M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED REP. BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MR. MEDAVENKATAIAH vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No(s). 4678 OF 2021 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 23353 of 2012) M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED        …Appellant(s)  VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.      …Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL No(s).           OF 2022 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 23351 of 2012) SRI SYED AHMED       …Appellant(s)  VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.  …Respondent(s) CIVIL APPEAL No(s).  4699­4719  OF 2021  (arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 20866­20886 of 2012 THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA  DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER    …Appellant(s)  VERSUS SRI KAKARAL RAVIKUMAR AND OTHERS  …Respondent(s) Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by BABITA PANDEY Date: 2022.10.11 18:13:43 IST Reason: 1 CIVIL APPEAL No(s).  4679­4698  OF 2021  (arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 21310­21329 of 2012 M/S. AARESS IRON & STEEL LTD.     …Appellant(s)  VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ETC.   …Respondent(s) AND WITH CIVIL APPEAL No(s).  4745­4747 OF 2021  (arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 21915­21917 of 2013 THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER     …Appellant(s)  VERSUS SRI KAKARAL RAVIKUMAR AND OTHERS  …Respondent(s)   J U D G M E N T Vikram Nath, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP(C) No. 23351/2012. 2. The   State   of   Karnataka   (Civil   Appeal   No.   4745­4747   of 2021), the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (Civil Appeal No. 4699­4719 of 2021), M/S MSPL Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4678 of 2021) and AARESS Iron & Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4679­4698 of 2021) have jointly assailed the correctness of the   judgement   and   order   dated   22.03.2012   passed   by   the 2 Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, Circuit Bench at Dharwad in a group of writ appeals filed by the land owners.  By the said judgment, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeals, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.03.2009 and   the   writ   petitions   were   allowed.   The   notifications   under Sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas 1 Development Act, 1966  were quashed. 3. Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 23351 of 2012 is filed by a land owner Syed Ahmed challenging the judgment dated 14.12.2011 passed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   Karnataka   High   Court, Circuit   Bench   at   Dharwad   in   Writ   Appeal   No.   6098   of   2009 whereby the writ appeal was dismissed and the judgement of the learned   Single   Judge   dated   23.06.2008   dismissing   the   writ petition {bearing number W.P.No. 18617 of 2007 (LA­KIDAB)} was affirmed.   As the argument of the appellant is based upon the Division Bench Judgement of the Karnataka High Court dated 22.03.2012   which   is   impugned   in   the   group   of   Civil   Appeals referred to above, this matter has been taken up analogous with the above said appeals. Background 1 In short “the 1966 Act” 3 4.      Two State Acts legislated in the State of Karnataka are relevant   for   determination   of   issues   in   the   present   case. Karnataka   Industrial   Areas   Development   Act,   1966   and   the 2 Karnataka Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2002 .  (i)  The   1966   Act   came   up   with   the   following preamble/object: “An   Act   to   make   special   provisions   for   securing   the establishment   of   industrial   areas   in   the   1   [State   of Karnataka]1   and   generally   to   promote   the   establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose   to   establish   an   Industrial   Areas   Development Board   and   for   purposes   connected   with   the   matters aforesaid.   WHEREAS   it   is   expedient   to   make   special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the 1 [State of Karnataka]1 and generally to promote the establishment and the orderly development of industries in such industrial areas, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial   Areas   Development   Board   and   for   purposes connected with the matters aforesaid;” (ii)   The   2002   Act   was   enacted   with   the   following preamble/object: “An   Act   to   provide   for   the   promotion   of   industrial development and facilitation of new investments to simplify the   regulatory   frame   work   by   reducing   procedural requirements and rationalising documents and to provide for an investor friendly environment in the State of Karnataka. Whereas,   it   is   expedient   to   provide   for   speedy implementation of industrial and other projects in the State by providing  single point guidance and assistance to promoters,   reducing   the   procedural   requirements, and   to   ensure   smooth rationalising   documents   operation ;” 2 In short “the 2002 Act” 4 5. The acquisition is for two companies viz. M/s MSPL 3  4 Ltd. and M/s AARESS Iron and Steel Ltd. , for setting up an iron   ore   palletisation   plant   and   an   integrated   steel   plant respectively. 6. Before setting out the facts it is relevant to note that challenge to the notifications under Section 1(3) and 3(1) of 1966   Act   is   made   only   in   W.P.   No.6304   of   2008.   This petition  relates   to   the   land   acquired   for   MSPL.   The   land owner in this petition S. Narayana Reddy owned only 4.35 acres whereas the total land acquired for MSPL was approx: 110 acres. Thus, S.Narayana Reddy owned a fraction of land being less than 4% of the total acquisition for MSPL. Rest of the 10 petitions challenged the notification under Section 28 of   1966   Act.   The   writ   petitioners   therein   in   all   the   10 petitions held less than 10% of the total land acquired for AISL. For sake of convenience facts from the appeal of MSPL have been recorded. It covers the relevant facts of the AISL appeal also. ________________ 3 In short “MSPL” 4 In short “AISL” 5 Chronology of events : i. MSPL moved an application on 23.03.2005 before the 5 State High Level Clearance Committee  under the 2002 Act for approval of project to set up palletisation plant and   an   integrated   steel   plant   in   Koppal   Taluk   of Koppal District in the State of Karnataka. ii. The SHLCC in its meeting dated 06.06.2005 approved the proposal of the project of MSPL to establish 1.20 million TPA iron ore pellet plant and 1 million TPA speciality steel plant (an integrated steel plant with an initial capacity of 1 million TPA) with a total cost of Rs. 2296.26 Crores for both the plants. iii. The SHLCC also approved infrastructural facilities for the   aforesaid   project   which   included   acquisition   of 1034   acres   of   land   by   Karnataka   Industrial   Area 63 Development Board  setup under the 1966 Act. iv. Government   of   Karnataka   on   the   aforementioned recommendations issued a Government Order dated 5 3 In short “SHLCC” 6 In short “KIADB” 6 22.12.2005  permitting  MSPL  to  setup   the   project and   also   approved   the   infrastructural   facilities, including 1034 acres of land to be acquired by the KIADB. v. MSPL   on   04.01.2006   transferred   all   applications made to the Government of Karnataka for setting up of palletisation and iron and steel plant to AISL. vi. Consequent   to   the   above,   AISL   on   09.01.2006 applied for all applications submitted by MSPL to be transferred in its name.  vii. On 16.01.2006, a further restructuring was made by   MSPL   and   it   was   communicated   to   the Department   of   Industries   that   the   palletisation project was to be done by MSPL whereas the iron and steel project was to be done by AISL. viii. On 28.01.2006, the Land Audit Committee granted approval of 1034 acres of land for acquisition. ix. On   15.02.2006,  Karnataka  Udyog   Mitra  conveyed the                  decision dated 28.01.2006 to KIADB to give 1034 acres of land for the project. x. The   Government   of   Karnataka   issued   another 7 Government   Order   dated   22.03.2006   modifying already approved project for pellet plant in favour of the MSPL and integrated steel plant in the name of AISL.  xi. The   State   Government   issued   notifications   under Section 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act somewhere between 09.11.2006 till 07.05.2007. 7 4 xii.   The   Karnataka   State   Pollution   Control   Board   on 19.10.2006   forwarded   its   inspection   report   for   the palletisation plant of MSPL.   xiii.The   Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer,   KIADB   on 20.11.2006   issued   notice   to   the   land   owners   under Section 28(2) of 1966 Act inviting their objections. xiv.   On 12.04.2007, the Special Land Acquisition Office, KIADB issued an order under Section 28 (3) of 1966 Act after dealing with each of the objections. xv.   Thereafter, notifications under Section 28(4) of 1966 Act   was   issued   on   17.05.2007,   13.03.2008   and 17.04.2007 for a total area of 110 acres 24 guntas 7 4 In short KSPCB 8 required by MSPL. (Similar notifications were issued for the land required for AISL) xvi.   The compensation under Section 29 (2) of 1966 Act was   determined at a sum of Rs. 3,64,98,000/­ for MSPL.  xvii.  The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB issued its orders   determining   compensation   of   land   in   two categories: Rs. 3 lac per acre for dry land and Rs. 3.50 lacs per acre for irrigated lands.  The land owners were requested to collect their compensation. xviii.   Writ   Petition   No.   10501   of   2007   and   10   other petitions   were   filed   praying   for   quashing   of   the notifications issued under Section 28(4) of the 1966 Act   for   MSPL   and   AISL.     It   would   be   relevant   to mention that more than 90 per cent of the land owners covering 90 per cent of the area acquired accepted the compensation.  It was only 10 per cent or less of the land owners who had filed the above 11 petitions.  In Writ   Petition   No.   6304   of   2008   challenge   was   also made to the grant under Sections 1(3) and 3(1) of the 9 1966 Act.  The area of petitioners therein sought to be acquired is only 4 acres and 34 guntas.   Further the Writ Petition No. 6304 of 2008 was with respect to the land for the pelletisation plant being set up by MSPL The other 10 petitions were for the land acquired for AISL.   xix.   On 31.01.2008, the Government of Karnataka issued an order for transfer of land with respect to 110 acres and 24 guntas. xx.    The transfer of possession took place on 10.03.2008 and both the companies MSPL and AISL were handed over possession. xxi.     MSPL   entered   into   an   agreement   with   KIADB   on 11.03.2008. xxii.   KSPCB gave its consent to MSPL to establish pellet plant on 02.08.2008 and 01.12.2008. xxiii.   Further the Ecology and Environment Department of Government   of   Karnataka   gave   environmental clearance on 01.10.2010. 10 xxiv.   On 17.03.2009, the learned Single Judge dismissed all the 11 petitions.   xxv.    Judgment of the Single Judge was challenged by way writ appeals before the Division Bench.  xxvi.   The Division Bench vide judgment dated 22.03.2012 allowed   the   appeals   and   quashed   the   acquisition proceedings for the entire areas which was not even challenged.   xxvii.       Special  Leave   Petitions   filed   in  this   Court  with a request   for   interim   order   in   favour   of   MSPL.     This Court   granted   interim   protection   on   27.07.2012   by staying   operation   of   the   impugned   judgment   of   the Division Bench. xxviii.     The Ministry of Environment and Forest issued an order dated 08.09.2014 providing that the plant may be continued to operate. xxix.    The KSPCB issued an order dated 16.10.2014 asking MSPL   to   apply   for   Terms   of   Reference   (TOR)   by 07.12.2014 and also to obtain environment clearance 11 within one year.   xxx.       The Ministry of Environment and Forest vide letter dated   23.09.2016   communicated   environmental clearance to MSPL.   7.   The above chronology of events is part of the written note of the   appellant   MSPL.   No   objection   has   been   taken   by   the respondents to the said chronology. Proceedings before the High Court: 8. Before the learned Single Judge, the learned counsels for land owners had raised two points as recorded in paragraph 3 thereof; the same is reproduced below: “Sri   Mahabaleshwar   Goud,   learned   counsel   appearing   on behalf   of   some   of   the   petitioners   canvassed   mainly   two points:  (a)  The State Government has not issued Notification under   Section   1(3)   of   the   KIADB   Act   and   consequently, Chapter 7 of the KIADB Act has not come into force in so far as   it   relates   to   the   present   acquisition   is   concerned   and therefore, the acquisition notifications issued under Section 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIADB Act are bad in the eye of law, and  (b)  the acquisition is in respect of only one company and therefore, the same is not for public purpose.   According to him, it is the case of colourable exercise of power and the action of the respondents is fraudulent and therefore, the acquisition proceedings vitiate.” 9. Insofar   as   the   first   point   was   concerned   regarding   the 12 absence of notification under Section 1(3) of the 1966 Act, the learned counsel appearing for KIADB produced the notification of the Government dated 09.01.2006 notifying that chapter VII of the 1966 Act would come into force in the relevant area.  Insofar as the second point is concerned that the acquisition was only for one company and as such it could not be for public purpose, the exercise  being   colourable   exercise   of   power   and   the   action  of respondents is fraudulent was dealt with by the learned Single Judge in detail and relying upon the judgments of the Karnataka High Court under the 1966 Act held that the second argument would also fail.   The learned Single Judge has also recorded in the last paragraph that only 1/10 i.e. 10% of the land owners submitted their grievances by filing the writ petitions.  It further gave reasons for not accepting their challenge in larger public interest   relying   upon   a   judgment   of   this   Court.     The   last paragraph of the judgment of learned Single Judge is reproduced hereinbelow: th “As aforementioned, the owners of only 1/10  of the lands which   are   sought   to   be   acquired   are   agitating   their grievances by filing these writ petitions.  If the Notifications under Section 28(1) and Section 28(4) of the KIADB Act are set   aside,   qua   these   pockets   of   lands,   then   the   entire development activity in the industrial area will come to a grinding halt and that would not be in the interest of anyone. It   is   not   advisable   nor   feasible   to   interfere   with   the 13 acquisition of such a large tract of lands when the occupants th of 9/10   of the acquired lands have not thought it fit to challenge the acquisition proceedings.  The aforesaid view of mine is supported by the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of OM PRAKASH AND ANOTHER ­vs­ STATE OF U.P. AND OTEHRS ((1998) 6 SCC PAGE­1). The individual’s right of   the   land   owner   must   yield   place   to   the   larger   public purposes.     In   view   of   the   same,   this   Court   declines   to interfere I the acquisition proceedings.” 10. The Division Bench allowed the appeals, and after setting aside the judgement of the learned Single Judge proceeded to quash   the   acquisition   proceedings.     In   paragraph   127,   the Division Bench recorded its conclusions which are reproduced hereunder: “127. In the result, we sum up our conclusions as under: i)  In  the  Indian  context,  Judicial   review  of  administrative action is much more precise, pervasive and accurate than as contemplated either under the English legal system or as developed in the American legal system. In the wake of our country having a written Constitution and  laws made by competent   legislatures,   judicial   review   of   administrative action   is   not   merely   confined   to   the   question   of   decision making   process   on   the   parameters   of   the   same   being affected or vitiated due to unreasonableness, arbitrariness or irrationality,  which  concepts  are  not   capable  of  a  precise definition   though   many   erudite   authors   have   made   good contributions and administrative law is very much part of jurisprudence   but   is   on   more   substantial   and   precise parameters   such   as   on   the   touchstone   of   the   statutory provisions   and   the   constitutional   provisions   and   therefore any decision and the process of making such a decision, if is not in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions and the   constitutional   provisions,   the   decision   is   affected   and cannot be sustained. ii) Acquisition of private  lands even for a public purpose, while   should   always   be   in   conformity   with   the   laws 14 governing   acquisition   proceedings   and   existence   of   public purpose which subserve a public interest is a sine quo none of   such   acquisition   proceedings,   in   a   situation   where acquisition   is   of   private   agricultural   lands   belonging   to agriculturists   and   has   the   effect   of   affecting   their   very livelihood and depriving them of their avocation, then the acquisition proceedings will have to be tested even on the touchstone of the constitutional provisions such as Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India and though there is no corresponding safeguard as is provided under Article 22 of the Constitution of India visa­vis violations of Article 21, nevertheless, Courts will have to apply the test of strict   compliance   with   procedural   requirements   and   any deviation   even   from   procedural   requirement   will   vitiate acquisition proceedings. iii) Acquisition of lands under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 can only be for the purpose of developing the subject lands as an industrial area and by the Board and cannot be for the benefit of a private industry   or   company   or   companies,   particularly   as   the notifications issued under the provisions of 1, 3 and 28 of the Act,   proclaiming   that   the   subject   lands   are   notified   for acquisition for the purpose of the board and when once it is so,   handing   over   of   such   lands   to   a   private   industrialist amounts to an instance of improper exercise of power and for a purpose other than the published and stated purpose, but more importantly, distribution of such acquired land, whether after development or before development, being in the nature of distribution of largesse of the State, amounts to depriving equal opportunity to all aspirants, who propose to set up industries in industrial areas and when the State hands over acquired lands to a private individual, it is therefore violative of the equality clause in the Constitution of India. In this regard, statement of law as enunciated in the single bench decision of this Court in the case of Heggappanavara [supra], later followed by another learned Single Judge in the case of N. Somashekar [supra], on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of RAMTANU [supra], does not state the correct legal position as indicated in para 21 of the judgment of the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court, reading as under: 21. Counsel on behalf of the petitioners contended that there was procedural discrimination between the Land Acquisition Act and the Act in the present case. It was said that there was a special procedure designed by 15 the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of land for the companies whereas in the present case the State was acquiring   land   for   companies   without   adopting   the procedure   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act.   It   is   to   be remembered   that   the   Act   in   the   present   case   is   a special one having the specific and special purpose of growth, development and organisation of industries in the   State   of   Maharashtra.   The   Act   has   its   own procedure   and   there   is   no   provision   in   the   Act   for acquisition of land for a company as in the case of Land Acquisition Act. In the present case, acquisition under the Act is for the  purpose of  development of industrial   estates   or   industrial   areas   by   the Corporation or any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. The policy underlying the Act is not acquisition of land for any company but for the one and   only purpose   of   development,  organisation  and growth of industrial estates and industrial areas. The Act is designed to have a planned industrial city as opposed to haphazard growth of industrial areas in all parts   of   the   State.   The   Act   is   intended   to   prevent, growth   of   industries   in   the   developed   parts   of   the State.   Industries   are   therefore   to   be   set   up   in   the developing   or   new   parts   of   the   State   where   new industrial towns will be brought  into existence. The object  of  the  Act   is  to   carve  out  planned   areas  for industries.   On   one   side   there   will   be   engineering industries   and   on   the   other   there   will   be   chemical industries. There will be localisation of industries with the result that the residents and dwellers of towns and cities   will   not   suffer   either   from   the   polluted   air   or obnoxious chemicals of industries or the dense growth of   industries   and   industrial   population,   within   and near about the residential areas. The Land Acquisition Act is a general Act and that is why there is specific provision for acquisition of land by the State for public purpose   and   acquisition   of   land   by   the   State   For companies.   The   present   Act   on   the   other   hand   is designed the sole purpose of development of industrial areas   and   industrial   estates   and   growth   and development of industries within the State. Industrial undertakings   or   persons   who   are   engaged   in industries all become entitled to the facilities on such industrial   growth.   Under   the   Land   Acquisition   Act acquisition is at the instance of and for the benefit of a company whereas under the present Act acquisition is solely by the State for public purposes. The two Acts 16 are dissimilar in situations and circumstances. though   the   examination   by   the   Supreme   Court   of   the Maharashtra Act  was in the context  of the Constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Act as being repugnant to the Central Enactment ­ Land Acquisition Act ­ as we find the purpose of acquisition of lands under the Maharashtra Act as well   as   the   Karnataka   Act   is   both   for   the   purpose   of developing industrial areas in the State, and therefore cannot be   held   to   be   laying   down   the   correct   law   and   ratio   as indicated in the two single bench decisions of this Court to this effect is hereby overruled. iv) An approval of the project proposed by an entrepreneur and   cleared   by   the   State   high   level   clearance   committee under Section 5 of the Felicitation Act by itself cannot act as an   insurance   against   any   possible   violations,   infractions, illegalities   or   irregularities   in   the   matter   of   acquisition   of private   lands   by   the   State   Government   in   exercise   of   its power   under   any   enabling   acquisition   Acts   including   the present  act (KIAD  Act, 1966). Such clearance cannot  and does not absolve the State Government from adhering to the procedural requirements envisaged tinder the Acquisition Act and in the instant case, under the provisions of the KIAD Act and   the   legality   or   otherwise   of   the   proceedings   for acquisition of lands has to bear scrutiny independently and the   mere   approval   of   the   project   by   the   State   high   level clearance   committee   cannot   and   will   not   validate   the illegalities or irregularities in the matter of acquisit ion of land. On such an independent examination in the instant case, we find from the records that the State Government as an   acquiring   authority   and   the   board   as   a   statutory development board, have not, only committed infractions of statutory provisions of Sections 3(1) and 28 of the Act but having also merely surrendered to the decision of the State high level committee and have thereby abdicated their duties and responsibilities under the acquiring Act. v)   Simultaneous   issue   of   notifications   by   the   State Government for declaring an area as industrial area under Section   3(1)   of   the   Act   for   notifying   the   applicability   of Chapter­VII of the Act in respect of an industrial area under Section 1(3) of the Act and the State Government issuing the notification of its intention to acquire any extent of land in an industrial area for the purpose of development by the board, particularly when different extent of lands are mentioned in these notifications, betrays a clear lack of understanding of 17 the statutory provisions as well as lack of awareness to the legislative scheme in making provisions in the Act for issuing of not only notifications but also to gazette the same under these three different statutory provisions  and unless it is factually and on record that the State Government is able to establish a commensurate application of mind to the three different enabling sections of the Act, a presumption that either   the   notifications   are   validly   issued   or   that   the notifications   are   fully   in   conformity   with   the   procedural requirement does not arise. For a valid acquisition of lands by the  State  Government in exercise  of its  powers  under Section   28   of   the   Act,   unless   the   State   Government   has adhered to the procedural requirement under sub­sections (2) to (8) of Section 28 of the Act, the acquisition proceedings get vitiated,   as   the   acquisition   results   in   deprivation   of   not merely land of agriculturists but also their livelihood and denial   of   their   avocation,   and   therefore   the   present acquisition   of   land   becomes   unsustainable   as   procedural requirements   under   these   statutory   provisions   are   not adhered to in the present cases. vi) Proceedings for acquisition of lands notified under Section 28 of the Act are also vitiated for the reason that the State Government has not shown its awareness to the mandate of sub­rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, imposing restrictions and prohibitions on new projects or activities based on their potential environmental impacts in   respect   of   the   industries   and   the   nature   of   industries proposed to be set up by the fourth respondent in the subject lands   before   embarking   on   acquisition   proceedings.   The amended Rule has come into force as per notification dated 14­9­2006 and in clear and emphatic terms envisages the procedure   for   either   granting   or   rejecting   of   prior environmental clearance. In terms of the notification, even before   construction   of   new   projects,   it   has   to   be approved/permitted or cleared by the central government or by the State level environment impact assessment authority, constituted by the Central Government under sub­section (3) of   Section   3   of   the   Environment   (Protection)   Act.   The industries proposed to be set up by respondents 4 and 5 having an annual production capacity far exceeding 20000 tonnes are a class of industries/activities within the meaning of   column   3(a)   of   the   schedule   to   the   notification   and therefore   prior   clearance   by   the   Central   Government   was essential. The  State Government having embarked  on the acquisition proceedings by issue of preliminary notification dated 9­11­2006 i.e., subsequent to the publication of the 18 notification   dated   14­9­2006   under   the   provisions   of   the Environment   (Protection)   Act,   indicates   that   the   State Government had embarked on acquisition proceedings for the benefit of a private company to set, up industries covered by the notification even before it was known as to whether a project   of   this   nature   can   be   cleared   by   the   Central Government  and   therefore  the  acquisition  proceedings  get vitiated. Acquisition of private agricultural lands by the State Government and in the name of a public purpose cannot be either casual or without being aware of the suitability and possibility of the acquired lands being available or otherwise for the proposal. In this view of the matter the State action affecting rights of citizens under Articles 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India and in turn violating Article 14 also, cannot pass muster before a constitutional Court.” 11. Based on the above conclusion, the Division Bench allowed the bunch of appeals and quashed the notifications issued under Sections 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act.  Aggrieved by the same, the appeals have been preferred by not only the companies for whose benefits the land was acquired but also by the KIADB and the State of Karnataka.  At the cost of repetition, it is pointed out that Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 23351 of 2012 has been preferred   by   a   land   owner   aggrieved   by   judgment   dated 14.12.2011, whereby the writ appeal of the said petitioner was dismissed, confirming the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned   Single   Judge   with   respect   to   a   challenge   relating   to similar   acquisition   for   a  company   BMM   Ispat  Ltd.   on   similar grounds. 19 12. We  have   heard  the   learned   counsel  for  the   parties  and perused   the   material   on   record.     Shri   Krishnan   Venugopal, learned Senior counsel appearing for the MSPL, after taking us through the chronology of events, summarised the findings and reasonings given in the impugned judgment as follows: a. The appellant being a ‘private’ company, its interests are not public. b. The appellant MSPL multiplied into two or three entities even during the process of acquisition proceedings. c. The 2002 Act cannot lead to a situation that ‘at the same time it can never be by giving a go by to other statutory requirements and procedural compliances. d. The process followed in terms of Section 28 of the 1996 Act was not proper and many land owners were complaining about being dispossessed or thrown out of their land as procedural requirements were not complied. e. Section 28(7) of the 1996 Act is ‘draconian’. f. There is no ‘public purpose’ when land is acquired for one entity. 20 g. The KIADB has not examined the issue of Environmental Clearance.  h. Acquisition proceedings, in the background of the 2002 Act, are not in accordance with law and not for public purpose. 13. Mr.   Venugopal   also   briefly   summarised   the   conclusions given in paragraph 127 of the impugned judgment, which have already been reproduced above as follows: i. KIADB cannot acquire lands for a single company/private industrialist and the same is improper exercise of power. It is also not in public interest. ii. Approval of project by SHLCC under the 2002 Act is not immunity   against   illegalities/irregularities   in   land acquisition. iii. Simultaneous issuance of Notifications under Sections 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act for declaration of the land as ‘industrial area’ and its acquisition, ‘betrays a clear lack of understanding of the statutory provisions as well as lack of awareness to the legislative scheme’ and further, ‘unless it is factually and on record that the State Government is able 21 to   establish   a   commensurate   application   of   mind   to   the three   different   enabling   sections   of   the   1966   Act,   a presumption that either the notifications are validly issued or  that the   notifications   are  fully  in  conformity  with  the procedural requirement does not arise’. iv. State   Government   has   not   complied   with   the   EIA Notification for Environmental Clearance. 14. Shri   Krishnan   Venugopal,   learned   Senior   Counsel   then advanced   his   submissions   which   are   briefly   summarised hereunder: a. Failure   to   appreciate   following   facts   and   material   on record Approval of Project was after due consideration of material i. The   initiation   of   the   entire   process   is   based   on   an application filed by Appellant and its consideration under the   2002   Act.   The   Application   was   considered   on 06.06.2005. ii. The   Government   Order   approving   the   Project   was   on 22.12.2005.   The approval was not hastily done and the 22 Government Order in fact notes key features of the project. iii. The approval for modification of the Government Order by inclusion   of   AISL   was   based   on   an   application   filed   by MSPL.  The details and relation between AISL and MSPL are set out in additional documents, which discloses that MSPL and AISL had common shareholders and were under same management   and   ultimately,   AISL   was   a   wholly   owned subsidiary of MSPL. iv. Full and complete disclosure was made by Applicant and the   same   was   duly   considered   and   not   mechanically approved by Government of Karnataka.  The High Court has observed: “106…..There   is   absolutely   no   application   of   mind   at   the subsequent levels. A notification issued under Section 3 of the Act in the name of the Act and for declaring an area mentions names of respondent Nos. 4 and 5.   Respondent No. 5 was never   an   applicant   before   the   State   High   Level   Clearance Committee, but, nevertheless, figures in the notification under Section 3 of the Act. Even mentioning of the names do not reveal or spell out as to how they figure there.  No preamble or legend is given to it. Then follows the application of chapter­VII in respect of the land notified.” v. The above observations have not taken into consideration the   Government Order dated 22.03.2006.   The grant of land is also approved by the Land Audit Committee in its 23 meeting on 28.01.2006. Objections of land owners duly considered vi. Upon   approval   to   the   Project   under   the   2002   Act,   the notifications for land acquisition are issued under the 1966 Act.  The Notifications for acquisition of land were issued on 09.11.2006:­ (A) declaration under Section 1(3) that Chapter VII would apply (B) declaration under Section 3(1) that an area is ‘industrial area’ for the 1966 Act and (C) acquisition of land. vii. Notice is only thereafter issued under Section 28(1) of the 1966 Act to the individual landowners to show cause as to why land should not be acquired. In the present case, notice under   Section   28(2)   was   issued   on   20.11.2006   and   the objections   were   duly   considered.   The   Special   Land Acquisition Officer passed an order under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act after considering these objections. viii. Sample   Panchnama   has   also   been   placed   before   this Hon’ble Court. Without any basis and despite material on record,   the   High   court   has   concluded   that   procedure   in terms of Section 28(3) was violated. 24 b. Failure to appreciate law Scope of Facilitation Act i. The High Court has erroneously concluded that the 2002 Act ‘virtually leaves no option to all other agencies of the State whether statutory or otherwise and has produced in them a state of submissiveness and they have mechanically like robots acted in a compliant manner.’ It is submitted that   the   very   purpose   of   a   SHLCC   and   Single   Window Clearance   Committee   would   be   defeated   if   the   approval granted by such committee is reviewed again and again by other departments.  The approach of the High Court will not only render the text of the 2002 Act otiose and unworkable, but will defeat the very purpose of the 2002 Act as set out in the Statement of Object and Reasons. ii. Further, the Hon’ble High Court has completly exceeded its jurisdiction to review the very approval of the Project when the only issue to have examined was – whether the mandate of Section 28 of the 1966 Act was complied. iii.  The High Court’s conclusion that the 2002 Act leads to a complete ‘go by’ to ‘statutory requirements and procedural 25 compliances’   is   manifestly   contrary   to   the   record.   The approval of the project by the SHLCC, the State Government Order along with the compliances in terms of site inspection by   KPSCB     and     even     obtaining     Environmental Clearance, the approval in terms of the 2002 Act has not given a ‘go by’ to statutory requirements and procedural compliances. iv. It   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   erred   in appreciating   the   scope   of   the   Facilitation   Act.     It   is submitted that the same is only for approval of proposal of a project and not for construction and operation itself, which are only subject to various other approvals. Process under section 28 of 1966 Act v. The   High   Court   has   concluded   that   the   power   of   State Government to take possession of land under Section 28(7) of   the   1966   Act   is   draconian.   However,   this   power   is conferred only in the scenario that orders are passed after considering objections and further notice to the landowners in terms of Section 28(6) of the 1966 Act. vi. It is only on the refusal in such an event that the power to 26 forcibly acquire land is conferred on the State Government. Single entity being eligible Applicant vii. It is submitted that the High Court has committed a grave error of jurisdiction in reconsidering the approval granted to the Project­ which was cleared by the SHLCC and also by the Land Audit Committee. It is submitted that the High Court could not have second­guessed the policy decision to approve a palletisation and integrated steel plant. viii. Without prejudice to the above contention, in any event, it is submitted   that   a   single   applicant   can   be   an   eligible applicant and there is no bar for the same. ix. The   conclusions   fail   to   appreciate   the   socio­economic benefit to the State of Karnataka and the scope of what constitutes ‘public purpose’.  15. Learned counsels appearing for AISL, State of Karnataka and KIADB have majorly adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Krishnan   Venugopal   and   have   submitted   that   the   impugned judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   be   set   aside.   It   is   their submission that the procedure as prescribed under the law has 27 been strictly adhered to. 16. On behalf of the respondent no.8 in the Appeal of MSPL, Shri   Shekhar   S.   Naphade,   learned   Senior   counsel   made submissions.  Other counsels appearing for other land owners in the appeal of AISL have adopted the same.  Briefly the arguments advanced on behalf of the private respondents are reproduced below: a. MSPL and AISL did not have any Environmental Clearance, in   the   absence   of   which   the   land   could   not   have   been acquired for setting up the plant. b. The   land   owner–respondents   have   not   accepted   any compensation. c. Just   because   90%   of   acquirees   have   accepted compensation, that does not validate an illegal acquisition. d. This is a colourable exercise of power since the 1996 Act does not contemplate acquisition for a private party directly. An area has to be set up as an industrial area in which private industry can be set up later. In the present case, the procedure   has   been   shortened   at   the   behest   of   private 28 parties.  e. AISL was not even before the SHLCC and the only applicant was MSPL. Hence, the acquisition for AISL is bad in law. f. Division   Bench   considered   the   issues   in   detail   and   has rightly quashed the notifications under 1966 Act. It does not call   for   any   interference.   The   appeal   deserves   to   be dismissed. 17. In so far as Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 23351 of 2012 is concerned, Shri Ankur S. Kulkarni, learned counsel, supported the   arguments   of   Mr.   Shekhar   S.   Naphade.   He   has   further submitted that judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012 is correct on law and facts as such the Division Bench dismissing the writ appeal by the impugned judgement dated 14.12.2011 committed an error and, therefore, needs to be set aside.   18. It may be noted here that depending upon the outcome of the decision in the appeals filed by MSPL, AISL, KIADB and State of Karnataka in which the judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012  is  under  challenge,   the  fate   of  the   aforesaid  Civil Appeal of Syed Ahmad would rest. 29 19. Before proceeding to deal with the respective submissions, a brief outline of the two state enactments i.e. 1966 Act and the 2002 Act, is spelled out.  1966 Act. 20.     The object of the 1966 Act is already reproduced in the earlier part of this order. It is for securing the establishment of industrial areas and generally to promote the establishment and orderly   development   of   industries   therein   within   the   state   of Karnataka. (i) Under section 1(3), it is provided that the Act would come into force at once except Chapter VII which shall come into force in such area and from such date as the State Government may from time to time by notification specify on this behalf. (ii) Section 2 deals with the definitions of the various words and phrases used in the Act.  (iii)  Under section 3(1), the State Government by Notification may declare any area in the State to be an industrial area for purposes of the Act. (iv)Under section 6, a Board is to be established chaired by the Secretary,   Commerce   and   Industries   Department.   Its 30 constitution is provided therein and comprises of the following as members: ● The Secretary, Finance Department; ● The Secretary, Housing and Urban Development; ● The Commissioner, Industrial Development; ● Director, Industries and Commerce; ● The   Chairman   and   Managing   Director,   Karnataka   State Industrial   Investment   and   Development   Corporation Limited; ● The Chairman, Karnataka State Pollution Control Board; ● The Director, Town Planning; ● The Managing Director, Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation Limited; ● The   Managing   Director,   Karnataka   State   Financial Corporation; ● The Executive Member of the Board; and  ● Two nominees of the Industrial Development Bank of India; (v) The functions of the Board are enumerated in section 13 and further general powers of the Board are spelled out in section   14   of   the   1966   Act.   The   same   are   reproduced hereunder: 31 “13.   Functions.­   The functions of the Board shall be,­  (i)  generally to promote  and  assist  in the   rapid   and   orderly   establishment, growth   and   development   of   industries [and to provide industrial infrastructural facilities   and   amenity]   in   industrial , and areas (ii) in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of clause (i), to,­   (a)   develop   industrial   areas declared by the State Government and make them available for undertakings to establish themselves; (b)   establish,   maintain,   develop, and   manage   industrial   estates   within industrial areas; (c)   undertake   such   schemes   or programmes of works, either jointly with other corporate bodies or institutions, or with   the   Government   or   local   or statutory authorities, or on an agency basis,   as   it   considers   necessary   or desirable,   for   the   furtherance   of   the purposes   for   which   the   Board   is established   and   for   all   purposes connected therewith.  Subject to the 14. General powers of the Board.­ provisions of the Act, the Board shall have power,­  (a) to acquire and hold such property, both movable and immovable as the Board may deem necessary for the performance of any of its activities and to lease,   sell,   exchange   or   otherwise   transfer   any property held by it on such conditions as may be deemed proper by the Board; (b) to purchase by agreement or take on lease or under any form of tenancy any land, to erect such buildings and to execute such other works as may be   necessary   for   the   purpose   of   carrying   out   its duties and functions; 32 (c)   to   provide   or   cause   to   be   provided   amenities [industrial   infrastructural   facilities]   and   common facilities   in   industrial   areas   and   construct   and maintain   or   cause   to   be   maintained   works   and buildings therefor; (d) to make available buildings on lease or sale or lease­cum­sale to industrialists or persons intending to start industrial undertakings; (e)   to   construct   buildings   for   the   housing   of   the employees of industries; (f)  (i)   to   allot   to   suitable   persons   [premises   or   parts thereof]   including   residential   tenements   in   the industrial   areas   established   or   developed   by   the Board; (ii)   to   modify   or   rescind   such   allotments, including   the   right   and   power   to   evict   the allottees concerned on breach of any of the terms or conditions of their allotment;  (iii) to resume possession of premises or part thereof including residential tenements in the industrial   area,   or   industrial   estate   in   the manner provided in section 34B. (g)   to   delegate   any   of   its   powers   generally   or specially to the Executive Member;  (h) to enter into and perform all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient for carrying out any of its functions; and (i) to do such other things and perform such acts as it may   think   necessary   or   expedient   for   the   proper conduct of its functions, and the carrying into effect the purposes of this Act.                                                                                                                                                                                      (vi) Chapter VII deals with the acquisition and disposal of the land. Section 27 provides that the areas notified by the State 33 Government   under   section   1(3)   would   be   applicable   to   this Chapter with effect from the date specified in the notification. Section   28   and   its   sub­sections   (i)   to   (viii)   provide   the procedure   for   acquisition   of   land.   Section   29   provides   for determination of compensation of the land acquired. Section 30 provides   that   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894   would   mutatis mutandis   apply   with   respect   to   the   provisions   therein   for inquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, reference to Court, apportionment and payment of compensation. Section 40 confers powers on the State Government to make rules and section 41 confers power on the Board to frame regulations with the previous approval of the State Government.  2002 Act: 21. This   Act   was   promulgated   for   promotion   of   industrial development and facilitation of new investments to simplify the regulatory   framework.   Statement   of   objects   and   reasons   is reproduced below:­ “ STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS.­  It is considered necessary to provide for the promotion of industrial   development   and   facilitation   of   new 34 investments, to simplify the regulatory frame work, by   reducing   the   procedural   requirements   and rationalising   documents   and   to   provide   for   an investor   friendly   environment   in   the   State   of Karnataka. The Bill among other things provides for the following, namely:­  1.   Constitution   of   State   High   Level   Clearance Committee,   State   Level   Single   Window   Clearance Committee   and   District   Level   Single   Window Clearance Committee for consideration of application from entrepreneurs intending to establish industries in the State.  2.   Appointment   of   Karnataka   Udyoga   Mitra   as   a Nodal   Agency   at   State   Level   and   the   District Industries   Centre   at   Nodal   Agency   at   the   District level to undertake investment promotional activities and to render necessary guidance and assistance to entrepreneurs to setup industrial undertaking in the State.  3. Providing Combined Application Form in lieu of existing forms prescribed under various laws.  4.   Facilitating   entrepreneurs   by   furnishing   a   self certification at the time of submitting the combined application form to the Nodal Agency.  5. Rationalising inspections by various authorities. 6. Providing for deemed approval by the departments or authorities in case of delay.  7. Penalty for entrepreneurs who fail to comply with the conditions of undertaking in the self certification. ” (i) Section   3(1)   provided   for   establishment   of   a   SHLCC consisting of such members as may be notified by the State Government to work as a single point clearance committee. Under sub­section (2), the SHLCC was to examine and consider 35 such   proposals   received   from   any   entrepreneur   relating   to setting up of any industrial or any other project in the State with the minimum investment of Rs.100 Crores or above. The functions   of   the   SHLCC   are   provided   in   section   4   and   its powers are provided in section 5.  (ii) Under   section  6,   a  State  Level  Single   Window  Clearance Committee (SLSWCC) is to be notified by the State Government which   has   the   power   to   deal   with   the   proposals   with   the investment of more than Rs.15 Crores but less than Rs.100 Crores.  The powers of SLSWCC are provided in section 7 and section 8. (iii)Similarly, there would  be a District Level Single Window Clearance Committee (DLSWCC) dealing with investments up to Rs.15 Crores and its functions and powers spelled out in paragraphs 10 and 11.  (iv)Under   section   11(A),   the   Government   could   constitute   a State Level Empowered Committee which was to be chaired by the Chief Secretary of the State, with Principal Secretaries of 10 different departments, Chairman of KSPCB, Director­General and Inspector­General of Police & State Fire Extinguishing and Emergency   Services,   Chief   Executive   Officer   &   Executive 36 Member   of   KIADB   and   the   Commissioner   for   Industrial Development & the Director for Industries and Commerce as its members.  (v) There   was   also   provision   made   for   Nodal   Agencies, Karnataka Udyog Mitra at the State Level under section 12 and its functions enumerated under section 13. (vi)Section 14 provides for a Combined Application Form for use of entrepreneurs for obtaining clearance to be prescribed by the State Government to all the Clearance Committees.  (vii) Section   17   provides   for   deemed   approval   in   case clearance is not issued within stipulated time. (viii) Section   18   provided   for   an   appeal   by   any   person aggrieved by the decision of the above­mentioned committees.  22. In the present case as stated in the chronology of events, the MSPL had initially moved an application under the 2002 Act. During  the  consideration of  the  said  application  by  the  State Government, MSPL shared its projects of the two industries by inducting   AISL   a   fully   owned   subsidiary   of   MSPL.   The introduction of AISL was accepted by the State Government and necessary applications were given by AISL also. The SHLCC had 37 earlier   approved   both   the   projects   and   one   of   the recommendations was for acquisition of land under the 1966 Act. The   KIADB   considered   the   recommendations   of   the   SHLCC, Karnataka Udyog Mitra & the State Government and accordingly acquired the land as per the procedure prescribed under section 28 of the 1966 Act.  23. It is this acquisition of land for MSPL and AISL which is under challenge in these proceedings. The Division bench having quashed the acquisition as also the notifications under section 1(3) and section 3(1) along with section 28 of 1966 Act is now for consideration in the present group of appeals. 24. Based   upon   the   arguments   advanced   by   the   learned counsels,   the   following   issues   arise   in   these   appeals   for   our consideration: (I) Whether in the absence of environmental clearance, the acquisition in question could have taken place?  (II)   Whether   the   acquisition   was   vitiated   in   view   of   the undue   haste   and   non­application   of   mind   by   the   competent authorities? 38 (III) Whether the procedure prescribed under the 1966 Act was duly followed? (IV) Whether the acquisition for a single company could be said to be for public purpose and could be made under the 1966 Act?  (V) Whether acquisition could be made for a non­applicant AISL under the 1966 Act without its application being routed through SHLCC. (VI)   Whether   the   comparison with   the   Maharashtra Industrial   Development   Act,   1962,   placing   reliance   on   the judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Shri   Ramtanu   Co­   ,  reported  in op.Housing Society Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (197) 3 SCC 323 in the impugned judgment is correct? (VII) Whether the conclusions arrived at in the impugned judgment are vitiated on account of inclusion of value judgments of policy views by the High Court? (VIII) Whether the entire acquisition could be quashed upon a   petition   by   a   fraction   of   landowners   holding   a   fraction   of acquired land which is only 10 % or less of the total acquired land? A.  Environmental Clearance. 39 25. On   record   environmental   clearance   has   been   given   on 23.09.2016   by   the   Ministry   of   Environment   and   Forests, Government of India, copy of which has been filed along with I.A. No.118035 of 2017 in the appeal of MSPL. Prior to it, the Ministry itself   vide   paragraph­2   of   the   Notification   dated   14.09.2006 provided   that   no   Environment   Clearance   from   MOEF   was required for securing land. It may also be relevant to note here that   KSPCB   had   given   its   clearance   and   no   objection   much earlier   for   setting   up   the   plant   vide   communication   dated 02.08.2008. Further, the Ecology and Environmental Department of Government of Karnataka had given clearance on 01.10.2010. Further,   the   Ministry   of   MOEF   had   issued   an   order   dated 08.09.2014 providing that the plant may be continued to operate. Thereafter,   the   KSPCB   issued   an   order   dated   16.10.2014 requiring MSPL to apply for Terms of Reference by 07.12.2014 and to obtain environment clearance from MOEF within one year. The MSPL accordingly applied as per the Terms of Reference and was   granted   the   environment   clearance   by   MOEF   vide communication dated 23.09.2016. In view of the above facts, as of date, no objection can be raised that there is no environmental 40 clearance certificate from the Ministry of Environment and Forest as the same has already been issued on 23.09.2016. B.  Non­application of mind and undue haste. 26. From the chronology of events what is to be noted is that the   SHLCC   after   considering   all   aspects   of   the   matter   had resolved to approve the project and had made recommendations accordingly.   Thereafter,   the   KIADB   accepted   the recommendations   of   the   SHLCC   and   the   same   also   had   due approval of the Government at the highest level. The division made   by   MSPL   (the   initial   applicant)   for   setting   up   the   two industries by two different entities also had due approval of the KIADB and the Government.  27. The original writ petitioners (land owners) had challenged the notifications under Section 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act on the ground of non­application of mind and undue haste. No grounds were raised nor any foundation laid in the petitions alleging mala fide. The object of the 2002 Act was primarily to provide a Single Window Clearance by the High Level Committees constituted   under   the   2002   Act.   We   have   gone   through   the reports and recommendations of the different Committees as also 41 the State Government and we find that all aspects of the matter have been considered and a conscious decision has been taken on   the   overall   conspectus   of   the   project   and   the   proposals submitted. 28. The meeting of the SHLCC dated 06.06.2005 was chaired by the Chief Minister, State of Karnataka, the concerned Ministers and Secretaries were also present in the meeting. The complete project   was   discussed   under   different   heads   including   the background   of   the   promoters,   background   of   the   company, means   of   finance,   infrastructure   facilities,   environment   and pollution   control   clearances,   local   employment,   water consumption,   electricity   consumption   and   incentives   & concessions.  29. The   Government   Order,   thereafter,   was   issued   on 22.12.2005   detailing   the   different   facets   of   the   proposal   and granting due approval for establishment of the palletization plant as   also   the   integrated   steel   plant   with   a   total   investment   of 2292.26   crores   and   generating   employment   to   one   thousand persons.  42 30. Thereafter, under the provisions of 1966 Act, the Land Audit th Committee   in   its   meeting   of   28   January,   2006,   which   was chaired by the Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries and Secretaries of other relevant Departments with special invitees also took a conscious decision with respect to the project submitted by MSPL for both the plants at subject Item No.2.5 and recommended for acquisition of 1034 acres of land and to intimate the same to the KIADB. It was thereafter that the Nodal Agency of the State level i.e. Karnataka Udyog Mitra in its meeting dated 15.02.2006 after considering the proceedings of th the SHLCC dated 6   June, 2005 and that of the Land Audit Committee dated 28.01.2006 accepted the recommendation for acquisition of 1034 acres of land.  31. These aspects were examined by this Court in  Chairman & MD, BPL Ltd. Vs. S.P. Gururaja,  reported in   (2003) 8 SCC 567 . This Hon’ble Court was dealing with a similar situation where a State High Level Committee was constituted to grant approvals and   acquire   land   to   the   appellant   therein.   This   process   was challenged in a public interest litigation. This Court was pleased to dismiss the writ petition finding that: 43 17. The Company intended to set up more than one unit. For   the   purpose   of   achieving   the   objective   of   economic development of the State, the State is entitled to deal with the applications  of the  entrepreneurs in an appropriate manner. For the said purpose a High Level Committee was constituted.   The   said   Committee   held   its   meeting   on 10.10.1994   wherein   not   only   the   members   referred   to hereinbefore but also various other officers were present. Presumably,   prior   thereto   the   applications   filed   by   the Company were scrutinized by the competent authorities. After   detailed   discussions,   the   High   Level   Committee resolved: (a) to permit the unit to change the location from Malur Indl. Area. to Dobespet Industrial Area; (b) to allot a total of 500 acres of land for the three projects viz., Colour Picture Tube, Colour Televisions and Battery, in Dobespet Industrial   Area,   Nelamangala   to,   in   lieu   of   the   earlier allotment of 100 acres of land at Malur Indl Area for the Colour TV sets project, subject to the promoters indicating the individual land requirement for Colour Picture Tube project,   Colour   TV   project   and   the   battery   project   duly justifying   the   requirement   with   necessary   plans,   block diagrams, etc.  18. Similar considerations were made in respect of Colour Television   Picture   Tube   Project   of   the   Company   and Manufacture of Batteries. The matter relating to allotment of land is a statutory function on the part of the Board. In terms of the provisions of the Act, consultations with the State   Government   is   required   if   Regulation   13   of   the Regulations   in   place   of   Regulation   7   is   to   be   taken recourse to. Does it mean that consultations must be held in   a   particular   manner,   i.e.   by   exchange   of correspondences   and   in   no   other?   Answer   to   the   said questions must be rendered in negative. The High Level Committee was chaired by the Minister who in terms of the Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India was entitled to represent the State.   Once   a   consultation   takes   place   by   mutual discussion   and   a   consensus   is   arrived   at   between different authorities performing different functions under the statutes, the purpose for which consultation was to be made   would   stand   satisfied.   Under   the   Act   or   the Regulations framed thereunder, no procedure for holding such consultations had been laid down. In that situation it was open to the competent authorities to evolve their own procedure. Such a procedure of taking a decision upon 44 deliberations   does   not   fall   foul   of   Article   14   of   the Constitution of India. No malice of fact has been alleged in the instant case.” 32. In view of the above, the finding in the impugned judgment regarding non­application  of mind and  the  submission of  Mr. Naphade to the aforesaid effect cannot be sustained. 33. Insofar as the notifications under Section 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of 1966 Act being issued on the same date, it may be noted that   there   is   no   embargo   on   the   same.   The   statutes   do   not prohibit the same. Moreover, this issue has also been dealt with by this Court in the case of  Deputy General Manager (HRM) and   reported in   another Vs. Mudappa and others 2007 (9) SCC 768 . Para 30 of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder: “In   our   judgment,   the   learned   Single   Judge   was wholly in error in taking such view and quashing the notification.   Upholding   of   such   view   would   make statutory   provisions   under   the   Act   or   similar provisions   in   other   laws,   (for   example,   the   Land Acquisition Act, 1894) nugatory and otiose.   We are also of the view that the learned Single Judge was not right in  finding  fault with the State Authorities   in   issuing   notifications   under Section   1(3),   Section   3(1)   and   Section   28(1) simultaneously .   There   is   no   bar   in   issuing   such notifications as has been done and no provision has been   shown   to   us   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the contesting   respondents   which   prevented   the   State from doing so. Even that ground, therefore, cannot help the land­owners”.  45 34. The above view has the approval of this Court in its recent order dated 28.01.2020 passed in      Special Leave Petition (c) No(s).9662 of 2013 (C. Jayaram and others Vs. The State of Karnataka and others) . C. Procedure Prescribed under the 1966 Act duly followed: 35. As already noted above from the chronology of events given in the earlier part of the judgment, the due procedure had been followed. It is also to be noticed that the objections were invited under the procedure prescribed in Section 28 of the 1966 Act and the   same   were   duly   considered   and   disposed   of,   as   such,   it cannot be alleged that the objections have not been considered vitiating the acquisitions. In this respect it would be relevant to mention that the Land Audit Committee approved the grant of 1034 acres of land in its meeting dated 28.01.2006, which was duly   accepted   and   approved   by   the   State   Nodal   Agency, Karnataka Udyog Mitra in its meeting dated 15.02.2006 and duly communicated vide letter of even date to the KIADB to start the process for acquisition. It was thereafter that the notifications were issued under Section 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act, on 09.11.2006. Simultaneous publication of the said notifications 46 has already been upheld to be not suffering from any illegality or irregularity.  36. Pursuant to the notification under Section 28(1) of the 1966 Act, further steps were taken and after inviting objections and disposing of the same, final declaration was made, compensation was determined and thereafter possession taken. It would be also relevant  to  state  here   that   from   the   material  on  record,   it  is apparent that the land was acquired in the name of the State, thereafter transferred to the KIADB, which proceeded to allot the same   to   MSPL   and   AISL   respectively   and,   accordingly,   lease deeds were executed. The entire process as provided under the Act   has   been   strictly   followed.   The   Division   Bench   in   the impugned judgment apparently was swayed by its own personal views based   on   assumptions   and   having   no  material  backing which led to the quashing of the notifications.   D.  Acquisition for a Single Company. 37. Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act is reproduced below: “28. Acquisition of land.­ (1) if at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board,  or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects 47 of   this   Act ,   the   State   Government   may   by notification,   given   notice   of   its   intention   to   acquire such land.”  [Emphasis Provided] The words for the purpose of development by the Board, and or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act make it amply clear that the intention to acquire land in the opinion   of   the   State   Government   could   be   not   only   for   the purpose of development by the Board but for any other purpose in furtherance of the  objects of  this  Act. This  gives power to acquire   land   beyond   development   by   KIADB.   Further,   the regulations framed by the Board under Section 41 particularly deal with this aspect in Regulation 13 which reads as under; “Allotment of Plots in Special Cases: Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations,   the Board in consultation with the State Government  may allot any   plot   or   area   other   than   those   in   respect   of which applications are called for under Regulation 7 to   any   individual   or   company   for   the  or for the provision of establishment of an industry any   amenity   required   in   the   Industrial   area.” [Emphasis Provided] 38. Under the above regulations, the Board is empowered to allot   any   plot   or   area   to   any   individual   or   company   for establishment   of   an   industry   in   consultation   with   the   State Government. This provision also contemplates acquiring land for the   purpose   of   allotment   to   a   single   company   to   set   up   an 48 industry. In the present case, the allotment by the Board is duly approved by the State Government. 39. In the same context, it would be relevant to refer to a judgment of this Court in the case of   P. Narayanappa Vs. State reported in , where it upheld the of Karnataka   (2006) 7 SCC 578 acquisition of land in favour of a private company under the 1966 Act.   Paragraphs   6,   13   and   14   of   the   said   judgment   are reproduced below: “6. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the   appellants,   has   challenged   the   impugned notifications   on   several   grounds   and   the   principal ground is that the land has been acquired in order to benefit a company, namely, Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) who had submitted a project report for   setting   up   a   software   technology   park   which included   an   I.T.   Training   Institute/Engineering College,   Research   and   Development   Centre, Educational   Centre,   Commercial   and   Residential Buildings   and   Service   Apartments,   Convention Centre, Hotel, Shopping Mall, etc…… ………… 13. The provision for acquisition of land under the Act is   contained   in   Section   28   which   is   somewhat different from the provisions contained in  Sections 4 , 5A  and  6  of the Land Acquisition Act. The legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to make a specific provision for acquisition of the land in the Act itself rather than to take recourse to  Sections 4  and  6  of the Land   Acquisition   Act.   A   plain   reading   of   sub­   section (1) of       Section 28     would show that land can   be   acquired   for   the   purpose   of   (i) development by the Board, or (ii) for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Sub­section (3) of  Section 28  is similar to  Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act and the final notification 49 is issued under sub­section (4) of   Section 28 .   The necessary precondition for a valid notification   under sub­section (4) of       Section 28     is that the State Government should be satisfied that the land is required for the purpose specified in the  viz., for notification issued under sub­section (1), the purpose of (i) development by the Board, or (ii)  for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects  Therefore, in order to judge the validity of of the Act. the notification what is to be seen is whether the acquisition of  land  is being made for securing the establishment of industrial areas or to promote the establishment or orderly development of industries in such   areas.   In   view   of   wide   definition   of   the words   "industrial   infrastructural   facilities"   as   contained in      Section 2    (7a) of the Act, making of a   technology   park,   research   and   development centre, townships, trade and tourism centres or making provisions for marketing and banking which would contribute to the development of industries   will   meet   the   objectives   of   the   Act and   acquisition   of   land   for   such   a   purpose would be perfectly valid. 14……….   Sub­section   (1)   of       Section   28     clearly shows   that   the   land   can   be   acquired   for   (i) development   by   the   Board;   or   (ii)   for   any   other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Under   sub­section   (8)   of   Section   28 ,   the   State Government   is   empowered,   after   it   has   taken possession of land, to transfer the same to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired. Section 32  empowers the State Government to place at the disposal of the Board any land vested in it and the   Board   is   enjoined   to   deal   with   the   land   in accordance with the regulations made and directions given by the State Government in this behalf. This stage when the Board gets the authority to deal with the land comes at a later stage which is after the land has been developed by it.  An entrepreneur or a   company   may   give   a   proposal   to   the   State Government   for   setting   up   an   industry   or infrastructural facility and the Government may thereafter acquire the land and give it to the Board. It is also possible that after the land has 50 already   been   acquired   and   developed   by   the Board, it may be allotted to an entrepreneur or a   company   for   setting   up   an   industry   or   Therefore, the scheme of infrastructural facility. the Act does not show that at the time of acquisition of   the   land   and   issuing   a   preliminary   notification under  Section 28(1)  of the Act, the complete details of the nature of the industry or infrastructural facility proposed to be set up should also be mentioned. At that stage what is to be seen is whether the land is acquired for development by the Board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, as mentioned in sub­section (1) of   Section 28   of the Act. In fact, if the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellants is accepted, it would mean   that   even   at   the   stage   of   preliminary notification under  Section 28(1)  of the Act, the nature of   the   activity   which   may   be   done   by   some entrepreneur   or   a   company   which   may   give   a proposal for setting up an industry or infrastructural facility much  after land  has  been  acquired  should also be taken note of and specifically mentioned in the notification, which is well nigh impossible. While interpreting the provisions of the Act, the Court should not   only   take   into   consideration   the   facts   of   the present   case   but   should   also   have   in   mind   all possible   contingencies.   Therefore,   on   a   plain reading of the language used in the Act, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned senior   counsel   for   the   appellants   that   the impugned notification is vague or cryptic as the complete   details   of   the   project   which   was proposed to be established by Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) were not mentioned    and on account of the aforesaid lacuna, the landowners were   deprived   of   their   right   to   make   a   proper representation or to show cause against the proposed acquisition.”  [Emphasis Provided]   40. Therefore, the view expressed by the Division Bench that no acquisition could be made for a single company cannot be sustained.  51 E­ Acquisition for a non­applicant (AISL). 41. It is not disputed that AISL (non­applicant) is fully owned subsidiary of MSPL (applicant). In effect, AISL is a new Company promoted   by   the   same   promoters.   The   State   Government examined the request of MSPL and also AISL for modification of its   Government   Order   dated   22.12.2005.   It   examined   the bifurcation   under   various   heads.   State   Government   issued Government Order dated 22.03.2006 splitting the infrastructures required   with   further   stipulation   that   all   other   terms   and conditions mentioned in the Government Order dated 22.12.2005 would apply as it is to both the Companies. The only change sought by MSPL was the integrated steel plant be set up by AISL which was its own subsidiary. These are commercial matters and the State after examining the proposal for change in its wisdom accepted the same. There was no change in the project, as such, regarding the finance, employment and other infrastructures. The objection raised by Mr. Naphade to the aforesaid effect does not merit consideration. F. Relevance of Shri Ramtanu judgment: 52 42. The   impugned   judgment   has   placed   reliance   upon   the judgment in the case of       for the proposition Shri Ramtanu (supra) that the acquisition under the 1966 Act was in  pari materia  to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1962 and, therefore, the acquisition has to be for public purpose only and not for a private company. At the outset, it may be recorded that validity of the 1962 Act was being considered in the case of  Shri   Ramtanu (supra) . In the present litigation, there is no challenge to the validity of the 1966 Act or the 2002 Act. Further, the object and purpose   of   the   1962   Act   was   for   securing   the   orderly establishment   in   industrial   areas   and   industrial   State   of industries in the State of Maharashtra whereas the 1966 Act, the object   and   preamble   was   to   promote   the   establishment   and orderly development of industries (in industrial areas). This Court while dealing with the 1962 Act discussed this aspect in para 21 of    , which is reproduced hereunder: Shri Ramtanu (supra)

53

54

43. Thus, it is to be noticed that the purpose in 1962 Act was for establishment of industrial areas whereas in the other statute i.e   1966   Act,   it   was   for   promotion   of   the   establishment   and orderly   development   of   industries.   Thus,   the   reliance   by   the Division Bench in the impugned judgment on the case of   Shri Ramtanu (supra)  is misplaced. G.  Value judgments of policy views. 44. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment seems to have been swayed by its own philosophy in due deference to the principles of statutory interpretation. The statute is to be read in its   plain   language.   Setting   up   of   industries   is   part   of development. There has to be a sustainable growth and existence of all facets and, that is why, laws have been framed, cheques and balance have been imposed so that development takes place side by side with the protection and preservation of nature and environment.   Certain   extracts   from   the   impugned   judgment wherein the Division Bench had expressed its personal policy views and value judgments are reproduced hereunder: 55  “Though the word ‘development’ is used, when this word is examined in an objective manner, in an impassionate manner, it is nothing but interference with the existing state of nature and destroying naute !” (P.90­91) “Any industry inevitably creates and causes pollution of the land, air and water….” (P.91) “Unfortunately,   by   and   large,….courts   have   been   pro acquisition   and   have   generally   approved   or   upheld acquisition proceedings  in the  name  of  public  interest.” (P.96) “When examined on such a touchstone and such tests are applied, we find that the present acquisition proceedings cannot   stand.   The   affectation   is   very   adverse   and   the benefit if at all is a return because of future development of any industry with some potential for employment and may be a little revenue to the State. The affectation to the livelihood and dignified life of thousands of people which is not examined even it is not the focal point, it should be at least be given due attention which it deserved” (P.105) “…..[A]nd with the history of limited companies being too well­known, though the British claim the invention of joint stock company is the genius of English legal mind when the concept is examined from the perception as it prevails in this country and in the society and examine from the ethos of our society, it is nothing short of deception or playing fraud.” (P.106) “A   joint   stock   company   is   invented   only   to   defraud creditors.”   (P.106­107) “Let us not lose our souls in the name of development by depriving land holders of their land holdings.” (P.108) 45. A   perusal   of   the   above   makes   it   amply   clear   that   the Division Bench introduced several value judgments and policy views in order to interpret the provisions of the 1966 Act and the 2002 Act. It is only as a measure of caution that the said aspect is being taken note of. Such value judgments and policy views are 56 beyond the domain of the Courts. The Courts should refrain itself from expressing value judgments and policy views in order to interpret statutes. Statutes are to be read in their plain language and   not   otherwise.   Reference   may   be   had   to   the   following decisions: (i) Regina Vs. Barnet London Borough Council; (1983) 1 AII ER 226; (ii) Union of India Vs. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd.; (2001) 4 SCC 139 (Para 17) (iii)      D.R.   Venkatachalam   Vs.   Transport Commissioner; (1977) 2 SCC 273 (Para 29) (iv) Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of Tamil Nadu; (2002) 3 SCC 533 (Para 13); (v) Harbhajan Singh Vs. Press Council of India; (2002) 3 SCC 722 (Para 11) and  (vi)Unique   Butyle   Tube   Industries   Vs.   U.P. Financial   Corporation;   (2003)   2  SCC   455   (Para 12). H.    Challenge   to   acquisition   by   a   minority   (10%)   of   land owners. 46. It is admitted position that the challenge to the acquisition of more than a thousand acres was made by a small fraction of land owners having land less than 10% of the total acquisition. Compensation   for   rest   of   the   90%   land   acquired   had   been 57 accepted by their respective land owners. The Division Bench has quashed the entire acquisition of more than a thousand acres at the instance of such a small fraction. This aspect has been dealt with by this Court in the case of   Amarjit Singh   Vs.   State of   reported  in     and   Vs. Punjab (2010)  10 SCC  43 Om Prakash   State of U.P.   reported in ( 1998) 6 SCC   1 . The learned Single Judge   had   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   of   Om   Prakash . It is also worthwhile to mention that out of approx 110 (supra) acres of land acquires for MSPL, only one land owner possessing only   4.34   acres   of   land,   had   filed   the   writ  appeal   before   the Division Bench. Quashing the entire acquisition at the instance of   one   land   owner   having   4.34   acres   of   land   out   of   total acquisition for MSPL of 110 acres, would be against the public policy and public interest. The MSPL alone provides employment to 292 persons with a substantial investment of Rs.200 crores. The employment to approximately 300 persons by MSPL is also alleged to be double of the number of employees as projected in the proposal. Further, in the case of AISL acquisition of 914 acres is challenged by a fraction of less than 10% land owners. The estimated project of AISL is approx Rs.2092 crores and would employment to at least one thousand persons.  58 47. In view of the above analysis, we are of the view that the Division Bench committed an error in quashing the acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, the appeals filed by MSPL, AISL, KIADB and State of Karnataka are allowed.  48. The judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012 is set aside and the writ petitions stand dismissed as ordered by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 17.03.2009. 49. Insofar as the claim of Syed Ahmed is concerned, which is in   respect   of   similar   acquisition   for   M/S   BMM   Ispat   Ltd.   on similar grounds based upon the judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012 impugned in the other appeals, deserves to be dismissed   as   we   have   already   set   aside   the   said   judgment. Relevant to state here that Syed Ahmed was owner of 14.35 acres out of total land measuring 705.99 acres acquired for M/S BMM Ispat Ltd., which is less than 2%. The appeal of Syed Ahmed is accordingly dismissed. 50. There shall be no order as to costs. 59 51. Pending application(s), if any, is/are disposed of. …..…….......................... J. [HEMANT GUPTA] ………….........................J. [VIKRAM NATH] NEW DELHI OCTOBER 11, 2022.  60