Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
C. M. FRANCIS & CO.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
12/12/1960
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
KAPUR, J.L.
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION:
1961 AIR 617 1961 SCR (3) 181
CITATOR INFO :
R 1961 SC 619 (28)
RF 1967 SC 295 (60)
RF 1979 SC1588 (14)
ACT:
Sales Tax-Recovery of-Remedies open to the authorities-Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898, s. 386(1)(b)-Travan-
core Cochin General Sales Tax Act (XI Of 1125 Malayalam
Era), ss. 13 and 19.
HEADNOTE:
The respondents were assessed to sales tax under the
Travancore Cochin General Sales Tax Act and proceedings were
started against them under s. 13 of the Act for the recovery
of the arrears of Sales Tax as if they were arrears of land
revenue. The proceedings were not fruitful. Thereafter a
prosecution under s. 19 of the Act was instituted
against the partners who pleaded guilty and the magistrate
issued warrants under s. 386(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to the Collector of the District for the recovery
of the arrears of sales tax as if they were a fine imposed
by that court. The authorities again started proceedings
under S. 13 of the Act read with Travancore Cochin Revenue
Recovery Act, 1951, and certain properties were attached.
The respondents urged that in as much as they were
prosecuted under s. 19 of the Act and the magistrate had
issued warrants, the procedure for recovery under s. 13 of
the Act was not available.
The question was whether s. 19 was to be taken to prevail
over s. 13 of the Act.
Held, that neither of the remedies for recovery of arrears
of tax as laid down by ss. 13 and 19 of the Travancore
Cochin General Sales Tax Act was destructive of each other
and unless the statute laid down in express words or by
necessary implication that one remedy was to the exclusion
of the other, both the remedies were open to the authorities
and they could resort to any one of them at their option.
Shankar Sabai v. Din Dial, I.L.R. [1889] 12 All. 409 (F.B.),
418,approved.
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 279 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
November 18, 1957, of the Kerala High Court in O. P. No. 87
of 1956.
A. V. Sayed Muhammad, for the appellants.
The respondents did not appear.
182
1960. December 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal with the special leave of
this Court against the judgment of the High Court of Kerala
dated November 18, 1957, passed in a petition for writ of
prohibition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The State
of Kerala and the Tahsildars of Kottayam and Kanjirappally
Taluks are the appellants, and C.M. Francis & Co., a
partnership firm, is the first respondent, and the partners
of the firm are the remaining respondents.
The respondents were doing business in hill produce like
pepper, ginger, betelnuts etc., and were assessed to sales
tax under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act XI of
1125 (referred to as the Act), for the years 1950 to 1954.
The respondents have to pay a sum of Rs. 1,01,716-4-3 as
tax. In 1954, proceedings were started against them under
s. 13 of the Act, which provides that if the tax is not paid
as laid down in that section, the whole of the amount or
such part thereof as remains due, may be recovered as if it
were an arrears of land revenue. It appears that the pro-
ceedings were not fruitful, and a prosecution under s. 19 of
the Act was instituted against the partners in the Court of
the First Class Magistrate, Ponkunnam. Respondents 2 to 5
pleaded guilty, and the Magistrate passed an order on
October 18, 1955 as follows:
"The sentence or other final order: A 1 to 4
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- each and
in default to undergo S. 1. for one month
each. A 1 to 4 admit that they failed to pay
on demand by the competent authority, a sum of
Rs. 1,01,716-4-3 due from them as sales tax
for the years 1950 to 1954. This amount will
be realised from A 1 to 4, jointly or
severally, individually or collectively under
the provisions of the Cr.P.C. for realisation
of criminal fines, as if it were a fine
imposed by this court on each accused
individually and all of them together. Take
steps for the realisation."
Warrants under s. 386 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure were issued to the Collector of Kottayam District
for recovery of the arrears of sales tax.
183
The authorities, however, started proceedings again under s.
13 of the Act read with the provisions of the Travancore-
Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951 (VII of 1951), to recover
the amount as arrears of land revenue, and attached some
properties belonging to the respondents within the
jurisdiction of the second and third appellants, the
Tahsildars of Kottayam and Kanjirappally Taluks. The firm
thereupon filed the petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for a writ of prohibition or other order or
direction to the effect that the proceedings for realisation
of the arrears under the Revenue Recovery Act be quashed.
In the petition, the respondents urged that inasmuch as they
were prosecuted under s. 19 of the Act and the Magistrate
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had issued warrants, the procedure for recovery under s. 13
was not available. They contended that under s. 386 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure the warrant is to be deemed to be
a decree and has to be executed according to civil process
applicable to the execution of decrees under the Code of
Civil Procedure. They, therefore, submitted that the
procedure under s. 19 of the Act was no longer open, and
could not be proceeded with.
Section 19 of the Act, so far as it is material, reads as
follows:
"Any person who........................
(b) fails to pay within the time allowed,
any tax
assessed on him under this Act, or
(d)fraudulently evades the payment of any
tax assessed on him..........
shall on conviction by a Magistrate of the
first class, be liable to a fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees and in the case
of a conviction under clause (b), (d) the
Magistrate shall specify in the order the tax
which the person convicted has failed or
evaded to pay and the tax so specified shall
be recoverable as if it were a fine under the
Code of Criminal Procedure for the timebeing
in force."
In dealing with the question, the learned Judges of the High
Court felt that s. 13 of the Act was in the
184
nature of a general law, over which the special procedure
prescribed by s. 19 of the Act read with s. 386 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure was to prevail. They, however,
thought that, since all the processes available under s. 19
of the Act were also available under s. 386 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, it was not necessary to decide what
would happen if the proceedings under s. 386 came to
nothing. They observed that if the question arose, they
would consider it. The writ of prohibition was granted by
the High Court.
The respondents did not appear in this Court. We have heard
learned counsel for the appellants, who has drawn our
attention to all the relevant provisions of the law. The
question which arises is whether s. 19 must be taken to
prevail over s. 13 of the Act. Both the sections lay down
the mode for recovery of arrears of tax, and, as has already
been noticed by the High Court, lead to the application of
the process for recovery by attachment and sale of movable
and immovable properties, belonging to the tax-evader. It
cannot be said that one proceeding is more general than the
other, because there is much that is common between them, in
so far as the mode of recovery is concerned. Section 19, in
addition to recovery of the amount, gives the power to the
Magistrate to convict and sentence the offender to fine or
in default of payment of fine, to imprisonment. In our
opinion, neither of the remedies for recovery is destructive
of the other, because if two remedies are open, both can be
resorted to, at the option of the authorities recovering the
amount. It was observed by Mahmood, J. in Shankar Sahai v.
Din Dial (1) that where the law provides two or more
remedies, there is no reason to think that one debars the
other and therefore both must be understood to remain open
to him, who claims a remedy. Unless the statute in express
words or by necessary implication laid down that one remedy
was to the exclusion of the other, the observations of
Mahmood, J. quoted above must apply. In our opinion, in the
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absence of any such provision in the
(1) I.L.R. (1889) 12 All- 409 (F.B.), 418.
185
Act,, both the remedies were open to the authorities, and
they could resort to any one of them at their option.
The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the High Court
set aside. Though the respondents did not appear, in the
circumstances of the case we think we should make an order
that the costs shall be paid by them both here and in the
High Court.
Appeal allowed.