Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 57
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 430 OF 2018
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
CHAMAN LAL … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
R. MAHADEVAN, J.
1. The instant Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the State of Himachal
Pradesh assailing the Final Judgment and Order dated 26.08.2014 passed by the
1
High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No. 295 of
2010, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent
and set aside the judgment of conviction dated 16.07.2010 and the consequential
order of sentence dated 03.08.2010 passed by the Sessions Judge, Chamba
2
Division, Chamba, Himachal Pradesh in Sessions Trial No. 19 of 2010, thereby
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2026.01.15
16:25:17 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2
Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
2
acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
3
Code, 1860 .
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 07.12.2009, the respondent-husband
Chaman Lal allegedly poured kerosene on his wife Saro Devi (deceased) at their
residence situated in Village Rampur, Pargana Dhundi, Tehsil and District
Chamba, Himachal Pradesh and set her on fire by lighting a matchstick. On
seeing her engulfed in flames, some villagers rushed to her rescue and the
respondent also attempted to extinguish the fire. Despite these efforts, the
deceased sustained severe burn injuries. The information was conveyed to her
brother, Ramesh Kumar, who arrived at the spot and made arrangements to take
her to the District Hospital, Chamba where she was provided with medical
treatment. After receiving initial treatment at Chamba, her condition did not
improve and she was referred to Tanda Medical College and Hospital on
15.12.2009 where she was provided with further treatment. When the doctor
opined that there was no chance of improvement, the brother of the deceased
took her back to his home on 22.12.2009, after which he continued to look after
her. On 15.01.2010, she succumbed to her injuries.
3. Based on the information given by the brother of the deceased, FIR No.
292 of 2009 was registered under Section 302 IPC against the respondent at
Police Station Sadar, Chamba on 08.12.2009. During the investigation, it was
3
For short, “IPC”
3
revealed that the respondent had contracted a love marriage with the deceased
and three children were born out of the said wedlock. However, their
relationship had become strained and on the fateful day, i.e. on 07.12.2009, the
accused poured kerosene upon the deceased and set her on fire, thereby causing
her death. Upon information given by the brother of the deceased, ASI Mukesh
Kumar came to the hospital. On his intimation, the Tehsildar of the Chamba
region reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased, which
was treated as Dying Declaration.
4. After completion of the investigation, a challan under Section 302 IPC
was prepared and filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba. The
Magistrate upon examining the record and complying with the provisions of
4
Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , found that the case was
exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and accordingly, committed it to the
Sessions Court.
5. The trial Court, after hearing the respondent and the prosecution and on
the basis of the materials available on record, framed a charge under Section 302
IPC. The respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6. The prosecution led its evidence. Thereafter, the statement of the
respondent was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He was given an
4
For short, “Cr.P.C”
4
opportunity to lead evidence in defence. After trial and upon perusal of the
materials brought on record by the parties, the trial Court found the respondent
guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC and accordingly convicted and
sentenced him to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in
default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three
years. The period of detention undergone during investigation and trial was
directed to be set off against the sentence imposed.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence
imposed by the trial Court, the respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 295 of
2010 before the High Court. By its judgment dated 26.08.2014, the High Court
set aside the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 16.07.2010
and 03.08.2010 respectively and acquitted the respondent of the charge under
Section 302 IPC by extending to him the benefit of doubt.
8. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of acquittal, the State of Himachal
Pradesh has preferred the present Criminal Appeal before this Court.
9. Mr. Vivek Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant –
State submitted that the deceased Saro Devi was married to the respondent in
the year 2002. The couple resided in Village Rampur, Tehsil and District
Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. It was alleged that there were disputes and frequent
quarrels between the husband and wife owing to the respondent’s suspicion
5
th
regarding the character of the deceased. On the evening of 7 December 2009, it
was alleged that the respondent poured kerosene oil upon his wife and set her on
fire with a matchstick at their residence. The deceased sustained severe burn
injuries to the extent of 70% and the respondent also sustained about 3% burn
injuries on his hand. Despite treatment, the deceased succumbed to her injuries
on 15.01.2010.
9.1. It was further submitted that on 08.12.2009, the Tehsildar-cum-Executive
Magistrate, Amar Singh (PW-1) recorded the dying declaration (Ext. PW-1/B)
of the deceased at the hospital, after medical certification of her fitness and in
the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, K.D. Sharma (PW-10) and
the Investigating Officer, ASI Mukesh Kumar (PW-12). In her statement, the
deceased categorically stated that her husband had set her on fire after insulting
her by calling her a “Kanjri” (woman of bad character). It was contended that
the trial Court rightly relied upon the dying declaration and convicted the
respondent. However, the High Court erroneously acquitted the respondent by
discarding the dying declaration on the sole ground of alleged discrepancies
relating to the time of arrival of the Tehsildar at the hospital.
9.2. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court committed a serious
error in holding that the time of arrival of the Tehsildar was doubtful relying
selectively on one statement of the brother of the deceased (PW-2). The High
Court failed to appreciate that PW-2 upon being specifically questioned,
6
corroborated the version of PW-1, PW-10 and PW-12, all of whom consistently
stated that the Tehsildar reached the hospital around 11.00-11.15 a.m. The High
Court thus erred in isolating one portion of PW-2’s testimony and ignoring
consistent corroborative evidence.
9.3. It was submitted that the High Court further erred in discarding the
testimony of PW-10, who was an independent witness to the recording of the
dying declaration. He deposed that the statement of the deceased was dictated
by the Tehsildar word by word. The defence did not put any question or
suggestion to PW-1 during cross-examination and that the statement was
improperly recorded. In the absence of any challenge, the High Court could not
have drawn an adverse inference on this aspect.
9.4. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court wrongly relied upon
the testimonies of the ward member Om Prakash (PW-4) and Ravindra (PW-5).
PW-4, who for the first time before the Court introduced a version that the
deceased had poured kerosene upon herself, which he admittedly did not make
in his statement before the police thereby rendering his testimony a material
improvement and inherently unreliable. Similarly, PW-5 though declared
hostile, was nevertheless relied upon by the High Court despite her close
relationship with the respondent-she being his paternal aunt (bua). Her
testimony being naturally biased, ought to have been discarded and could not
have formed the basis of any finding in favour of the respondent.
7
9.5. It was further submitted that the High Court gravely erred in accepting the
testimony of DW-2, the minor son of the respondent who sought to set up a plea
of alibi by stating that his father was working in the kitchen garden at the
relevant time. The testimony of DW-2 stands in direct contradiction to that of
PW-12, the Investigating Officer, who categorically stated in his cross-
examination that during the course of inquiry, the children of the deceased had
informed him that they were playing outside at the time of the incident. The
High Court therefore committed a manifest error in placing reliance on defence
evidence which was inconsistent and stood expressly contradicted by the
prosecution witnesses.
9.6. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court failed to properly
appreciate the credible and independent testimony of the Tehsildar (PW-1) who
categorically deposed that the deceased had stated before him that her husband
poured kerosene upon her after calling her a “Kanjri” . The said statement
coming from an independent and disinterested public servant, not only
establishes the overt act attributable to the respondent but also furnishes a clear
and proximate motive for the commission of the offence. Significantly, nothing
adverse was elicited in the cross-examination of PW-1 so as to cast any doubt
on his credibility or veracity. The High Court therefore fell into manifest error
in holding that no motive stood established against the respondent. The further
observation that the absence of any pending court proceedings between the
8
spouses indicated lack of animosity is wholly misconceived and legally
unsustainable. It is well settled that matrimonial discord and animosity between
spouses do not necessarily manifest in the form of litigation. The surrounding
circumstances, when read conjointly with the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2
clearly demonstrate strained marital relations and provide sufficient motive for
the commission of the offence.
9.7. It was submitted that the High Court has erred in discarding the dying
declaration which was duly recorded by the Tehsildar-cum-Executive
Magistrate in the presence of responsible officers and stood fully corroborated
by both medical and ocular evidence.
9.8. The learned counsel further drew our attention to the suspicious post-
incident conduct of the respondent. PW-2 deposed that the respondent did not
contact him directly to inform him about the condition of his sister. Instead, as
testified by Yashpal (PW-3) the respondent contacted PW-3, who in turn
conveyed the information to PW-2. Such conduct is wholly unnatural for a
husband and strongly indicative of a guilty mind.
9.9. The learned counsel ultimately submitted that the findings recorded by
the High Court are based on a clear misappreciation of evidence and
consideration of wholly irrelevant factors while completely ignoring the cogent,
reliable and trustworthy testimonies of independent witnesses including PW-1,
9
PW-10 and PW-12. Conversely, undue reliance was placed on hostile witnesses
and contradictory defence evidence, leading to a manifest miscarriage of justice.
9.10. It was therefore urged that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by
the High Court be set aside and that the conviction and sentence recorded by the
trial Court be restored thereby allowing the present criminal appeal.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Krishna Pal Singh, learned counsel appointed as
a micus curiae for the respondent refuted the submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellant – State. At the outset, he drew our attention to the deposition of
Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) who stated that he was informed by Yashpal (PW-3)
that his sister Saro Devi had sustained burn injuries. Thereafter, PW-2 went to
the house of the respondent and found the deceased in a serious condition with
extensive burn injuries. PW-3 corroborated this version and deposed that the
respondent had telephonically informed him on 07.12.2009 that Saro Devi had
been burnt and that efforts should be made to save her. The statement of
Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) recorded vide Ext. PW-12/A was treated as the FIR in
the present case. The High Court found that in the said Rukka (FIR), PW-2
specifically stated that when he asked his sister as to who had set her on fire she
did not disclose the name of any person. This, according to the defence, was the
earliest version of the incident recorded on 07.12.2009 wherein the deceased
merely stated that she had been set on fire. Though the trial Court placed
primary reliance on the dying declaration (Ext. PW-1/B) recorded by PW-1
10
Tehsildar, the High Court found the same to be suspicious and not worthy of
reliance.
10.1. The learned counsel further submitted that it is an admitted fact that
villagers including the respondent himself, made efforts to extinguish the fire
and rescue the deceased. PW-2 stated that he spoke to his sister on the mobile
phone of the respondent during which she only said, “I got burnt, save me”.
Even in his statement Ext. PW-12/A treated as the FIR, she made no allegation
that the respondent had poured kerosene on her or set her on fire with a
matchstick. PW-2 admitted that despite repeatedly asking her as to who had set
her on fire, she did not name anyone, though he personally suspected the
respondent.
10.2. The learned counsel placed reliance on the testimonies of PW-4 Om
Prakash, the Ward Member, PW-5 Ravindra (declared hostile), DW-2 Kamal
Kishor, the eight-year-old son of the deceased and DW-1 Kamla, a friend of the
deceased from the same village to contend that the respondent did not commit
the alleged offence and that the deceased caught fire on her own. It was argued
that the cumulative effect of the evidence on record creates serious doubt about
the prosecution allegation that the respondent poured kerosene on the deceased
and set her on fire. To support the plea of self-immolation, emphasis was laid on
the fact that the respondent himself sustained burn injuries while attempting to
rescue the deceased.
11
10.3. In this regard, PW-11 Dr. Vishal Thakur examined the respondent on
10.12.2009 and found burn injuries on his left hand to the extent of 3% along
with a bruise on the right elbow and issued the MLC (Ext. PW-11/C). It was
submitted that the conduct of the respondent in immediately informing the
relatives of the deceased further strengthens the defence version that the
deceased herself poured kerosene and set herself on fire.
10.4. It was further submitted that although the prosecution relied heavily on
the dying declaration allegedly recorded by PW-1 Tehsildar on 08.12.2009, the
High Court rightly found the same to be suspicious and untrustworthy. PW-1
stated that he reached the hospital at around 11.00-11.15 a.m. on 08.12.2009 to
record the dying declaration and claimed to have informed the police about the
same. However, when confronted with his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
no such fact was found recorded therein. PW-2 in his examination-in-chief
stated that the Tehsildar came to the hospital in the evening of 08.12.2009,
though later stated that the dying declaration was recorded at about 11.30 a.m.
PW-1 further stated that the Deputy Superintendent of Police was present at the
time of recording of the dying declaration and had appended his signature
thereto.
10.5. The learned counsel contended that the very presence of police officers at
the time of recording the dying declaration casts a serious doubt on its
authenticity as ideally no police official ought to be present at that stage. This
12
circumstance, according to the defence, gives rise to a strong suspicion that the
statement was manipulated in connivance with the police and that PW-1 merely
signed a statement that had already been prepared. This submission was sought
to be supported by the testimony of PW-10, the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, who stated that the statement was recorded by the Tehsildar and signed
by him. However, in cross examination, PW-10 admitted that he could not recall
whether the statement had been recorded by ASI Santosh Kumar and stated that
it was dictated by the Tehsildar word by word after questioning the deceased. It
was argued that this indicates that the statement was, in fact, written by a police
official signed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and subsequently shown
as having been recorded by PW-1. The defence further argued that ASI Santosh
Kumar though cited as a prosecution witness, was deliberately withheld to
conceal the true manner in which the dying declaration came to be recorded.
Consequently, the dying declaration (Ext. PW-1/B), according to the defence, is
of doubtful credibility and was rightly discarded by the High Court.
10.6. On the issue of motive, the learned counsel submitted that no motive
whatsoever was established for the respondent to set the deceased on fire. The
allegation that the respondent called the deceased a “Kanjri” even if accepted,
could have caused humiliation to the deceased and may have prompted her to
take the extreme step of self-immolation. This possibility, it was contended, is
consistent with the evidence on record.
13
10.7. It was lastly submitted that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the respondent set the deceased on fire by pouring
kerosene upon her. On the contrary, the evidence supports the defence theory of
self-immolation arising out of a sense of humiliation. The dying declaration
relied upon by the prosecution being suspicious in nature could not, in the
absence of reliable corroboration, form the sole basis for conviction. It was
argued that the trial Court discarded the defence evidence without cogent
reasons, whereas defence evidence is entitled to the same degree of scrutiny as
prosecution evidence and cannot be rejected outright.
10.8. Placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of Haryana v.
5 6
Ram Singh and Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab , the learned counsel
submitted that defence witnesses must be subjected to careful and critical
evaluation and ought not to be discarded merely on the ground that they were
produced by the defence.
10.9. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the impugned judgment of
acquittal does not call for any interference by this Court and the present criminal
appeal deserves to be dismissed.
5
(2002) 2 SCC 426
6
(2009) 16 SCC 487
14
11. We have carefully considered the submissions made on bothsides and
perused the materials available on record.
12. In the present case, the appellant – State has challenged the judgment of
the High Court acquitting the respondent of the offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC. The trial Court earlier found the respondent guilty of
committing the offence under Section 302 IPC, holding that he had caused the
death of his wife by setting her on fire. Accordingly, the trial Court convicted
the respondent and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a
fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for a
further period of three years.
13. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it would be apposite to
refer to certain decisions delineating the contours of appellate interference with
an order of acquittal. In Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
7
others , this Court, while considering appeals against a judgment of acquittal
rendered by the High Court, categorically observed that there is no absolute
restriction in law on the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. It was further reiterated
that where, upon scrutiny, the appellate court finds that the decision of the court
below is based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence or is contrary to settled
7
AIR 2016 SC 1160 : (2016) 4 SCC 357
15
principles of law, interference with such an order becomes not only permissible
but also imperative.
8
13.1. In Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and another etc. (one of us, B.V.
Nagarathna, J., was a member of the Bench) this Court, after undertaking a
detailed survey of the case law, summarised the circumstances under which in
an appeal against an order of acquittal an order of conviction may be passed.
The following paragraphs are relevant:
“31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this
Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as
follows:
31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal,
especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed upto the High Court.
It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong
process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts
of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that
the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai, AIR 1981 SC 1442] Such fetters
on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a
person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to
the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is
held by a superior court. [Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, AIR 1979 (SC)
1284] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which,
after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable,
logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh,
(1990) CrLJ 2274 (SC)]
31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of
acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court
may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of
conviction, may be summarised as follows:
31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse:
8
(2022) 3 SCC 471 – 3 Judge Bench
16
a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court
based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of
Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 207] For example, where
direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without
cogent reasoning; [State of UP v. Shanker, AIR 1981 SC 879]
b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the
same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were
‘interested’ witnesses; [State of UP v. Hakim Singh, AIR 1980 SC 184]
c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court,
on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses
to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind
in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC
207]
d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the
High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury
found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime.
[Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, AIR 1979 SC 1284]
e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of ‘implicit
proof’ rather than that of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ and therefore
evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of UP v. Ranjha Ram,
AIR 1986 SC 1959]
f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an
exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the
accused; [State of Maharashtra v. ChampalalPunjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC
1675] or where acquittal rests merely in exaggerated devotion to the rule
of benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. [Gurbachan v. Satpal Singh,
AIR 1990 SC 209].
g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had
no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case,
there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused,
thereby making it unnecessary on the part of the prosecution to establish
‘motive.’ [State of AP v. Bogam Chandraiah, AIR 1986 SC 1899]
31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice:
a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused
persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of
evidence, [State of UP v. Pheru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205] or based on
extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and
fantasy. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pussu 1983 AIR 867 (SC)]
b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in
conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or
indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the
accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of
delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial
17
nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC
1675]
[Source: Durga Das Basu – “The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973” Sixth
Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX]”
9
13.2. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore , this Court
reiterated that it is ordinarily slow to interfere with orders of acquittal. However,
it was clarified that where the High Court has adopted a wholly erroneous
process of reasoning, misread material evidence, or ignored vital circumstances
resulting in a grave miscarriage of injustice, interference is clearly permissible.
The following paragraphs are instructive:
“20. Having considered the submissions and perused the record, before we
proceed further, it would be useful for us to notice the law as to when it would
be appropriate for this Court, exercising its power under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, to reverse an acquittal into a conviction. Normally, the
Court is reluctant to interfere with an order of acquittal. But when it appears
that the High Court has on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a
legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case and ignoring
some of the most vital facts, acquitted the respondent and the order of acquittal
passed by the High Court has resulted in a grave and substantial miscarriage of
justice, extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
may rightfully be exercised (See: State of U.P. v. Sahai & Others, (1982) 1 SCC
352).
21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah & Others (2005) 3 SCC 169,
reiterating the same view it was observed:
“8. … This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow
in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse
appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of
justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would
not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the
accused and if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen
one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be
reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.”
9
2023 SCC OnLine SC 537
18
22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd.
Ibrahim & Others, (2020) 11 SCC 174, it was observed:
“190. … Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of
the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such
reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court
might reverse an order of acquittal if the court finds that no person
properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on
record found the accused to be “not guilty”. …”
10
13.3. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg Etc. , this Court while
considering appeals against an order of acquittal passed by the High Court,
undertook a comprehensive examination of the scope and ambit of its power in
criminal matters. The following paragraphs are opposite in this context:
“15.1. In Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2022) 11 SCC 800, it was held:
“25. It may be highlighted at the outset that although the powers vested
in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are wide, this Court in
a criminal appeal by special leave will ordinarily loath to enter into a
fresh reappraisement of evidence and question the credibility of
witnesses when there is a concurrent finding of fact, save for certain
exceptional circumstances. While it is difficult to lay down a rule of
universal application, it has been affirmed time and again that except
where the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error of law or
procedure, or is based on misreading of evidence, or is inconsistent with
the evidence and thus has led to a perverse finding, this Court will
refrain from interfering with the findings of the courts below.”
15.2. On a reading of various judgments, viz., Ramaniklal Gokaldas v. State of
Gujarat, (1976) 1 SCC 6, Nadodi Jayaraman v. State of T.N., 1992 Supp (3)
SCC 161, Banwari Ram v. State of U.P. (1998) 9 SCC 3, the generally accepted
standard – which it ought to be stated, is not a rule – is that when the Courts
below concurred, this Court does not enter into the reappreciation of the
evidence, in a criminal case. In the present case, the Courts below have, in fact,
arrived at opposite findings and as such, to set the matter to rest either by
conviction or acquittal, this Court must analyse the evidence on record.”
10
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801
19
13.4. Thus, it is vivid that where a judgment of acquittal is found to be
manifestly erroneous, perverse, or founded on a misreading of evidence or
incorrect application of law, this Court would be justified to set aside the
acquittal and record a conviction, albeit exercising such power with
circumspection and in exceptional circumstances.
14. Guided by the above principles, we now proceed to examine the facts of
the present case. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined
twelve witnesses (PW-1 to PW-12) and marked the relevant documents and
material objects. The defence, in turn, examined two witnesses (DW-1 and
DW-2). A brief and structured appreciation of the oral evidence is as under:
• PW-1 Amar Singh, the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate, deposed that
pursuant to a written direction (Ext. PW-1/A), he proceeded to the Civil
Hospital, Chamba on 08.12.2009 at about 11.00-11.15 a.m. for the
purpose of recording the statement of Saro Devi. Before recording the
statement, he ascertained from the attending doctor that the patient was in
a fit condition to make a statement. Thereafter, he recorded her statement,
which is on record as Ext. PW-1/B. According to PW1, the deceased
stated in clear and unequivocal terms that her husband had sprinkled
kerosene oil upon her and set her on fire with a matchstick. She further
stated that the respondent used to abuse her by calling her “Kanjri” and
had asked her to leave the house. PW-1 deposed that the deceased
20
remained conscious throughout, affixed her thumb impression on the
statement and that he appended the requisite certificate regarding her
fitness and consciousness. He further stated that PW-10, K.D. Sharma,
Deputy Superintendent of Police, was present at that time and signed the
statement as a witness. In his cross examination, PW-1 categorically
denied the suggestion that the statement was recorded at the instance of
the police or that the deceased had not made such a statement.
• PW-2, Ramesh Kumar, the brother of the deceased, deposed that on
07.12.2009 he was informed by PW-3 Yashpal that his sister had suffered
burn injuries. He stated that he contacted his sister telephonically on
someone else’s phone and she told him that she had been put on fire and
sought help. PW-2 further stated that he immediately went to the house of
the respondent and found his sister lying on the bed in a seriously burnt
condition without clothes on her body. She was alive at that time and was
taken by him to the hospital at Chamba. He reported the matter to the
police and his statement Ext. PW-12/A was recorded, on the basis of
which the FIR came to be registered. PW-2 further stated that on the next
day, i.e. 08.12.2009, the Tehsildar came to the hospital and recorded the
statement of his sister in his presence. Although he initially stated that the
Tehsildar came in the evening, on a question put by the Court he clarified
that the statement was recorded at about 11.30 a.m. He also stated that at
21
the time of recording of the statement, the deceased recognised him, his
parents and her mother-in-law. In his cross-examination, he denied the
suggestion that the deceased was unconscious or incapable of making a
statement.
• PW-3, Yashpal corroborated the version of PW-2. He stated that on
07.12.2009 he received a telephonic call from the respondent informing
him that Saro Devi had sustained burn injuries and seeking help to save
her. He deposed that he immediately conveyed this information to PW-2,
Ramesh Kumar.
• PW-4, Om Prakash, a ward member, stated that upon reaching the house
of the respondent, he found the deceased crying and shouting “bachao,
bachao”. He further stated that upon enquiry, the deceased told him that
she had herself poured kerosene oil on her. He also deposed that the
police seized a kerosene can and a matchbox from the spot and took
photographs. He proved the seizure memos Ext. PW-4/A and Ext.
PW-4/B and identified the seized articles including the kerosene can,
matchbox and burnt clothes, namely, salwar, shirt, bra, dupatta and scalp
hair.
• PW-5, Ravindra, the aunt of the respondent stated that the deceased did
not say that the respondent had set her on fire but stated that she had
herself caught fire.
22
• PW-6, Pawan Kumar, Head Constable deposed that on 18.12.2009 ASI
Mukesh Kumar deposited three sealed parcels with him in the Malkhana,
one containing burnt mat, another containing burnt clothes of the
deceased and the third containing a matchstick and a plastic can with
kerosene oil. He made the requisite entries in the Malkhana register. He
further stated that on 19.12.2009 the said parcels were sent to the RFSL
through Constable Rakesh Kumar. He also proved the deposit and
dispatch of the viscera of the deceased. His testimony remained
unchallenged as no cross examination was conducted.
• PW-7, Nazir Hussain, Patwari, stated that he was associated with the
investigation and issued the Jamabandi and Tatima at the request of the
police, which were proved as Ext. PW-17/A and Ext. PW-17/B
respectively. His testimony was not subjected to cross-examination.
• PW-8, Gian Chand deposed that on 07.12.2009 at about 09.10 p.m., he
received telephonic information that a woman in a burnt condition had
been brought to the hospital and that necessary action be taken. He proved
the recording and transmission of this information. There was no cross-
examination of this witness.
• PW-9, Kuldeep Singh, ASI deposed that on 08.12.2009 at about
12.05 a.m. he received a rukka through Home Guard Balbir, on the basis
of which FIR Ext. PW-9/A was registered. He proved his endorsement
23
Ext. PW-9/B and stated that thereafter the file was handed over to ASI
Mukesh Kumar for investigation.
• PW-10, Shri K.D. Sharma, Deputy Superintendent of Police, supported
the testimony of PW-1 and stated that the dying declaration of the
deceased was recorded by the Tehsildar and that he signed the same as a
witness. In his cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the dying
declaration was fabricated or that it was not recorded by the Tehsildar.
• PW-11, Dr. Vishal Thakur, Medical Officer, was declared hostile. He
initially stated that he did not remember whether any opinion regarding
the fitness of the deceased to make a statement was sought or given.
However, in the cross-examination by the prosecution, he admitted
having issued a written opinion Ext. PW-11/B on 07.12.2009 declaring
the patient unfit to make a statement. Though he vacillated in his
deposition thereafter, significantly, no question was put to him regarding
the subsequent medical opinion recorded on Ext. PW-12/C dated
08.12.2009 declaring the patient fit to make a statement.
• PW-12, Mukesh Kumar, ASI and Investigating Officer deposed that on
07.12.2009 he moved an application Ext. PW-11/B seeking medical
opinion and the doctor declared the patient unfit to make a statement.
Based on the statement of PW-2, Ramesh Kumar (Ext. PW-12/A), the
FIR (Ext. PW-9/A) was registered. He further stated that on 08.12.2009
he again sought medical opinion vide Ext. PW-12/C and the doctor
24
declared the deceased fit, pursuant to which the Tehsildar recorded her
statement. He proved the site plan Ext. PW-12/D, the seizure memos,
arrest of the accused, the post-mortem report Ext. PW-12/F and the FSL
reports Ext. PX and PY.
• DW-1, Kamla deposed that the deceased while in the hospital and later at
Tanda, told her that she had herself sprinkled kerosene oil and set herself
on fire.
• DW-2, Kamal Kumar, the minor son of the deceased, stated that his
grandmother had gone to attend a marriage; that the respondent was
working in the kitchen garden; that on learning that his mother had caught
fire, the respondent attempted to extinguish the fire with his hands and
suffered burn injuries; and that thereafter his maternal uncle came and
took the deceased to the hospital.
14.1. The evidence on record establishes that on 08.12.2009, PW-1 recorded
the statement of the deceased in the hospital, after obtaining medical opinion
regarding her fitness, which was treated as her dying declaration. PW-2
supported the prosecution version and affirmed that the deceased was conscious
and capable of making a statement. PW-10 corroborated the recording of the
dying declaration while PW-12 supported the prosecution case through the
investigative narrative. PW-4 and PW-5 turned hostile, whereas PW-3, PW-6,
25
PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 are largely formal witnesses whose testimonies do not
directly bear upon the core issue of culpability.
15. Having noticed the evidence of the witnesses and the rival submissions, it
is now necessary to evaluate whether the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt.
15.1. As noticed earlier, the prosecution case is that on 07.12.2009, the
respondent poured kerosene oil upon his wife, Saro Devi, at their residence and
set her ablaze by lighting a matchstick. On hearing her cries, neighbours rushed
to the spot and attempted to rescue her; the respondent also participated in
extinguishing the fire and sustained minor burn injuries. The deceased suffered
extensive burn injuries and was admitted to the hospital at Chamba. On
08.12.2009, her statement was recorded in the hospital by PW-1, the Tehsildar-
cum-Executive Magistrate, after obtaining medical opinion regarding her
fitness, in the presence of PW-10, the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The
deceased ultimately succumbed to her injuries on 15.01.2010 due to septic
shock. The prosecution relies upon the said statement as a dying declaration
under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
16. Before examining the evidentiary value of the dying declaration, it is
apposite to note the settled legal principles governing dying declarations.
Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act renders admissible statements made by
26
a deceased person as to the cause of death or the circumstances of the
transaction resulting in death. It is well settled that a dying declaration need not
be made in expectation of immediate death; that a conviction under Section 302
IPC can rest solely on a dying declaration if it is found to be voluntary, truthful
and reliable; and that corroboration is not a rule of law but one of prudence.
11
16.1. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay , this Court laid down the
foundational principles governing appreciation of dying declarations. In that
case, the deceased had made three successive dying declarations within a span
of two hours, which were to some extent contradictory. However, one aspect
remained consistent in all three declarations namely that he had been attacked
by two persons, Kushal Rao and Tukaram with swords and spears. Relying upon
this common thread running through the declarations, which was further
corroborated by medical evidence disclosing punctured and incised wounds on
various parts of the body, this Court held that the declarations could be safely
relied upon to convict the accused who had been named therein. While so
holding, this Court expounded the principles governing the circumstances under
which a dying declaration may be accepted without corroboration. In this
regard, Paragraph 16 of the judgment is apposite:
“16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the
decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have
come to the conclusion,
11
1958 SCR 552
27
1. that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration
cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated;
2. that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the
circumstances in which the dying declaration was made;
3. that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration
is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence;
4. that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of
evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and
with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence;
5. that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate
in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and,
as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a
much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral
testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human
character, and
6. that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to
keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for
observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was
committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts
stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by
circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent
throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart
from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the
earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.”
16.2. The above principles were subsequently summarised by this Court in Smt.
12
Paniben v. State of Gujarat , as follows:
“(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot
be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3
SCC 104])
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can
base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav
[(1985) 1 SCC 552])
12
1992 SCC OnLine SC 355 : AIR 1992 SUPREME COURT 1817
28
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure
that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The
deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit
state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor
[(1976) 3 SCC 618]
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without
corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264])
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying
declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State
of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25])
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of
conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 654])
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the
occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti
Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455])
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On
the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo
Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769])
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit
mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion.
But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious
state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
(Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Supp SCC 152])
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying
declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan
Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390]) ”
13
16.3. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra , a Constitution Bench held that
medical certification of fitness is not an absolute requirement and that the
testimony of the Magistrate recording the dying declaration would suffice if the
Court is otherwise satisfied about the mental fitness of the declarant.
13
(2002) 6 SCC 710
29
14
16.4. In State of U.P. v. Veerpal , it was reiterated that a conviction can be
sustained solely on the basis of a dying declaration even in the absence of
corroboration, provided it inspires confidence. In the said case, the deceased in
her dying declaration named the person who had set her on fire. Even in the
statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., the deceased stated that her
father-in-law had attacked her with a stick with the intention to kill her and that
as a result, she locked herself in the room and set herself ablaze. Considering the
dying declaration of the deceased, which was found to be voluntary, truthful and
reliable, this Court set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court
and restored the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC recorded by the trial Court.
17. In light of the aforesaid principles, the dying declaration in the present
case inspires full confidence. It was recorded on 08.12.2009 by PW-1, the
Tehsildar, a neutral and independent public officer. Prior to recording the
statement, medical opinion regarding the fitness of the deceased was duly
obtained. PW-1 categorically stated that the deceased was conscious, oriented
and capable of making a statement. This version stands corroborated by PW-10,
the Deputy Superintendent of Police and PW-2, the brother of the deceased,
both of whom deposed that the deceased recognised them and responded
14
(2022) 4 SCC 741
30
appropriately to questions. Although PW-11, the Medical Officer vacillated on
certain aspects, the dying declaration cannot be discarded on that ground alone.
The declaration clearly and unequivocally attributes the act of pouring kerosene
oil and igniting the fire to the respondent. It bears the thumb impression of the
deceased and was recorded in the presence of senior officers. There is no
material on record suggestive of tutoring, coercion or manipulation.
18. The High Court disbelieved the dying declaration primarily on two
grounds: (i) an alleged inconsistency with respect to the time at which the
statement was recorded; and (ii) a doubt as to whether PW-1 himself recorded
the statement or merely dictated it. In our considered opinion, neither ground is
sustainable.
18.1. As regards the first aspect, PW-2 initially made a vague reference to the
evening; however, upon a clarification sought by the Court, he categorically
stated that the statement was recorded at around 11.30 a.m. This clarification
aligns with the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-10. Such a minor discrepancy,
which stood satisfactorily explained, does not go to the root of the prosecution
case, especially when the factum of recording of the dying declaration on
08.12.2009 stands firmly established.
18.2. With regard to the manner of recording, PW-1 clearly deposed that he
recorded the statement of the deceased after putting questions to her. PW-10
31
clarified that the statement was recorded under the supervision and authority of
PW-1, who ensured that the answers given by the deceased were correctly
reduced into writing. Recording a dying declaration under the supervision of a
Magistrate does not render it invalid. No suggestion was put to PW-1 in cross-
examination that he did not record the statement or that he abdicated his
responsibility. The High Court thus discarded the dying declaration on
conjectures not borne out by the evidence.
18.3. In any event, the law does not prescribe any rigid form for recording a
dying declaration. So long as the Court is satisfied that the declaration is
voluntary, truthful and reliable, hyper-technical objections cannot form the basis
for its rejection.
19. In the present case, it is true that the Rukka (FIR) records that the
deceased did not initially name the assailant. However, it is settled law that an
FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia of the entire prosecution case. At
that stage, the immediate concern of the family members was the survival of the
victim who had sustained nearly 70% burn injuries. Such an omission in the
earliest version, in these circumstances, cannot ipso facto discredit the
subsequent dying declaration recorded in accordance with law.
20. PW-4 and PW-5 were declared hostile and attempted to attribute oral
statements to the deceased suggesting self-immolation. The trial Court rightly
32
rejected their testimony. Their version is essentially hearsay and was never
disclosed at the earliest available opportunity. In Bhajju v. State of Madhya
15
Pradesh , this Court held that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied
upon only to the extent it is corroborated by other reliable evidence. Recently, in
16
Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab , this principle was reiterated. In the present
case, no such corroboration exists in respect of the testimony of PW-4 and
PW-5, whose statements are unsupported by any independent or reliable
evidence on record.
21. The defence witnesses, DW-1 and DW-2, stand on no better footing.
DW-1 admitted in cross-examination that she had reached the spot only after the
deceased had already caught fire and was not present at the time of the incident.
Her testimony is thus not based on direct knowledge and lacks corroboration.
DW-2, the minor son of the deceased, does not claim to have witnessed the act
of pouring kerosene or igniting the fire. At best, his testimony indicates that the
respondent attempted to extinguish the fire, a circumstance which does not
negate or dilute the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. The High Court
without a proper appreciation of the probative value of these testimonies, erred
in placing reliance upon them to overturn the conviction recorded by the trial
Court.
15
(2012) 4 SCC 327
16
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1669
33
22. The plea of self-immolation on behalf of the respondent does not inspire
the confidence of this Court. The alleged conduct of the respondent in
attempting to extinguish the fire and sustaining minor burn injuries does not, by
itself, exonerate him from culpability. Such conduct can equally be consistent
with an attempt to create an appearance of innocence after the commission of
the offence. The defence witnesses are either interested or partisan and fail to
rebut the consistent and cogent prosecution evidence.
23. Motive assumes significance, primarily in cases based on circumstantial
evidence. Where there is direct evidence in the form of a credible and
trustworthy dying declaration, the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal
to the prosecution case. This position has been consistently affirmed by this
17
Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah and another , Dasin
18
Bai @ Shanti Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh , and Purshottam Chopra v. State
19
(NCT of Delhi) . In the present case, the evidence on record discloses that the
respondent subjected the deceased to frequent quarrels, humiliation and verbal
abuse, including branding her a “Kanjri” and repeatedly asking her to leave the
matrimonial home. The dying declaration itself refers to persistent matrimonial
discord and ill-treatment thereby furnishing a plausible background for the
commission of the offence. In any event, the prosecution is not required to
17
(1986) 3 SCC 637
18
2015 SCC OnLine SC 107
19
2020 SCC OnLine SC 6
34
establish motive with mathematical precision and failure to conclusively prove
motive does not weaken an otherwise reliable and cogent case.
24. Upon an overall appraisal of the evidence, we are satisfied that the dying
declaration of the deceased, Saro Devi, is voluntary, truthful and reliable. It was
recorded by a competent authority at a time when the deceased was conscious,
oriented and capable of making a statement. The minor discrepancies
highlighted by the High Court do not create any dent in the credibility of the
dying declaration. Therefore, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the respondent committed the offence punishable under Section 302
IPC.
25. The trial Court correctly relied upon the dying declaration and the
surrounding circumstances to record the conviction of the respondent. The High
Court erred in discarding this crucial piece of evidence on speculative and
hyper-technical grounds and in placing undue reliance on the testimonies of
hostile and defence witnesses. The judgments relied upon by the respondent do
not lay down any absolute proposition that a dying declaration must invariably
be discarded in the absence of corroboration. Each case must necessarily turn on
its own facts.
26. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the High Court fell into
manifest error in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of conviction recorded
35
by the trial Court by re-appreciating the evidence in a manner contrary to the
settled principles governing appellate interference.
27. Accordingly, the criminal appeal filed by the appellant – State is allowed.
The impugned judgement of acquittal passed by the High Court is set aside.
Consequently, the judgement of conviction and order of sentence passed by the
trial Court are restored. The respondent shall surrender forthwith to undergo the
remaining sentence, failing which the trial Court shall take appropriate steps in
accordance with law.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
.…………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]
.…………………………J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 15, 2026.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 57
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 430 OF 2018
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
CHAMAN LAL … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
R. MAHADEVAN, J.
1. The instant Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the State of Himachal
Pradesh assailing the Final Judgment and Order dated 26.08.2014 passed by the
1
High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No. 295 of
2010, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent
and set aside the judgment of conviction dated 16.07.2010 and the consequential
order of sentence dated 03.08.2010 passed by the Sessions Judge, Chamba
2
Division, Chamba, Himachal Pradesh in Sessions Trial No. 19 of 2010, thereby
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2026.01.15
16:25:17 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2
Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
2
acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
3
Code, 1860 .
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 07.12.2009, the respondent-husband
Chaman Lal allegedly poured kerosene on his wife Saro Devi (deceased) at their
residence situated in Village Rampur, Pargana Dhundi, Tehsil and District
Chamba, Himachal Pradesh and set her on fire by lighting a matchstick. On
seeing her engulfed in flames, some villagers rushed to her rescue and the
respondent also attempted to extinguish the fire. Despite these efforts, the
deceased sustained severe burn injuries. The information was conveyed to her
brother, Ramesh Kumar, who arrived at the spot and made arrangements to take
her to the District Hospital, Chamba where she was provided with medical
treatment. After receiving initial treatment at Chamba, her condition did not
improve and she was referred to Tanda Medical College and Hospital on
15.12.2009 where she was provided with further treatment. When the doctor
opined that there was no chance of improvement, the brother of the deceased
took her back to his home on 22.12.2009, after which he continued to look after
her. On 15.01.2010, she succumbed to her injuries.
3. Based on the information given by the brother of the deceased, FIR No.
292 of 2009 was registered under Section 302 IPC against the respondent at
Police Station Sadar, Chamba on 08.12.2009. During the investigation, it was
3
For short, “IPC”
3
revealed that the respondent had contracted a love marriage with the deceased
and three children were born out of the said wedlock. However, their
relationship had become strained and on the fateful day, i.e. on 07.12.2009, the
accused poured kerosene upon the deceased and set her on fire, thereby causing
her death. Upon information given by the brother of the deceased, ASI Mukesh
Kumar came to the hospital. On his intimation, the Tehsildar of the Chamba
region reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased, which
was treated as Dying Declaration.
4. After completion of the investigation, a challan under Section 302 IPC
was prepared and filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba. The
Magistrate upon examining the record and complying with the provisions of
4
Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , found that the case was
exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and accordingly, committed it to the
Sessions Court.
5. The trial Court, after hearing the respondent and the prosecution and on
the basis of the materials available on record, framed a charge under Section 302
IPC. The respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6. The prosecution led its evidence. Thereafter, the statement of the
respondent was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He was given an
4
For short, “Cr.P.C”
4
opportunity to lead evidence in defence. After trial and upon perusal of the
materials brought on record by the parties, the trial Court found the respondent
guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC and accordingly convicted and
sentenced him to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in
default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three
years. The period of detention undergone during investigation and trial was
directed to be set off against the sentence imposed.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence
imposed by the trial Court, the respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 295 of
2010 before the High Court. By its judgment dated 26.08.2014, the High Court
set aside the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 16.07.2010
and 03.08.2010 respectively and acquitted the respondent of the charge under
Section 302 IPC by extending to him the benefit of doubt.
8. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of acquittal, the State of Himachal
Pradesh has preferred the present Criminal Appeal before this Court.
9. Mr. Vivek Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant –
State submitted that the deceased Saro Devi was married to the respondent in
the year 2002. The couple resided in Village Rampur, Tehsil and District
Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. It was alleged that there were disputes and frequent
quarrels between the husband and wife owing to the respondent’s suspicion
5
th
regarding the character of the deceased. On the evening of 7 December 2009, it
was alleged that the respondent poured kerosene oil upon his wife and set her on
fire with a matchstick at their residence. The deceased sustained severe burn
injuries to the extent of 70% and the respondent also sustained about 3% burn
injuries on his hand. Despite treatment, the deceased succumbed to her injuries
on 15.01.2010.
9.1. It was further submitted that on 08.12.2009, the Tehsildar-cum-Executive
Magistrate, Amar Singh (PW-1) recorded the dying declaration (Ext. PW-1/B)
of the deceased at the hospital, after medical certification of her fitness and in
the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, K.D. Sharma (PW-10) and
the Investigating Officer, ASI Mukesh Kumar (PW-12). In her statement, the
deceased categorically stated that her husband had set her on fire after insulting
her by calling her a “Kanjri” (woman of bad character). It was contended that
the trial Court rightly relied upon the dying declaration and convicted the
respondent. However, the High Court erroneously acquitted the respondent by
discarding the dying declaration on the sole ground of alleged discrepancies
relating to the time of arrival of the Tehsildar at the hospital.
9.2. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court committed a serious
error in holding that the time of arrival of the Tehsildar was doubtful relying
selectively on one statement of the brother of the deceased (PW-2). The High
Court failed to appreciate that PW-2 upon being specifically questioned,
6
corroborated the version of PW-1, PW-10 and PW-12, all of whom consistently
stated that the Tehsildar reached the hospital around 11.00-11.15 a.m. The High
Court thus erred in isolating one portion of PW-2’s testimony and ignoring
consistent corroborative evidence.
9.3. It was submitted that the High Court further erred in discarding the
testimony of PW-10, who was an independent witness to the recording of the
dying declaration. He deposed that the statement of the deceased was dictated
by the Tehsildar word by word. The defence did not put any question or
suggestion to PW-1 during cross-examination and that the statement was
improperly recorded. In the absence of any challenge, the High Court could not
have drawn an adverse inference on this aspect.
9.4. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court wrongly relied upon
the testimonies of the ward member Om Prakash (PW-4) and Ravindra (PW-5).
PW-4, who for the first time before the Court introduced a version that the
deceased had poured kerosene upon herself, which he admittedly did not make
in his statement before the police thereby rendering his testimony a material
improvement and inherently unreliable. Similarly, PW-5 though declared
hostile, was nevertheless relied upon by the High Court despite her close
relationship with the respondent-she being his paternal aunt (bua). Her
testimony being naturally biased, ought to have been discarded and could not
have formed the basis of any finding in favour of the respondent.
7
9.5. It was further submitted that the High Court gravely erred in accepting the
testimony of DW-2, the minor son of the respondent who sought to set up a plea
of alibi by stating that his father was working in the kitchen garden at the
relevant time. The testimony of DW-2 stands in direct contradiction to that of
PW-12, the Investigating Officer, who categorically stated in his cross-
examination that during the course of inquiry, the children of the deceased had
informed him that they were playing outside at the time of the incident. The
High Court therefore committed a manifest error in placing reliance on defence
evidence which was inconsistent and stood expressly contradicted by the
prosecution witnesses.
9.6. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court failed to properly
appreciate the credible and independent testimony of the Tehsildar (PW-1) who
categorically deposed that the deceased had stated before him that her husband
poured kerosene upon her after calling her a “Kanjri” . The said statement
coming from an independent and disinterested public servant, not only
establishes the overt act attributable to the respondent but also furnishes a clear
and proximate motive for the commission of the offence. Significantly, nothing
adverse was elicited in the cross-examination of PW-1 so as to cast any doubt
on his credibility or veracity. The High Court therefore fell into manifest error
in holding that no motive stood established against the respondent. The further
observation that the absence of any pending court proceedings between the
8
spouses indicated lack of animosity is wholly misconceived and legally
unsustainable. It is well settled that matrimonial discord and animosity between
spouses do not necessarily manifest in the form of litigation. The surrounding
circumstances, when read conjointly with the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2
clearly demonstrate strained marital relations and provide sufficient motive for
the commission of the offence.
9.7. It was submitted that the High Court has erred in discarding the dying
declaration which was duly recorded by the Tehsildar-cum-Executive
Magistrate in the presence of responsible officers and stood fully corroborated
by both medical and ocular evidence.
9.8. The learned counsel further drew our attention to the suspicious post-
incident conduct of the respondent. PW-2 deposed that the respondent did not
contact him directly to inform him about the condition of his sister. Instead, as
testified by Yashpal (PW-3) the respondent contacted PW-3, who in turn
conveyed the information to PW-2. Such conduct is wholly unnatural for a
husband and strongly indicative of a guilty mind.
9.9. The learned counsel ultimately submitted that the findings recorded by
the High Court are based on a clear misappreciation of evidence and
consideration of wholly irrelevant factors while completely ignoring the cogent,
reliable and trustworthy testimonies of independent witnesses including PW-1,
9
PW-10 and PW-12. Conversely, undue reliance was placed on hostile witnesses
and contradictory defence evidence, leading to a manifest miscarriage of justice.
9.10. It was therefore urged that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by
the High Court be set aside and that the conviction and sentence recorded by the
trial Court be restored thereby allowing the present criminal appeal.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Krishna Pal Singh, learned counsel appointed as
a micus curiae for the respondent refuted the submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellant – State. At the outset, he drew our attention to the deposition of
Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) who stated that he was informed by Yashpal (PW-3)
that his sister Saro Devi had sustained burn injuries. Thereafter, PW-2 went to
the house of the respondent and found the deceased in a serious condition with
extensive burn injuries. PW-3 corroborated this version and deposed that the
respondent had telephonically informed him on 07.12.2009 that Saro Devi had
been burnt and that efforts should be made to save her. The statement of
Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) recorded vide Ext. PW-12/A was treated as the FIR in
the present case. The High Court found that in the said Rukka (FIR), PW-2
specifically stated that when he asked his sister as to who had set her on fire she
did not disclose the name of any person. This, according to the defence, was the
earliest version of the incident recorded on 07.12.2009 wherein the deceased
merely stated that she had been set on fire. Though the trial Court placed
primary reliance on the dying declaration (Ext. PW-1/B) recorded by PW-1
10
Tehsildar, the High Court found the same to be suspicious and not worthy of
reliance.
10.1. The learned counsel further submitted that it is an admitted fact that
villagers including the respondent himself, made efforts to extinguish the fire
and rescue the deceased. PW-2 stated that he spoke to his sister on the mobile
phone of the respondent during which she only said, “I got burnt, save me”.
Even in his statement Ext. PW-12/A treated as the FIR, she made no allegation
that the respondent had poured kerosene on her or set her on fire with a
matchstick. PW-2 admitted that despite repeatedly asking her as to who had set
her on fire, she did not name anyone, though he personally suspected the
respondent.
10.2. The learned counsel placed reliance on the testimonies of PW-4 Om
Prakash, the Ward Member, PW-5 Ravindra (declared hostile), DW-2 Kamal
Kishor, the eight-year-old son of the deceased and DW-1 Kamla, a friend of the
deceased from the same village to contend that the respondent did not commit
the alleged offence and that the deceased caught fire on her own. It was argued
that the cumulative effect of the evidence on record creates serious doubt about
the prosecution allegation that the respondent poured kerosene on the deceased
and set her on fire. To support the plea of self-immolation, emphasis was laid on
the fact that the respondent himself sustained burn injuries while attempting to
rescue the deceased.
11
10.3. In this regard, PW-11 Dr. Vishal Thakur examined the respondent on
10.12.2009 and found burn injuries on his left hand to the extent of 3% along
with a bruise on the right elbow and issued the MLC (Ext. PW-11/C). It was
submitted that the conduct of the respondent in immediately informing the
relatives of the deceased further strengthens the defence version that the
deceased herself poured kerosene and set herself on fire.
10.4. It was further submitted that although the prosecution relied heavily on
the dying declaration allegedly recorded by PW-1 Tehsildar on 08.12.2009, the
High Court rightly found the same to be suspicious and untrustworthy. PW-1
stated that he reached the hospital at around 11.00-11.15 a.m. on 08.12.2009 to
record the dying declaration and claimed to have informed the police about the
same. However, when confronted with his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
no such fact was found recorded therein. PW-2 in his examination-in-chief
stated that the Tehsildar came to the hospital in the evening of 08.12.2009,
though later stated that the dying declaration was recorded at about 11.30 a.m.
PW-1 further stated that the Deputy Superintendent of Police was present at the
time of recording of the dying declaration and had appended his signature
thereto.
10.5. The learned counsel contended that the very presence of police officers at
the time of recording the dying declaration casts a serious doubt on its
authenticity as ideally no police official ought to be present at that stage. This
12
circumstance, according to the defence, gives rise to a strong suspicion that the
statement was manipulated in connivance with the police and that PW-1 merely
signed a statement that had already been prepared. This submission was sought
to be supported by the testimony of PW-10, the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, who stated that the statement was recorded by the Tehsildar and signed
by him. However, in cross examination, PW-10 admitted that he could not recall
whether the statement had been recorded by ASI Santosh Kumar and stated that
it was dictated by the Tehsildar word by word after questioning the deceased. It
was argued that this indicates that the statement was, in fact, written by a police
official signed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and subsequently shown
as having been recorded by PW-1. The defence further argued that ASI Santosh
Kumar though cited as a prosecution witness, was deliberately withheld to
conceal the true manner in which the dying declaration came to be recorded.
Consequently, the dying declaration (Ext. PW-1/B), according to the defence, is
of doubtful credibility and was rightly discarded by the High Court.
10.6. On the issue of motive, the learned counsel submitted that no motive
whatsoever was established for the respondent to set the deceased on fire. The
allegation that the respondent called the deceased a “Kanjri” even if accepted,
could have caused humiliation to the deceased and may have prompted her to
take the extreme step of self-immolation. This possibility, it was contended, is
consistent with the evidence on record.
13
10.7. It was lastly submitted that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the respondent set the deceased on fire by pouring
kerosene upon her. On the contrary, the evidence supports the defence theory of
self-immolation arising out of a sense of humiliation. The dying declaration
relied upon by the prosecution being suspicious in nature could not, in the
absence of reliable corroboration, form the sole basis for conviction. It was
argued that the trial Court discarded the defence evidence without cogent
reasons, whereas defence evidence is entitled to the same degree of scrutiny as
prosecution evidence and cannot be rejected outright.
10.8. Placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of Haryana v.
5 6
Ram Singh and Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab , the learned counsel
submitted that defence witnesses must be subjected to careful and critical
evaluation and ought not to be discarded merely on the ground that they were
produced by the defence.
10.9. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the impugned judgment of
acquittal does not call for any interference by this Court and the present criminal
appeal deserves to be dismissed.
5
(2002) 2 SCC 426
6
(2009) 16 SCC 487
14
11. We have carefully considered the submissions made on bothsides and
perused the materials available on record.
12. In the present case, the appellant – State has challenged the judgment of
the High Court acquitting the respondent of the offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC. The trial Court earlier found the respondent guilty of
committing the offence under Section 302 IPC, holding that he had caused the
death of his wife by setting her on fire. Accordingly, the trial Court convicted
the respondent and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a
fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for a
further period of three years.
13. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it would be apposite to
refer to certain decisions delineating the contours of appellate interference with
an order of acquittal. In Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
7
others , this Court, while considering appeals against a judgment of acquittal
rendered by the High Court, categorically observed that there is no absolute
restriction in law on the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. It was further reiterated
that where, upon scrutiny, the appellate court finds that the decision of the court
below is based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence or is contrary to settled
7
AIR 2016 SC 1160 : (2016) 4 SCC 357
15
principles of law, interference with such an order becomes not only permissible
but also imperative.
8
13.1. In Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and another etc. (one of us, B.V.
Nagarathna, J., was a member of the Bench) this Court, after undertaking a
detailed survey of the case law, summarised the circumstances under which in
an appeal against an order of acquittal an order of conviction may be passed.
The following paragraphs are relevant:
“31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this
Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as
follows:
31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal,
especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed upto the High Court.
It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong
process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts
of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that
the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai, AIR 1981 SC 1442] Such fetters
on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a
person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to
the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is
held by a superior court. [Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, AIR 1979 (SC)
1284] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which,
after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable,
logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh,
(1990) CrLJ 2274 (SC)]
31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of
acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court
may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of
conviction, may be summarised as follows:
31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse:
8
(2022) 3 SCC 471 – 3 Judge Bench
16
a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court
based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of
Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 207] For example, where
direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without
cogent reasoning; [State of UP v. Shanker, AIR 1981 SC 879]
b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the
same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were
‘interested’ witnesses; [State of UP v. Hakim Singh, AIR 1980 SC 184]
c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court,
on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses
to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind
in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC
207]
d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the
High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury
found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime.
[Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, AIR 1979 SC 1284]
e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of ‘implicit
proof’ rather than that of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ and therefore
evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of UP v. Ranjha Ram,
AIR 1986 SC 1959]
f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an
exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the
accused; [State of Maharashtra v. ChampalalPunjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC
1675] or where acquittal rests merely in exaggerated devotion to the rule
of benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. [Gurbachan v. Satpal Singh,
AIR 1990 SC 209].
g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had
no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case,
there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused,
thereby making it unnecessary on the part of the prosecution to establish
‘motive.’ [State of AP v. Bogam Chandraiah, AIR 1986 SC 1899]
31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice:
a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused
persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of
evidence, [State of UP v. Pheru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205] or based on
extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and
fantasy. [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pussu 1983 AIR 867 (SC)]
b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in
conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or
indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the
accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of
delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial
17
nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC
1675]
[Source: Durga Das Basu – “The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973” Sixth
Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX]”
9
13.2. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore , this Court
reiterated that it is ordinarily slow to interfere with orders of acquittal. However,
it was clarified that where the High Court has adopted a wholly erroneous
process of reasoning, misread material evidence, or ignored vital circumstances
resulting in a grave miscarriage of injustice, interference is clearly permissible.
The following paragraphs are instructive:
“20. Having considered the submissions and perused the record, before we
proceed further, it would be useful for us to notice the law as to when it would
be appropriate for this Court, exercising its power under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, to reverse an acquittal into a conviction. Normally, the
Court is reluctant to interfere with an order of acquittal. But when it appears
that the High Court has on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a
legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case and ignoring
some of the most vital facts, acquitted the respondent and the order of acquittal
passed by the High Court has resulted in a grave and substantial miscarriage of
justice, extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
may rightfully be exercised (See: State of U.P. v. Sahai & Others, (1982) 1 SCC
352).
21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah & Others (2005) 3 SCC 169,
reiterating the same view it was observed:
“8. … This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow
in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse
appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of
justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would
not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the
accused and if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen
one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be
reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.”
9
2023 SCC OnLine SC 537
18
22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd.
Ibrahim & Others, (2020) 11 SCC 174, it was observed:
“190. … Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of
the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such
reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court
might reverse an order of acquittal if the court finds that no person
properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on
record found the accused to be “not guilty”. …”
10
13.3. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg Etc. , this Court while
considering appeals against an order of acquittal passed by the High Court,
undertook a comprehensive examination of the scope and ambit of its power in
criminal matters. The following paragraphs are opposite in this context:
“15.1. In Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2022) 11 SCC 800, it was held:
“25. It may be highlighted at the outset that although the powers vested
in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are wide, this Court in
a criminal appeal by special leave will ordinarily loath to enter into a
fresh reappraisement of evidence and question the credibility of
witnesses when there is a concurrent finding of fact, save for certain
exceptional circumstances. While it is difficult to lay down a rule of
universal application, it has been affirmed time and again that except
where the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error of law or
procedure, or is based on misreading of evidence, or is inconsistent with
the evidence and thus has led to a perverse finding, this Court will
refrain from interfering with the findings of the courts below.”
15.2. On a reading of various judgments, viz., Ramaniklal Gokaldas v. State of
Gujarat, (1976) 1 SCC 6, Nadodi Jayaraman v. State of T.N., 1992 Supp (3)
SCC 161, Banwari Ram v. State of U.P. (1998) 9 SCC 3, the generally accepted
standard – which it ought to be stated, is not a rule – is that when the Courts
below concurred, this Court does not enter into the reappreciation of the
evidence, in a criminal case. In the present case, the Courts below have, in fact,
arrived at opposite findings and as such, to set the matter to rest either by
conviction or acquittal, this Court must analyse the evidence on record.”
10
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801
19
13.4. Thus, it is vivid that where a judgment of acquittal is found to be
manifestly erroneous, perverse, or founded on a misreading of evidence or
incorrect application of law, this Court would be justified to set aside the
acquittal and record a conviction, albeit exercising such power with
circumspection and in exceptional circumstances.
14. Guided by the above principles, we now proceed to examine the facts of
the present case. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined
twelve witnesses (PW-1 to PW-12) and marked the relevant documents and
material objects. The defence, in turn, examined two witnesses (DW-1 and
DW-2). A brief and structured appreciation of the oral evidence is as under:
• PW-1 Amar Singh, the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate, deposed that
pursuant to a written direction (Ext. PW-1/A), he proceeded to the Civil
Hospital, Chamba on 08.12.2009 at about 11.00-11.15 a.m. for the
purpose of recording the statement of Saro Devi. Before recording the
statement, he ascertained from the attending doctor that the patient was in
a fit condition to make a statement. Thereafter, he recorded her statement,
which is on record as Ext. PW-1/B. According to PW1, the deceased
stated in clear and unequivocal terms that her husband had sprinkled
kerosene oil upon her and set her on fire with a matchstick. She further
stated that the respondent used to abuse her by calling her “Kanjri” and
had asked her to leave the house. PW-1 deposed that the deceased
20
remained conscious throughout, affixed her thumb impression on the
statement and that he appended the requisite certificate regarding her
fitness and consciousness. He further stated that PW-10, K.D. Sharma,
Deputy Superintendent of Police, was present at that time and signed the
statement as a witness. In his cross examination, PW-1 categorically
denied the suggestion that the statement was recorded at the instance of
the police or that the deceased had not made such a statement.
• PW-2, Ramesh Kumar, the brother of the deceased, deposed that on
07.12.2009 he was informed by PW-3 Yashpal that his sister had suffered
burn injuries. He stated that he contacted his sister telephonically on
someone else’s phone and she told him that she had been put on fire and
sought help. PW-2 further stated that he immediately went to the house of
the respondent and found his sister lying on the bed in a seriously burnt
condition without clothes on her body. She was alive at that time and was
taken by him to the hospital at Chamba. He reported the matter to the
police and his statement Ext. PW-12/A was recorded, on the basis of
which the FIR came to be registered. PW-2 further stated that on the next
day, i.e. 08.12.2009, the Tehsildar came to the hospital and recorded the
statement of his sister in his presence. Although he initially stated that the
Tehsildar came in the evening, on a question put by the Court he clarified
that the statement was recorded at about 11.30 a.m. He also stated that at
21
the time of recording of the statement, the deceased recognised him, his
parents and her mother-in-law. In his cross-examination, he denied the
suggestion that the deceased was unconscious or incapable of making a
statement.
• PW-3, Yashpal corroborated the version of PW-2. He stated that on
07.12.2009 he received a telephonic call from the respondent informing
him that Saro Devi had sustained burn injuries and seeking help to save
her. He deposed that he immediately conveyed this information to PW-2,
Ramesh Kumar.
• PW-4, Om Prakash, a ward member, stated that upon reaching the house
of the respondent, he found the deceased crying and shouting “bachao,
bachao”. He further stated that upon enquiry, the deceased told him that
she had herself poured kerosene oil on her. He also deposed that the
police seized a kerosene can and a matchbox from the spot and took
photographs. He proved the seizure memos Ext. PW-4/A and Ext.
PW-4/B and identified the seized articles including the kerosene can,
matchbox and burnt clothes, namely, salwar, shirt, bra, dupatta and scalp
hair.
• PW-5, Ravindra, the aunt of the respondent stated that the deceased did
not say that the respondent had set her on fire but stated that she had
herself caught fire.
22
• PW-6, Pawan Kumar, Head Constable deposed that on 18.12.2009 ASI
Mukesh Kumar deposited three sealed parcels with him in the Malkhana,
one containing burnt mat, another containing burnt clothes of the
deceased and the third containing a matchstick and a plastic can with
kerosene oil. He made the requisite entries in the Malkhana register. He
further stated that on 19.12.2009 the said parcels were sent to the RFSL
through Constable Rakesh Kumar. He also proved the deposit and
dispatch of the viscera of the deceased. His testimony remained
unchallenged as no cross examination was conducted.
• PW-7, Nazir Hussain, Patwari, stated that he was associated with the
investigation and issued the Jamabandi and Tatima at the request of the
police, which were proved as Ext. PW-17/A and Ext. PW-17/B
respectively. His testimony was not subjected to cross-examination.
• PW-8, Gian Chand deposed that on 07.12.2009 at about 09.10 p.m., he
received telephonic information that a woman in a burnt condition had
been brought to the hospital and that necessary action be taken. He proved
the recording and transmission of this information. There was no cross-
examination of this witness.
• PW-9, Kuldeep Singh, ASI deposed that on 08.12.2009 at about
12.05 a.m. he received a rukka through Home Guard Balbir, on the basis
of which FIR Ext. PW-9/A was registered. He proved his endorsement
23
Ext. PW-9/B and stated that thereafter the file was handed over to ASI
Mukesh Kumar for investigation.
• PW-10, Shri K.D. Sharma, Deputy Superintendent of Police, supported
the testimony of PW-1 and stated that the dying declaration of the
deceased was recorded by the Tehsildar and that he signed the same as a
witness. In his cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the dying
declaration was fabricated or that it was not recorded by the Tehsildar.
• PW-11, Dr. Vishal Thakur, Medical Officer, was declared hostile. He
initially stated that he did not remember whether any opinion regarding
the fitness of the deceased to make a statement was sought or given.
However, in the cross-examination by the prosecution, he admitted
having issued a written opinion Ext. PW-11/B on 07.12.2009 declaring
the patient unfit to make a statement. Though he vacillated in his
deposition thereafter, significantly, no question was put to him regarding
the subsequent medical opinion recorded on Ext. PW-12/C dated
08.12.2009 declaring the patient fit to make a statement.
• PW-12, Mukesh Kumar, ASI and Investigating Officer deposed that on
07.12.2009 he moved an application Ext. PW-11/B seeking medical
opinion and the doctor declared the patient unfit to make a statement.
Based on the statement of PW-2, Ramesh Kumar (Ext. PW-12/A), the
FIR (Ext. PW-9/A) was registered. He further stated that on 08.12.2009
he again sought medical opinion vide Ext. PW-12/C and the doctor
24
declared the deceased fit, pursuant to which the Tehsildar recorded her
statement. He proved the site plan Ext. PW-12/D, the seizure memos,
arrest of the accused, the post-mortem report Ext. PW-12/F and the FSL
reports Ext. PX and PY.
• DW-1, Kamla deposed that the deceased while in the hospital and later at
Tanda, told her that she had herself sprinkled kerosene oil and set herself
on fire.
• DW-2, Kamal Kumar, the minor son of the deceased, stated that his
grandmother had gone to attend a marriage; that the respondent was
working in the kitchen garden; that on learning that his mother had caught
fire, the respondent attempted to extinguish the fire with his hands and
suffered burn injuries; and that thereafter his maternal uncle came and
took the deceased to the hospital.
14.1. The evidence on record establishes that on 08.12.2009, PW-1 recorded
the statement of the deceased in the hospital, after obtaining medical opinion
regarding her fitness, which was treated as her dying declaration. PW-2
supported the prosecution version and affirmed that the deceased was conscious
and capable of making a statement. PW-10 corroborated the recording of the
dying declaration while PW-12 supported the prosecution case through the
investigative narrative. PW-4 and PW-5 turned hostile, whereas PW-3, PW-6,
25
PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 are largely formal witnesses whose testimonies do not
directly bear upon the core issue of culpability.
15. Having noticed the evidence of the witnesses and the rival submissions, it
is now necessary to evaluate whether the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt.
15.1. As noticed earlier, the prosecution case is that on 07.12.2009, the
respondent poured kerosene oil upon his wife, Saro Devi, at their residence and
set her ablaze by lighting a matchstick. On hearing her cries, neighbours rushed
to the spot and attempted to rescue her; the respondent also participated in
extinguishing the fire and sustained minor burn injuries. The deceased suffered
extensive burn injuries and was admitted to the hospital at Chamba. On
08.12.2009, her statement was recorded in the hospital by PW-1, the Tehsildar-
cum-Executive Magistrate, after obtaining medical opinion regarding her
fitness, in the presence of PW-10, the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The
deceased ultimately succumbed to her injuries on 15.01.2010 due to septic
shock. The prosecution relies upon the said statement as a dying declaration
under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
16. Before examining the evidentiary value of the dying declaration, it is
apposite to note the settled legal principles governing dying declarations.
Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act renders admissible statements made by
26
a deceased person as to the cause of death or the circumstances of the
transaction resulting in death. It is well settled that a dying declaration need not
be made in expectation of immediate death; that a conviction under Section 302
IPC can rest solely on a dying declaration if it is found to be voluntary, truthful
and reliable; and that corroboration is not a rule of law but one of prudence.
11
16.1. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay , this Court laid down the
foundational principles governing appreciation of dying declarations. In that
case, the deceased had made three successive dying declarations within a span
of two hours, which were to some extent contradictory. However, one aspect
remained consistent in all three declarations namely that he had been attacked
by two persons, Kushal Rao and Tukaram with swords and spears. Relying upon
this common thread running through the declarations, which was further
corroborated by medical evidence disclosing punctured and incised wounds on
various parts of the body, this Court held that the declarations could be safely
relied upon to convict the accused who had been named therein. While so
holding, this Court expounded the principles governing the circumstances under
which a dying declaration may be accepted without corroboration. In this
regard, Paragraph 16 of the judgment is apposite:
“16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the
decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have
come to the conclusion,
11
1958 SCR 552
27
1. that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration
cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated;
2. that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the
circumstances in which the dying declaration was made;
3. that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration
is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence;
4. that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of
evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and
with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence;
5. that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate
in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and,
as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a
much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral
testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human
character, and
6. that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to
keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for
observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was
committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts
stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by
circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent
throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart
from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the
earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.”
16.2. The above principles were subsequently summarised by this Court in Smt.
12
Paniben v. State of Gujarat , as follows:
“(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot
be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3
SCC 104])
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can
base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav
[(1985) 1 SCC 552])
12
1992 SCC OnLine SC 355 : AIR 1992 SUPREME COURT 1817
28
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure
that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The
deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit
state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor
[(1976) 3 SCC 618]
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without
corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264])
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying
declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State
of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25])
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of
conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 654])
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the
occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti
Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455])
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On
the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo
Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769])
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit
mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion.
But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious
state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
(Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Supp SCC 152])
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying
declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan
Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390]) ”
13
16.3. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra , a Constitution Bench held that
medical certification of fitness is not an absolute requirement and that the
testimony of the Magistrate recording the dying declaration would suffice if the
Court is otherwise satisfied about the mental fitness of the declarant.
13
(2002) 6 SCC 710
29
14
16.4. In State of U.P. v. Veerpal , it was reiterated that a conviction can be
sustained solely on the basis of a dying declaration even in the absence of
corroboration, provided it inspires confidence. In the said case, the deceased in
her dying declaration named the person who had set her on fire. Even in the
statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., the deceased stated that her
father-in-law had attacked her with a stick with the intention to kill her and that
as a result, she locked herself in the room and set herself ablaze. Considering the
dying declaration of the deceased, which was found to be voluntary, truthful and
reliable, this Court set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court
and restored the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC recorded by the trial Court.
17. In light of the aforesaid principles, the dying declaration in the present
case inspires full confidence. It was recorded on 08.12.2009 by PW-1, the
Tehsildar, a neutral and independent public officer. Prior to recording the
statement, medical opinion regarding the fitness of the deceased was duly
obtained. PW-1 categorically stated that the deceased was conscious, oriented
and capable of making a statement. This version stands corroborated by PW-10,
the Deputy Superintendent of Police and PW-2, the brother of the deceased,
both of whom deposed that the deceased recognised them and responded
14
(2022) 4 SCC 741
30
appropriately to questions. Although PW-11, the Medical Officer vacillated on
certain aspects, the dying declaration cannot be discarded on that ground alone.
The declaration clearly and unequivocally attributes the act of pouring kerosene
oil and igniting the fire to the respondent. It bears the thumb impression of the
deceased and was recorded in the presence of senior officers. There is no
material on record suggestive of tutoring, coercion or manipulation.
18. The High Court disbelieved the dying declaration primarily on two
grounds: (i) an alleged inconsistency with respect to the time at which the
statement was recorded; and (ii) a doubt as to whether PW-1 himself recorded
the statement or merely dictated it. In our considered opinion, neither ground is
sustainable.
18.1. As regards the first aspect, PW-2 initially made a vague reference to the
evening; however, upon a clarification sought by the Court, he categorically
stated that the statement was recorded at around 11.30 a.m. This clarification
aligns with the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-10. Such a minor discrepancy,
which stood satisfactorily explained, does not go to the root of the prosecution
case, especially when the factum of recording of the dying declaration on
08.12.2009 stands firmly established.
18.2. With regard to the manner of recording, PW-1 clearly deposed that he
recorded the statement of the deceased after putting questions to her. PW-10
31
clarified that the statement was recorded under the supervision and authority of
PW-1, who ensured that the answers given by the deceased were correctly
reduced into writing. Recording a dying declaration under the supervision of a
Magistrate does not render it invalid. No suggestion was put to PW-1 in cross-
examination that he did not record the statement or that he abdicated his
responsibility. The High Court thus discarded the dying declaration on
conjectures not borne out by the evidence.
18.3. In any event, the law does not prescribe any rigid form for recording a
dying declaration. So long as the Court is satisfied that the declaration is
voluntary, truthful and reliable, hyper-technical objections cannot form the basis
for its rejection.
19. In the present case, it is true that the Rukka (FIR) records that the
deceased did not initially name the assailant. However, it is settled law that an
FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia of the entire prosecution case. At
that stage, the immediate concern of the family members was the survival of the
victim who had sustained nearly 70% burn injuries. Such an omission in the
earliest version, in these circumstances, cannot ipso facto discredit the
subsequent dying declaration recorded in accordance with law.
20. PW-4 and PW-5 were declared hostile and attempted to attribute oral
statements to the deceased suggesting self-immolation. The trial Court rightly
32
rejected their testimony. Their version is essentially hearsay and was never
disclosed at the earliest available opportunity. In Bhajju v. State of Madhya
15
Pradesh , this Court held that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied
upon only to the extent it is corroborated by other reliable evidence. Recently, in
16
Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab , this principle was reiterated. In the present
case, no such corroboration exists in respect of the testimony of PW-4 and
PW-5, whose statements are unsupported by any independent or reliable
evidence on record.
21. The defence witnesses, DW-1 and DW-2, stand on no better footing.
DW-1 admitted in cross-examination that she had reached the spot only after the
deceased had already caught fire and was not present at the time of the incident.
Her testimony is thus not based on direct knowledge and lacks corroboration.
DW-2, the minor son of the deceased, does not claim to have witnessed the act
of pouring kerosene or igniting the fire. At best, his testimony indicates that the
respondent attempted to extinguish the fire, a circumstance which does not
negate or dilute the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. The High Court
without a proper appreciation of the probative value of these testimonies, erred
in placing reliance upon them to overturn the conviction recorded by the trial
Court.
15
(2012) 4 SCC 327
16
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1669
33
22. The plea of self-immolation on behalf of the respondent does not inspire
the confidence of this Court. The alleged conduct of the respondent in
attempting to extinguish the fire and sustaining minor burn injuries does not, by
itself, exonerate him from culpability. Such conduct can equally be consistent
with an attempt to create an appearance of innocence after the commission of
the offence. The defence witnesses are either interested or partisan and fail to
rebut the consistent and cogent prosecution evidence.
23. Motive assumes significance, primarily in cases based on circumstantial
evidence. Where there is direct evidence in the form of a credible and
trustworthy dying declaration, the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal
to the prosecution case. This position has been consistently affirmed by this
17
Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah and another , Dasin
18
Bai @ Shanti Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh , and Purshottam Chopra v. State
19
(NCT of Delhi) . In the present case, the evidence on record discloses that the
respondent subjected the deceased to frequent quarrels, humiliation and verbal
abuse, including branding her a “Kanjri” and repeatedly asking her to leave the
matrimonial home. The dying declaration itself refers to persistent matrimonial
discord and ill-treatment thereby furnishing a plausible background for the
commission of the offence. In any event, the prosecution is not required to
17
(1986) 3 SCC 637
18
2015 SCC OnLine SC 107
19
2020 SCC OnLine SC 6
34
establish motive with mathematical precision and failure to conclusively prove
motive does not weaken an otherwise reliable and cogent case.
24. Upon an overall appraisal of the evidence, we are satisfied that the dying
declaration of the deceased, Saro Devi, is voluntary, truthful and reliable. It was
recorded by a competent authority at a time when the deceased was conscious,
oriented and capable of making a statement. The minor discrepancies
highlighted by the High Court do not create any dent in the credibility of the
dying declaration. Therefore, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the respondent committed the offence punishable under Section 302
IPC.
25. The trial Court correctly relied upon the dying declaration and the
surrounding circumstances to record the conviction of the respondent. The High
Court erred in discarding this crucial piece of evidence on speculative and
hyper-technical grounds and in placing undue reliance on the testimonies of
hostile and defence witnesses. The judgments relied upon by the respondent do
not lay down any absolute proposition that a dying declaration must invariably
be discarded in the absence of corroboration. Each case must necessarily turn on
its own facts.
26. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the High Court fell into
manifest error in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of conviction recorded
35
by the trial Court by re-appreciating the evidence in a manner contrary to the
settled principles governing appellate interference.
27. Accordingly, the criminal appeal filed by the appellant – State is allowed.
The impugned judgement of acquittal passed by the High Court is set aside.
Consequently, the judgement of conviction and order of sentence passed by the
trial Court are restored. The respondent shall surrender forthwith to undergo the
remaining sentence, failing which the trial Court shall take appropriate steps in
accordance with law.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
.…………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]
.…………………………J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 15, 2026.