Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2024 INSC 167
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 666/2012
DATTATRAYA APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
This appeal arises out of the final judgment and order dated
23.11.2010 passed by the Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 06/2009 whereby the conviction of the
appellant under Sections 302 and 316 of the Indian Penal Code
(for short ‘IPC’) was upheld and the appellant was sentenced to
undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 and 10 years of R.I.
under Section 316 of IPC, and was directed to pay fine amount of
Rs.5000 and Rs.2000/-, respectively.
2. The facts of this case are that the appellant (32 years of
age in the year 2007), was married to one, Meenabai Dattatraya
Gawali, (who was 30 years of age on the date of the incident).
The wife Meenabai (deceased) was having a pregnancy of nine
months at that time. It is the case of the prosecution that the
appellant came home at about 10.00 P.M. on the fateful night of
26.01.2007 in an inebriated state. He then picked a fight with
Signature Not Verified
his wife while she was cooking food in the kitchen and poured
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2024.03.04
18:03:34 IST
Reason:
kerosene on her and as the stove burst, the wife sustained burn
injuries, which in hospital were determined as 98%. She was taken
to the Civil Hospital, Solapur at about midnight, where the first
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injury report itself indicates that she sustained burn injuries
of about 98%. A statement is then recorded of the deceased at
01.30 AM on 27.01.2007, which states as under:-
“ STATEMENT
Solapur
Dated-27/01/2007
Time-01.30 AM
Saturday after completing Friday
Patient is conscious oriental and fit for giving
valid statement at present.
1.41 AM – 27.01.2007 – Sd/- Deshpande
Smt.Minabai Datta Gavli, age 30 years, R/o. A. Kata
Savargaon, Tq.Taljapur, District. Osmanabad gives
statement that in the night on Friday 26.01.2007 at 10
PM there was trifle dispute between husband and wife
and at the time of cooking Mr. Dattatraya Gavli, age
40 years, service-wireman with the anger of dispute
poured rockel on me. At that time stove flared up and
I burned up to 98%. My husband is also burned 40%, Mr.
Datta Gavli has also burnt. He got burnt while putting
out the fire. At that time husband had drunk liquor.
He was addicted to liquor. My grandmother admitted in
Civil Hospital at night 12 am. Now I am under
treatment and giving statement myself.
Yours faithfully
Thumb Impression
Thumb Impression of left hand of
Smt. Minabai Dattatraya Gavli
Before (M.V.Wagh) Executive Magistrate Office,
Solapur.
Patient was conscious oriented and fit for giving
valid statement.
(Exh.33)
Sd/- A.P.Deshpande-”
3. A case is then registered at Tamalwadi Police Station, as
Crime No. 12/2007, filed under Section 307 of the IPC against the
appellant.
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4. As we have already stated above, the deceased at that time
was nine months pregnant. She gave birth to a stillborn child on
the next day i.e., 28.01.2007 and died on 04.02.2007.
5. The offence which was registered under Section 307 of the
IPC was converted into an offence under Section 302 of the IPC
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and another charge under Section 316 was added.
6. The police after an investigation filed its chargesheet in
the Court of Judicial Magistrate, F.C., Tuljapur, which was
registered as RCC No.96/2007 and the case was committed to
Sessions, where it was ultimately placed before Addl. Sessions
Court, Usmanabad, Maharashtra. The appellant faced the Trial
Court where he was convicted of offences under Sections 302 and
316 of IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and 10
years of rigorous imprisonment respectively, along with fine and
default stipulation.
7. The matter was taken in an appeal before the Bombay High
Court by the appellant which was dismissed.
8. The Special Leave Petition later was filed by the appellant
before this Court in which leave was granted vide order dated
09.04.2012.
9. We have heard Mr.Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr.Bharat Bagla, learned counsel
| 1 Section 316. | Causing death of quick unborn child by act amounting to culpable homicide.-- | |
|---|---|---|
| Whoever does any act under such circumstances, that if he thereby caused death he would | ||
| be guilty of culpable homicide, and does by such act cause the death of a quick unborn | ||
| child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may | ||
| extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. |
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appearing for the respondent, at some length.
10. The prosecution in this case had examined nine prosecution
witnesses and placed relevant documents such as medical reports,
dying declaration etc., in order to establish its case. The
appellant gave his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.,
but did not produce any defence witnesses. In his statement,
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant admits to the
fact that at the relevant point of time, PW-7 who is the maternal
grandmother of the deceased (the wife of the appellant) was
residing with them. He also admits that his wife was nine months
pregnant at the time of the incident and gave birth to a
stillborn child on 28.01.2007. He, however, denies all instances
of quarreling with his wife and committing the act as alleged by
the prosecution. PW-7 here is the star witness of the
prosecution, who was present in the house and was witness to the
crime. There is also a dying declaration.
11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and then
examining the evidence placed by the prosecution, we find that
there is an overwhelming evidence placed by the prosecution
before the Trial Court regarding the incident itself. The
prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt regarding the incident itself inasmuch as the incident took
place on midnight of 26.01.2007 and 27.01.2007, and the appellant
who was in an inebriated state, picked a quarrel with his wife
and while she was cooking his meal in the kitchen, poured
kerosene on her as a result of which she sustained burn injuries
and subsequently died.
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12. The fact that the appellant had quarreled with the deceased
and had poured kerosene on her is well established. The statement
given by the deceased herself, which the prosecution has placed
as a dying declaration, categorically states that she was being
tortured at the hands of her husband and that her husband was
having an affair with another woman, and that on the fateful day,
he returned late at night in an inebriated state had a fight with
her and then threw kerosene on her, as a result, she sustained
burn injuries. But then, she also states that he also tried to
extinguish the fire and as a result, he too got burn injuries.
The other evidence as we have stated above, is in the form of PW-
7, Chaturabai Tukaram Kale, who is the maternal grand mother of
the deceased, who was residing with the deceased and her husband
(appellant) eight to nine days prior to the incident, and was
taking care of the deceased as she was on the family way. She
also supports the story that the appellant was having an affair
with another woman which was the main reason for the quarrel
between the couple. On the fateful day, the two were quarreling
because of this reason alone and the appellant, thereafter, threw
kerosene on his wife, and set her on fire. Having witnessed the
incident she came out of the house and started shouting that my
grand daughter has been set on fire.
13. Another prosecution witness which is worth mentioning here
is PW-8 i.e. Vimal Suryakant Salunkhe, who is the maternal
aunt, of the deceased and the daughter of PW-7. This witness was
told by the deceased that the appellant had kept a mistress and
this resulted in frequent fights between husband and wife (i.e.,
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the deceased). Deceased had also informed her that her husband
i.e., the accused, was addicted to liquor. She was told about the
incident by her mother (PW-7) at about 1 ‘O’ Clock in the night,
and the fact that the burn injuries were caused by the act of the
accused (the appellant). On information received from her mother
(PW-7), she went to the Civil Hospital, Solapur, along with her
husband where she saw Meena (the deceased), in a burnt condition
and it was the deceased who told her that the appellant had kept
a mistress at Kati-Sawargaon and it was for this reason, that he
was picking quarrels with her. At the time of the incident, she
was cooking food on the stove for her husband and it was for this
reason that when he poured kerosene on her, which was lying in
the can, the stove burst and she came out of the room shouting
for help. She was also asked by people who had gathered at the
house by that time as to why her husband has done this to her.
This witness (PW-8), then states that the deceased died in the
hospital after nine days. She had also recognized the accused who
was before the Court. This witness was again put to a lengthy
cross examination without giving any benefit to the defence.
14. Both PW-7 and PW-8 have clearly established the fact that
the burn injuries were caused by the appellant and that he had
returned to his house in an inebriated state and was under the
influence of liquor while he did the act, after picking a quarrel
with his wife. The presence of PW-7, being a witness, in the
house at the time of the incident was never in doubt.
15. The statement was given to PW-8 by the deceased stating how
she sustained burn injuries at the hands of her husband, i.e.,
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the present appellant, and the same was first recorded in the
statement which was given immediately after she had reached the
hospital at about 01.30 AM on 27.01.2007, before PW-1. PW-1 was
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working as ‘Avval Karkun’ in the Tahsil Office, North Solapur, at
the relevant point of time and was requested by the police at
12:30 AM in the night to record the dying declaration of the
deceased at Civil Hospital, Solapur.
16. The examination-in-chief of PW-1 reads as under:-
“ Ex am-in-Chief by APP Shri Jadhav
1. I am working as Aval Karkun in Tahsil office, North
Solapur. Since 2d Jan. 2007 I am working as Special
Executive Magistrate. For two days, work of recording of
dying declaration was allotted to me on Friday and
Saturday. On 26th Jan. 2007 I was in my house. Police
had been to my house in the night at about 12.30
O'clock. I was requested to record the dying declaration
orally. Thereafter I had been to Civil Hospital,
Solapur. A letter was given to me for recording dying
declaration of Meena Gawali and her husband Datta
Gawali. I am having the copy of letter with me. I had
given my endorsement on the office copy of the letter of
the police. The said letter now shown to me is same. It
is at exh.23. Thereafter I had been to Medical officer
Shri A.P. Deshpande and requested him to show the
patient. The patients were shown to me. Both the
patients sustained burn injuries. Before recording DD I
requested medical officer to examine the patient and
certify about the same. Doctor examined Dattatraya
Bhanudas Gawali. Dr. Deshpande accordingly made the
endorsement on the statement of Dattatraya Gawali at the
top of the same. The patient disclosed his name as
Dattatraya Bhanudas Gawali R/o. Kati Sawargaon. As per
the statement given by the patient, I recorded the same.
I read over the statement to Dattarya and he admitted
the same to be correct. I obtained the left thumb mark
of the patient. I again requested the Medical officer to
examine the patient and to tell me as to whether he is
conscious or not. Doctor examined patient and certified
the patient to be conscious. The endorsement now shown
to me is of medical officer. While recording the
2 Special Executive Magistrate
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statement I myself, Datta Gawali and medical officer
only were there. I put my signature on the statement.
The statement now shown to me is the same. It is in my
hand writing. It is at exh. 24. The patient disclosed me
that on 26.01.2007, in the night there was quarrel
between myself and my wife and at the relevant time, I
poured kerosene on her person in the angry mood when she
was cooking food. Dur to that according to the patient
they both sustained burn injury. He told me that he was
under the influence of liquor.
2. I also recorded the dying declaration of Meenabai
Gawali and requested Dr. A.P. Deshpande to examine
patient before recording her statement. After examining
the patient Doctor told me that patient was conscious
and was in position to give statement. Accordingly
doctor put his endorsement on the dying declaration in
the beginning of the statement. The patient disclosed
her name as Meena Datta Gawali, R/o. Kati Sawargaon.
Meenabai told me that in the nigh on 26.01.2007 when she
was cooking the food there was quarrel between herself
and her husband and at the relevant time her husband
poured kerosene on her person in angry mood due to which
there was bursting of stove in which she sustained burn
injury. She also told that her husband was under the
influence of liquor. Accordingly I recorded the dying
declaration given by Meenabai. The same was read over to
the deceased which she admitted to be true and correct.
I also obtained the left thumb mark of the patient on
the dying declaration. Again I requested the medical
officer to examine the patient and tell me as to whether
she was in position to give statement or not. Doctor
A.P. Deshpande again examined the patient and certified
the patient to be conscious. Accordingly he put the
endorsement alongwith his signature on the dying
declaration. At the time of recording of dying
declaration I myself, patient and doctor only were
there. The dying declaration now shown to me is the
same. It is in my hand writing. It bears my signature.
It is at exh. 25. The contents therein are true and
correct. Thereafter I handed over the statements to the
police chauky, Civil hospital, Solapur.”
17. This witness was cross-examined by the defence as there was
some discrepancy in his statement as to whether the deceased was
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in a proper state of mind to give a statement. His examination-
in-chief was taken again by the Assistant Public Prosecutor and
the witness was declared hostile only to the extent of
discrepancy that the patient was not in a position to talk. But
nothing substantially moves on this aspect, inasmuch as, even if
we do not consider the dying declaration of the deceased which
was given at 01.30 AM in the night on 27.01.2007, there is
sufficient evidence to prove that it was the appellant who had
poured kerosene on the deceased which led to the burn injuries
and the death of the deceased and the child she was bearing.
There is no doubt that an offence under Section 316 has clearly
been made out. We only have to examine whether an offence here is
under Section 302 of IPC or is it of a lesser magnitude.
18. Having considered the entire evidence at length, we are also
of the considered opinion that under the given facts and
circumstances of the case, it would not be a case of murder but
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder for the reasons
which we want to state as under.
19. We have, by and large, accepted the case of the prosecution
as to the incident itself. There is sufficient evidence to prove
that the burn injury was caused to the deceased by an act done at
the hands of the appellant and it was the appellant who had come
to his house under the influence of liquor and poured kerosene on
his wife while she was cooking food for him on a stove, which
resulted in bursting of the stove and causing burn injuries on
the deceased. There is also sufficient proof of the fact that the
husband and wife were having frequent fights even earlier. This
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has come out in the deposition of PW-7 and her cross-examination
has inspired our confidence as well as that of PW-8 though she is
not an eye-witness to the incident. The fact that the deceased
gave birth to a stillborn child on the next day i.e., 28.01.2007
while she was still alive and the death was caused by the act of
the appellant which we have already stated above, also makes a
case under Section 316 of the Indian Penal Code.
20. From every available evidence, which was placed by the
prosecution, it is a case where a sudden fight took place between
the husband and wife. The deceased at that time was carrying a
pregnancy of nine months and it was the act of pouring kerosene
on the deceased that resulted in the fire and the subsequent burn
injuries and the ultimate death of the deceased. In our
considered opinion, this act at the hands of the appellant will
be covered under the fourth exception given under Section 300 of
the IPC, i.e., “Culpable homicide is not murder if it is
committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner”.
21. The act of the appellant is not premeditated, but is a
result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion.
Therefore, we convert the findings of Section 302 to that of 304
Part-II, as we are of the opinion that though the appellant had
knowledge that such an act can result in the death of the
deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased.
Therefore, this is an offence which would come under Part-II not
under Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC.
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On almost similar facts, (as are present in the case at
hand), this Court had converted the findings of Section 302 to
that of Section 304 Part II IPC. The case of which reference is
being made here is Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC
324 . The appellant who had been convicted under Section 302 IPC
for causing death of his wife by pouring kerosene on her and then
setting her on fire was convicted by the Trial Court under
Section 302, which was upheld by the High Court. The facts of the
case are as follows :-
In the above case, the appellant who in an inebriated state
was pressurizing his wife to part with some ornaments so that he
could buy some more liquor. On her refusal he poured kerosene on
her and set her on fire by lighting a matchstick. But then he
also tried to pour water on her to save her. This Court was thus
of the opinion that :
| “7….Very probably he would not have | |
|---|---|
| anticipated that the act done by him would | |
| have escalated to such a proportion that | |
| she might die. If he had ever intended her | |
| to die he would not have alerted his senses | |
| to bring water in an effort to rescue her. | |
| We are inclined to think that all that the | |
| accused thought of was to inflict burns to | |
| her and to frighten her but unfortunately | |
| the situation slipped out of his control | |
| and it went to the fatal extent. He would | |
| not have intended to inflict the injuries | |
| which she sustained on account of his act. | |
| Therefore we are persuaded to bring down | |
| the offence from first degree murder to | |
| culpable homicide not amounting to murder. |
| 8. | We therefore alter the conviction from | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II | |||
| IPC...” |
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The facts of the present case, as we have already discussed
above, by and large reflect the same situation, nature of crime
as well as the act of the accused and the consequences of his
action. We are inclined to accept the arguments raised by the
learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sudhanshu S.
Choudhari that under the present circumstances it would indeed be
a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as given in
Section 304 Part II in as much as, though the accused had
knowledge of the consequences of the act he was committing, yet
there was no intention to cause death.
The appeal is partly allowed. We convert the findings of
Section 302 to that of Section 304 Part II of IPC and sentence
the accused to 10 years of R.I. To this extent the findings
given by the trial court and High Court will stand modified. We
have also been informed that the appellant has already undergone
incarceration for more than 10 years. Therefore, he shall be
released forthwith from the jail, unless he is required in some
other offence.
………………………………………………………………,J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
………………………………………………………………,J.
[PRASANNA B. VARALE]
NEW DELHI;
01ST FEBRUARY, 2024
13
ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.16 SECTION II-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 666/2012
DATTATRAYA Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s)
Date : 01-02-2024 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA BHALACHANDRA VARALE
For Appellant(s) Mr. Sudhanshu S . Choudhari, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Rucha Pande, Adv.
Mr. M Veera Ragavan, Adv.
Ms. Gautami Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Pranjal Chapalgaonkar, Adv.
Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.
Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv.
Mr. Aditya Krishna, Adv.
Ms. Raavi Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Adarsh Dubey, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeal is partly allowed in terms of the signed reportable
order.
The relevant portion of the order reads as under:-
“The appeal is partly allowed. We convert the findings of
Section 302 to that of Section 304 Part II of IPC and sentence the
accused to 10 years of R.I. To this extent the findings given by
the trial court and High Court will stand modified. We have also
been informed that the appellant has already undergone incarceration
for more than 10 years. Therefore, he shall be released forthwith
from the jail, unless he is required in some other offence.”
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(VARSHA MENDIRATTA) (R.S. NARAYANAN)
COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file)
*earlier ROP dated 01.02.2024 has already been uploaded and sent to
the concerned branch.
14
ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.16 SECTION II-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 666/2012
DATTATRAYA Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s)
Date : 01-02-2024 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA BHALACHANDRA VARALE
For Appellant(s) Mr. Sudhanshu S . Choudhari, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Rucha Pande, Adv.
Mr. M Veera Ragavan, Adv.
Ms. Gautami Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Pranjal Chapalgaonkar, Adv.
Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.
Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv.
Mr. Aditya Krishna, Adv.
Ms. Raavi Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Adarsh Dubey, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
We have already passed the detailed order partly allowing
the present appeal, in which, we have converted the findings of
Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and
since, the appellant had already undergone incarceration for more
than 13 years in jail, we have also directed him to be released
from jail forthwith. All the same, we are of the considered view
that it may take some time for the appellant to actually get the
certified copy of the detailed order.
Therefore, we direct that the appellant be released
forthwith from jail, not awaiting the copy of the final detailed
order, unless the appellant is required in some other offence.
(VARSHA MENDIRATTA) (R.S. NARAYANAN)
COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR