Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1250
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 16833 OF 2024]
KOTRESH @ KOTRAPPA … APPELLANT
VS.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant was tried for the murder of one ‘S’. The relevant
th
Sessions Court, for reasons assigned in the judgment dated 18
January, 2020 convicted the appellant for culpable homicide not
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.10.17
16:48:10 IST
Reason:
amounting to murder under Section 304 Part-II, Indian Penal Code,
1 st
1860 and by an order dated 21 January, 2020 sentenced him to 10
(ten) years rigorous imprisonment.
3. Such conviction and sentence were carried by the appellant in an
2
appeal under Section 374 (2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench. By its judgment
th
and order dated 8 February, 2024, the High Court maintained the
conviction of the appellant, however, reduced the sentence to 8
(eight) years rigorous imprisonment.
4. Despite being partially successful before the High Court, the appellant
remained dissatisfied and has laid a challenge to the judgment and
th
order dated 8 February, 2024.
th
5. A limited notice, confined to the sentence, was issued on 4 March,
2025 by a coordinate Bench of this Court. Upon service of notice,
respondent no. 1-State entered appearance through its counsel.
Respondent no. 2 – the complainant, however, informed this Court of
his inability to engage a counsel and sought legal aid.
6. Having considered the prayer of the respondent no. 2 – the
th
complainant, this Court by an order dated 9 September, 2025
appointed Mr. Ashok Gaur, learned senior counsel and Ms. Shakshi
Singh, learned counsel as amici curiae .
1
IPC
2
CrPC
2
7. The prosecution case in a nutshell is this. The first cousin of the
3 4
appellant had allegedly been raped by S’s elder brother . C had given
birth to a child too. While V was in custody and facing trial for the
offence under Section 376, IPC, the family members of the appellant
including the father of C insisted that marriage between C and V be
solemnised. The parties tried to find out a solution a day prior to the
incident of crime which, however, proved abortive.
8. On the following day, the family members of C including the appellant
again stormed the residence of V. An altercation led to a scuffle. S, a
completely innocent person, intervened to bring about peace. It was,
at this stage, that the appellant rushed to a nearby house, picked up
an axe and struck a blow on the neck of S. Unfortunately, S
succumbed to the injury inflicted on him by the appellant.
9. Circumstances leading to the death of S were duly proved before the
sessions court. The outcome of the trial as well as the appeal have
been noted above and hence are not repeated.
10. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Rahul Kaushik, learned senior
counsel submits that the appellant, who was barely 20 years old on
the date of the incident of crime, could not control his senses because
the family members of V were not agreeable to his marriage with C
and without any premeditation struck the fatal blow on S leading to
his unfortunate death. He further submits that the appellant, behind
3
hereafter ‘C’
4
hereafter ‘V’
3
bars for two and a half years, has suffered enough for the involuntary
act and may be let off with a reduced sentence. According to him,
this is a peculiar case where the sentence of 8 (eight) years rigorous
imprisonment imposed by the High Court deserves to be altered to
the period of sentence already served.
11. Referring to a coordinate Bench decision of this Court in Deo Nath
5
Rai v. State of Bihar , Mr. Kaushik submits that for a similar offence
punishable under Section 304 Part-II, IPC, 5 (five) years rigorous
imprisonment was imposed by this Court. He urges that even if this
Court were not inclined to let off the appellant with the period of
sentence already undergone, suitable reduction may be ordered
having regard to the facts and circumstances where the appellant lost
control of his senses.
12. Mr. Kaushik, accordingly, prayed that the appeal be allowed by
ordering suitable reduction in the term of sentence.
13. Prayer of the appellant has, however, been vehemently opposed by
Mr. Gaur. According to him, it is not entirely correct to contend that
the incident of altercation and scuffle was a one-off incident.
Referring to the evidence on record, he submits that even a day prior
to the incident of crime the family members of C including her father
(the complainant – respondent no. 2) had been attacked.
5
(2018) 13 SCC 87
4
14. Mr. Gaur next submits that although Mr. Kaushik has stressed on the
age of the appellant, this Court may not overlook that S was also in
the prime of his life when he was struck the fatal blow by the
appellant. S was all of 23 years old and the appellant took away S’s
life by brutally killing him. He sought to emphasise that the sessions
court ought to have convicted the appellant for murder under Section
302, IPC, and not under Section 304 Part-II thereof, having regard to
the overwhelming evidence on record that the appellant had both
intention and knowledge.
15. On the question of intention, referring to the decision of another
coordinate Bench of this Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of
6
A.P. , Mr. Gaur invites our attention to paragraph 29 thereof reading
as follows:
“ 29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal
question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide
whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II.
Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of
cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an
objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes
culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or
suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no
intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not
even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be
cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for
murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention
to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder
punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences
punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under
Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally
from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other,
circumstances: ( i ) nature of the weapon used; ( ii ) whether the
weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;
( iii ) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; ( iv ) the
6
(2006) 11 SCC 444
5
amount of force employed in causing injury; ( v ) whether the act was
in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;
( vi ) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any
premeditation; ( vii ) whether there was any prior enmity or whether
the deceased was a stranger; ( viii ) whether there was any grave and
sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; ( ix )
whether it was in the heat of passion; ( x ) whether the person
inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel
and unusual manner; ( xi ) whether the accused dealt a single blow or
several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not
exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances
with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the
question of intention. Be that as it may.”
16. It is the contention of Mr. Gaur that it was a premeditated act of the
appellant. Referring to the evidence of PW-4, an injured eye-witness,
he pointed out that the appellant and the co-accused were beating
others when S sought to intervene. Having queried as to why PW-4
was being beaten, it was said that they were waiting for S; thereafter
the appellant went to the house of one Tamanna, brought the axe
and hacked S to death. Unless it was pre-planned, Mr. Gaur submits,
the appellant would not have known where the axe (being the weapon
of offence) was kept. Next, he points out from the evidence of PW-4
(the uncle of V) that the accused had agreed to keep C and her child
with them, provided a share of the property were given to them. From
the evidence of PW-8 (PW-4’ son), it is pointed out that there were
demands from the side of some of the accused (A-8 and A-9) that C
should be given a share of the property, if she were not accepted in
the family. These circumstances, seen together, would give a clear
idea that it is far from the truth that the appellant in the heat of the
moment inflicted the fatal blow. He also submits that although one
6
single blow was inflicted by the appellant on the neck of S, it was
sufficient to cause death and did cause the death of the appellant. S,
according to him, tried to intervene to ensure that there was no loss
of life or limb of anyone engaged in the altercation and scuffle but
unfortunately ended giving up his life without in any manner being
responsible for what had happened in the past.
17. It is further contended by Mr. Gaur that nothing precludes the
appellant from seeking premature release under the remission policy
of the State. As and when the appellant acquires eligibility, he
submits, the appellant may apply and if he is entitled in law for a
premature release, the respondent no.2 – the complainant can have
no grievance in this behalf.
18. While winding up his arguments, Mr. Gaur cited the decision of one
other coordinate Bench of this Court in Raj Bala v. State of
7
Haryana . This decision was placed for driving home the point that
no court should reduce the term of sentence based on fancy or notion
and that a balance, bearing in mind proportionality, must be struck
in the interest of the victim too by ordering such term sentence which
would meet the demands of the case. According to him, the High
Court upon proper application of mind has reduced the term sentence
to 8 (eight) years and, therefore, no further interference is
warranted.
7
(2016) 1 SCC 463
7
19. Mr. Gaur, thus, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
20. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1-State adopts the
submissions of Mr. Gaur. He further drew our attention to the
evidence of a couple of witnesses to demonstrate that the family
members of the appellant were all armed with axes while they
confronted the family of V.
21. We have heard the parties and considered the evidence on record
with the care and attention the same deserves.
22. No doubt, the appellant had a reason to bear a grudge against V
because he had allegedly raped C which finally resulted in C delivering
a baby. The appellant, being a close relative of C and faced with the
situation in which C was placed, may not have been unjustified in
nurturing a grievance and securing justice for her, with the father of
C. Suffice to note, C was also very young and having given birth to a
child, the appellant might have felt as a dutiful brother to take care
of her interest. Having said that, we cannot keep aside the role of S
in the entire incident. An open fight had followed the scuffle during
which the two opposing factions were giving blows and hits to each
other. S happened to be the younger brother of V. There is no
allegation levelled by any witness that S was part of the altercation
and the subsequence scuffle leading to fight; in fact, there is evidence
on record that S had intervened in course of the fight and was
attempting to bring about peace between the two factions. An
innocent person was done to death by the appellant without there
8
being any provocation. The sessions court did not convict the
appellant for murder since, according to it, Exception 1 to Section
300, IPC was attracted. In our considered opinion, the appellant
might have been deprived of the power of self-control by reason of
the alleged act of rape committed by V on C. But there was no such
sudden provocation at the place of occurrence which necessitated him
to act in the manner he did and cause the death of S. Indeed, as
observed above, neither S was instrumental in provoking the
appellant nor was the blow struck on S’s neck by the appellant by
mistake or accident. Once we have concluded that there was no
provocation, Exception 1 was certainly not applicable. Be that as it
may, neither the respondent no. 1-State nor the respondent no. 2 –
the complainant appealed against the judgment of conviction
recorded by the sessions court. We, therefore, do not see reason to
dilate on this aspect any further but would bear this in mind while
considering the prayer of Mr. Kaushik for reduction in the term
sentence imposed by the High Court.
23. Mr. Gaur’s submission that S was an intervenor who attempted to
bring about peace and was himself a young man of 23 years cannot
be brushed aside. If other family members had not agreed to the
proposal to have the marriage of C solemnised with V, no fault could
at least be attributed to an innocent person like S who had to suffer
homicidal death caused by the appellant. Viewed through the prism
of Section 304 Part-II, IPC, the appellant did have the knowledge that
9
his act of striking S with the axe on his neck is likely to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death. While the sessions court was
justified in ordering imprisonment of the appellant for 10 (ten) years,
the High Court has been indulgent towards the appellant and granted
relief to him by reducing the term sentence by 8 (eight) years.
24. In Raj Bala (supra), this Court upon a survey of precedents on the
point of sentence, had the occasion to observe as follows:
“ 16. A court, while imposing sentence, has a duty to respond to the
collective cry of the society. The legislature in its wisdom has
conferred discretion on the court but the duty of the court in such a
situation becomes more difficult and complex. It has to exercise the
discretion on reasonable and rational parameters. The discretion
cannot be allowed to yield to fancy or notion. A Judge has to keep in
mind the paramount concept of rule of law and the conscience of the
collective and balance it with the principle of proportionality but when
the discretion is exercised in a capricious manner, it tantamounts to
relinquishment of duty and reckless abandonment of responsibility.
One cannot remain a total alien to the demand of the socio-cultural
milieu regard being had to the command of law and also brush aside
the agony of the victim or the survivors of the victim. Society waits
with patience to see that justice is done. There is a hope on the part
of the society and when the criminal culpability is established and the
discretion is irrationally exercised by the court, the said hope is
shattered and the patience is wrecked. It is the duty of the court not
to exercise the discretion in such a manner as a consequence of
which the expectation inherent in patience, which is the ‘finest part
of fortitude’ is destroyed. A Judge should never feel that the
individuals who constitute the society as a whole is imperceptible to
the exercise of discretion. He should always bear in mind that
erroneous and fallacious exercise of discretion is perceived by a
visible collective.”
25. One of the precedents, as reaffirmed in Raj Bala (supra), is Shailesh
8
Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat , where Arijit Pasayat, J., speaking
8
(2006) 2 SCC 359
10
for a two-judge Bench, articulated the parameters governing the
determination of an appropriate sentence in the following words:
“ 7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims
and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an
essential function of the State. It could be achieved through
instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural
conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and
the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the
challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social
order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out
criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved
by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone
of the edifice of “order” should meet the challenges confronting the
society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: “State
of criminal law continues to be—as it should be—a decisive reflection
of social consciousness of society.” Therefore, in operating the
sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or
deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing
process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where
it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case,
the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and
committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of
the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration.
8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would
do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public
confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure
under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court
to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence
and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This
position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v.
State of T.N. [(1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724]
9. Criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality
in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of
criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to
the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to
permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability
that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence
affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice
sentences are determined largely by other considerations.
Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are
offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping
him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his
crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just
deserts as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent
injustice that are serious and widespread.
11
10. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in
principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence
in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all
serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilised
societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of
proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times.
Even now for a single grave infraction, drastic sentences are imposed.
Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious
crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is
unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those
considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of
proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has
some very undesirable practical consequences.”
(emphasis ours)
26. The decision in Deo Nath Rai (supra) has also been perused. In that
case, on facts and circumstances, this Court held that though the high
court was justified in altering conviction of the accused to Section 304
Part-II, IPC, it was not justified in imposing lesser sentence
particularly on the accused P who gave a sword blow on the right
shoulder of deceased M. The decision turns on its own facts and no
law is discernible which would impel us to take a view different from
that we propose to take hereinbelow.
27. We have taken into account that the appellant was about 20 years of
age at the time of the incident and that there may have been some
exasperation in his mind. Nevertheless, the courts are obligated to
adopt a balanced and principled approach in matters of sentencing.
Undue leniency can cause public confidence in the justice system to
plummet, while excessive severity may lead to injustice.
28. Guided by the aforesaid decisions and after having considered the
factual matrix, we are of the considered opinion that the sentence
12
imposed by the High Court does not call for any interference and that
the appellant is not entitled to any relief.
29. The appeal is liable to be and is, accordingly, dismissed.
30. Needless to observe, the appellant shall be entitled to seek premature
release in terms of the remission policy of the State of Karnataka,
provided he acquires eligibility thereunder.
31. We record our sincere appreciation for the able assistance rendered
to us by the amici curiae .
………………………………….……J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…………………….…………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 17, 2025.
13
2025 INSC 1250
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 16833 OF 2024]
KOTRESH @ KOTRAPPA … APPELLANT
VS.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant was tried for the murder of one ‘S’. The relevant
th
Sessions Court, for reasons assigned in the judgment dated 18
January, 2020 convicted the appellant for culpable homicide not
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.10.17
16:48:10 IST
Reason:
amounting to murder under Section 304 Part-II, Indian Penal Code,
1 st
1860 and by an order dated 21 January, 2020 sentenced him to 10
(ten) years rigorous imprisonment.
3. Such conviction and sentence were carried by the appellant in an
2
appeal under Section 374 (2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench. By its judgment
th
and order dated 8 February, 2024, the High Court maintained the
conviction of the appellant, however, reduced the sentence to 8
(eight) years rigorous imprisonment.
4. Despite being partially successful before the High Court, the appellant
remained dissatisfied and has laid a challenge to the judgment and
th
order dated 8 February, 2024.
th
5. A limited notice, confined to the sentence, was issued on 4 March,
2025 by a coordinate Bench of this Court. Upon service of notice,
respondent no. 1-State entered appearance through its counsel.
Respondent no. 2 – the complainant, however, informed this Court of
his inability to engage a counsel and sought legal aid.
6. Having considered the prayer of the respondent no. 2 – the
th
complainant, this Court by an order dated 9 September, 2025
appointed Mr. Ashok Gaur, learned senior counsel and Ms. Shakshi
Singh, learned counsel as amici curiae .
1
IPC
2
CrPC
2
7. The prosecution case in a nutshell is this. The first cousin of the
3 4
appellant had allegedly been raped by S’s elder brother . C had given
birth to a child too. While V was in custody and facing trial for the
offence under Section 376, IPC, the family members of the appellant
including the father of C insisted that marriage between C and V be
solemnised. The parties tried to find out a solution a day prior to the
incident of crime which, however, proved abortive.
8. On the following day, the family members of C including the appellant
again stormed the residence of V. An altercation led to a scuffle. S, a
completely innocent person, intervened to bring about peace. It was,
at this stage, that the appellant rushed to a nearby house, picked up
an axe and struck a blow on the neck of S. Unfortunately, S
succumbed to the injury inflicted on him by the appellant.
9. Circumstances leading to the death of S were duly proved before the
sessions court. The outcome of the trial as well as the appeal have
been noted above and hence are not repeated.
10. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Rahul Kaushik, learned senior
counsel submits that the appellant, who was barely 20 years old on
the date of the incident of crime, could not control his senses because
the family members of V were not agreeable to his marriage with C
and without any premeditation struck the fatal blow on S leading to
his unfortunate death. He further submits that the appellant, behind
3
hereafter ‘C’
4
hereafter ‘V’
3
bars for two and a half years, has suffered enough for the involuntary
act and may be let off with a reduced sentence. According to him,
this is a peculiar case where the sentence of 8 (eight) years rigorous
imprisonment imposed by the High Court deserves to be altered to
the period of sentence already served.
11. Referring to a coordinate Bench decision of this Court in Deo Nath
5
Rai v. State of Bihar , Mr. Kaushik submits that for a similar offence
punishable under Section 304 Part-II, IPC, 5 (five) years rigorous
imprisonment was imposed by this Court. He urges that even if this
Court were not inclined to let off the appellant with the period of
sentence already undergone, suitable reduction may be ordered
having regard to the facts and circumstances where the appellant lost
control of his senses.
12. Mr. Kaushik, accordingly, prayed that the appeal be allowed by
ordering suitable reduction in the term of sentence.
13. Prayer of the appellant has, however, been vehemently opposed by
Mr. Gaur. According to him, it is not entirely correct to contend that
the incident of altercation and scuffle was a one-off incident.
Referring to the evidence on record, he submits that even a day prior
to the incident of crime the family members of C including her father
(the complainant – respondent no. 2) had been attacked.
5
(2018) 13 SCC 87
4
14. Mr. Gaur next submits that although Mr. Kaushik has stressed on the
age of the appellant, this Court may not overlook that S was also in
the prime of his life when he was struck the fatal blow by the
appellant. S was all of 23 years old and the appellant took away S’s
life by brutally killing him. He sought to emphasise that the sessions
court ought to have convicted the appellant for murder under Section
302, IPC, and not under Section 304 Part-II thereof, having regard to
the overwhelming evidence on record that the appellant had both
intention and knowledge.
15. On the question of intention, referring to the decision of another
coordinate Bench of this Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of
6
A.P. , Mr. Gaur invites our attention to paragraph 29 thereof reading
as follows:
“ 29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal
question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide
whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II.
Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of
cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an
objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes
culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or
suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no
intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not
even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be
cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for
murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention
to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder
punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences
punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under
Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally
from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other,
circumstances: ( i ) nature of the weapon used; ( ii ) whether the
weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;
( iii ) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; ( iv ) the
6
(2006) 11 SCC 444
5
amount of force employed in causing injury; ( v ) whether the act was
in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;
( vi ) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any
premeditation; ( vii ) whether there was any prior enmity or whether
the deceased was a stranger; ( viii ) whether there was any grave and
sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; ( ix )
whether it was in the heat of passion; ( x ) whether the person
inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel
and unusual manner; ( xi ) whether the accused dealt a single blow or
several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not
exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances
with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the
question of intention. Be that as it may.”
16. It is the contention of Mr. Gaur that it was a premeditated act of the
appellant. Referring to the evidence of PW-4, an injured eye-witness,
he pointed out that the appellant and the co-accused were beating
others when S sought to intervene. Having queried as to why PW-4
was being beaten, it was said that they were waiting for S; thereafter
the appellant went to the house of one Tamanna, brought the axe
and hacked S to death. Unless it was pre-planned, Mr. Gaur submits,
the appellant would not have known where the axe (being the weapon
of offence) was kept. Next, he points out from the evidence of PW-4
(the uncle of V) that the accused had agreed to keep C and her child
with them, provided a share of the property were given to them. From
the evidence of PW-8 (PW-4’ son), it is pointed out that there were
demands from the side of some of the accused (A-8 and A-9) that C
should be given a share of the property, if she were not accepted in
the family. These circumstances, seen together, would give a clear
idea that it is far from the truth that the appellant in the heat of the
moment inflicted the fatal blow. He also submits that although one
6
single blow was inflicted by the appellant on the neck of S, it was
sufficient to cause death and did cause the death of the appellant. S,
according to him, tried to intervene to ensure that there was no loss
of life or limb of anyone engaged in the altercation and scuffle but
unfortunately ended giving up his life without in any manner being
responsible for what had happened in the past.
17. It is further contended by Mr. Gaur that nothing precludes the
appellant from seeking premature release under the remission policy
of the State. As and when the appellant acquires eligibility, he
submits, the appellant may apply and if he is entitled in law for a
premature release, the respondent no.2 – the complainant can have
no grievance in this behalf.
18. While winding up his arguments, Mr. Gaur cited the decision of one
other coordinate Bench of this Court in Raj Bala v. State of
7
Haryana . This decision was placed for driving home the point that
no court should reduce the term of sentence based on fancy or notion
and that a balance, bearing in mind proportionality, must be struck
in the interest of the victim too by ordering such term sentence which
would meet the demands of the case. According to him, the High
Court upon proper application of mind has reduced the term sentence
to 8 (eight) years and, therefore, no further interference is
warranted.
7
(2016) 1 SCC 463
7
19. Mr. Gaur, thus, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
20. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1-State adopts the
submissions of Mr. Gaur. He further drew our attention to the
evidence of a couple of witnesses to demonstrate that the family
members of the appellant were all armed with axes while they
confronted the family of V.
21. We have heard the parties and considered the evidence on record
with the care and attention the same deserves.
22. No doubt, the appellant had a reason to bear a grudge against V
because he had allegedly raped C which finally resulted in C delivering
a baby. The appellant, being a close relative of C and faced with the
situation in which C was placed, may not have been unjustified in
nurturing a grievance and securing justice for her, with the father of
C. Suffice to note, C was also very young and having given birth to a
child, the appellant might have felt as a dutiful brother to take care
of her interest. Having said that, we cannot keep aside the role of S
in the entire incident. An open fight had followed the scuffle during
which the two opposing factions were giving blows and hits to each
other. S happened to be the younger brother of V. There is no
allegation levelled by any witness that S was part of the altercation
and the subsequence scuffle leading to fight; in fact, there is evidence
on record that S had intervened in course of the fight and was
attempting to bring about peace between the two factions. An
innocent person was done to death by the appellant without there
8
being any provocation. The sessions court did not convict the
appellant for murder since, according to it, Exception 1 to Section
300, IPC was attracted. In our considered opinion, the appellant
might have been deprived of the power of self-control by reason of
the alleged act of rape committed by V on C. But there was no such
sudden provocation at the place of occurrence which necessitated him
to act in the manner he did and cause the death of S. Indeed, as
observed above, neither S was instrumental in provoking the
appellant nor was the blow struck on S’s neck by the appellant by
mistake or accident. Once we have concluded that there was no
provocation, Exception 1 was certainly not applicable. Be that as it
may, neither the respondent no. 1-State nor the respondent no. 2 –
the complainant appealed against the judgment of conviction
recorded by the sessions court. We, therefore, do not see reason to
dilate on this aspect any further but would bear this in mind while
considering the prayer of Mr. Kaushik for reduction in the term
sentence imposed by the High Court.
23. Mr. Gaur’s submission that S was an intervenor who attempted to
bring about peace and was himself a young man of 23 years cannot
be brushed aside. If other family members had not agreed to the
proposal to have the marriage of C solemnised with V, no fault could
at least be attributed to an innocent person like S who had to suffer
homicidal death caused by the appellant. Viewed through the prism
of Section 304 Part-II, IPC, the appellant did have the knowledge that
9
his act of striking S with the axe on his neck is likely to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death. While the sessions court was
justified in ordering imprisonment of the appellant for 10 (ten) years,
the High Court has been indulgent towards the appellant and granted
relief to him by reducing the term sentence by 8 (eight) years.
24. In Raj Bala (supra), this Court upon a survey of precedents on the
point of sentence, had the occasion to observe as follows:
“ 16. A court, while imposing sentence, has a duty to respond to the
collective cry of the society. The legislature in its wisdom has
conferred discretion on the court but the duty of the court in such a
situation becomes more difficult and complex. It has to exercise the
discretion on reasonable and rational parameters. The discretion
cannot be allowed to yield to fancy or notion. A Judge has to keep in
mind the paramount concept of rule of law and the conscience of the
collective and balance it with the principle of proportionality but when
the discretion is exercised in a capricious manner, it tantamounts to
relinquishment of duty and reckless abandonment of responsibility.
One cannot remain a total alien to the demand of the socio-cultural
milieu regard being had to the command of law and also brush aside
the agony of the victim or the survivors of the victim. Society waits
with patience to see that justice is done. There is a hope on the part
of the society and when the criminal culpability is established and the
discretion is irrationally exercised by the court, the said hope is
shattered and the patience is wrecked. It is the duty of the court not
to exercise the discretion in such a manner as a consequence of
which the expectation inherent in patience, which is the ‘finest part
of fortitude’ is destroyed. A Judge should never feel that the
individuals who constitute the society as a whole is imperceptible to
the exercise of discretion. He should always bear in mind that
erroneous and fallacious exercise of discretion is perceived by a
visible collective.”
25. One of the precedents, as reaffirmed in Raj Bala (supra), is Shailesh
8
Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat , where Arijit Pasayat, J., speaking
8
(2006) 2 SCC 359
10
for a two-judge Bench, articulated the parameters governing the
determination of an appropriate sentence in the following words:
“ 7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims
and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an
essential function of the State. It could be achieved through
instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural
conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and
the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the
challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social
order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out
criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved
by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone
of the edifice of “order” should meet the challenges confronting the
society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: “State
of criminal law continues to be—as it should be—a decisive reflection
of social consciousness of society.” Therefore, in operating the
sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or
deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing
process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where
it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case,
the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and
committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of
the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration.
8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would
do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public
confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure
under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court
to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence
and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This
position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v.
State of T.N. [(1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724]
9. Criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality
in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of
criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to
the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to
permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability
that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence
affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice
sentences are determined largely by other considerations.
Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are
offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping
him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his
crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just
deserts as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent
injustice that are serious and widespread.
11
10. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in
principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence
in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all
serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilised
societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of
proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times.
Even now for a single grave infraction, drastic sentences are imposed.
Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious
crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is
unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those
considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of
proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has
some very undesirable practical consequences.”
(emphasis ours)
26. The decision in Deo Nath Rai (supra) has also been perused. In that
case, on facts and circumstances, this Court held that though the high
court was justified in altering conviction of the accused to Section 304
Part-II, IPC, it was not justified in imposing lesser sentence
particularly on the accused P who gave a sword blow on the right
shoulder of deceased M. The decision turns on its own facts and no
law is discernible which would impel us to take a view different from
that we propose to take hereinbelow.
27. We have taken into account that the appellant was about 20 years of
age at the time of the incident and that there may have been some
exasperation in his mind. Nevertheless, the courts are obligated to
adopt a balanced and principled approach in matters of sentencing.
Undue leniency can cause public confidence in the justice system to
plummet, while excessive severity may lead to injustice.
28. Guided by the aforesaid decisions and after having considered the
factual matrix, we are of the considered opinion that the sentence
12
imposed by the High Court does not call for any interference and that
the appellant is not entitled to any relief.
29. The appeal is liable to be and is, accordingly, dismissed.
30. Needless to observe, the appellant shall be entitled to seek premature
release in terms of the remission policy of the State of Karnataka,
provided he acquires eligibility thereunder.
31. We record our sincere appreciation for the able assistance rendered
to us by the amici curiae .
………………………………….……J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…………………….…………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 17, 2025.
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