Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1328
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. 230675/2025
IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1022 OF 1989
All India Judges Association and Ors. …Petitioners
Versus
Union of India and Ors. …Respondents
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. The instant Interlocutory Application seeks to
revisit the principles governing the determination of
seniority within the cadre of Higher Judicial Services
( HJS ) of all the States. This controversy is neither novel
nor transient; rather, it represents a recurring dilemma
that has, from time to time, engaged the attention of this
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2025.11.19
12:18:51 IST
Reason:
Court.
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2. To briefly outline the factual context herein, the
HJS, across the country, is comprised of officers
recruited through three sources: ( i ) Regular Promotees
RP ii
( ); ( ) those promoted through the Limited
Departmental Competitive Examinations ( LDCE ); and
( iii ) Direct Recruits ( DR ). These three sources for
recruitment and appointment to the position of District
Judge were crystallised through various directions
issued in the successive All India Judges Association
( AIJA ) proceedings. It is amongst these three sources
that the dispute of inter se seniority has arisen.
3. Over the course of many decades, divergent
approaches have been adopted in an endeavour to
reconcile competing claims between different streams of
appointment, reflecting this Court’s continued attempt
to bring coherence and uniformity to this enduring
issue.
4. This question has once again fallen before us for
consideration in light of an interlocutory application,
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being I.A. No. 230675 of 2025, filed by learned Amicus
Curiae (Mr Siddharth Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate) in the
lead case. Notice was accordingly issued in respect of
this application on 17.09.2025.
5. Having regard to the fact that the aforesaid
application brought to light an ‘anomalous situation’
pertaining to the inter se seniority between District
Judges (Direct Recruits) and District Judges
(Promotees), this Court, vide order dated 07.10.2025,
was pleased to record as follows:
“ 2 . This Court, vide order dated 17th
September, 2025, had considered an
application filed by Shri. Siddharth
Bhatnagar, learned amicus curiae, who had
pointed out an anomalous situation viz., in
most of the states, judicial officers recruited
as Civil Judge (‘CJ’) often do not reach the
level of Principal District Judge (‘PDJ’), leave
aside reaching the position of a High Court
Judge. This has resulted in many bright
young lawyers being dissuaded from joining
the service at the level of CJ.
….
10 . It cannot be disputed that the judges who
were initially appointed as CJ gain rich
experience since they have been serving in the
judiciary for a number of decades.
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Furthermore, every judicial officer, be it one
who was initially recruited as CJ or one who
was directly recruited as a District Judge, has
an aspiration to reach at least up to the
position of a High Court Judge.
11 . We are, therefore, of the view that a
proper balance has to be struck between the
competing claims. However, this issue would
involve consideration of some of the
judgments and orders passed by Benches
comprising of three learned judges of this
Court. Therefore, in order to put the entire
controversy at rest and provide a meaningful
and long-lasting solution, we are of the
considered view that it will be appropriate if
the issue is considered by a Constitution
Bench consisting of five learned Judges of this
Court.
12 . We, therefore, direct the Registrar
(Judicial) to place the matter before the Chief
Justice of India, on the administrative side for
obtaining appropriate orders.”
6. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India thereafter
directed that the matter be placed before a 5-Judge
Bench. The matter was accordingly taken up on
14.10.2025, whereupon the limited question requiring
consideration was delineated as follows:
“What should be the criteria for determining
seniority in the cadre of Higher Judicial
Services”
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COMPETING VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS
7. As already mentioned heretofore, the learned
Amicus, through the captioned application, underscored
certain issues pervading seniority in the HJS.
inter se
8. Although the objective of the application was
initially to embellish, enliven, and enrich the District
Judiciary by balancing both merit and practical
experience, it has presently been prompted by a
perceived discontentment and heartburn amongst those
recruited to the lower rungs of the judiciary.
9. The malady of disproportionate progression within
the HJS has been observed by this Court in previous
AIJA proceedings and was also noted with concern by
the First National Judicial Pay Commission under the
Chairmanship of Justice K.J. Shetty, a former Judge of
this Court ( Shetty Commission ).
10. In this vein, as a workable outcome to improve the
position of the RPs and LDCEs and considering the
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recommendations of the Shetty Commission, the Amicus
put forth four proposals:
i. A 1:1 quota should be prescribed for appointment
to Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within the
HJS;
ii. The zone of consideration for upgradation to
Selection Grade and Super Time Scale should
comprise equal numbers of DRs and promotees
(RPs and LDCEs combined), without any
prescription regarding the actual selections;
iii. Providing one year seniority for every five years of
completed service within the lower rungs of the
judicial service, subject to a maximum of three
years, which is an attempt to revive the
recommendation of the Shetty Commission; or
iv. Creating three separate seniority lists within the
HJS, on the basis of source of recruitment, in the
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ratio of 50:25:25, as recommended by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh.
11. Thereupon, responses were filed by States / Union
Territories Administrations, as well as the Registrar
Generals of various High Courts and other stakeholders
comprising detailed submissions regarding the rules
existing in their respective States for the career
progression of Judicial Officers appointed or promoted
from the aforementioned three sources.
12. On the one hand, the RPs through their learned
counsels, raised cudgels against DRs on the grounds of
an advantage being conferred upon them by virtue of
their relatively younger age at the time of entering into
the HJS. Their contentions have been briefly
summarized hereinbelow:
i. The age advantage enjoyed by DRs enables their
progress to the Selection Grade and the Super
Time Scale, as well as taking on administrative
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roles in Districts, and ultimately, being elevated
to the High Court;
ii. Experience in judicial service is superior to
experience at the Bar, and there should be
recognition of prior judicial service in the posts of
Civil Judge-Junior Division
(Munsiff/Magistrates) and Civil Judge-Senior
Division (Sub Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrates),
whether they are promoted to the HJS from the
RP or LDCE cadres. Reliance was placed in this
regard on the decision in Rejanish K.V. v K.
1
Deepa ;
iii. ‘Heartburn’ is caused by the induction of younger
candidates as DRs and their consequential
career progression, which diminishes the
consideration of the efforts of judicial officers who
have toiled endlessly in their judicial work for
long years.
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13. Similarly, those representing the LDCEs, while
largely adopting the arguments raised by the RPs, also
sought to bring forward certain issues distinct to them:
i.
Earlier judicial service ought to be reckoned in
the same manner for both RPs and LDCEs;
ii. If sufficient candidates are not found through
LDCE in a recruitment year, the vacancies
should not be filled by RPs but should be carried
forward. In such a scenario, the passed-over
seniority ought to be conferred in the successive
selection;
iii. The position on the roster should be preserved
even if there aren’t sufficient vacancies available
in any given year.
14. On the contrary, the learned counsels representing
DRs argued that there is no pressing need for this Court
to create any favourable systems so as to promote RPs
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and LDCEs. In this regard, the following submissions
were adduced:
i. The available data clearly shows that the
situation pertaining to inter se seniority varies
across different States, with some States where
the DRs hold more prominent positions, while in
others, the RPs have an advantage over the DRs;
ii. The High Courts, being conferred with the power
to regulate, inter alia , the inter se seniority within
the Judicial Services, are better equipped to
determine the issue on the basis of the statistics
and features intrinsic to a particular State
Judicial Service, as well as to determine the inter
se seniority within the cadre of District Judges;
iii. Upon entry into the HJS, the source of
recruitment becomes inconsequential, and the
service rendered in the feeder category pales into
insignificance. When seniority of the incumbents
in a particular recruitment year is adjusted as
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per the roster system providing proportional
representation to RPs, LDCEs and DRs, such
seniority on entry continues and the birthmark
of the source from which they were recruited is
no more relevant for further career advancement
within the cadre by way of fixation in the higher
grades or designation for the discharge of
administrative duties.
iv. The position on the roster should be preserved
even if there are not sufficient vacancies available
in any given year.
15. Additionally, several High Courts were represented
before this Court by learned senior counsel, whose
submissions broadly aligned with one or the other set of
arguments addressed. As these submissions have
already been duly adverted to hereinabove, we do not
consider it necessary to reiterate them.
16. What is of greater significance, however, is that the
said counsel extended valuable assistance by placing
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before us relevant statistics and prevailing
circumstances, thereby illuminating the range of
possible approaches available to this Court for resolving
the present issue.
ANALYSIS
17. As we turn to scrutinizing and appraising the
singular issue at hand, we deem it appropriate to clarify
at the very outset that there can be no separate quota
insofar as the recommendations for elevation to the High
Court are concerned. We say so, being especially mindful
of the truism that such processes are neither promotions
nor a fixation for financial upgradation or career
advancement.
I. Power of this Court re: seniority within the HJS
T HE S UCCESSIVE AIJA P ROCEEDINGS
18. At this juncture, it is imperative to address the
specific plea raised by various parties before us that this
Court, in view of the powers granted to the High Court
under Articles 233 to 235, should restrain itself from
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issuing mandatory guidelines on the rules governing the
service of judicial officers.
19. In consideration thereof, we must first trace the
trajectory of the AIJA proceedings before this Court.
20. The captioned Writ Petition was filed in the year
1989 and has been retained in this Court as a measure
of ongoing mandamus, to safeguard the independence of
the judiciary—a basic structure of the Constitution as
held by this Court—and to effectively serve the efficient
administration of justice.
21. In the All India Judges' Association v. Union of
2
India (First AIJA) , this Court addressed: ( i ) the
establishment of an All India Judicial Service; ( ii )
uniformity in the designation of judicial officers, both on
the criminal and civil side, across the Country; ( iii )
retirement age of judicial officers to be stipulated as 60
years; ( iv ) consideration of appropriate pay scales; ( v ) a
working library and provision for sumptuary allowance;
( vi ) residential accommodation to be provided by the
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State Government; ( vii ) adequate transport facilities;
and ( viii ) establishment of institutions for in-service
training.
22.
All of these aspects were articulated to establish a
status for the judicial service that aligns with the
assigned judicial duties, maintaining the principle of
separation of powers and safeguarding the
independence of the judiciary. This idea was further
supported by creating a supportive working environment
free from the burdens of mundane routines and the
challenges of maintaining a work-life balance.
23. Although directions were issued on all these
aspects, a review was filed, leading to the judgment in
3
All India Judges' Association v. Union of India
(Second AIJA) , where some modifications were made;
the most significant being the requirement of three
years' practice as a mandatory and essential
qualification for recruitment to judicial posts at the lower
rungs in the judicial hierarchy, and the weeding out of
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dead wood at an age prior to the stipulation of 60 years
as the common age of superannuation.
2
24. The directions put forth in the First AIJA were
3
Second AIJA
essentially affirmed in all respects in the ,
except for the direction for grant of sumptuary as well as
residence-cum-library allowances, which stood
withdrawn subject to fulfilment of certain conditions.
Essentially, the directions issued, as already
highlighted, aimed to accord a special status to judicial
officers who, in their role of dispensing justice, occupy a
position that is both demanding and unique; and stands
in contrast to other State services, given that their
independence is a fundamental aspect of the
Constitution, as held by this Court.
25. Thereafter, in the All India Judges' Association
4
v. Union of India (Third AIJA) , this Court specifically
examined the clarification sought by the State of Kerala
and found that the five years of legal practice prescribed
as the minimum qualification for appointment to the
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lower rung of the judicial service in that State, to be
perfectly in order, since the direction in the Second
3
AIJA aimed to establish a minimum essential
qualification of three years’ practice.
26. While reaffirming the requirement of at least three
years’ practice for recruitment to the lowest rung of
judicial office, it was also determined that a by-transfer
appointment to the cadre of Munsif-Magistrates from the
ministerial and gazetted staff of the district judiciary and
the High Court was bad because it did not meet the
minimum requirement of three years’ practice at the bar.
27. In All India Judges' Association v. Union of
5
India (Fourth AIJA) , the requirement of a minimum
experience at the Bar was dispensed with, finding fresh
graduates also eligible to offer themselves for
recruitment to the lower rungs of the judiciary,
especially in the context of a mandatory training period
of one year having been provided. Further, a faster
promotional opportunity was provided for the judicial
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officers in the lower rungs by prescribing an LDCE. It
was also directed that for proportional representation of
the RPs, LDCEs and DRs, a ratio of 50:25:25 would be
applied to the cadre of District Judges; the seniority at
the entry point in the HJS being determined on a 40-
point roster as approved by this Court in R.K.
6
Sabharwal & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.
28. Later, in the year 2010, in All India Judges Assn.
7
v. Union of India ( Fifth AIJA) , having realised that a
large number of vacancies in the 25% LDCE category
remained unfilled, the said quota itself was reduced to
10%. A ratio of 65:10:25, respectively, for the RPs,
LDCEs and DRs, was thus prescribed for recruitment to
the cadre of District Judges.
29. This ratio has, however, been once again modified
this year itself in 2025 in the All India Judges
8
Association v. Union of India (Sixth AIJA) to
50:25:25, also revamping and expanding the framework
for accelerated promotion from Junior Division to Senior
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Division and thereafter to the HJS. As of date, the
1
decision of this Court in Rejanish K.V has further
enabled the service of judicial officers to be reckoned for
the purpose of direct recruitment to the HJS through
participation in the direct recruitment examinations.
30. The series of AIJA decisions thus acknowledges
and recognises the fact that in a democracy, the role of
the judiciary is truly indispensable. For the efficient
functioning of the Rule of Law and to ensure that our
democracy prospers, it is de reiguer that we nurture an
efficient, strong, and enlightened judiciary.
H IGH C OURT AS A REPOSITORY OF POWERS
31. At the same time, we are also cognizant of the wide-
ranging powers and general superintendence vested
with each High Court regarding the judicial services,
within the respective States / Union Territories.
32. To understand the width of these powers, one need
not look beyond the decisions of two Constitution
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Benches of this Court in B.S. Yadav v. State of
9 10
Haryana and State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah .
9
33. To explicate, B.S. Yadav was a case in which the
judicial officers promoted to the higher judicial service of
Punjab and Haryana, two different States with a unified
High Court, challenged the determination of seniority
inter se promotees and direct recruits based on two
different sets of rules. A Constitution bench of this Court
held that although the State Legislature or the Governor
has the authority to pass laws regulating the
recruitment of Judicial Officers of the State under Article
309, the extent of these powers is to be regulated by
Article 235, ensuring that the Rules and Regulations
made do not impinge upon or detrimentally affect the
control vested in the High Court by Article 235.
10
34. Similarly, in Bal Mukund Sah , this Court
considered the application of reservation of vacancies, as
enacted by the State of Bihar in the direct recruitment
to the posts in the judiciary of the State, both to the
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Higher Judicial Services of District Judges and the
grassroots level in the lower rungs of the judiciary. The
Constitution Bench therein held that the appropriate
Legislature or the Governor can regulate the recruitment
and conditions of services of the persons appointed to
public services and posts, only subject to other
provisions of the Constitution, including the power of
superintendence conferred on the High Court under
Article 235.
35. It is therefore quite clear that both the Constitution
Bench decisions definitively state that, whether it
concerns recruitment or the determination of seniority,
the State Legislature empowered under Article 309 or
the Governor, exercising the power to make rules under
the proviso to Article 309, ought to consult the High
Court. This is especially so when Article 309 is subject
to other provisions of the Constitution, giving primacy to
Articles 233 to 235, wherein the control of the entire
District Judiciary is conceded to the High Court.
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36. Having said that, we consider it necessary to
observe that there can be no doubt that this Court faces
no constitutional impediment in exercising its unique
power of judicial review under Article 32, read with other
relevant provisions of the Constitution, including
Articles 141 and 142, to lay down uniform guidelines
governing the structure and functioning of the judicial
services across the country. It is imperative to note that
this very function has been carried out by this Court
through a series of judgments passed in the instant Writ
Petition as well as in other cases, including in Rejanish
1
K.V. and Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U.P. Public
11
Service Commission , with the consistent goal of
strengthening the judiciary by fostering uniformity in the
structure of judicial services, enabling judicial
institutions to be more effective, and ensuring that
excellence and merit continue to remain the hallmark of
judicial officers.
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37. There is no gainsaying that Articles 233 to 235
assign policy decisions, such as the specific manner of
implementing the directions of this Court, to the domain
of the High Court. However, at the same time, it is also
essential that overarching guidelines, which would apply
across all States, be framed to ensure the development
of unified and robust judicial services, with the ultimate
goal of cultivating an independent judiciary. These
guidelines do not foreclose the powers of the High Court;
instead, they establish a homogenous framework within
which each High Court, as a Constitutional Court, can
exercise superintendence over the judicial services.
II. The curious case of ‘Heartburn’
38. Having addressed the initial concern about this
Court's propriety to enter into the domain of seniority
within the judicial services, we turn our attention to the
issue of ‘heartburn’.
39. The RPs in this regard vehemently urged that a
separate quota be created in their favour within the HJS
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for career advancement. They pointed out their service
in the judicial service in the Senior Division and the
Junior Division, which, according to them, has been
1
Rejanish K.V.
recognised by this Court in as being far
superior to experience at the Bar. They further
contended that the ‘heartburn’ caused by the induction
of younger candidates as DRs and their consequential
career progression diminishes the efforts of officers who
have toiled endlessly in their judicial work.
40. It may be noticed that the Constitution Bench in
1
Rejanish K.V. , while permitting judicial officers to
compete along with the Members of the Bar for direct
recruitment to HJS, did not observe that the experience
in judicial service is superior to that of a practising
advocate, but only noticed that it is in no manner
inferior.
41. It merits emphasis that in prescribing the
minimum years of practice for recruitment to the lower
rungs of the judiciary, this Court on earlier occasions
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specifically laid stress upon the experience at the Bar as
an essential requirement for entry into judicial service.
8
The three-judge Bench in the Sixth AIJA merely
equated judicial service and experience at the Bar and
did not confer any supremacy on one as against the
other.
42. In this context, it must be noted that the
discontentment of the RPs within the HJS cadre has
been mitigated to a large extent by increasing the ratio
for the HJS cadre for LDCEs, and by enabling judicial
officers who have completed a minimum period of service
and reached an age, at par with that prescribed for bar
members are also being considered for direct
recruitment to the HJS.
43. We also need to note that the DRs, especially the
members from the Bar, are now at a disadvantage due
12
to the decision in R. Poornima v. Union of India . This
dictum provides that consideration for recommendation
to the High Court will be possible only after they have
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completed ten years as a judicial officer. In sharp
contrast, an RP or LDCE would face an advantage in this
scenario since such a requirement would also take into
consideration their service at the lower rungs of the
judiciary and the HJS.
44. The data supplied by various High Courts, hence,
has to be looked at in the above perspective. The last
three decades have witnessed substantial changes in the
minimum required experience for recruitment to the
lower rungs in the judiciary. In 1993, three years’
experience at the Bar was prescribed by this Court.
Although this minimum requirement was dispensed
with in the year 2002, this position has occupied the
field for the last two decades.
45. Presently, State Judiciaries are in the cusp of a
major change with the reintroduction of the minimum
three years’ experience at the Bar for recruitment to
junior division and the further directions issued by this
8
Court in Sixth AIJA enabling accelerated career
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progression to the judicial officers recruited and
continuing in the lower rungs of judiciary, with an
additional provision for participating in direct
1
Rejanish K.V
recruitment to HJS, as provided in . The
data supplied concerns persons continuing in the State
Judiciary, which also varies from State to State.
46. As has been noticed earlier, some of the States have
more RPs occupying positions of significance, while in
others the DRs are more prominent. High Courts across
the country are also not ad idem on the issue raised,
with most of them exhorting before this Court to neither
enter into the question of a further seniority
determination in the HJS, different from that assigned
on entry thereat, nor to tweak the assignment of
seniority based on roster points applied to the ratio of
recruitment from the three sources.
47. Even within the HJS, the fixation in the Selection
Grade and the Super Time Scale is regulated by merit-
cum-seniority; seniority being assigned from the date of
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entry into the HJS in proportion with the ratio based on
the roster points assigned to each source. As in any
selection based on merit-cum-seniority, merit remains
the dominant consideration, and seniority is applied
only when the merit or suitability stands equal. The
consideration of merit is performance-based within the
cadre of HJS, relatable to various periods spent in that
cadre and not those spent earlier in the lower rungs of
the judiciary.
48. This is also the position with respect to the
assignment of administrative duties in a District, which
falls upon the senior-most within the HJS, in a given
District, designated as District Judge or Principal
District Judge.
49. The fixation in higher grades and designations for
the purpose of discharging administrative duties is never
dependent solely on seniority; merit and suitability are
the norm, which must be evaluated based on service in
that cadre, rather than prior service in the lower rungs.
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50. In bringing this issue to a close, we consider it
appropriate to employ an analogy to illustrate the
relative modes of entry into the Higher Judicial Service.
If entry into the HJS is viewed as a common destination,
one may conceive of DRs as reaching that destination by
flight, LDCEs as travelling by train, and RPs as
traversing the distance on foot. At first blush, it may
indeed appear that the RPs experience a greater degree
of heartburn when compared to the relative swiftness
with which the other categories are able to enter the
HJS.
51. However, this perceived difficulty stands
sufficiently addressed by the fact that this Court has
ensured the availability of multiple avenues to
Promotees for career advancement—whether through
1
the LDCE, or, as recognised in Rejanish K.V. , through
the option of participating in the Direct Recruitment
process.
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52. When such opportunities exist, the mere inability
of certain officers to succeed in these examinations on
the basis of merit, or the contention that their
promotional channel is slower or numerically larger,
cannot furnish a valid basis for seeking preferential
treatment within the HJS merely on account of a sense
of grievance. It is well settled that career progression to
the higher echelons of the judiciary is neither a matter
of right nor of entitlement.
III. Non-retention of ‘Birthmark’
53. The issue of determining seniority, inter se RPs and
DRs has vexed public offices from the very inception, and
there is a wealth of precedents to rely upon.
54. For instance, in Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of
13
Customs , this court considered the rotational system
for granting seniority between DRs and RPs upon
entering a cadre, as well as maintaining that seniority
upon promotion to higher posts. In the context of
promotion from the post of Appraisers to the Principal
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Appraisers, the Constitution Bench ruled that when
there is only one recruitment source, the normal rule
applies, i.e. a person promoted to a higher grade gains
seniority in that grade based on the date of promotion,
provided they are found fit and confirmed in the higher
grade after the probation period. In such cases,
continuous appointment in the higher grade determines
seniority, since the source of recruitment is the same.
55. This principle straightforwardly applies to the
fixation of seniority in the Selection Grade and Super
Time Scale within the HJS in the cadre of District
Judges, recruited or promoted from the three different
sources. Further career advancement in the HJS thus
depends on seniority within that cadre, not the feeder
category.
56. This principle was followed by another Constitution
14
Bench in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India ,
which was concerned with the promotion from Train
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Examiners ‘D’ Grade, which was a common cadre formed
by separate sources, to Train Examiners ‘C’ Grade.
57. The decision in State of Jammu & Kashmir v.
15
Sh. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.
also stands out in
this context, where a Constitution Bench of this Court
had the opportunity to expand the principle laid out in
13 14
Mervyn Coutindo and Roshan Lal Tandon .
Judicial scrutiny in that case was limited to considering
whether a classification based on educational
qualification had a reasonable basis and bore a nexus
with the object in view. When approving the
classification, the Court noted that the rules did not
discriminate among graduates on the basis of source,
thereby undermining any claim of a ‘birthmark’ in the
cadre influencing the classification.
58. Article 16, ensuring equality of opportunities in
matters relating to employment, was held to be an
instance of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article
14. The concept of equality, it was held, has an inherent
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limitation arising from the very nature of the
constitutional guarantee, mandating ‘equality for equals’
and not for ‘unequals’ . The classification on the basis of
educational qualification, made with a view to achieving
administrative efficiency, was held to be not resting on
any fortuitous circumstances and, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, justified the validity of such
classification.
14
59. The ratio in Roshan Lal Tandon insofar as it
held that the direct recruits and promotees lost their
birthmarks on fusion into a common stream of service,
prohibiting their classification on the basis of the source
from which they were recruited, was found to be not
applicable in the facts and circumstances of Triloki
15
Nath Khosa . The Constitution Bench in Triloki Nath
15
Khosa held that “… The ratio of Roshan Lal’s case can
at best be an impediment in favouring persons drawn
from one source as against those drawn from another for
the reason merely that they are drawn from different
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sources” (sic para 47) . This impediment is in the teeth of
the answer to the question posed by the Amicus in this
case.
14
60. Roshan Lal Tandon
The dictum of as succinctly
15
stated in Triloki Nath Khosa however, squarely
applies in the case of District Judges appointed from
three different sources, being further classified on the
basis of their length of service in the lower rungs of the
judiciary, prejudicing the DRs, who do not have the
advantage of such service in the lower cadre.
61. In this light, the theory of classification, as
proposed by the Amicus, subverts and submerges the
precious guarantee of equality as available to the
members of the common cadre, who, on appointment
and determination of their inter se seniority, at the time
of appointment into the HJS, lose the ‘birthmark’ of the
source from which they are appointed.
62. Reference must also be made in this regard to the
decision in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering
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Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra and
16
Ors. , which was inter alia concerned with the inter se
seniority of direct recruits and promotees, as also the
determination of seniority of ad-hoc appointees. While
deciding the issues, including that of implementation of
a quota and the consequence of its breakdown, it was
unequivocally held that, on appointment to a post in
accordance with the rules, seniority ought to be
conferred from the date of initial appointment; the
departure being possible only when the initial
appointment is ad-hoc and not in accordance with the
rules, with which issues we are not concerned.
63. The appointment made by way of a stopgap
arrangement without considering the claims of the
eligible available persons and without following the rules
of appointment was held to be not comparable with the
experience of a regular appointee, because of the sheer
qualitative difference in the appointment itself. It was
reiterated that otherwise there would be treatment of
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unequals as equals, which would violate the principle of
equality spelt out in Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. These principles were further reiterated in
State of West Bengal v. Aghore Nath
the cases of
17
Dey and Ram Janam Singh v. State of Uttar
18
Pradesh .
64. Hence, if at all the experience in the lower rungs of
the judiciary is to be reckoned for determining seniority
in HJS, there should be some compelling reason which
stands the test of reasonableness, not being vitiated by
the foul of arbitrariness, which again has to be provided
by means of statutory rules. In our view, there is no
basis to consider the previous experience as a Civil
Judge as an intelligible differentia creating a reasonable
classification to favour RPs or LDCEs in the selection for
higher grade scales or appointment as Principal District
Judges.
65. However, it goes without saying that this does not
preclude the High Courts, which are capable of deciding
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on compelling reasons based on the particular facts and
circumstances of each State, along with available data
and statistics, from providing preferential treatment to
any group within the HJS. Provided that such
preferential treatment does not go contrary to the
15
principles enunciated in Triloki Nath Khosa , and is
incorporated within the statutory rules.
IV. The Roster and its implementation
66. As previously observed, this Court, in the Fourth
5
AIJA , had found that preparation of a Roster is the
most suitable method of determining seniority within the
HJS, and we see no reason to deviate therefrom.
However, hindsight, experience, and subsequent
developments have necessitated that this Court take a
fresh look at some aspects of the roster system of
seniority and address the issues and gaps that have
emerged therein.
67. Submissions were made from both sides on the
efficacy of a 40-point roster as stipulated in the Fourth
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5
AIJA , where the quota for RP, LDCE, and DR was set in
a 50:25:25 ratio. Although this ratio for the composition
of the cadre was later modified to 65:10:25, the earlier
ratio was reinstated by the Constitution Bench in the
8
Sixth AIJA . Whereas, though the stipulation for a 40-
point seniority roster has remained a common feature
across different States, its exact formulations remain
varied.
68. At present, the sequence of seniority and the
specific roster points assigned to each source are
decided by the respective State Governments in
consultation with the High Court and stipulated in the
relevant service rules. Most of the States / Union
Territories / High Courts have supplied this Court with
the details of the roster points prescribed in their
respective rules. A majority of the States have allocated
the first three positions to the RPs, followed by one to
the DRs and one to LDCE, with the roster points
repeated in the said sequence. However, insofar as the
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Northeastern States, Chhattisgarh, and Gujarat, are
concerned, LDCE is given preference in seniority over the
DRs, with the first positions going to the RPs.
69.
In three other States, the situation is different, as
the LDCEs have been given the first preference in
seniority, followed by the RPs and then the DRs. Clearly,
the determination of the roster points has created
divergent service rules for the same cadre of officers. In
our considered opinion, this situation is an affront to the
ideal of uniformity within the judicial services that is
sought to be preserved through these proceedings.
70. With these observations and having considered the
suggestions made across the Bar on this matter, it
appears to us that the most appropriate mechanism to
harmonise the system of seniority across the HJS is a 4-
point roster system, wherein the first two points shall be
allocated to RPs, the third to LDCE(s), and the fourth to
DR(s). This roster would, it goes without saying, repeat
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thereafter, till all the appointees are placed within the
roster.
71. In this backdrop, we may also clarify that the roster
is an annual creation. The timeline for recruitment to
HJS, as well as the lower judicial services, is prescribed
11
in the operative portions of Malik Mazhar Sultan . If
the judgment is followed by the letter, it would result in
all appointments, from all three sources, being achieved
within the same year. The annual roster is envisaged as
a complementary component to manage the intake from
all three sources and assign inter se seniority thereto. In
this situation, the fixation of seniority among RPs,
LDCEs, and DRs shall be determined according to the
roster points for that particular year, de hors the exact
date of appointment. To put it tersely, as long as the
appointment takes place within the same year as that in
which the recruitment is initiated, there are no qualms
in placing all such appointees within the same roster of
that year.
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72. The above clarification, as an obvious
consequence, then begs the question: what would
happen when the recruitment does not conclude within
the same year as when it was initiated? Experience
indicates that, especially since the process of evaluation
for promotion is based on merit-cum-seniority, with
merit being the predominant factor, delays are likely in
selecting LDCE candidates and even more so in the case
of DRs, where merit is the sole consideration—
complications in the evaluation process, unexpected
administrative holdups, and lengthy litigation are just a
list of examples that delay the procedure.
73. That, however, is only one side of the coin. On the
flip side, this Court must also uphold and enforce the
ideal of seniority as per continuous service within the
cadre to prevent the anomalies that many States are
faced with today. The aforementioned question has
remained one of the significant gaps in the existing
directions regarding the seniority roster in the HJS, and
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this Court must now strike a balance between these two
concerns.
74. This is not the first occasion that this Court has
had to consider the impact of selection delays on a
seniority roster of a government service. Union of India.
19
v. N.R. Parmar considered the inter se seniority
between direct recruits and the promotees. Therein, the
direct recruitment process, though substantially
commenced in the same recruitment year, could not be
completed within that recruitment year, so the
promotees were appointed substantially before the direct
recruits, who finally joined two years later. In such a
situation, this Court permitted the placement of such
direct recruits within the same roster as the timely
appointed promotees, since the delay was attributable to
the rigmaroles of a direct recruitment.
20
75. In K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro , a
three-Judge Bench overruled the decision in N.R.
19
Parmar to hold that the general principle of law is that
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a direct recruit cannot get a back-dated notional
seniority, earlier than the date when he joined in service.
A Two-Judge Bench in Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan
21
Singh Rao K.
doubted the correctness of
20
Meghachandra Singh especially since the attention
of the three Judge Bench was not invited to the decision
of a Co-ordinate Bench in M. Subba Reddy v. A.P.
22
SRTC .
21
76. In Hariharan , attention was drawn to the
anomaly arising when the process of recruitment of
direct recruits is completed within the same recruitment
year, yet an adequate number of candidates could not
be selected. It was observed that in such circumstances,
the shortfall must be carried forward to the succeeding
recruitment year. Consequently, candidates selected
against such carried-forward vacancies are required to
be placed en bloc below the Promotees of the earlier
years. Unless this procedure is adhered to, the rotation
of the quota system stands frustrated.
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77. The reference was thus only with respect to the
selections made from different sources, based on a ratio
applied to the cadre, to vacancies arising in a
recruitment year.
78. While this particular issue remains pending in the
abovementioned reference, in our view, keeping in mind
the most celebrated principle of assigning seniority on
the basis of the period of continuous service while also
acknowledging the almost inevitable incidence of
speedbumps, the model delineated hereinafter for the
purposes of HJS would be most appropriate.
79. If the recruitment process from any source is not
completed in the year in which it began, but
appointments are made before the end of the following
year, those appointees shall be placed at their respective
roster points for the year of initiation. Provided that no
appointments from any source are made for the next
recruitment year before these appointments are effected.
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80. To illustrate, let us consider that the recruitment
process from all three sources is initiated in Year A. The
procedures for appointment of LDCEs and RPs are
completed within the same Year A, and they are placed
in the Annual Roster for Year A. However, a variety of
issues cause the appointments of DRs to happen only in
Year A+1. Now, these DRs, although appointed in Year
A+1, would be permitted to also take their positions
within the roster for Year A, as long as they were
appointed prior to the LDCEs, RPs, and DRs whose
recruitment is initiated in Year A+1.
81. Barring the above exception, we affirm that the
continuous length of service ought to be the criterion for
determining inter se seniority in the HJS, subject to the
further condition that all appointees in a single
recruitment year are placed against their respective
annual roster points, regardless of the actual date of
appointment.
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82. The above mechanism, in our opinion, serves to
mitigate the grievances and preserve the seniority of an
appointee who was subsequently borne in service only
due to the vagaries of the recruitment process. In the
same vein, the officers appointed earlier also cannot be
aggrieved, as they would be adjusted within the roster
only along with their relative contemporaries in the
service and would be put on notice regarding the
seniority determination once the other selections are
concluded.
83. If the High Court, for any valid reason, decides not
to initiate the recruitment process from any of the three
sources in a given year, the person subsequently
appointed from those sources shall not be eligible to be
placed within the roster for that year in which
recruitment from the source did not take place.
84. We are at the same time also cognizant of the
necessity of ensuring that vacancies in the judicial
services do not remain unfilled, the negative
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consequences of which have been very cogently
11
addressed by this Court in Mazhar Malik Sultan . To
8
this end, this Court in the Sixth AIJA , has already
provided that unfilled vacancies within the LDCE quota
may be diverted and filled by RPs.
85. In our considered opinion, the above system can
also be extended to the vacancies that remain unfilled
after the process of direct recruitment is completed. To
explicate, when some of the vacancies pertaining to DRs
or LDCEs in a particular year are not filled up due to
non-availability of suitable candidates from these
sources, despite the recruitment process being taken to
its conclusion, the positions which remain vacant for
want of candidates shall be filled up in the same
recruitment year through regular promotion from the
cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) as per the
applicable rules.
86. In such a scenario, the candidates who are
ordinarily selected from the three sources are assigned
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seniority on induction to the HJS as per the Annual
Roster in the regular manner. The remaining RPs, who
are promoted in the vacancies from the other sources,
would also be entitled to be placed in the same roster,
but they would only occupy the subsequent positions for
RPs, i.e., this diversion does not grant the roster position
of LDCEs or DRs to these RPs. In the subsequent
recruitment year, the ratio of 50:25:25 should guide the
computation of vacancies to be filled from each source.
This would be a continuing exercise of applying the
roster points on the candidates selected in each
recruitment year, while the ratio is applied to the cadre,
for determining the vacancies arising in a subsequent
year.
V. Data – an unreliable guide
87. Despite the data presented by the Amicus Curiae as
to the constitution of the HJS in various States,
specifically the number of posts occupied by the RPs and
the DRs, a reality check on facts is not possible due to
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the rather amorphous and fluid situation that has
existed in the past three decades.
88. As was found, it was in 1992 that this Court in the
3
Second AIJA
prescribed a minimum requirement of
three years’ practice at the Bar for recruitment to the
lower rungs of the judiciary. Before that, it was not
uniform and different periods were prescribed in
different States; as we saw from Kerala, which
prescribed a minimum five years’ practice at the Bar for
recruitment to the entry point at the lower rung of the
judiciary, which stood approved in 1994 by the Third
4
AIJA .
89. Be it the three-year course or the five-year course
in LL.B, the latter of which commenced only in 1988-89,
that too initially confined to National Law Universities,
the average age of recruitment as Munsiff/Magistrate
would have been 26 to 28. The age limit would further
increase in the case of reservations, wherever it was
enabled with a relaxation in the maximum age. There
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would be minimal representation of those who were
recruited at the commencement of the three decades just
past.
5
90. Fourth AIJA
With the , in 2002, the requirement
of practice was fully dispensed with, in which context,
the age of recruitment could be anything above 23 years;
who would be the present incumbents in the post of
District Judges, having been promoted from the Senior
Division. Even then, the time spent in Junior Division
and Senior Division, before promotion to the HJS varied
considerably in the different States and there could be
no common malady ferreted out which requires
mitigation.
91. We are constrained to observe that the suggestions
as placed on record by the learned Amicus would be
counter-productive and would run against established
norms of service jurisprudence, if the service in the lower
cadre is reckoned for determining the seniority in the
higher cadre, especially when, in addition to regular
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promotions, there is a merit based promotion
opportunity through LDCE and DR, participation in
which is now permitted to both the existing Judicial
Officers and the Members of the Bar.
92. The ratio of 1:1, as suggested by the Amicus and
the zone of consideration of 50% officers from the two
categories of promotion and direct recruitment, would
only create further disparities and lead to
discontentment of those promoted on merit and would
create a disadvantage to those Judicial Officers who are
directly recruited to the HJS. A three-year seniority
would also cause injustice insofar as direct recruitment
is concerned, providing no such incentive to a Judicial
Officer who had earlier been in the Junior Division or the
Senior Division.
93. The separate seniority list in respect of the three
different sources would also result in inequalities. We
have no reason to doubt that creating quotas for fixation
in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within the
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cadre of District Judges based on the prior service in the
lower rungs of the Judiciary would be iniquitous and
would result in sacrificing merit.
94.
As was observed, the disparities in the data and
statistics presented, coupled with the anticipated
change in the constitution of the HJS prompted by the
8 1
Sixth AIJA and Rejanish K.V make today a wholly
inopportune moment to bring in any weightage to RPs in
the HJS, on the basis of their service in the Junior
Division and the Senior Division. This is, especially so,
when the merit, suitability and seniority determined for
fixation in the higher grades of Selection Grade and
Super Time Scale have to be factored and evaluated on
the basis of the service in the HJS and not that in the
lower feeder cadre. The earlier service in the lower rungs
of the judiciary can only enable a meritorious promotion
to the HJS, and the incumbents in the HJS having lost
their ‘genetic blemish’ or so to say the ‘genetic
adornment’ of experience in the lower cadre, will have to
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prove their merit in the HJS for further career
advancement. It would also dampen the spirit of those
who avail the chances of accelerated promotion, since
then, there would be no incentive in taking that
opportunity.
95. Ambition is a ladder, the last rung of which is
always elusive to the one pursuing it, who endlessly
searches for it; based on which, seniority cannot be
fixed. For all these reasons, we are compelled to note
that the questions raised and the reliefs sought by the
learned Amicus through this Interlocutory Application
must be declined, save for the mechanisms envisaged
and enumerated through this judgment.
96. Perhaps at this juncture and milieu, prior to
solidifying our conclusions and directions, it would be
2
fitting to quote a passage from the First AIJA :
“ Judges do not have an easy job. They
repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to
avoid; make decisions. ”
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CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
97. Before proceeding any further, we consider it
apposite to record a caveat that the guidelines issued
herein are not intended to adjudicate or resolve any
inter
se seniority dispute among RPs, LDCEs and DRs. What
we seek to lay down are general and mandatory
guidelines which shall, henceforth, be incorporated into
the respective statutory service rules governing the
determination of inter se seniority among officers
appointed from different sources to the Higher Judicial
Services.
98. Likewise, the directions issued herein shall not be
construed as an avenue to reopen or unsettle
inter se
seniorities that have already been determined between
officers appointed from the different sources of
recruitment.
99. It is further clarified that such directions, as well
as this judgment in toto , are being issued considering the
issues as on date and may require reconsideration upon
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observing the ultimate impact and effect of the decisions
1
rendered by the Constitution Bench in Rejanish K.V.
8
and the Sixth AIJA . We say so, being mindful of the
fact that the inter se position amongst RPs, LDCEs and
DRs is likely to undergo substantial change in due
course, in light of the aforesaid decisions. Such altered
circumstances may necessitate a review, modification,
or recall of the present directions.
100. In this vein, we deem it appropriate to invoke our
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to record
the following conclusions and issue the ensuing
directions:
(i) That, perceived discontentment and
heartburn without something more in the
form of a legal claim, illegal denial, or at
least a legitimate expectation cannot
result in creating an artificial
classification of members within a cadre.
(ii) That, the statistical data is disparate and
does not provide a substantial basis to
find such discontentment and heartburn
of RPs in the HJS, to be justified.
(iii) That, there is no common malady of
disproportionate representation of DRs in
the HJS such that it is diminishing the
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prospects of financial upgradation or
designation as Principal District Judges to
the promotees, which afflict the Country
as a whole or make it imperative for this
Court to resolve it, by giving a preference
to RPs or LDCEs.
(iv) That, the data put forth in many States
indicates a prevalence or equivalence of
RPs in the HJS and key positions, which is
th
natural since their ratio is 3/4 of the
total posts in the cadre.
(v) That, on the entry into a common cadre
from different sources (RP, LDCE and DR)
and assignment of seniority as per the
annual roster, the incumbents lose their
‘birthmark’ of the source from which they
are recruited.
(vi) That fixation in the Selection Grade and
Super Time Scale within the HJS is based
on the merit-cum-seniority within the
cadre and cannot depend upon the length
of service or performance in the lower
rungs of the Judiciary; the latter loses its
significance after RPs and LDCEs, by its
virtue, are propelled into the HJS.
Reliance on it does not serve the object of
efficient administration of justice and is
counterproductive.
(vii) That, the length and performance as a
Civil Judge also does not constitute an
intelligible differentia to classify
incumbents in the common cadre of
District Judge and the classification made
15
in Triloki Nath Khosa by a Constitution
Bench of this Court on the basis of
educational qualifications stands on a
different footing.
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(viii) That, individual career aspirations are a
normal incidence of service, accentuated
only by better performance; they are not
connected to the objective of an
independent and strengthened judiciary
and cannot guide the shape of the rules of
seniority.
(ix) That, sufficient accelerated opportunities
are provided for Members of the Judicial
Service entering into the lower rungs, for
career advancement as provided by the
1
Constitution Bench in Rejanish K.V. ;
enabling the reckoning of their service for
direct recruitment to HJS and by the Sixth
8
AIJA ; facilitating fast-track promotions
to Civil Judge (Senior Division) and the
HJS through reduction in the minimum
period of service.
(x) That, the seniority of officers within the
HJS shall be determined through an
annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers
appointed in the particular year in the
repeating sequence of 2 RPs, 1 LDCE, and
1 DR.
(xi) That, only if the recruitment process is
completed within the year after which it
was initiated and no other appointments,
from any of the three sources, have
already taken place in respect of the
recruitment initiated for that subsequent
year, shall the officers belatedly so
appointed be entitled to seniority as per
the roster of the year in which recruitment
was initiated.
(xii) That, if the recruitment process is not
initiated for vacancies arising in a given
year in the same year, the candidate
filling such vacancy, in subsequent
recruitment, shall be granted seniority
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within the annual roster of the year in
which the recruitment process is finally
concluded and appointment is made.
(xiii) That, after the recruitment of DRs and
LDCEs is complete for a particular year,
the positions falling in their quota that
remain unfilled due to lack of suitable
candidates shall be filled through RPs,
subject to such RPs being placed only on
subsequent RP positions in the annual
roster; and the vacancies in the
subsequent year shall be computed so as
to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the
entire cadre.
(xiv) That, the statutory rules governing the
HJS in the respective States, in
consultation with the High Courts, shall
prescribe the exact modalities of the
Annual Roster and how the directions of
this judgement shall be implemented.
101. The respective States / Union Territory
Administrations are hereby also directed to undertake
appropriate amendments in their respective statutory
rules, in consultation with the High Court, to bring them
in consonance with the guidelines laid down in this
judgment, within a period of three months.
102. The question framed by us is thus answered in the
above terms. The instant Interlocutory Application
stands disposed of.
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103. I.A. Nos. 269261 and 270515/2025 also stand
disposed of.
104. Ordered accordingly.
.…….......……………….CJI
(B.R. GAVAI)
….…….......……………….J.
(SURYA KANT)
….…….......……………….J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
….…….......……………….J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
….…….......……………….J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
New Delhi;
November 19, 2025
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I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989
1
Rejanish K.V. v K. Deepa
1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2196
2
First AIJA
2
(1992) 1 SCC 119
3
Second AIJA
3
(1993) 4 SCC 288
4
Third AIJA
4
(1994) SCC 314
5
Fourth AIJA
5
(2002) 4 SCC 247
6
R.K. Sabharwal & Ors. v. State of
Punjab & Ors.
6
(1995) 2 SCC 745
7
Fifth AIJA
7
(2010) 15 SCC 170
8
Sixth AIJA
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184
9
B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana
9
(1980) Supp SCC 524
10
State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah
10
(2000) 4 SCC 640
11
Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U.P. Public
Service Commission
11
(2008) 17 SCC 703
12
R. Poornima v. Union of India
12
(2023) 12 SCC 519
13
Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of
Customs
13
(1966) 3 SCR 600
14
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India
14
(1968) 1 SCR 185
15
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sh.
Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.
15
(1974) 1 SCC 19
16
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering
Officers’ Association v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors.
16
(1990) 2 SCC 715
17
State of West Bengal v. Aghore Nath
Dey
17
(1993) 3 SCC 371
18
Ram Janam Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh
18
(1994) 2 SCC 622
19
Union of India. v. N.R. Parmar
19
(2012) 13 SCC 340
20
K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam
Siro
20
(2020) 5 SCC 689
21
Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan Singh
Rao
21
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1717
22
M. Subba Reddy v. A.P. SRTC
22
(2004) 6 SCC 729
Page 59 of 59
I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. 230675/2025
IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1022 OF 1989
All India Judges Association and Ors. …Petitioners
Versus
Union of India and Ors. …Respondents
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. The instant Interlocutory Application seeks to
revisit the principles governing the determination of
seniority within the cadre of Higher Judicial Services
( HJS ) of all the States. This controversy is neither novel
nor transient; rather, it represents a recurring dilemma
that has, from time to time, engaged the attention of this
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2025.11.19
12:18:51 IST
Reason:
Court.
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2. To briefly outline the factual context herein, the
HJS, across the country, is comprised of officers
recruited through three sources: ( i ) Regular Promotees
RP ii
( ); ( ) those promoted through the Limited
Departmental Competitive Examinations ( LDCE ); and
( iii ) Direct Recruits ( DR ). These three sources for
recruitment and appointment to the position of District
Judge were crystallised through various directions
issued in the successive All India Judges Association
( AIJA ) proceedings. It is amongst these three sources
that the dispute of inter se seniority has arisen.
3. Over the course of many decades, divergent
approaches have been adopted in an endeavour to
reconcile competing claims between different streams of
appointment, reflecting this Court’s continued attempt
to bring coherence and uniformity to this enduring
issue.
4. This question has once again fallen before us for
consideration in light of an interlocutory application,
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being I.A. No. 230675 of 2025, filed by learned Amicus
Curiae (Mr Siddharth Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate) in the
lead case. Notice was accordingly issued in respect of
this application on 17.09.2025.
5. Having regard to the fact that the aforesaid
application brought to light an ‘anomalous situation’
pertaining to the inter se seniority between District
Judges (Direct Recruits) and District Judges
(Promotees), this Court, vide order dated 07.10.2025,
was pleased to record as follows:
“ 2 . This Court, vide order dated 17th
September, 2025, had considered an
application filed by Shri. Siddharth
Bhatnagar, learned amicus curiae, who had
pointed out an anomalous situation viz., in
most of the states, judicial officers recruited
as Civil Judge (‘CJ’) often do not reach the
level of Principal District Judge (‘PDJ’), leave
aside reaching the position of a High Court
Judge. This has resulted in many bright
young lawyers being dissuaded from joining
the service at the level of CJ.
….
10 . It cannot be disputed that the judges who
were initially appointed as CJ gain rich
experience since they have been serving in the
judiciary for a number of decades.
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Furthermore, every judicial officer, be it one
who was initially recruited as CJ or one who
was directly recruited as a District Judge, has
an aspiration to reach at least up to the
position of a High Court Judge.
11 . We are, therefore, of the view that a
proper balance has to be struck between the
competing claims. However, this issue would
involve consideration of some of the
judgments and orders passed by Benches
comprising of three learned judges of this
Court. Therefore, in order to put the entire
controversy at rest and provide a meaningful
and long-lasting solution, we are of the
considered view that it will be appropriate if
the issue is considered by a Constitution
Bench consisting of five learned Judges of this
Court.
12 . We, therefore, direct the Registrar
(Judicial) to place the matter before the Chief
Justice of India, on the administrative side for
obtaining appropriate orders.”
6. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India thereafter
directed that the matter be placed before a 5-Judge
Bench. The matter was accordingly taken up on
14.10.2025, whereupon the limited question requiring
consideration was delineated as follows:
“What should be the criteria for determining
seniority in the cadre of Higher Judicial
Services”
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COMPETING VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS
7. As already mentioned heretofore, the learned
Amicus, through the captioned application, underscored
certain issues pervading seniority in the HJS.
inter se
8. Although the objective of the application was
initially to embellish, enliven, and enrich the District
Judiciary by balancing both merit and practical
experience, it has presently been prompted by a
perceived discontentment and heartburn amongst those
recruited to the lower rungs of the judiciary.
9. The malady of disproportionate progression within
the HJS has been observed by this Court in previous
AIJA proceedings and was also noted with concern by
the First National Judicial Pay Commission under the
Chairmanship of Justice K.J. Shetty, a former Judge of
this Court ( Shetty Commission ).
10. In this vein, as a workable outcome to improve the
position of the RPs and LDCEs and considering the
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recommendations of the Shetty Commission, the Amicus
put forth four proposals:
i. A 1:1 quota should be prescribed for appointment
to Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within the
HJS;
ii. The zone of consideration for upgradation to
Selection Grade and Super Time Scale should
comprise equal numbers of DRs and promotees
(RPs and LDCEs combined), without any
prescription regarding the actual selections;
iii. Providing one year seniority for every five years of
completed service within the lower rungs of the
judicial service, subject to a maximum of three
years, which is an attempt to revive the
recommendation of the Shetty Commission; or
iv. Creating three separate seniority lists within the
HJS, on the basis of source of recruitment, in the
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ratio of 50:25:25, as recommended by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh.
11. Thereupon, responses were filed by States / Union
Territories Administrations, as well as the Registrar
Generals of various High Courts and other stakeholders
comprising detailed submissions regarding the rules
existing in their respective States for the career
progression of Judicial Officers appointed or promoted
from the aforementioned three sources.
12. On the one hand, the RPs through their learned
counsels, raised cudgels against DRs on the grounds of
an advantage being conferred upon them by virtue of
their relatively younger age at the time of entering into
the HJS. Their contentions have been briefly
summarized hereinbelow:
i. The age advantage enjoyed by DRs enables their
progress to the Selection Grade and the Super
Time Scale, as well as taking on administrative
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roles in Districts, and ultimately, being elevated
to the High Court;
ii. Experience in judicial service is superior to
experience at the Bar, and there should be
recognition of prior judicial service in the posts of
Civil Judge-Junior Division
(Munsiff/Magistrates) and Civil Judge-Senior
Division (Sub Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrates),
whether they are promoted to the HJS from the
RP or LDCE cadres. Reliance was placed in this
regard on the decision in Rejanish K.V. v K.
1
Deepa ;
iii. ‘Heartburn’ is caused by the induction of younger
candidates as DRs and their consequential
career progression, which diminishes the
consideration of the efforts of judicial officers who
have toiled endlessly in their judicial work for
long years.
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13. Similarly, those representing the LDCEs, while
largely adopting the arguments raised by the RPs, also
sought to bring forward certain issues distinct to them:
i.
Earlier judicial service ought to be reckoned in
the same manner for both RPs and LDCEs;
ii. If sufficient candidates are not found through
LDCE in a recruitment year, the vacancies
should not be filled by RPs but should be carried
forward. In such a scenario, the passed-over
seniority ought to be conferred in the successive
selection;
iii. The position on the roster should be preserved
even if there aren’t sufficient vacancies available
in any given year.
14. On the contrary, the learned counsels representing
DRs argued that there is no pressing need for this Court
to create any favourable systems so as to promote RPs
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and LDCEs. In this regard, the following submissions
were adduced:
i. The available data clearly shows that the
situation pertaining to inter se seniority varies
across different States, with some States where
the DRs hold more prominent positions, while in
others, the RPs have an advantage over the DRs;
ii. The High Courts, being conferred with the power
to regulate, inter alia , the inter se seniority within
the Judicial Services, are better equipped to
determine the issue on the basis of the statistics
and features intrinsic to a particular State
Judicial Service, as well as to determine the inter
se seniority within the cadre of District Judges;
iii. Upon entry into the HJS, the source of
recruitment becomes inconsequential, and the
service rendered in the feeder category pales into
insignificance. When seniority of the incumbents
in a particular recruitment year is adjusted as
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per the roster system providing proportional
representation to RPs, LDCEs and DRs, such
seniority on entry continues and the birthmark
of the source from which they were recruited is
no more relevant for further career advancement
within the cadre by way of fixation in the higher
grades or designation for the discharge of
administrative duties.
iv. The position on the roster should be preserved
even if there are not sufficient vacancies available
in any given year.
15. Additionally, several High Courts were represented
before this Court by learned senior counsel, whose
submissions broadly aligned with one or the other set of
arguments addressed. As these submissions have
already been duly adverted to hereinabove, we do not
consider it necessary to reiterate them.
16. What is of greater significance, however, is that the
said counsel extended valuable assistance by placing
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before us relevant statistics and prevailing
circumstances, thereby illuminating the range of
possible approaches available to this Court for resolving
the present issue.
ANALYSIS
17. As we turn to scrutinizing and appraising the
singular issue at hand, we deem it appropriate to clarify
at the very outset that there can be no separate quota
insofar as the recommendations for elevation to the High
Court are concerned. We say so, being especially mindful
of the truism that such processes are neither promotions
nor a fixation for financial upgradation or career
advancement.
I. Power of this Court re: seniority within the HJS
T HE S UCCESSIVE AIJA P ROCEEDINGS
18. At this juncture, it is imperative to address the
specific plea raised by various parties before us that this
Court, in view of the powers granted to the High Court
under Articles 233 to 235, should restrain itself from
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issuing mandatory guidelines on the rules governing the
service of judicial officers.
19. In consideration thereof, we must first trace the
trajectory of the AIJA proceedings before this Court.
20. The captioned Writ Petition was filed in the year
1989 and has been retained in this Court as a measure
of ongoing mandamus, to safeguard the independence of
the judiciary—a basic structure of the Constitution as
held by this Court—and to effectively serve the efficient
administration of justice.
21. In the All India Judges' Association v. Union of
2
India (First AIJA) , this Court addressed: ( i ) the
establishment of an All India Judicial Service; ( ii )
uniformity in the designation of judicial officers, both on
the criminal and civil side, across the Country; ( iii )
retirement age of judicial officers to be stipulated as 60
years; ( iv ) consideration of appropriate pay scales; ( v ) a
working library and provision for sumptuary allowance;
( vi ) residential accommodation to be provided by the
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State Government; ( vii ) adequate transport facilities;
and ( viii ) establishment of institutions for in-service
training.
22.
All of these aspects were articulated to establish a
status for the judicial service that aligns with the
assigned judicial duties, maintaining the principle of
separation of powers and safeguarding the
independence of the judiciary. This idea was further
supported by creating a supportive working environment
free from the burdens of mundane routines and the
challenges of maintaining a work-life balance.
23. Although directions were issued on all these
aspects, a review was filed, leading to the judgment in
3
All India Judges' Association v. Union of India
(Second AIJA) , where some modifications were made;
the most significant being the requirement of three
years' practice as a mandatory and essential
qualification for recruitment to judicial posts at the lower
rungs in the judicial hierarchy, and the weeding out of
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dead wood at an age prior to the stipulation of 60 years
as the common age of superannuation.
2
24. The directions put forth in the First AIJA were
3
Second AIJA
essentially affirmed in all respects in the ,
except for the direction for grant of sumptuary as well as
residence-cum-library allowances, which stood
withdrawn subject to fulfilment of certain conditions.
Essentially, the directions issued, as already
highlighted, aimed to accord a special status to judicial
officers who, in their role of dispensing justice, occupy a
position that is both demanding and unique; and stands
in contrast to other State services, given that their
independence is a fundamental aspect of the
Constitution, as held by this Court.
25. Thereafter, in the All India Judges' Association
4
v. Union of India (Third AIJA) , this Court specifically
examined the clarification sought by the State of Kerala
and found that the five years of legal practice prescribed
as the minimum qualification for appointment to the
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lower rung of the judicial service in that State, to be
perfectly in order, since the direction in the Second
3
AIJA aimed to establish a minimum essential
qualification of three years’ practice.
26. While reaffirming the requirement of at least three
years’ practice for recruitment to the lowest rung of
judicial office, it was also determined that a by-transfer
appointment to the cadre of Munsif-Magistrates from the
ministerial and gazetted staff of the district judiciary and
the High Court was bad because it did not meet the
minimum requirement of three years’ practice at the bar.
27. In All India Judges' Association v. Union of
5
India (Fourth AIJA) , the requirement of a minimum
experience at the Bar was dispensed with, finding fresh
graduates also eligible to offer themselves for
recruitment to the lower rungs of the judiciary,
especially in the context of a mandatory training period
of one year having been provided. Further, a faster
promotional opportunity was provided for the judicial
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officers in the lower rungs by prescribing an LDCE. It
was also directed that for proportional representation of
the RPs, LDCEs and DRs, a ratio of 50:25:25 would be
applied to the cadre of District Judges; the seniority at
the entry point in the HJS being determined on a 40-
point roster as approved by this Court in R.K.
6
Sabharwal & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.
28. Later, in the year 2010, in All India Judges Assn.
7
v. Union of India ( Fifth AIJA) , having realised that a
large number of vacancies in the 25% LDCE category
remained unfilled, the said quota itself was reduced to
10%. A ratio of 65:10:25, respectively, for the RPs,
LDCEs and DRs, was thus prescribed for recruitment to
the cadre of District Judges.
29. This ratio has, however, been once again modified
this year itself in 2025 in the All India Judges
8
Association v. Union of India (Sixth AIJA) to
50:25:25, also revamping and expanding the framework
for accelerated promotion from Junior Division to Senior
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Division and thereafter to the HJS. As of date, the
1
decision of this Court in Rejanish K.V has further
enabled the service of judicial officers to be reckoned for
the purpose of direct recruitment to the HJS through
participation in the direct recruitment examinations.
30. The series of AIJA decisions thus acknowledges
and recognises the fact that in a democracy, the role of
the judiciary is truly indispensable. For the efficient
functioning of the Rule of Law and to ensure that our
democracy prospers, it is de reiguer that we nurture an
efficient, strong, and enlightened judiciary.
H IGH C OURT AS A REPOSITORY OF POWERS
31. At the same time, we are also cognizant of the wide-
ranging powers and general superintendence vested
with each High Court regarding the judicial services,
within the respective States / Union Territories.
32. To understand the width of these powers, one need
not look beyond the decisions of two Constitution
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Benches of this Court in B.S. Yadav v. State of
9 10
Haryana and State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah .
9
33. To explicate, B.S. Yadav was a case in which the
judicial officers promoted to the higher judicial service of
Punjab and Haryana, two different States with a unified
High Court, challenged the determination of seniority
inter se promotees and direct recruits based on two
different sets of rules. A Constitution bench of this Court
held that although the State Legislature or the Governor
has the authority to pass laws regulating the
recruitment of Judicial Officers of the State under Article
309, the extent of these powers is to be regulated by
Article 235, ensuring that the Rules and Regulations
made do not impinge upon or detrimentally affect the
control vested in the High Court by Article 235.
10
34. Similarly, in Bal Mukund Sah , this Court
considered the application of reservation of vacancies, as
enacted by the State of Bihar in the direct recruitment
to the posts in the judiciary of the State, both to the
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Higher Judicial Services of District Judges and the
grassroots level in the lower rungs of the judiciary. The
Constitution Bench therein held that the appropriate
Legislature or the Governor can regulate the recruitment
and conditions of services of the persons appointed to
public services and posts, only subject to other
provisions of the Constitution, including the power of
superintendence conferred on the High Court under
Article 235.
35. It is therefore quite clear that both the Constitution
Bench decisions definitively state that, whether it
concerns recruitment or the determination of seniority,
the State Legislature empowered under Article 309 or
the Governor, exercising the power to make rules under
the proviso to Article 309, ought to consult the High
Court. This is especially so when Article 309 is subject
to other provisions of the Constitution, giving primacy to
Articles 233 to 235, wherein the control of the entire
District Judiciary is conceded to the High Court.
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36. Having said that, we consider it necessary to
observe that there can be no doubt that this Court faces
no constitutional impediment in exercising its unique
power of judicial review under Article 32, read with other
relevant provisions of the Constitution, including
Articles 141 and 142, to lay down uniform guidelines
governing the structure and functioning of the judicial
services across the country. It is imperative to note that
this very function has been carried out by this Court
through a series of judgments passed in the instant Writ
Petition as well as in other cases, including in Rejanish
1
K.V. and Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U.P. Public
11
Service Commission , with the consistent goal of
strengthening the judiciary by fostering uniformity in the
structure of judicial services, enabling judicial
institutions to be more effective, and ensuring that
excellence and merit continue to remain the hallmark of
judicial officers.
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37. There is no gainsaying that Articles 233 to 235
assign policy decisions, such as the specific manner of
implementing the directions of this Court, to the domain
of the High Court. However, at the same time, it is also
essential that overarching guidelines, which would apply
across all States, be framed to ensure the development
of unified and robust judicial services, with the ultimate
goal of cultivating an independent judiciary. These
guidelines do not foreclose the powers of the High Court;
instead, they establish a homogenous framework within
which each High Court, as a Constitutional Court, can
exercise superintendence over the judicial services.
II. The curious case of ‘Heartburn’
38. Having addressed the initial concern about this
Court's propriety to enter into the domain of seniority
within the judicial services, we turn our attention to the
issue of ‘heartburn’.
39. The RPs in this regard vehemently urged that a
separate quota be created in their favour within the HJS
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for career advancement. They pointed out their service
in the judicial service in the Senior Division and the
Junior Division, which, according to them, has been
1
Rejanish K.V.
recognised by this Court in as being far
superior to experience at the Bar. They further
contended that the ‘heartburn’ caused by the induction
of younger candidates as DRs and their consequential
career progression diminishes the efforts of officers who
have toiled endlessly in their judicial work.
40. It may be noticed that the Constitution Bench in
1
Rejanish K.V. , while permitting judicial officers to
compete along with the Members of the Bar for direct
recruitment to HJS, did not observe that the experience
in judicial service is superior to that of a practising
advocate, but only noticed that it is in no manner
inferior.
41. It merits emphasis that in prescribing the
minimum years of practice for recruitment to the lower
rungs of the judiciary, this Court on earlier occasions
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specifically laid stress upon the experience at the Bar as
an essential requirement for entry into judicial service.
8
The three-judge Bench in the Sixth AIJA merely
equated judicial service and experience at the Bar and
did not confer any supremacy on one as against the
other.
42. In this context, it must be noted that the
discontentment of the RPs within the HJS cadre has
been mitigated to a large extent by increasing the ratio
for the HJS cadre for LDCEs, and by enabling judicial
officers who have completed a minimum period of service
and reached an age, at par with that prescribed for bar
members are also being considered for direct
recruitment to the HJS.
43. We also need to note that the DRs, especially the
members from the Bar, are now at a disadvantage due
12
to the decision in R. Poornima v. Union of India . This
dictum provides that consideration for recommendation
to the High Court will be possible only after they have
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completed ten years as a judicial officer. In sharp
contrast, an RP or LDCE would face an advantage in this
scenario since such a requirement would also take into
consideration their service at the lower rungs of the
judiciary and the HJS.
44. The data supplied by various High Courts, hence,
has to be looked at in the above perspective. The last
three decades have witnessed substantial changes in the
minimum required experience for recruitment to the
lower rungs in the judiciary. In 1993, three years’
experience at the Bar was prescribed by this Court.
Although this minimum requirement was dispensed
with in the year 2002, this position has occupied the
field for the last two decades.
45. Presently, State Judiciaries are in the cusp of a
major change with the reintroduction of the minimum
three years’ experience at the Bar for recruitment to
junior division and the further directions issued by this
8
Court in Sixth AIJA enabling accelerated career
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progression to the judicial officers recruited and
continuing in the lower rungs of judiciary, with an
additional provision for participating in direct
1
Rejanish K.V
recruitment to HJS, as provided in . The
data supplied concerns persons continuing in the State
Judiciary, which also varies from State to State.
46. As has been noticed earlier, some of the States have
more RPs occupying positions of significance, while in
others the DRs are more prominent. High Courts across
the country are also not ad idem on the issue raised,
with most of them exhorting before this Court to neither
enter into the question of a further seniority
determination in the HJS, different from that assigned
on entry thereat, nor to tweak the assignment of
seniority based on roster points applied to the ratio of
recruitment from the three sources.
47. Even within the HJS, the fixation in the Selection
Grade and the Super Time Scale is regulated by merit-
cum-seniority; seniority being assigned from the date of
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entry into the HJS in proportion with the ratio based on
the roster points assigned to each source. As in any
selection based on merit-cum-seniority, merit remains
the dominant consideration, and seniority is applied
only when the merit or suitability stands equal. The
consideration of merit is performance-based within the
cadre of HJS, relatable to various periods spent in that
cadre and not those spent earlier in the lower rungs of
the judiciary.
48. This is also the position with respect to the
assignment of administrative duties in a District, which
falls upon the senior-most within the HJS, in a given
District, designated as District Judge or Principal
District Judge.
49. The fixation in higher grades and designations for
the purpose of discharging administrative duties is never
dependent solely on seniority; merit and suitability are
the norm, which must be evaluated based on service in
that cadre, rather than prior service in the lower rungs.
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50. In bringing this issue to a close, we consider it
appropriate to employ an analogy to illustrate the
relative modes of entry into the Higher Judicial Service.
If entry into the HJS is viewed as a common destination,
one may conceive of DRs as reaching that destination by
flight, LDCEs as travelling by train, and RPs as
traversing the distance on foot. At first blush, it may
indeed appear that the RPs experience a greater degree
of heartburn when compared to the relative swiftness
with which the other categories are able to enter the
HJS.
51. However, this perceived difficulty stands
sufficiently addressed by the fact that this Court has
ensured the availability of multiple avenues to
Promotees for career advancement—whether through
1
the LDCE, or, as recognised in Rejanish K.V. , through
the option of participating in the Direct Recruitment
process.
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52. When such opportunities exist, the mere inability
of certain officers to succeed in these examinations on
the basis of merit, or the contention that their
promotional channel is slower or numerically larger,
cannot furnish a valid basis for seeking preferential
treatment within the HJS merely on account of a sense
of grievance. It is well settled that career progression to
the higher echelons of the judiciary is neither a matter
of right nor of entitlement.
III. Non-retention of ‘Birthmark’
53. The issue of determining seniority, inter se RPs and
DRs has vexed public offices from the very inception, and
there is a wealth of precedents to rely upon.
54. For instance, in Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of
13
Customs , this court considered the rotational system
for granting seniority between DRs and RPs upon
entering a cadre, as well as maintaining that seniority
upon promotion to higher posts. In the context of
promotion from the post of Appraisers to the Principal
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Appraisers, the Constitution Bench ruled that when
there is only one recruitment source, the normal rule
applies, i.e. a person promoted to a higher grade gains
seniority in that grade based on the date of promotion,
provided they are found fit and confirmed in the higher
grade after the probation period. In such cases,
continuous appointment in the higher grade determines
seniority, since the source of recruitment is the same.
55. This principle straightforwardly applies to the
fixation of seniority in the Selection Grade and Super
Time Scale within the HJS in the cadre of District
Judges, recruited or promoted from the three different
sources. Further career advancement in the HJS thus
depends on seniority within that cadre, not the feeder
category.
56. This principle was followed by another Constitution
14
Bench in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India ,
which was concerned with the promotion from Train
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Examiners ‘D’ Grade, which was a common cadre formed
by separate sources, to Train Examiners ‘C’ Grade.
57. The decision in State of Jammu & Kashmir v.
15
Sh. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.
also stands out in
this context, where a Constitution Bench of this Court
had the opportunity to expand the principle laid out in
13 14
Mervyn Coutindo and Roshan Lal Tandon .
Judicial scrutiny in that case was limited to considering
whether a classification based on educational
qualification had a reasonable basis and bore a nexus
with the object in view. When approving the
classification, the Court noted that the rules did not
discriminate among graduates on the basis of source,
thereby undermining any claim of a ‘birthmark’ in the
cadre influencing the classification.
58. Article 16, ensuring equality of opportunities in
matters relating to employment, was held to be an
instance of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article
14. The concept of equality, it was held, has an inherent
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limitation arising from the very nature of the
constitutional guarantee, mandating ‘equality for equals’
and not for ‘unequals’ . The classification on the basis of
educational qualification, made with a view to achieving
administrative efficiency, was held to be not resting on
any fortuitous circumstances and, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, justified the validity of such
classification.
14
59. The ratio in Roshan Lal Tandon insofar as it
held that the direct recruits and promotees lost their
birthmarks on fusion into a common stream of service,
prohibiting their classification on the basis of the source
from which they were recruited, was found to be not
applicable in the facts and circumstances of Triloki
15
Nath Khosa . The Constitution Bench in Triloki Nath
15
Khosa held that “… The ratio of Roshan Lal’s case can
at best be an impediment in favouring persons drawn
from one source as against those drawn from another for
the reason merely that they are drawn from different
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sources” (sic para 47) . This impediment is in the teeth of
the answer to the question posed by the Amicus in this
case.
14
60. Roshan Lal Tandon
The dictum of as succinctly
15
stated in Triloki Nath Khosa however, squarely
applies in the case of District Judges appointed from
three different sources, being further classified on the
basis of their length of service in the lower rungs of the
judiciary, prejudicing the DRs, who do not have the
advantage of such service in the lower cadre.
61. In this light, the theory of classification, as
proposed by the Amicus, subverts and submerges the
precious guarantee of equality as available to the
members of the common cadre, who, on appointment
and determination of their inter se seniority, at the time
of appointment into the HJS, lose the ‘birthmark’ of the
source from which they are appointed.
62. Reference must also be made in this regard to the
decision in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering
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Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra and
16
Ors. , which was inter alia concerned with the inter se
seniority of direct recruits and promotees, as also the
determination of seniority of ad-hoc appointees. While
deciding the issues, including that of implementation of
a quota and the consequence of its breakdown, it was
unequivocally held that, on appointment to a post in
accordance with the rules, seniority ought to be
conferred from the date of initial appointment; the
departure being possible only when the initial
appointment is ad-hoc and not in accordance with the
rules, with which issues we are not concerned.
63. The appointment made by way of a stopgap
arrangement without considering the claims of the
eligible available persons and without following the rules
of appointment was held to be not comparable with the
experience of a regular appointee, because of the sheer
qualitative difference in the appointment itself. It was
reiterated that otherwise there would be treatment of
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unequals as equals, which would violate the principle of
equality spelt out in Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. These principles were further reiterated in
State of West Bengal v. Aghore Nath
the cases of
17
Dey and Ram Janam Singh v. State of Uttar
18
Pradesh .
64. Hence, if at all the experience in the lower rungs of
the judiciary is to be reckoned for determining seniority
in HJS, there should be some compelling reason which
stands the test of reasonableness, not being vitiated by
the foul of arbitrariness, which again has to be provided
by means of statutory rules. In our view, there is no
basis to consider the previous experience as a Civil
Judge as an intelligible differentia creating a reasonable
classification to favour RPs or LDCEs in the selection for
higher grade scales or appointment as Principal District
Judges.
65. However, it goes without saying that this does not
preclude the High Courts, which are capable of deciding
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on compelling reasons based on the particular facts and
circumstances of each State, along with available data
and statistics, from providing preferential treatment to
any group within the HJS. Provided that such
preferential treatment does not go contrary to the
15
principles enunciated in Triloki Nath Khosa , and is
incorporated within the statutory rules.
IV. The Roster and its implementation
66. As previously observed, this Court, in the Fourth
5
AIJA , had found that preparation of a Roster is the
most suitable method of determining seniority within the
HJS, and we see no reason to deviate therefrom.
However, hindsight, experience, and subsequent
developments have necessitated that this Court take a
fresh look at some aspects of the roster system of
seniority and address the issues and gaps that have
emerged therein.
67. Submissions were made from both sides on the
efficacy of a 40-point roster as stipulated in the Fourth
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5
AIJA , where the quota for RP, LDCE, and DR was set in
a 50:25:25 ratio. Although this ratio for the composition
of the cadre was later modified to 65:10:25, the earlier
ratio was reinstated by the Constitution Bench in the
8
Sixth AIJA . Whereas, though the stipulation for a 40-
point seniority roster has remained a common feature
across different States, its exact formulations remain
varied.
68. At present, the sequence of seniority and the
specific roster points assigned to each source are
decided by the respective State Governments in
consultation with the High Court and stipulated in the
relevant service rules. Most of the States / Union
Territories / High Courts have supplied this Court with
the details of the roster points prescribed in their
respective rules. A majority of the States have allocated
the first three positions to the RPs, followed by one to
the DRs and one to LDCE, with the roster points
repeated in the said sequence. However, insofar as the
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Northeastern States, Chhattisgarh, and Gujarat, are
concerned, LDCE is given preference in seniority over the
DRs, with the first positions going to the RPs.
69.
In three other States, the situation is different, as
the LDCEs have been given the first preference in
seniority, followed by the RPs and then the DRs. Clearly,
the determination of the roster points has created
divergent service rules for the same cadre of officers. In
our considered opinion, this situation is an affront to the
ideal of uniformity within the judicial services that is
sought to be preserved through these proceedings.
70. With these observations and having considered the
suggestions made across the Bar on this matter, it
appears to us that the most appropriate mechanism to
harmonise the system of seniority across the HJS is a 4-
point roster system, wherein the first two points shall be
allocated to RPs, the third to LDCE(s), and the fourth to
DR(s). This roster would, it goes without saying, repeat
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thereafter, till all the appointees are placed within the
roster.
71. In this backdrop, we may also clarify that the roster
is an annual creation. The timeline for recruitment to
HJS, as well as the lower judicial services, is prescribed
11
in the operative portions of Malik Mazhar Sultan . If
the judgment is followed by the letter, it would result in
all appointments, from all three sources, being achieved
within the same year. The annual roster is envisaged as
a complementary component to manage the intake from
all three sources and assign inter se seniority thereto. In
this situation, the fixation of seniority among RPs,
LDCEs, and DRs shall be determined according to the
roster points for that particular year, de hors the exact
date of appointment. To put it tersely, as long as the
appointment takes place within the same year as that in
which the recruitment is initiated, there are no qualms
in placing all such appointees within the same roster of
that year.
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72. The above clarification, as an obvious
consequence, then begs the question: what would
happen when the recruitment does not conclude within
the same year as when it was initiated? Experience
indicates that, especially since the process of evaluation
for promotion is based on merit-cum-seniority, with
merit being the predominant factor, delays are likely in
selecting LDCE candidates and even more so in the case
of DRs, where merit is the sole consideration—
complications in the evaluation process, unexpected
administrative holdups, and lengthy litigation are just a
list of examples that delay the procedure.
73. That, however, is only one side of the coin. On the
flip side, this Court must also uphold and enforce the
ideal of seniority as per continuous service within the
cadre to prevent the anomalies that many States are
faced with today. The aforementioned question has
remained one of the significant gaps in the existing
directions regarding the seniority roster in the HJS, and
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this Court must now strike a balance between these two
concerns.
74. This is not the first occasion that this Court has
had to consider the impact of selection delays on a
seniority roster of a government service. Union of India.
19
v. N.R. Parmar considered the inter se seniority
between direct recruits and the promotees. Therein, the
direct recruitment process, though substantially
commenced in the same recruitment year, could not be
completed within that recruitment year, so the
promotees were appointed substantially before the direct
recruits, who finally joined two years later. In such a
situation, this Court permitted the placement of such
direct recruits within the same roster as the timely
appointed promotees, since the delay was attributable to
the rigmaroles of a direct recruitment.
20
75. In K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro , a
three-Judge Bench overruled the decision in N.R.
19
Parmar to hold that the general principle of law is that
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a direct recruit cannot get a back-dated notional
seniority, earlier than the date when he joined in service.
A Two-Judge Bench in Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan
21
Singh Rao K.
doubted the correctness of
20
Meghachandra Singh especially since the attention
of the three Judge Bench was not invited to the decision
of a Co-ordinate Bench in M. Subba Reddy v. A.P.
22
SRTC .
21
76. In Hariharan , attention was drawn to the
anomaly arising when the process of recruitment of
direct recruits is completed within the same recruitment
year, yet an adequate number of candidates could not
be selected. It was observed that in such circumstances,
the shortfall must be carried forward to the succeeding
recruitment year. Consequently, candidates selected
against such carried-forward vacancies are required to
be placed en bloc below the Promotees of the earlier
years. Unless this procedure is adhered to, the rotation
of the quota system stands frustrated.
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77. The reference was thus only with respect to the
selections made from different sources, based on a ratio
applied to the cadre, to vacancies arising in a
recruitment year.
78. While this particular issue remains pending in the
abovementioned reference, in our view, keeping in mind
the most celebrated principle of assigning seniority on
the basis of the period of continuous service while also
acknowledging the almost inevitable incidence of
speedbumps, the model delineated hereinafter for the
purposes of HJS would be most appropriate.
79. If the recruitment process from any source is not
completed in the year in which it began, but
appointments are made before the end of the following
year, those appointees shall be placed at their respective
roster points for the year of initiation. Provided that no
appointments from any source are made for the next
recruitment year before these appointments are effected.
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80. To illustrate, let us consider that the recruitment
process from all three sources is initiated in Year A. The
procedures for appointment of LDCEs and RPs are
completed within the same Year A, and they are placed
in the Annual Roster for Year A. However, a variety of
issues cause the appointments of DRs to happen only in
Year A+1. Now, these DRs, although appointed in Year
A+1, would be permitted to also take their positions
within the roster for Year A, as long as they were
appointed prior to the LDCEs, RPs, and DRs whose
recruitment is initiated in Year A+1.
81. Barring the above exception, we affirm that the
continuous length of service ought to be the criterion for
determining inter se seniority in the HJS, subject to the
further condition that all appointees in a single
recruitment year are placed against their respective
annual roster points, regardless of the actual date of
appointment.
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82. The above mechanism, in our opinion, serves to
mitigate the grievances and preserve the seniority of an
appointee who was subsequently borne in service only
due to the vagaries of the recruitment process. In the
same vein, the officers appointed earlier also cannot be
aggrieved, as they would be adjusted within the roster
only along with their relative contemporaries in the
service and would be put on notice regarding the
seniority determination once the other selections are
concluded.
83. If the High Court, for any valid reason, decides not
to initiate the recruitment process from any of the three
sources in a given year, the person subsequently
appointed from those sources shall not be eligible to be
placed within the roster for that year in which
recruitment from the source did not take place.
84. We are at the same time also cognizant of the
necessity of ensuring that vacancies in the judicial
services do not remain unfilled, the negative
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consequences of which have been very cogently
11
addressed by this Court in Mazhar Malik Sultan . To
8
this end, this Court in the Sixth AIJA , has already
provided that unfilled vacancies within the LDCE quota
may be diverted and filled by RPs.
85. In our considered opinion, the above system can
also be extended to the vacancies that remain unfilled
after the process of direct recruitment is completed. To
explicate, when some of the vacancies pertaining to DRs
or LDCEs in a particular year are not filled up due to
non-availability of suitable candidates from these
sources, despite the recruitment process being taken to
its conclusion, the positions which remain vacant for
want of candidates shall be filled up in the same
recruitment year through regular promotion from the
cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) as per the
applicable rules.
86. In such a scenario, the candidates who are
ordinarily selected from the three sources are assigned
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seniority on induction to the HJS as per the Annual
Roster in the regular manner. The remaining RPs, who
are promoted in the vacancies from the other sources,
would also be entitled to be placed in the same roster,
but they would only occupy the subsequent positions for
RPs, i.e., this diversion does not grant the roster position
of LDCEs or DRs to these RPs. In the subsequent
recruitment year, the ratio of 50:25:25 should guide the
computation of vacancies to be filled from each source.
This would be a continuing exercise of applying the
roster points on the candidates selected in each
recruitment year, while the ratio is applied to the cadre,
for determining the vacancies arising in a subsequent
year.
V. Data – an unreliable guide
87. Despite the data presented by the Amicus Curiae as
to the constitution of the HJS in various States,
specifically the number of posts occupied by the RPs and
the DRs, a reality check on facts is not possible due to
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the rather amorphous and fluid situation that has
existed in the past three decades.
88. As was found, it was in 1992 that this Court in the
3
Second AIJA
prescribed a minimum requirement of
three years’ practice at the Bar for recruitment to the
lower rungs of the judiciary. Before that, it was not
uniform and different periods were prescribed in
different States; as we saw from Kerala, which
prescribed a minimum five years’ practice at the Bar for
recruitment to the entry point at the lower rung of the
judiciary, which stood approved in 1994 by the Third
4
AIJA .
89. Be it the three-year course or the five-year course
in LL.B, the latter of which commenced only in 1988-89,
that too initially confined to National Law Universities,
the average age of recruitment as Munsiff/Magistrate
would have been 26 to 28. The age limit would further
increase in the case of reservations, wherever it was
enabled with a relaxation in the maximum age. There
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would be minimal representation of those who were
recruited at the commencement of the three decades just
past.
5
90. Fourth AIJA
With the , in 2002, the requirement
of practice was fully dispensed with, in which context,
the age of recruitment could be anything above 23 years;
who would be the present incumbents in the post of
District Judges, having been promoted from the Senior
Division. Even then, the time spent in Junior Division
and Senior Division, before promotion to the HJS varied
considerably in the different States and there could be
no common malady ferreted out which requires
mitigation.
91. We are constrained to observe that the suggestions
as placed on record by the learned Amicus would be
counter-productive and would run against established
norms of service jurisprudence, if the service in the lower
cadre is reckoned for determining the seniority in the
higher cadre, especially when, in addition to regular
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promotions, there is a merit based promotion
opportunity through LDCE and DR, participation in
which is now permitted to both the existing Judicial
Officers and the Members of the Bar.
92. The ratio of 1:1, as suggested by the Amicus and
the zone of consideration of 50% officers from the two
categories of promotion and direct recruitment, would
only create further disparities and lead to
discontentment of those promoted on merit and would
create a disadvantage to those Judicial Officers who are
directly recruited to the HJS. A three-year seniority
would also cause injustice insofar as direct recruitment
is concerned, providing no such incentive to a Judicial
Officer who had earlier been in the Junior Division or the
Senior Division.
93. The separate seniority list in respect of the three
different sources would also result in inequalities. We
have no reason to doubt that creating quotas for fixation
in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within the
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cadre of District Judges based on the prior service in the
lower rungs of the Judiciary would be iniquitous and
would result in sacrificing merit.
94.
As was observed, the disparities in the data and
statistics presented, coupled with the anticipated
change in the constitution of the HJS prompted by the
8 1
Sixth AIJA and Rejanish K.V make today a wholly
inopportune moment to bring in any weightage to RPs in
the HJS, on the basis of their service in the Junior
Division and the Senior Division. This is, especially so,
when the merit, suitability and seniority determined for
fixation in the higher grades of Selection Grade and
Super Time Scale have to be factored and evaluated on
the basis of the service in the HJS and not that in the
lower feeder cadre. The earlier service in the lower rungs
of the judiciary can only enable a meritorious promotion
to the HJS, and the incumbents in the HJS having lost
their ‘genetic blemish’ or so to say the ‘genetic
adornment’ of experience in the lower cadre, will have to
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prove their merit in the HJS for further career
advancement. It would also dampen the spirit of those
who avail the chances of accelerated promotion, since
then, there would be no incentive in taking that
opportunity.
95. Ambition is a ladder, the last rung of which is
always elusive to the one pursuing it, who endlessly
searches for it; based on which, seniority cannot be
fixed. For all these reasons, we are compelled to note
that the questions raised and the reliefs sought by the
learned Amicus through this Interlocutory Application
must be declined, save for the mechanisms envisaged
and enumerated through this judgment.
96. Perhaps at this juncture and milieu, prior to
solidifying our conclusions and directions, it would be
2
fitting to quote a passage from the First AIJA :
“ Judges do not have an easy job. They
repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to
avoid; make decisions. ”
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CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
97. Before proceeding any further, we consider it
apposite to record a caveat that the guidelines issued
herein are not intended to adjudicate or resolve any
inter
se seniority dispute among RPs, LDCEs and DRs. What
we seek to lay down are general and mandatory
guidelines which shall, henceforth, be incorporated into
the respective statutory service rules governing the
determination of inter se seniority among officers
appointed from different sources to the Higher Judicial
Services.
98. Likewise, the directions issued herein shall not be
construed as an avenue to reopen or unsettle
inter se
seniorities that have already been determined between
officers appointed from the different sources of
recruitment.
99. It is further clarified that such directions, as well
as this judgment in toto , are being issued considering the
issues as on date and may require reconsideration upon
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observing the ultimate impact and effect of the decisions
1
rendered by the Constitution Bench in Rejanish K.V.
8
and the Sixth AIJA . We say so, being mindful of the
fact that the inter se position amongst RPs, LDCEs and
DRs is likely to undergo substantial change in due
course, in light of the aforesaid decisions. Such altered
circumstances may necessitate a review, modification,
or recall of the present directions.
100. In this vein, we deem it appropriate to invoke our
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to record
the following conclusions and issue the ensuing
directions:
(i) That, perceived discontentment and
heartburn without something more in the
form of a legal claim, illegal denial, or at
least a legitimate expectation cannot
result in creating an artificial
classification of members within a cadre.
(ii) That, the statistical data is disparate and
does not provide a substantial basis to
find such discontentment and heartburn
of RPs in the HJS, to be justified.
(iii) That, there is no common malady of
disproportionate representation of DRs in
the HJS such that it is diminishing the
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prospects of financial upgradation or
designation as Principal District Judges to
the promotees, which afflict the Country
as a whole or make it imperative for this
Court to resolve it, by giving a preference
to RPs or LDCEs.
(iv) That, the data put forth in many States
indicates a prevalence or equivalence of
RPs in the HJS and key positions, which is
th
natural since their ratio is 3/4 of the
total posts in the cadre.
(v) That, on the entry into a common cadre
from different sources (RP, LDCE and DR)
and assignment of seniority as per the
annual roster, the incumbents lose their
‘birthmark’ of the source from which they
are recruited.
(vi) That fixation in the Selection Grade and
Super Time Scale within the HJS is based
on the merit-cum-seniority within the
cadre and cannot depend upon the length
of service or performance in the lower
rungs of the Judiciary; the latter loses its
significance after RPs and LDCEs, by its
virtue, are propelled into the HJS.
Reliance on it does not serve the object of
efficient administration of justice and is
counterproductive.
(vii) That, the length and performance as a
Civil Judge also does not constitute an
intelligible differentia to classify
incumbents in the common cadre of
District Judge and the classification made
15
in Triloki Nath Khosa by a Constitution
Bench of this Court on the basis of
educational qualifications stands on a
different footing.
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(viii) That, individual career aspirations are a
normal incidence of service, accentuated
only by better performance; they are not
connected to the objective of an
independent and strengthened judiciary
and cannot guide the shape of the rules of
seniority.
(ix) That, sufficient accelerated opportunities
are provided for Members of the Judicial
Service entering into the lower rungs, for
career advancement as provided by the
1
Constitution Bench in Rejanish K.V. ;
enabling the reckoning of their service for
direct recruitment to HJS and by the Sixth
8
AIJA ; facilitating fast-track promotions
to Civil Judge (Senior Division) and the
HJS through reduction in the minimum
period of service.
(x) That, the seniority of officers within the
HJS shall be determined through an
annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers
appointed in the particular year in the
repeating sequence of 2 RPs, 1 LDCE, and
1 DR.
(xi) That, only if the recruitment process is
completed within the year after which it
was initiated and no other appointments,
from any of the three sources, have
already taken place in respect of the
recruitment initiated for that subsequent
year, shall the officers belatedly so
appointed be entitled to seniority as per
the roster of the year in which recruitment
was initiated.
(xii) That, if the recruitment process is not
initiated for vacancies arising in a given
year in the same year, the candidate
filling such vacancy, in subsequent
recruitment, shall be granted seniority
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I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989
within the annual roster of the year in
which the recruitment process is finally
concluded and appointment is made.
(xiii) That, after the recruitment of DRs and
LDCEs is complete for a particular year,
the positions falling in their quota that
remain unfilled due to lack of suitable
candidates shall be filled through RPs,
subject to such RPs being placed only on
subsequent RP positions in the annual
roster; and the vacancies in the
subsequent year shall be computed so as
to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the
entire cadre.
(xiv) That, the statutory rules governing the
HJS in the respective States, in
consultation with the High Courts, shall
prescribe the exact modalities of the
Annual Roster and how the directions of
this judgement shall be implemented.
101. The respective States / Union Territory
Administrations are hereby also directed to undertake
appropriate amendments in their respective statutory
rules, in consultation with the High Court, to bring them
in consonance with the guidelines laid down in this
judgment, within a period of three months.
102. The question framed by us is thus answered in the
above terms. The instant Interlocutory Application
stands disposed of.
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I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989
103. I.A. Nos. 269261 and 270515/2025 also stand
disposed of.
104. Ordered accordingly.
.…….......……………….CJI
(B.R. GAVAI)
….…….......……………….J.
(SURYA KANT)
….…….......……………….J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
….…….......……………….J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
….…….......……………….J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
New Delhi;
November 19, 2025
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I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989
1
Rejanish K.V. v K. Deepa
1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2196
2
First AIJA
2
(1992) 1 SCC 119
3
Second AIJA
3
(1993) 4 SCC 288
4
Third AIJA
4
(1994) SCC 314
5
Fourth AIJA
5
(2002) 4 SCC 247
6
R.K. Sabharwal & Ors. v. State of
Punjab & Ors.
6
(1995) 2 SCC 745
7
Fifth AIJA
7
(2010) 15 SCC 170
8
Sixth AIJA
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184
9
B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana
9
(1980) Supp SCC 524
10
State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah
10
(2000) 4 SCC 640
11
Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U.P. Public
Service Commission
11
(2008) 17 SCC 703
12
R. Poornima v. Union of India
12
(2023) 12 SCC 519
13
Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of
Customs
13
(1966) 3 SCR 600
14
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India
14
(1968) 1 SCR 185
15
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sh.
Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.
15
(1974) 1 SCC 19
16
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering
Officers’ Association v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors.
16
(1990) 2 SCC 715
17
State of West Bengal v. Aghore Nath
Dey
17
(1993) 3 SCC 371
18
Ram Janam Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh
18
(1994) 2 SCC 622
19
Union of India. v. N.R. Parmar
19
(2012) 13 SCC 340
20
K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam
Siro
20
(2020) 5 SCC 689
21
Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan Singh
Rao
21
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1717
22
M. Subba Reddy v. A.P. SRTC
22
(2004) 6 SCC 729
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I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989