Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MESSRS. LALCHAND BHAGAT AMBICAL RAM
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR & ORISSA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
14/05/1959
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
CITATION:
1959 AIR 1295 1960 SCR (1) 301
ACT:
Income-tax-Assessment based on conjecturcs-Fact finding
authority acting without evidence-Power of court to
interfere-High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation)
Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance III Of 1946).
HEADNOTE:
The appellant a Hindu undivided family carrying on business
in grain kept its books of account according to the
mercantile system and maintained in its cash books two
accounts: one showing the cash balances from day to day and
the other known as " Almirah account " wherein were kept
large balances which were not required for the day-to-day
working of the business. On January 12, 1946, on which date
the High Denomination Bank Notes (Deinonetisation)
Ordinance, 1946, was promulgated, the cash balances of the
appellant were RS. 29,284 in its Rokar and Rs. 2,81,397 in
the Almirah account. For the assessment year 1946-47 the
appellant filed-its Income-tax Return showing a loss of Rs.
46,4I5 in the business. The Income-tax Officer, in the
course of the assessment, noticed that the appellant
encashed high denomination notes of the value of RS.
2,g1,000 on January 19, 1946, and the explanation given by
the appellant was that these notes formed part of its cash
balances including cash balance in the Almirali account, but
it was rejected by the Income-tax Officer relying on the
following circumstances: (1) that the appellant’s food
grains licence had been cancelled for the accounting year
for its failure to keep proper stock accounts, (2) that
the appellant was prosecuted under the Defence of India
Rules but had been acquitted having been given the benefit
of doubt, (3) that the appellant was a speculator, and as
such could easily have earned amounts far in excess of the
value of the high denomination notes encashed, (4) that
notwithstanding the fact that the period was very favourable
to the food grains dealers the appellant had declared a loss
for the assessment year I944-45 UP to 1946-47, though it had
the benefit of a large capital on hand, and (5) that the
appellant was one of the premier grain merchants of
Sahibganj, a place which had gained sufficient notoriety for
smuggling foodgrains. The Income-tax Officer came to the
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conclusion that the appellant had all these probable sources
from which it could have earned the sum of Rs. 2,91,000, and
accordingly he treated the sum as the appellant’s secreted
profits from business and included it in its total income.
The Appellate Tribunal accepted the account books produced
by the appellant
302
and examined the cash book and taking into consideration all
the circumstances which had been adverted to by the Income-
tax Officer took the view that the appellant might be
expected to have possessed as part of its business cash
balance of at least Rs. 1,50,000 in the shape of high
denomination notes on January 12, 1946, when the Ordinance
was promulgated, but that the nature of the source from
which the appellant derived the remaining 14i high
denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each remained unexplained to
its satisfaction. It accordingly reduced the amount
considered as the secreted profits from Rs. 2,91,000 to Rs.
1,41,000. On reference, the High Court held that the
finding arrived at by the Tribunal was one of fact and that
it could not be urged that it was based on no evidence. On
appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended for the
appellant that the finding arrived at by the authorities
concerned, though it be one of fact, was vitiated by reason
of the authorities indulging in conjectures, suspicions and
surmises and basing the same on no material whatever which
would go to support the same, and that, in any case, it was
a preverse one which a reasonable body of men could not have
arrived at on the material on the record.
Held, that the Tribunal had been influenced by the
suspicions, conjectures and surmises which were freely
indulged in by the Income-tax Officer, and had arrived at
its conclusion, as it were by a rule of thumb, without any
proper materials before it and that its finding could not be
sustained; that having accepted the appellant’s books of
account it was not open to the Tribunal to accept the
explanation of the appellant in part as to Rs. 1,50,000 and
reject the same in regard to the sum of Rs. 1,41,000.
Messrs. Mehia Parikh & Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-
tax, Bombay, [1956] S.C.R. 626 and Kanpur Steel Co. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Uttar Pradesh, [1957] 32 I.T.R.
56, relied on.
Where a Tribunal has acted without any evidence or upon a
view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained
or the facts found were such that no person acting
judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law
could have found, the court is entitled to interfere.
Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay,
[1954] 26 I.T.R. 736; Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, [1955] i S.C.R.
941; Messrs. Mehta Parikk and Co. v. The Commisioner of
Income-tax, Bombay, [1956] S.C.R. 626 and Meenakshi Mills,
Madurai v. Commissioner of rncome-tax, Madras, [19561 S.C.R.
69i, followed.
JUDGMENT:
Civil APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 679 and 680
of 1957.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
the January 5, 1955, of the Patna High Court, in M.J.C. Nos.
374 & 375 of 1952.
303
R. J. Kolah and R. Patnaik, for the appellant.
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A. N. Kripal and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1959. May 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATT J.-These are two connected appeals with special
leave granted by this Court under Art. 136 of the
Constitution and arise out of the appellant’s assessment to
Income-tax for the assessment year 1946-47 and Excess
Profits Tax for the chargeable accounting period January 9,
1945, to February 2, 1946.
The appellant is a Hindu undivided family carrying on
extensive business in grain as merchants and commission
agents. It is one of the premier grain merchants and
wholesalers of Sahibganj in the District of Santhal Parganas
in the State of Bihar. It has branches at Nawgachia in the
District of Bhagalpur and at Dhulian in the District of
Murshidabad in West Bengal.
The appellant filed its Income-tax Return for the assessment
year 1946-47 showing a loss of Rs. 46,415 in the business.
The Income-tax Officer, Patna, however, in the course of the
assessment noticed that the appellant had encashed high
denomination notes of the value of Rs. 2,9 1,000 on January
19, 1946. The Income-tax Officer asked for an explanation
which the appellant gave stating that these notes formed
part of its cash balances including cash balance in the
Almirah account. The cash balances of the appellant on
January 12, 1946, on which date the High Denomination Bank
Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, was promulgated were
Rs. 29,284-3-9 in its Rokar and Rs. 2,81,397-10-0 in the
Almirah account. The Almirah account was an account for
moneys withdrawn and kept at home. The appellant sought to
prove the fact that the high denomination notes eneashed by
it formed part of its cash balances from certain entries in
its accounts wherein the fact that moneys were received in
high denomination notes had been noted. Portions of these
entries to the effect that moneys had been received in high
denomination notes were found
304
by the Income-tax Officer to be subsequent interpolations
made by the appellant with a view to advance its case that
the cash balances contained the high denomination notes
encashed by it. The Income-tax Officer found that the
appellant’s food grains licence at Nawgachia had been
cancelled for the accounting year for its failure to keep
proper stock accounts and that the appellant was prosecuted
under the Defence of India Rules but had been acquitted
having been given the benefit of doubt. The Income-tax
Officer also had regard to the fact that the appellant was a
speculator and that as a speculator the appellant could
easily have earned amounts far in excess of the value of the
high denomination notes encashed. He con. sidered that even
in the disclosed volume of business in the year under
consideration in the Head Office and in the branches, there
was possibility of his earning a considerable sum as against
which it showed a net loss of about Rs.46,000. The Income-
tax Officer also noticed that notwithstanding the fact that
the period was very favourable to food grains dealers, the
appellant had declared a loss for the assessment year 194445
up to 1946-47, though it had the benefit of a large capital
on hand. The Income-tax Officer further took into
consideration the circumstances that Nawgachia and Dhulian
were very important business centers and Sahibganj, the
principal place of business, had gained sufficient notoriety
for smuggling foodgrains and other commodities to Bengal by
country boats. Dhulian which was just on the Bengal, Bihar
border was also reported to be a great receiving centre for
such commodities. Having regard to all these circumstances,
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the Income-tax Officer rejected the appellant’s explanation
that the high denomination notes formed part of its cash
balances and treated the sum of Rs. 2,91,000 as the
appellant’s secreted profits from business and included it
in its total income and assessed the appellant for the said
assessment year on the income of Rs. 1,39,117. Dealing with
the Excess Profits Tax assessment, he also held that the
said income was derived from the business of the appellant
and hence it was liable to excess profits tax also,
305
The appellant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner against both these assessment orders and by his
orders dated February 28, 1951, the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner upheld the orders of the Income-tax Officer and
dismissed the appeals.
On further appeals from the said orders of the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
the Tribunal by its order dated April 29, 1952, dismissed
both the appeals as regards the Incometax as well as Excess
profits tax. Even though before the Income-tax Officer and
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the case of the
appellant was that the account book which contained the
entries in regard to the receipts of moneys in high
denomination notes were genuine and correct, this position
was abandoned by the appellant before the Tribunal. Before
the Tribunal, the appellant stated that the said entries
were made in sheer nervousness after coming into force of
the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Ordinance,
1946, on January 12, 1946, as the appellant did not know
that it had specific proof in its possession of having the
high denomination notes as part of its cash balances. The
Tribunal held that there was no other reason to suspect the
genuineness of the account books in which these
interpolations were made. If the entire account books were
fabricated to serve its purpose, there would be no need for
the appellant to make interpolations between the lines
already written in a different ink and in such an obvious
manner as to catch one’s eye on the most cursory perusal.
The Tribunal, however, examined the cash book and taking
into consideration all the circumstances which had been
adverted to by the Income-tax Officer held that the
appellant might be expected to have possessed as part of its
business cash balance of at least Rs. 1,50,000 in the shape
of high denomination notes on January 12, 1946, when the
Ordinance above-mentioned was promulgated. A copy of the
statement of large amounts received by the appellant from a
single constituent had been filed by the appellant which
showed that sums aggregating to Rs. 5,04,713 had been
received by the appellant in large amounts
39
306
exceeding Rs. 1,000 between February 6, 1945, and January
11, 1946. As to large payments made by the appellant, no
statement was filed, but the Tribunal examined the accounts
with a view to ascertain the payments which could have been
made in high denomination notes. The Tribunal came to the
conclusion that the nature of the source from which the
appellant derived the remaining 141 high denomination notes
of Rs. 1,000 each remained unexplained to its satisfaction.
It accordingly ordered that the addition made by the
authorities be reduced from Rs. 2,91,000 to Rs. 1,41,000.
The Income-tax Officer was also directed to make the
necessary consequential adjustment in the Income-tax
assessment based upon the result of the connected Excess
Profits Tax appeal. In regard to the Excess Profits Tax
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appeal the Tribunal after taking into account the preceding
and succeeding assessments and the nature of the appellant’s
business and the opportunities that it had to make
substantial business profits outside the books held that the
add back of Rs. 1,41,000 must be made to the business
profits disclosed by the appellant. Consequential relief
was accordingly given in the Excess Profits Tax appeal also.
The appellant thereafter applied to the Tribunal for stating
a case and raising and referring to the High Court the
following questions of law arising from the said order of
the Tribunal both as regards the Incometax and the excess
profits tax assessments :-
(1) " Whether there is any material to justify the
conclusion that Rs. 1,41,000 is secreted profit for the
purpose of assessment, this amount being a part of s.
2,91,000 and which was the amount represented by high
denomination notes encashed by the Petitioner.
(2) " Whether there is any material for a finding that the
sum of Rs. 1,41,000 is the secreted value of the high
denomination notes was business income liable to excess
profits tax."
By its order dated August 15, 1952, the Tribunal dismissed
these applications stating that the finding of the taxing
authorities was a pure finding of fact based
307
on evidence before them and that no question of law arose
out of the said order of the Tribunal.
The appellant thereupon made applications to the High Court
under s. 66(2) for directing the Tribunal to state a case
and raise and refer the said questions of law to the High
Court for its decision. By its order dated January 21,
1953, the High Court directed the Tribunal to state a case
and raise and refer the following question of law to the
High Court I for its decision in both the applications:-
Whether there is any material to support the finding of the
Appellate Tribunal that a sum of Rs. 1,41,000 is secreted
profit liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee under
the Indian Incometax Act and under the Excess Profits Tax
Act "
The tribunal accordingly stated a case and raised and
referred the aforesaid question of law to the High Court.
The said Reference was heard by the High Court and judgment
was delivered on January 5, 1955, whereby the High Court
answered the referred question in the affirmative. The High
Court was of the opinion that the onus of proving the source
of the said amount was on the appellant which the appellant
did not discharge and that there was evidence before the
Tribunal to come to the conclusion it did. The finding
arrived at by the Tribunal was therefore a pure finding of
fact and it could not be urged that it was based on no
evidence. The High Court further held that as the appellant
itself claimed that the said amount of Rs. 2,91,000 formed
part of the cash balance of its business, the said profits
were profits of the business and as such liable to excess
profits tax.
The appellant then applied to the High Court for a
certificate under s. 66A (2) of the Income-tax Act for leave
to appeal to this Court. These applications were rejected
by the High Court on August 25, 1955, observing that it had
answered the question of law not on the academic principles
of onus but on the material from which it was open to the
Income-tax authorities to arrive at the conclusion at which
they arrived.
308
The appellant thereupon on October 22, 1955, applied to this
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Court for special leave to appeal which was granted by this
Court on November 28, 1955, in both the appeals arising out
of the assessment for Income-tax as well as the excess
profits tax. Both the appeals arising out of these orders
being Civil Appeals Nos. 679 and 680 of 1957 are now before
us.
The main question to determine in these two appeals is
whether there was any material to support the finding of the
Tribunal that the sum of Rs. 1,41,000 represented the
secreted profits of the appellant’s business and as such
liable to be taxed in the hands of the appellant under the
Indian Income-tax Act and the Excess Profits Tax Act ? The
contention of the Revenue all throughout has been that it is
a finding of fact reached by the authorities competent in
that behalf and this Court should not interfere with
such findings of fact. The contention of the appellant on
the other hand, has been that even though it may be a
finding of fact to be reached by the authorities concerned
on the materials on the record before them, such finding is
vitiated by reason of the authorities indulging in
conjectures, suspicions and surmises and basing the same on
no material whatever which goes to support the same. It is
also contended that the finding reached by them is a
perverse one which a reasonable body of men could not have
arrived at on the material on the record.
The limits of our jurisdiction to interfere with finding of
fact reached by the courts or tribunals of facts have been
laid down by us in various decisions of this Court. In
Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay
(1) we observed that when a Court of fact arrives at its
decision by considering material which is irrelevant to the
enquiry, or acts on material, partly relevant and partly
irrelevant, where it is impossible to say to what extent the
mind of the Court was affected by the irrelevant material
used by it in arriving at its decision, a question of law
arises: Whether the finding of the Court of fact is not
vitiated by reason of its having
(1) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 736.
309
relied upon conjectures, surmises and suspicions not
supported by any evidence on record or partly upon evidence
and partly upon inadmissible material. We also observed in
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
West Benyal (1) that an assessment so made without
disclosing to the assessee the information supplied by the
departmental representative and without giving any
opportunity to the assessee to rebut the information so
supplied and declining to take into consideration all
materials which the assessee wanted to produce in support of
the case constituted a violation of the fundamental rules of
justice and called for interference on our part. In Messrs.
Metha Parikh and Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay(’) this Court observed that the conclusions based on
facts proved or admitted may be conclusions of fact but
whether a particular inference can legitimately be drawn
from such conclusions may be a question of law. Where,
however, the fact finding authority has acted without any
evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not
reasonably be entertained or the facts found were such that
no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to
the relevant law could have found, the Court is entitled to
interfere. In our decision in Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, - Madras (3) after discussing
the various authorities on the subject we laid down that:-
(3) A finding on a question of fact is open to attack under
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S. 66(1) as erroneous in law when there is no evidence to
support it or if it is perverse."
The latest pronouncement of this Court in Omar Salay Mohamed
Sait v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (4)
summarises the position thus,:-
" We are aware that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a
fact finding Tribunal and if it arrives at its own
conclusions of fact after due consideration of the evidence
before it this Court will not
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 941. (3) [19561 S.C.R. 69i.
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 626. (4) C.A. No. 15 Of 1958 decided
on
March 5, 1959.
310
interfere. It is necessary, however, that every fact for
and against the assessee must have been considered with due
care and the Tribunal must have given its finding in a
manner which would clearly indicate what were the questions
which arose for determination, what was the evidence pro and
contra in regard to each one of them and what were the
findings reached on the evidence before it. The conclusions
reached by the Tribunal should not be coloured by any
irrelevant considerations or matters of prejudice and if
there are any circumstances which required to be explained
by the assessee, the assessee should be given an opportunity
of doing so. On no account whatever should the Tribunal base
its findings on suspicions, conjectures or surmises nor
should it act on no evidence at all or on improper rejection
of material and relevant evidence or partly on evidence and
partly on suspicions, conjectures and surmises and if it
does anything of the sort, its findings even though on
questions of fact will be liable to be set aside by this
Court."
It is in the light of these observations that we have to
determine the question arising before us in the present
appeals. It is clear on the record that the appellant
maintained its books of account according to the mercantile
system and there were maintained in its cash books two
accounts: one showing the cash balances from day to day and
other known as " Almirah account " wherein ’Were kept large
balances which were not required for the day-to-day working
of the business. Even though the appellant kept large
amounts in bank deposits and securities monies were required
at short notice at different branches of the appellant.
There were also collections made from various Beoparies or
-merchants and monies were also required for doing the grain
purchase work on behalf of the Government. These monies
were credited in the Almirah account which showed heavy cash
balances from time to time. In the books of account for
previous years it was the practice of the appellant to give
details of the notes of high denominations giving the
distinctive numbers of these notes received or paid
311
or at least other description e.g., " So many notes " of Rs.
1,000 each. In the assessment year, however, this practice
does not appear to have been followed but entries continued
to be made of monies thus received from the banks, different
branches, Beoparees etc., without any such details being
filled therein. A statment of these cash balances viz., the
balance in the Rokar and the balance in the Almirah from
September 1, 1945, to January 31, 1946 was filed before the
Income-tax authorities and this statement showed that apart
from the balance in the Rokar the balance in the Almirah
rose from Rs. 1,36,397-10-0 on September 1, 1945, to Rs.
1,97,397-10-0 on September 30, 1945, to Rs. 2,23,397-10-0 on
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October 13, 1945, to Rs. 2,65,397-10-0 on November 27, 1945,
to Rs. 2,91,397-10-0 on December 29, 1945, and remained at
Rs. 2,81,397-10-0 on January 10, 1946. The balance in the
Rokar fluctuated considerably but on the relevant date January
10, 1946, it stood at Rs. 26,092-10-9.It was Rs. 24,976-13-3
on January II, 1946, and Rs. 29,284-3-9 on January 12, 1946,
when the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization)
Ordinance, [1946, was promulgated. These entries showed
that there was with the appellant on on January 12, 1946, an
aggregate sum of Rs. 3,10,681-13-9 and it was highly
probable that the High Denomination notes of Rs. 2,91,000
were included in this sum of Rs. 3,10,681-13-9. The books
of account of the appellant were not challenged in any other
manner except in regard to the interpolations relating to
the number of high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each
obviously made by the appellant in the accounts for the
assessment year in question in the manner aforesaid and even
in regard to these interpolations the explanation given by
the appellant in regard to the same was accepted by the
Tribunal. Even though the Income-tax Officer made capital
out of the interpolations and subsequent insertions in the
books of account and styled the evidence furnished by them
as created or manipulated evidence thus discounting the
story of the appellant in regard to the source of these high
denomination notes, the Tribunal
312
was definitely of opinion that there was no other reason to
suspect the genuineness of the account books in which these
interpolations were found. As a matter of fact the Tribunal
accepted these books of account as genuine and worked up its
theory on the basis of the entries which obtained in these
books of account. The Tribunal had before it the statement
of large amounts received by the appellant from the banks,
different branches of the appellant and its Beoparees or
merchants which showed that between February 6, 1945, and
January 11, 1946, amounts exceeding Rs. 1,000 aggegrating to
Rs. 5,04,713 had been received by the appellant. Even
though large amounts may have been paid out by the appellant
in this manner between the said dates, the entries of the
balance in Rokar and the balance in Almirah showed that on
January 12, 1946, the balance in Rokar was Rs. 26,234-3-9
and the balance in Almirah was Rs. 2,81,397-10-0 the total
cash balance thus aggregating to Rs. 3,10,681-13-9. Nobody
had any inkling of the promulgation of the High Denomination
Bank Notes (Demonetization) Ordinance, 1946, on January 12,
1946, and if in the normal course of affairs and situated as
the appellant was, the appellant kept these large cash
balances in High Denomination Notes of Rs. 1,000 each, there
was nothing surprising or improbable in it. If the
appellant had to disburse such large sums of monies at short
notices at the different branches of the appellant and also
to its Beoparees apart from financing the Government for
grain purchase work which it used to carry on, it would be
convenient for it to handle these large sums of monies in
high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each and the most
natural thing for it to do was to keep these cash balances
in as many high denomination notes as possible. The
Tribunal in fact took count of this position and after
giving due weight to all the circumstances arrived at the
conclusion that the appellant might be expected to have
possessed as part of its business cash balance at least Rs.
1,50,000 in the shape of high denomination notes on January
12, 1946, when the Ordinance above mentioned was
promulgated. This conclusion
313
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of the Tribunal could only be arrived at on the basis that
the entries in the books of account in regard to the balance
in Rokar and the balance in Almirah were correct and
represented the true state of affairs, in spite of the
interpolations and -subsequent insertions which had been
made to bolster up the true case.
If these were the materials on record which would lead to
the inference that the appellant might be expected to have
possessed as part of its cash balance at least Rs. 1,50,000
in the shape of high denomination notes on January 12, 1946,
when the Ordinance was promulgated, was there any material
on record which would legitimately lead the Tribunal to come
-to the conclusion that the nature of the source from which
the appellant derived the remaining 141 high denomination
notes of Rs. 1,000 each remained unexplained to its
satisfaction. If the entries in the books of account in
regard to the balance in Rokar and the balance in Almirah
were held to be genuine, logically enough there was no
escape from the conclusion that the appellant had offered
reasonable explanation as to the source of the 291 high
denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each which it encashed on
January 19, 1946. It was not open to the Tribunal to accept
the genuineness of these books of account and accept the ex-
planation of the appellant in part as to Rs. 1,50,000 and
reject the same in regard to the sum of Rs. 1,41,000-0-0.
Consistently enough, the Tribunal ought to have accepted
the’ explanation of the appellant in regard to the whole of
the sum of Rs. 2,91,000 and held that the appellant had
satisfactorily explained the encashment of the 291 high
denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each on January 19, 1946.
The Tribunal, however, appears to have been influenced by
the suspicions, conjectures and surmises which were freely
indulged. in by the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner and arrived at its own conclusion, as
it were, by a rule of thumb holding without any proper
materials before it that the appellant might be expected to
have possessed as part of its business, cash balance at
least Rs. 1,50,000 in the shape of high denomination notes
on January 40
314
12, 1946,- a mere conjecture or surmise for which there was
no basis in the materials on record before it.
The Income-tax Officer had indented in support of his
conclusion the surrounding circumstances, viz., that the
appellant was one of the premier Arhatdars and grain
merchants of Sahibgan1 with branches, doing similar
business, at Nawgachia and Dhullian and all these places
were very important business centres and Sahibganj, the
principal place of business, had gained sufficient notoriety
for smuggling foodgrains and other commodities to BenLal by
country boats, and Dhulian which was just on the Bihar-
Bengal border was reported to be a great receiving centre
for such commodities, that the foodgrains licence of the
appellant at Nawgachia was also cancelled during the
accounting year for not keeping proper stock accounts and
the appellant was prosecuted under the Defence of India
Rules but was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted,
that the accounting year and the year preceding it as also
the year succeeding it were very favourable for the
foodgrain dealers but the appellant though he had large
capital in hand declared losses all through from 1944-45
assessment year up to 1946-47 assessment year, the loss
according to its books in the year under consideration being
to the tune of about Rs. 46,000, that the appellant was in
very favourable circumstances in which there was a pos-
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sibility of its earning a considerable amount in the year
under consideration, that it also indulged in speculation (a
loss of about Rs. 40,000 shown in Nawgachia branch (in Kalai
account)), in which profit in a single transaction or in a
chain of transactions could exceed the amounts involved in
the high denomination notes, that even in the disclosed
volume of business in the year under consideration in the
Head Office and in branches there was possibility of its
earning a considerable sum as against which showed a net
loss of about Rs. 45,000 and that the appellant had all
these probable source or sources from which the appellant
could have earned the sum of Rs. 2,91,000 which was
represented by the high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000
315
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner also emphasized the
said aspect but based his conclusion mainly on the ground
that the appellant had failed to prove that the high
denomination notes had their origin in capital and not in
profit and held that the Income-tax Officer was justified in
treating the sum of Rs 2,91,000 as secreted profits.
This was the background against which the Tribunal came to
its own conclusion. Even though it recognised that it was
not improbable that when very large sums, say in excess of
Rs. 10,000 at a time were received, a fairly good portion
thereof consisted of high denomination notes and as high
denomination notes were valid tender and nobody could have
foreseen that they would be demonetised suddenly in January
1946, there was nothing out of the way in persons dealing
with tens of thousands of rupees and whose balances ran to
lakhs, being in possession of a fair proportion of their
balances in the shape of high denomination notes. While
recognizing this probability of the appellant having been in
possession of a fair proportion of its balances in the shape
of high denomination notes, the Tribunal unconsciously
though it was, fell into an error when it held that the
appellant might be expected to have possessed at least Rs.
1,50,000 in the shape of high denomination notes as part of
its cash balance, thus treating the remaining Rs. 1,41,000
in the high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each as outside
the purview of these cash balances.
Unless the Tribunal had at the back its mind the various
probabilities which had been referred to by the Income-tax
Officer as above it could not have come to the conclusion it
did that the balance of Rs 1,41,000 comprising of the
remaining 141 high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each was
not satisfactorily explained by the appellant.
If the entries in the books of account were genuine and the
balance in Rokar and the balance in Almirah on January 12,
1946, aggregated to Rs. 3,10,681-13-9 and if it was not
improbable that a fairly good portion of the very large sums
received by the appellant from time to time, say in excess
of Rs. 10,000 at a time
316
consisted of high denomination notes, there was no basis for
the conclusion that the appellant had satisfactorily
explained the possession of Rs. 1,50,000 in the high
denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each leaving the possession
of the balance of 141 high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000
each unexplained. Either the Tribunal did not apply its
mind to the situation or it, arrived at the conclusion it
did merely by applying the rule of thumb in which event the
finding of fact reached by it was such as could not
reasonably be entertained or the fact found were such as no
person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the
relevant law could have found, or the Tribunal in arriving
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at its findings was influenced by irrelevant considerations
or indulged in conjectures, surmises or suspicions in which
event also its finding could not be sustained.
Adverting to the various probabilities which weighed with
the Income-tax Officer we may ’observe that the notoriety
for smuggling foodgrains and other commodities to Bengal by
country boats acquired by Sahibgunj and the notoriety
achieved by Dhulian as a great receiving centre for such
commodities were merely a background of suspicion and the
appellant could not be tarred with the same brush as every
Arhatdar and grain merchant who might have been indulging in
smuggling operations, without an iota of evidenec in that
behalf. The cancellation of the foodgrain licence at
Nawgachia and the, prosecution of the appellant under the
Defence of India Rules was also of no consequence inasmuch
as the appellant was acquitted of the offence with which it
had been charged and its licence also was restored. The
mere possibility of the appellant earning considerable
amounts in the year under consideration was a pure
conjecture on the part of the Income-tax Officer and the
fact that the appellant indulged in speculation (in Kalai
account) could not legitimately lead to the inference that
the profit in a single transaction or in a chain of transac-
tions could exceed the amounts, involved in the high
denomination notes,-this also was a pure conjecture or
surmise on the part of the Income-tax Officer. As regards
the disclosed volume of business in the year
317
under consideration in the Head Office and in branches the
Income-tax Officer indulged in speculation when he talked of
the possibility of the appellant earning a considerable sum
as against which it showed a net loss of about Rs. 45,000.
The Income-tax Officer indicated the probable source or
sources from which the appellant could have earned a large
amount in the sum of Rs. 2,91,000 but the conclusion which
he arrived at in regard to the appellant having earned this
large amount during the year and which according to him
represented the secreted profits of the appellant in its
business was the result of pure conjectures and surmises on
his part and had no foundation in fact and was not proved
against the appellant -on the record of the proceedings. If
the conclusion of the Income-tax Officer was thus either
perverse or vitiated by suspicions, conjectures or surmises
the finding of the Tribunal was equally perverse or vitiated
if the Tribunal took count of all these probabilities and
without any rhyme or reason and merely by a rule of thumb,
as it were, came to the conclusion that the possession of
150 high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each was
satisfactorily explained by the appellant but not that of
the balance of 141 high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000
each.
The position as it obtained in this case was closely
analogous to that which obtained in Messrs. Mehta Parikh &
Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay (1). In that
case the assessee had to satisfactorily explain the
possession of 61 High Denomination Notes of Rs. 1,000 each
and the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee
had satisfactorily explained the possession of 31 of these
notes and not of the remaining 30. The High Court had
treated the finding of the Tribunal as a finding of fact.
It was held by this Court that the entries in cash-book and
the statements made in the affidavit in support of the
explanation, which were binding on the Revenue and could not
be questioned, clearly showed that it was quite within the
range of possibility that the assessee had in their
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possession the 61 High denomination notes on the relevant
date and their explanation in that
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 626.
318
behalf could not be assailed by a purely imaginary
Calculation of the nature made by the income-tax officer or
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It further held that
the Tribunal made a wrong approach and while accepting the
assessee’s explanation with regard to 31 of the notes, it
had absolutely no reason to exclude the rest as not covered
by it in the absence of any evidence to show that the
excluded notes were profits earned by the assessee from
undisclosed sources. The assessee having given a reasonable
explanation the Tribunal could not, by applying a rule of
thumb discard it so far as the rest were concerned and act
on mere surmise. In arriving at its decision this Court
referred to the case of Chunilal Ticamchand Coal Co. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa (1) and stated
that the case before it should also have been similarly
decided by the High Court in favour of the assessee.
A decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in in Kanpur
Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Incometax, Uttar
Pradesh(’) may also be noted in this context. The assessee
there encashed 32 currency notes of Rs. 1,000 each on
January 12, 1946, when the High Denomination Bank Notes
(Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, came into force, and when
the Income-tax Officer called upon it to explain how these
currency notes came into its possession, the assessee
claimed that the notes represented part of its cash balance
which, on that date, stood at Rs. 34,313. The Income-tax
Officer rejected the explanation and assessed the amount of
Rs. 32,000 represented by these currency notes as suppressed
income of the assessee from some undisclosed source. The
Tribunal took into account the statement of sales relating
to a few days preceding the date of encashment and found
that the highest amount of any one single transaction was
only Rs. 399. The Tribunal also referred to another
statement of the daily cash balances of the assessee from
December 20, 1945, to January 12, 1946, and noted that the
cash balance of the assessee was steadily increasing. The
Tribunal, however, estimated that high denomination
(1) [1955] 27 I.T.R. 602.
(2) [1957] 32 I.T.R. 56.
319
currency notes to the value of Rs. 7,000 only could form
part of the cash balance of the assessee. It therefore
upheld the assessment to the extent of Rs. 25,000. On a
reference to the High Court it was held (1) that the burden
of proof lay upon the Department to prove that the sum of
Rs. 32,000 represented suppressed income of the assessee
from undisclosed sources, and the burden was not on the
assessee to prove how it had received these high
denomination currency notes; for, until the Demonetisation
Ordinance came into force high denomination currency notes
could be used as freely as notes of any lower denomination
and no one had any idea that it should be necessary for him
to explain the possession of high denomination currency
notes, the assessee had naturally not kept any statement
regarding the receipt of these currency notes, and it was
for the first time on January 12, 1946, when the Ordinance
came into force, that it became necessary for the assessee
to explain its possession of these currency notes and (ii)
that the explanation given by the assessee that the notes
formed part of the cash balance of Rs. 34,000 and odd was
fairly satisfactory and was not found by the Tribunal to be
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false; the statement of sales was hardly relevant to the
question; the Department, in relying on the entries relating
to the bills of each day committed an error and no inference
should have been drawn from them; that any one single
transaction did not exceed Rs. 399 did not preclude the
possibility of payment in high denomination notes for such
transaction; therefore, the Tribunal rejected the
explanation of the assessee on surmises, and there was no
material for the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Rs. 25,000
represented suppressed income of the assessee from
undisclosed sources.
In arriving at the above decision the High Court referred to
the cases of Mehta Parikh & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-
tax, Bombay (1) and Chunilal Ticamchand Coal Co., Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Incometax, Bihar and Orissa (2).
It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal in arriving at the
conclusion it did in the present case indulged in
(1) [1956) S.C,R. 626,
(2) [1955] 27 I.T.R. 6o2
320
suspicions, conjectures and surmises and acted without any
evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not
reasonably be entertained or the facts found were such that
no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to
the relevant law could have found, or the finding was, in
other words, perverse and this Court is entitled to
interfere.
We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was clearly
in error in answering the referred question in the
affirmative. The proper answer should have been in the
negative having regard to all the circumstances of the case
which we have adverted to above.
The appeals will accordingly be, allowed, the judgment and
order passed by the High Court will be set aside and the
referred question will be answered in the negative. The
appellant will be entitled to its costs of the reference in
the High Court and of these appeals in this Court as against
the respondent.
Appeals allowed.