Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 409
Civil Appeal No(s). 4317/2026
@ SLP(C) No. 23429/2019
SIB NATH CHATTERJEE Appellant(s)
VERSUS
TULSIDAS CHATTERJEE & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
Facts
2. The appellant had set-up a claim of
pre-emption under sub-section (1) of Section
8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1955 Act’)
being owner/ raiyat possessing land
contiguous to the land under transfer.
3. Admittedly, the application under sub-
section (1) of Section 8 of the 1955 Act was
submitted after 17 months from the date of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHETAN ARORA
Date: 2026.04.22
18:14:24 IST
Reason:
transfer. Therefore, the second and third
respondents (i.e., transferees) filed an
1
application to reject appellant’s
application on the ground that the owner/
raiyat possessing contiguous land could
exercise the right within four months of the
date of transfer and not later.
4. The Court of first instance accepted
respondents’ plea and rejected the
application holding the same to be ex facie
barred by limitation prescribed by the 1955
Act.
5. Aggrieved therewith, an appeal was
preferred.
6. The Appellate Court observed that,
though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
is not applicable to original proceedings,
the application cannot be rejected at the
threshold on the ground of limitation. More
so, when the case of the applicant is that
he was not served notice of the transfer.
The Appellate Court therefore set aside the
order passed by the Court of first instance.
7. Aggrieved by the Appellate Court’s
2
order, the second and third respondents
1
filed a revision before the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.
8. The High Court held that the right of
pre-emption as conferred upon the raiyat
possessing land contiguous to the land under
transfer could be exercised within four
months from the date of transfer and since
the application under sub-section (1) of
Section 8 of the 1955 Act was submitted much
beyond four months, the same being ex facie
barred by limitation was rightly rejected by
the Court of first instance. Accordingly,
the High Court, vide impugned order dated
08.04.2019, set aside the order of the
Appellate Court and restored the order of
the Court of first instance.
9. Aggrieved by the order of the High
Court, this appeal has been filed.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the
parties and have perused the materials
1
1 The High Court at Calcutta
3
placed on record.
Submissions
11. The submission on behalf of the
appellant is that unless the transfer is
brought to the notice of the pre-emptor, the
pre-emptor would not be able to avail his
right, therefore the requirement of notice
of the proposed transfer to the pre-emptor
would have to be read into the provision and
if no notice is given, then the pre-emptor
must be deemed to have right of pre-emption
within four months from the date of
knowledge of such transfer. It was submitted
that since no notice was provided to the
appellant, the limitation for filing the
application would have to be counted from
the date of knowledge. To support his
submissions, learned counsel relied on a
decision of this Court in Chhana Rani Saha
2
vs Mani Pal @ Kaltu Pal . Therein this Court
had observed that the Trial Court had
rightly allowed the ownership of the land in
2
2 Civil Appeal No.5905 of 2009 decided on 15.11.2017
4
question, since it was found that the vendor
did not give notice of sale to the appellant
therein. In that light, it was argued that
the Appellate Court was justified in holding
that since the appellant was not served
notice of the transfer, the pre-emption
application could not have been rejected at
the threshold.
12. Per contra , learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that sub-section (1)
of Section 8 confers right of pre-emption on
different categories of persons. Each
category has a different limitation period
within which it could exercise its right.
Insofar as a person/ raiyat holding/
possessing adjoining/ contiguous land is
concerned, he could exercise right within
four months of the date of transfer. As the
appellant falls in this category and,
admittedly, the appellant had failed to
exercise his right of pre-emption within
four months of the date of transfer, the
application at his instance was not
5
maintainable. Therefore, it was rightly
rejected by the Trial Court, and the High
Court justifiably restored the same.
13. We have accorded due consideration to
the rival submissions.
Discussion
14. Before we proceed to address the rival
submissions, we must understand the true
nature of the right of pre-emption.
15. In Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar
3
Jaipuria and others , a five-Judge Bench of
this Court held that the law of pre-emption
imposes a limitation or disability upon the
ownership of a property to the extent that
it restricts the owner's unfettered right of
sale and compels him to sell the property to
his co-sharer or neighbor, as the case may
be. It was observed that the person who is
the co- sharer in the land or owns the land
in the vicinity consequently only gets an
advantage or benefit corresponding to the
3
3 (1954) 1 SCC 836: 1954 SCC OnLine SC 186
6
burden with which the owner of the property
is saddled; even though it does not amount
to an actual interest in the property sold.
It was observed that the crux of the whole
thing is that the benefit as well as the
burden of the right of pre-emption runs with
the land and can be enforced by or against
the owner of the land for the time being
although the right of the pre-emptor does
not amount to an interest in the land
itself. It was also observed that if the
right of pre-emption had been only a
personal right enforceable against the
vendee and there was no infirmity in the
title of the owner restricting his right of
sale in a certain manner, a bona fide
purchaser without notice would certainly
obtain an absolute title to the property,
unhampered by any right of the pre-emptor
and in such circumstances there could be no
justification for enforcing the right of
pre-emption against the purchaser on grounds
of justice, equity and good conscience on
7
which grounds alone the right could be
enforced on the present day. Thus, it was
held that the law of pre-emption creates a
right which attaches to the property and on
that footing only it can be enforced against
the purchaser.
16. In Bishan Singh & Ors. v. Khazan
4
Singh & Anr. , a four-Judge Bench of this
Court approved the decision of Allahabad
High Court rendered by Mahmood, J. in
5
Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah wherein the
right of pre-emption was described as under:
“It (right of pre-emption) is simply
a right of substitution, entitling
the pre-emptor, by means of a legal
incident to which sale itself was
subject, to stand in the shoes of
the vendee in respect of all the
rights and obligations arising from
the sale, under which he derived his
title. It is, in effect, as if in a
sale deed the vendee’s name were
4
4 AIR 1958 SC 838: 1959 SCR 878: 1958 SCC OnLine SC 88
5
5 (1885) ILR 7 All 775, 809
8
rubbed out and pre-emptor's name
inserted in its place.”
And thereafter, this Court summarized the
law relating to the right of pre-emption as
under:
“To summarize: (1) The right of pre-
emption is not a right to the thing
sold but a right to the offer of the
thing about to be sold. This right
is called the primary or inherent
right. (2) The pre-emptor has a
secondary right or a remedial right
to follow the thing sold. (3) It is
a right of substitution but not of
re-purchase i.e., the pre-emptor
takes the entire bargain and steps
into the shoes of the original
vendee. (4) It is a right to acquire
the whole of the property sold and
not a share of the property sold.
(5) Preference being the essence of
the right, the plaintiff must have a
superior right to that of the vendee
or the person substituted in his
9
place. (6) The right being a very
weak right, it can be defeated by
all legitimate methods, such as the
vendee allowing the claimant of a
superior or equal right being
substituted in his place.”
17. Following the above decision, in
Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v.
6
Shridhar Alshi & Ors. , a five-Judge Bench
of this Court held that there are no
equities in favor of a pre-emptor, whose
sole object is to disturb a valid
transaction by virtue of the rights created
in him by statute. Therefore, to defeat the
right of pre-emption by any legitimate means
is not fraud on the part of either the
vendor or the vendee and a person is
entitled to steer clear of the law of pre-
emption by all lawful means.
18. In Mohd. Noor and others v. Mohd.
7
Ibrahim and others , following the decision
in Radhakishan (supra), it was observed that
6
6 AIR 1960 SC 1368: (1961) 1 SCR 248: 1960 SCC OnLine SC 308
7
7 (1994) 5 SCC 562
10
right of pre-emption has not been looked
upon favorably as it operates as a clog on
the right of the owner to alienate his
property. Therefore, a person claiming right
of pre-emption under a statute must strictly
fall within the four corners of the
provisions contained therein.
19. Upon consideration of various
decisions of this Court, in our view, what
is settled is that the right of pre-emption
is a weak right. There are no equities in
favor of the pre-emptor. As a result, such
right can be defeated by any lawful means.
Besides, it is considered a clog on the
right of the owner to alienate his property,
therefore, the right, if conferred by a
statute, must be exercised strictly in terms
of the statute. As a sequitur , the statute
conferring the right of pre-emption is to be
construed strictly and not liberally.
20. Now, we shall have a look at the
relevant provisions of the 1955 Act
11
regarding conferment and exercise of the
right of pre-emption. Section 8 of the 1955
Act not only confers the right but also lays
down the procedure for its exercise. It
reads thus:
“ 8. Right of purchase by co-sharer
or contiguous tenant-
(1) If a portion or share of a plot
of land of a raiyat is transferred
to any person other than a co-
sharer of a raiyat in the plot of
land, the bargadar in the plot of
land may, within three months of
the date of such transfer, or any
co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot
of land may, within three months of
the service of the notice given
under sub-section (5) of section 5,
or any raiyat possessing land
adjoining such plot of land may,
within four months of the date of
such transfer, apply to the Munsif
having territorial jurisdiction,
for transfer of the said portion or
share of the plot of land to him,
subject to the limit mentioned in
section 14-M on deposit of the
consideration money together with a
further sum of ten per cent of that
amount:
Provided that if the bargadar in
the plot of land, a co-sharer of
raiyat in a plot of land and a
raiyat possessing land adjoining
such plot of land apply for such
transfer, the bargadar shall have
the prior right to have such
portion or share of the plot of
land transferred to him, and in
such a case, the deposit made by
others shall be refunded to them:
12
Provided further that where the
bargadar does not apply for such
transfer and a co-sharer of a
raiyat in the plot of land and a
raiyat possessing land adjoining
such plot of land both apply for
such transfer, the former shall
have the prior right to have such
portion or share of the plot of
land transferred to him, and in
such a case, the deposit made by
the latter shall be refunded to
him:
Provided also that as amongst
raiyats possessing lands adjoining
such plot of land preference shall
be given to the raiyat having the
longest common boundary with the
land transferred.
(2) Nothing in this section shall
apply to -
(a) a transfer by exchange or by
partition, or
(b) a transfer by bequest or gift,
or hiba-bil-ewaz, or
(c) a mortgage mentioned in section
7,
(d) a transfer for charitable or
religious purposes or both without
reservation of any pecuniary
benefit [for any individual, or]
(e) a transfer of land in favour of
a bargadar in respect of such land
if after such transfer, the
transferee holds as a raiyat land
not exceeding one acre (or 0.4047
hectare) in area in the aggregate.
Explanation - All orders passed and
the consequences thereof under
sections 8, 9 and 10 shall be
subject to the provisions of
Chapter IIB.
(3) Every application pending before
a Revenue Officer at the
commencement of section 7 of the
13
West Bengal Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1972 shall, on
such commencement, stand
transferred to, and disposed of by,
the Munsif having jurisdiction in
relation to the area in which the
land is situated and on such
transfer every such application
shall be dealt with from the stage
at which it was so transferred and
shall be disposed of in accordance
with the provision of this Act, as
amended by the West Bengal Land
Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972.”
21. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of
Section 8 of the 1955 Act would disclose that
the right of pre-emption arises on transfer of
a portion or share of a plot of land of raiyat
to any person other than a co-sharer of a
raiyat in the plot of land. When such transfer
takes place, the bargadar in the plot of land
may, within three months of the date of such
transfer, exercise his right of pre-emption.
Whereas a co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of
land may exercise the said right within three
months of the service of the notice given
under sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the 1955
Act. Besides those two, the raiyat possessing
land adjoining such plot of land has a right
14
of pre-emption. For convenience we refer to it
as the third category of persons who have been
conferred right of pre-emption. A person
belonging to the third category can exercise
the right of pre-emption within four months of
the date of such transfer.
22. Importantly, sub-section (1) of Section 8
does not use the phrase ‘within four months of
the date of knowledge, or notice, of such
transfer ’. Rather, it uses the phrase ‘within
four months of the date of such transfer’.
Therefore, the question that arises for our
consideration is whether ‘knowledge or notice’
can be read into the provision.
23. The submission on behalf of the appellant
is that in absence of notice or knowledge of
transfer, the person who has a right of pre-
emption would not be able to exercise the
right and, therefore, if the requirement of
notice of the transfer, or the date of
knowledge of the transfer, is not read into
the provision, the right would be rendered
15
nugatory.
24. Before we address the issue as to whether
‘the date of knowledge of transfer’, or ‘the
date of notice of transfer’ must be read into
Section 8 qua the starting point of limitation
for exercise of right by the third category of
persons, Section 5 of the 1955 Act needs to be
noticed. Section 5 reads thus:
“5. Transferability of [plot of land]
of a raiyat-
(1) A transfer of the [plot of land]
of a raiyat or a share or portion
thereof shall be made by an
instrument which must be registered
and the registering officer shall not
accept for registration any such
instrument unless-
(a) the sale price, or where there
is no sale price, the value of the
plot of land or portion or share
thereof transferred, is stated
therein;
(b) there is tendered along with
it,
(i) a notice giving the
particulars of the
transfer in the prescribed
form for transmission of
the prescribed authority;
(ii) such notices and
process fees as may be
required by sub-section
(4);
(c) the purpose for which the land
shall be used by the transferee is
stated therein; and
16
(d) such purpose for use of the
land by the transferee is
consistent with the purpose for
which the land was settled or was
being used and is not contrary to
the provisions of section 4B,
section 4C, section 4E or section
49.
(2) In case of bequest of such plot
of land or portion or share thereof,
no Court shall grant Probate or
Letters of Administration until the
applicant files in the prescribed
form a notice giving particulars of
the bequest together with the
prescribed process fees for
transmission to the prescribed
authority.
(3) No Court or Revenue Officer shall
confirm the sale of such a plot of
land or portion or share thereof put
to sale in execution of a decree or
certificate and no Court shall make a
decree or order absolute for
foreclosure of a mortgage of such a
plot of land or portion or share
thereof, until the purchaser of the
mortgagee, as the case may be, files
a notice or notices similar to, and
deposits process fees of the same
amount as that referred to in sub-
section (1).
(4) If the transfer of a portion or
share of such a plot of land be one
to which the provisions of section 8
apply, there shall be filed by the
transferor or transferee notices
giving particulars of the transfer in
the prescribed form together with the
process fees prescribed for the
service thereof on all the co-sharers
of the said plot of land who are not
parties to the transfer and for
affixing a copy thereof in the office
of the registering officer of the
Court house or the office of the
Revenue Officer, as the case may be,
17
as well as for affixing a copy on the
plot of land.
(5) The Court, the Revenue Officer or
the registering officer, as the case
may be, shall transmit the notice to
the authority referred to in sub-
clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-
section (1) who shall serve the
notices on the co-sharers referred to
in sub-section (4) by registered post
and shall cause copies of the notice
to be affixed on the plot of land and
in the Court house or in the office
of the Revenue Officer, or of the
registering officer, as the case may
be.
Explanation – in this section-
(a) “transferor”, “transferee”,
“purchaser” and “mortgage” include
their successors-in-interest, and
(b) “transfer” does not include
simple or usufructuary mortgage or
mortgage by deposit of title deeds.”
25. A careful reading of Section 5 (supra)
would indicate that it deals with three kinds
of situations: (1) transfer; (2) bequest; and
(3) court sale or foreclosure of mortgage,
pursuant to a decree. In the present case, we
are concerned with transfer by sale. Sub-
section (1) of Section 5 provides that an
instrument of transfer of a plot of land of a
raiyat or a share or portion thereof, shall
not be accepted for registration by the
18
registering authority unless the following
conditions are fulfilled: (a) sale price,
where there is no sale price, value of the
plot of land or share or portion thereof
transferred, is disclosed in the instrument;
(b) a notice giving particulars of the
transfer in the prescribed form for
8
transmission of the prescribed officer is
tendered with the instrument of transfer
together with such notice and process fee as
may be required by sub-section (4) of Section
5; (c) the purpose for which the transferee
shall use the land is stated in the
instrument; and (d) such purpose is consistent
with the purpose for which the land was
settled or was being used and is not contrary
to the provisions of Section 4B, Section 4C,
Section 4E or Section 49.
26. Sub-section (4) of Section 5 provides that
if the transfer of a portion or share of such
a plot of land be one to which the provisions
of Section 8 apply, there shall be filed by
8
8 Note: There appears some error, probably, it should be ‘to”
19
the transferor or transferee notices giving
particulars of the transfer in the prescribed
form together with the process fees prescribed
for the service thereof on all the co-sharers
of the said plot of land who are not parties
to the transfer and for affixing a copy
thereof in the office of the registering
officer of the Court house or the office of
the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, as
well as for affixing a copy on the plot of
land.
27. Sub-section (5) of Section 5 provides that
the Court, the Revenue Officer or the
registering officer, as the case may be, shall
transmit the notice to the authority referred
to in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-
section (1) who shall serve the notices on the
co-sharers referred to in sub-section (4) by
registered post and shall cause copies of the
notice to be affixed on the plot of land and
in the Court house or in the office of the
Revenue Officer, or of the registering
officer, as the case may be .
20
28. A conjoint reading of sub-sections (1)
(b), (4) and (5) of Section 5 of the 1955 Act,
inter alia , makes it clear that for
registration of an instrument of transfer of a
plot of land of a raiyat or a share or portion
thereof, the instrument of transfer must be
tendered along with (a) a notice giving the
particulars of the transfer in the prescribed
9
form for transmission of the prescribed
authority and (b) such notices and process
fees as may be required by sub-section (4).
Sub-section (4) applies if the subject of
transfer is such to which provisions of
Section 8 applies. Notably, Section 8 applies
whenever the transfer is of the plot of land
of a raiyat or portion or share thereof to any
person other than a co-sharer of a raiyat in
the plot of land. Therefore, if the subject of
transfer is such to which provisions of
Section 8 applies, the transferor or
transferee shall supply notices giving
particulars of the transfer in the prescribed
9
9 See: Footnote 8
21
form together with the process fees prescribed
for the service thereof on all the co-sharers
of the said plot of land who are not parties
to the transfer and for affixing a copy
thereof in the office of the registering
officer of the Court house or the office of
the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, as
well as for affixing a copy on the plot of
land. Sub-section (5) of Section 5 specifies
the procedure regarding service of notice on a
co-sharer as well as for affixation of notice.
Thus, sub-section (4) of Section 5 provides
for supplying of notice in the prescribed form
along with process fee for: (1) effecting
service of notice on a co-sharer(s) if he, or
they, is /are not party to the instrument of
transfer; (2) affixation of a copy thereof in
the office of the registering officer of the
Court house or the office of the Revenue
Officer, as the case may be; and (3) affixing
a copy on the plot of land. Sub-section (5) of
Section 5 specifies the procedure regarding
service of notice on a co-sharer as well as
22
for affixation of notice.
29. It is, therefore, clear that though
Section 5 provides for a notice of the
transfer to a co-sharer, there is no provision
to serve notice on other categories of pre-
emptors. However, it is not that the transfer
would go unnoticed since there is a
requirement to affix notice in the office of
the registering officer of the Court house, or
the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, and
of affixing a copy of the notice on the plot
of land.
30. From the discussion above, the legislative
intent is clear. The three categories of pre-
emptors are distinct, and they have distinct
timeline within which they are to exercise
their respective right of pre-emption under
the 1955 Act. A Bagardar can exercise his
right within three months from the date of
transfer whereas any raiyat possessing land
adjoining such plot of land can exercise
within four months from the date of transfer.
23
Insofar as co-sharer is concerned, the
limitation runs from the date of service of
notice under sub-section (5) of Section 5.
31. Now, we shall consider the argument on
behalf of the appellant that the requirement
of a notice as is there for a co-sharer must
be read into sub-section (1) of Section 8 of
the 1955 Act for the other two categories of
pre-emptors as well.
32. The law in this regard is settled. The
doctrine of reading down or of recasting the
statute can be applied in limited situations.
It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a
statute from being struck down on account of
its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of
the principle that when two interpretations
are possible – one rendering it constitutional
and the other making it unconstitutional, the
former should be preferred. The second
situation is where the provisions of the
statute are vague and ambiguous and it is
possible to gather the intentions of the
24
legislature from the object of the statute,
the context in which the provision occurs and
the purpose for which it is made. However,
when the provision is cast in a definite and
unambiguous language and its intention is
clear, it is not permissible either to mend or
bend it even if such recasting is in accord
with good reasons and conscience. In such
circumstances, it is not permissible for the
court to remake the statute. In short, the
object of reading down is to keep the
operation of the statute within the purpose of
10
the Act and constitutionally valid . Harshness
of a provision is no reason to read down the
same, if its plain meaning is unambiguous and
11
valid .
33. By applying the afore-stated principles as
to when a statutory provision can be read
down, we shall now consider whether sub-
section (1) of Section 8 of the 1955 Act needs
to be read down to save it from being
10
10 Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600,
paragraphs 255 and 326
11
11 Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641, paragraph 102.
25
unconstitutional.
34. In our view, Section 8 is clear and
categoric. The Section not only confers the
right of pre-emption on three different
categories of persons but also provides for
separate periods of limitation within which
each category could exercise its right.
Importantly, the right of pre-emption gets
triggered only when transfer is not to a co-
sharer. Understandably, a co-sharer stands on
a different footing as he has a direct
interest in the subject matter of transfer.
Therefore, the legislature specifically
provided for service of notice on him. The
other two categories of pre-emptors cannot
equate themselves with a co-sharer. In such
view of the matter, if the legislature, in its
wisdom, did not require service of notice on
them as in the case of a co-sharer, there is
no discrimination. Moreover, the right of pre-
emption is neither a fundamental right nor a
constitutional right, rather it is a weak
right which, in the case on hand, has been
26
conferred by a statute and, therefore, must
strictly be exercised in terms thereof. Thus,
in our view, reading down sub-section (1) of
section 8 is not required either to save it
from being declared unconstitutional or to
make it clear. More so, when it is neither
vague nor ambiguous.
35. Having regard to the discussion above, we
are of the considered view that there is no
substance in the argument that since no notice
of transfer was served on the appellant, the
period of limitation to file the application
under Section 8 of the 1955 Act would commence
from the date of knowledge of the transfer.
36. The decision in Chhana Rani Saha (supra )
relied by the appellant is of no help to the
appellant as it deals with a case where the
claim of pre-emption was rejected without
considering that the pre-emptor fell in the
category of a raiyat possessing land adjoining
the plot under transfer and therefore, even
though the pre-emptor was not a co-sharer, he
27
was entitled to assert his right of pre-
emption.
37. As the case of the appellant falls in the
third category where the limitation period
would be four months from the date of
transfer, we are of the view that the High
Court was correct in holding that the
application, which was filed much beyond the
prescribed period, was barred by limitation.
38. At last, a feeble attempt was made to
canvass that the subject matter of transfer
had come from common ancestors and, therefore,
the appellant could be bracketed in the
category of a co-sharer. This argument, in our
view, is completely misconceived as admittedly
at the time of transfer the estate stood
partitioned and the appellant was not a co-
sharer. Therefore, advisedly, this plea was
not pressed before the High Court.
39. Accordingly, we find no merit in the
appeal, the appeal stands dismissed.
40. Pending application(s), if any, stand
28
disposed of.
………………………………………………….J
[MANOJ MISRA]
………………………………………………….J
[VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]
New Delhi;
April 09, 2026
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ITEM NO.25 COURT NO.14 SECTION XVI
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 4317/2026
@ SLP(C) No. 23429/2019
SIB NATH CHATTERJEE Appellant(s)
VERSUS
TULSIDAS CHATTERJEE & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 09-04-2026 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
For Appellant(s) : Mr Rahul Kushwaha, Adv.
Mr Suraj Kumar, Adv.
Mr Ashutosh Singh, Adv.
Mr Sohit Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr. Subhasish Bhowmick, AOR
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Manju Jetley, AOR
Mr Rajesh Sen, Adv.
Ms Shibani Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr Shashikant Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Manohar Pratap, Adv.
Mr. Ajit Kumar Ekka, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal stands dismissed in terms
of the signed Reportable order placed on the
file.
3. Pending application(s), if any, stand
disposed of.
(CHETAN ARORA) (SAPNA BANSAL)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
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