1959 amended the assessment
list which was operative for the period April 1, 1959, to
March 31, 1960 and imposed house tax on the building for the
year 1959-60.
Section 67 of the Act provides that the Committee may at any
time amend the list after giving notice to any person
affected by the amendment and Sub. s. (2) provides that any
interested person may tender his objection and he shall be
given an opportunity of being heard etc.
The only question that arose for decision before this Court
was whether the Respondent was entitled to include the
building in the assessment list, which was operative for the
period April 1, 1959 to March 31, 1960.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (i) The assessment list for the year commencing from
April 1, 1959, had to be settled by March 31, 1959, at the
latest. This list was liable to be amended under S. 67 even
after March 31, 1959, on any of the grounds mentioned in
that Section. Sec. 66 does not say that the amendment of
the assessment list should have been made before March 31,
1959. The expression "subject to such amendment as may
thereafter be duly made" in Sec. 66 would indicate that the
amendment of the list could be made even after March 31,
1959 as Sec. 67 provides for amendment of the list "at any
time." [193BC]
It is not necessary that the assessment list should have
been amended before March 31, 1959, in order that the
Municipal Committee may impose house tax on the building for
the period from April 1, 1959 to March 31, 1960. An
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amendment of the list under S. 67 was permissible on any of
the grounds mentioned in the Section even after March 31,
1959, as otherwise, the expression "at any time" would have
no meaning. [193EF]
(ii) Further, the meaning of the expression "at any time"
will depend upon the context in which the expression occurs.
The expression "at any time" occurring in S. 67 read with
the word "thereafter" in S. 66 can only lead to the
conclusion that the amendment of the list in question was
permissible even after March 31, 1959. [195A]
Central Bank of India Ltd. Amritsar v. The Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1288; Exparte Norris
in Re Salder 17 Q.B.D. 728 referred to
190
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1315 of
1972.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated
October 28, 1969 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in
Letters Patent Appeal No. 93 of 1967.
M. C. Chagla, S. K. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the
appellant.
D. D. Chawla, H. K. Puri and S. K. Dhingra, for the
respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J. The appellant, Punjab National Bank Limited, is
the owner of a building bearing municipal No. 5, Parliament
Street, New Delhi. After completion of its construction, it
was ,occupied on July 1, 1958. The building was not entered
in the assessment list which was to be operative during the
period from April 1, 1958 to March 31, 1959. On September
4, 1959, the New Delhi Municipal Committee, the respondent
here, purporting to act under s. 67 of the Punjab Municipal
Act, 191 1, hereinafter referred to as the Act, issued a
notice to the appellant stating
"This is to inform you that your building mentioned at the
back of this letter has been completed and is in fact
occupied from 1-7-1958 and ought to be assessed to House tax
by amending the list for 1959-60 under section 67 of the
Municipal Act, 1911 and this Committee has, vide resolution
No. 30 dated 10-7-1959 proposed to amend the list for the
year 1959-60 by inserting the said property on an annual
value as given at the back of this letter.
"It is further proposed that the tax will take effect from
1-4-1959.
"Notice is hereby given to you under section 67 of the P. M.
Act that the Committee will consider the question of the
amendment of the list and will hear objections in Meeting
Room on 20th day of, November, 1959 at 10.00 A.M."
The appellant objected to the amendment of the list and levy
of the tax for the period in question but the objection was
over-ruled, and the respondent passed a resolution
confirming the proposed assessment on December 21, 1959.
Thereafter the respondent sent a bill for the tax for the
period. This was followed by a notice of demand.
191
The appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction
restraining the respondent from enforcing the demand on the
ground that the respondent had no jurisdiction to include
the building in the assessment list. The trial Court
decreed the suit. The District Judge, on appeal, agreed
with the view of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal.
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The second appeal filed against his decision was dismissed
by a learned single judge of the High Court.. An appeal was
filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge which
came up before a Division Bench of the Court which referred
the case to a larger Bench. The Bench, by a majority, set
aside the order of the single Judge and dismissed the suit.
This appeal, by certificate, is from this decision.
The only point that arises for consideration in this appeal
is whether the respondent was entitled to include the
building in the .assessment list which was operative for the
period from April 1, 1959 to March 31, 1960, by amending it
on November 20, 1959, and impose house tax on the building
for the year 1959-60.
Chapter V of the Act deals with taxation. Section 61
specifies the taxes which might be imposed by a Municipal
Committee and one such tax is a tax payable by an owner of
building and land. Section 62 lays down the procedure for
imposition of the. taxes mentioned in s. 61. Section 63
deals with the procedure for assessment of tax on immovable
property. It provides that the committee shall cause an
assessment list of all buildings and lands on which any tax
is imposed to be prepared. Section 64 provides that when
the assessment list has be-en completed, the committee shall
give public notice thereof. Section 65 provides that the
Committee shall, at the time of the publication of the
assessment list, give public notice of a time not less than
one month thereafter, when it will proceed to revise the
valuation, and assessment, and in all cases in which
property is for the first time assessed. or the assessment
thereof is enhanced, it shall also give notice to the owner
or occupier of the property. The Section further requires
that all objections to the valuation shall be made before or
at the time fixed in the notice. Section 66 provides for
the settlement of the list and it states :
"66. Settlement of list-(i) After the objections have been
enquired into and the persons making them have been allowed
an opportunity of being heard either in person or by
authorized agent as they may think fit, and the revision of
the valuation and assessment has been completed, the
amendments made in the list shall be .authenticated by the
signatures of not less than two members of the Committee who
shall at the same time certify that no valid objections has
been made to the
192
valuation and assessment contained in the list, except in
the case in which amendments have been entered therein, and
subject to such amendments as may thereafter be duly made,
the tax so assessed shall be deemed to be the tax for the
year commencing on the first day of January or first day of
April next ensuing as the Committee may determine, or in the
case of a tax then imposed for the first time for the period
between the date on which the tax comes into force and such
first day of January or April, as the case may be.
"(2) The list when amended under this section shall be
deposited in the committee’s office and shall there be open
during office hours to all owners or occupiers of property
comprised therein or the authorized agents of such persons,
and a public notice that it is so open shall forthwith be
published."
Section 67 which provides for further amendment of the
assessment list states :
" (1) The Committee may at any time amend the list by
inserting the name of any person whose name ought to have
been or ought to be inserted, or by inserting any property
which ought to have been or ought to be inserted, or by
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altering the assessment on any property which has been
erroneously valued or assessed through fraud, accident or
mistake, whether on the part of the committee or of the
assessee, or in the case of the tax payable by the occupier
by a change in the tenancy, after giving notice to any
person affected by the amendment, of a time, not less than
one month from the date of service, at which the amendment
is to be made.
(2) Any person interested in any such amendment may tender
his objection to the committee in writing before the time
fixed in the notice, or orally or in writing at that time,
and shall be allowed an opportunity of being heard in
support of the same in person, or by authorized agent, as he
may think fit."
Section 68 confers a discretion on the committee to prepare
for the whole or any part of the municipality a new
assessment list every year.
The majority was of the view that the amendment of the
assessment Est, though made on November 20, 1959, was opera-
tive from April 1, 1959, and that the building, was liable
to be taxed for the year which commenced from April 1, 1959,
and ended on March 31, 1960. The majority overruled the
argument
193
of the appellant that the municipal committee had no
jurisdiction to amend the assessment list after the list was
finalised on March 31, 1959.
It was contended for the appellant that when once the
assessment list was finalized in accordance with the
provisions of the Act, the committee had no jurisdiction to
amend it thereafter.
We think that the conclusion of the majority is correct.
The assessment list for the year commencing from April 1,
1959, had to be settled by March 31, 1959 at the latest;
this list was liable to be amended under s. 67 even after
March 31, 1959, on any of the grounds mentioned in that
section. Section 66 does not say that the amendment of the
assessment list should have been made before March 31,.
1959. The expression "subject to such amendment as may
thereafter be duly made" in s. 66 would indicate that the
amendment ’of the list could be made even after March 31,
1959, as s. 67 provides for amendment of the list "at
anytime’. And when the list was so amended, it shall be
deemed to have been in force for the year which commenced
from April 1, 1959, an( ended on March 31, 1960, and the tax
assessed therein shall be deemed to be the tax for the
financial year commencing from April 1, 1959. In other
words, it was not necessary that the assessment list should
have been amended before March 31, 1959, in order that the
municipal committee may impose house tax on the building for
the period from April 1, 1959 to March 31, 1960. An
amendment of the list under s. 67 was permissible on any of
the grounds mentioned in the section even after March
’31, .1959, as otherwise, the expression "at any time" would
have no meaning. The words "subject to such amendments as
may thereafter be duly made" in s. 66 postulate that a list
finalized before 1st January or 1st April is Liable to be
amended thereafter under s. 67. The building was certainly
liable to be included in the assessment list which was
finalized on March 31. 1959, but by some mistake it was not
so included. The list was, therefore, liable to be amended
under s. 67. That was done. When the list was amended, the
tax assessed for the building shall be deemed to be the tax
for it in the year which commenced from April 1, 1959, and
ended on March 31, 1960.
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We are not impressed by the argument of Mr. Chagla that the
expression "at any time" in s. 67 means that the amendment
of the assessment list could have been made only before
March 31, 1959. We think that the purpose behind s. 67 was
to enable the Municipal Committee to amend, the assessment
list at any time on any of the grounds mentioned therein.
Counsel referred to the decision in Ex-parte Norris. In Re
Salder(1) in support of his
(1) 17 Q.B.D. 728.
14-L631Sup.CI/73
194
contention that the words "at any time" in s. 67 must
receive a narrow construction as otherwise there will be no
limit of time for the amendment of the list. What happened
in that case was that a secured creditor, having stated in
his proof the value at which lie assessed his security, the
trustee gave him written notice that "it was his intention"
to redeem the security so valued, and thereupon applied for
and received from the Board of Trade the amount required for
such redemption. Before any further step was taken the
creditor applied to amend his valuation and proof, the
security having increased in value. The Court held that no-
thing had occurred to prevent the amendment from being
allowed. In so holding the Court had to consider the
argument based on rule 13 of the 2nd Schedule to the
Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which provided that a creditor may
amend the valuation and proof "at any time". Lord Esher M.
R., after stating that the Court has no right to diminish
the full force of the words "at any time" unless from the
Act itself or the Rules it is possible to find some neces-
sary implication to limit the force of the words, observed
"That they are to have some limitation cannot, I think, be
doubted; it cannot be that the right is to go on for ever.
One necessary implication, at all events, I think is, that
the right is at an end, if the trustee acting upon the
valuation put upon the security by the creditor, has
exercised the right given to him by the 12th rule, to redeem
the security "on payment to the creditor of the assessed
value". It is impossible to suppose that, after the trustee
has paid the amount of the valuation, and has thus on behalf
of the general body of the creditors become the purchaser of
the security, the creditor can undo all that."
The respondent on the other hand submitted that the words
"at any time" in s. 67 must be given the widest amplitude as
the purpose of s. 67 is to rectify any omission in the list
occasioned by the mistake, fraud, accident of the assessee
or the Committee as the case may be, and reliance was placed
on the decision in the Central Bank of India Ltd., Amritsar
v. The Hardford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd.(") where this Court
had to construe the expression "This insurance may be
terminated at any time at the request of the insured"
occurring in an insurance policy; it was held that the words
"at any time" can only mean "at any time the party concerned
likes".
We do not think that any universal rule can he laid down as
to the meaning of the expression "at any time". It all
depends
(1) A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1288.
195
upon the context in which the expression occurs. We think
that the expression "at any time" occurring in s. 67, when
read in conjunction with the word "thereafter" in s. 66 can
only lead to the conclusion that the amendment of the list
in question was permissible even after March 31, 1959.
The appellant contended that the building was not included
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in the list which was operative for the period which
commenced from April 1, 1959 and ended on March 31, 1960.
We have perused the assessment list produced before us and
we are satisfied that the amendment was made by inserting
the building in the list which was finalised on March 31,
1959, and which was operative for the period which commenced
from 1st April, 1959 and ended on 31st March, 1960.
We think that the majority was right in their conclusion and
we discuss the appeal but, in the circumstances, make no
order as to costs.
S.C. Appeal
dismissed.
196