Full Judgment Text
1
2025 INSC 1186
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.11884-11888 OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.9585-9589 of 2023)
THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH & ANR. … APPELLANTS
Versus
MIHIN LALING & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
1. Leave granted.
2. The core controversy in the instant set of appeals concerns
the purported legal dissonance between two Statutes, both of which
inter alia provide for land acquisition by the State authorities.
While on the one hand is the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract
Jhum Land Regulation, 1947 (hereinafter, `1947 Regulations’), a
pre-independence legislation governing the acquisition of ‘Jhum’
lands in the State of Arunachal Pradesh; on the other are the
settled land laws prevailing in the rest of the country, i.e.
either the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, `1894 Act’) or
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2025.10.06
19:16:02 IST
Reason:
its successor-statue, the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 (hereinafter, `2013 Act’).
2
3. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and its Authorities are before
us in appeal against the judgment and final order dated 12.09.2022,
passed by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court (Itanagar
Bench) (hereinafter, ‘High Court’) with respect to the validity of
the compensation provided for acquisition of certain ‘Jhum’ lands,
undertaken under the provisions of the 1947 Regulations.
4. The High Court has, vide the impugned judgment, inter alia
held that the 1947 Regulations and the 2013 Act function in
distinct legislative spheres, and are therefore not repugnant to
each other under Article 254 of the Constitution. It has also
upheld the learned Single Judge’s finding that the appellant-
authorities must provide solatium and interest to the respondents
as per the scheme of the 2013 Act.
5. Before proceeding with adjudication on merits, it is apposite
to briefly explicate the facts, which are broadly admitted. The
lands of the private-respondents were notified to be acquired on
17.02.2014, in a Notification issued under Section 10 of the 1947
Regulations. Notably, these lands were sought to be acquired for
the purpose of construction of the Trans-Arunachal-Highway
(hereinafter, ‘TAH’) along the Potin–Bopi (Godak) corridor.
6. The estimates for compensation were drawn up by the concerned
Departments, and communicated to the relevant landowners.
Pertinently, no solatium or additional interest formed part of
these calculations. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents made
3
representations before the Deputy Commissioner, Lower Subansiri
District, Ziro. These representations were negatived by the
Authority, citing Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations as a provision
which merely necessitates “reasonable compensation”, and no other
statutory benefit.
7. The private-respondents thereafter approached the High Court
seeking the benefits provided under the 2013 Act’s acquisition
mechanism. However, the High Court relegated them to the statutory
remedy of appealing before the State Governor, postulated under
Section 17 of the 1947 Regulations. By order dated 14.08.2020, the
Governor was pleased to reject their appeal, holding that since the
acquisition was effected under the 1947 Regulations, there would be
no applicability of the 2013 Act.
8. Still aggrieved, the respondents again approached the High
Court assailing the Governor’s rejection. The learned Single Judge
of the High Court allowed this Writ Petition vide order dated
25.04.2022, reasoning that the State’s laws cannot be repugnant to
the Central legislation and they are, to that extent, void. Thus,
while the acquisition under the 1947 Regulations was held to be
valid, its compensation was ordered to be calculated as per the
model laid down in the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the High Court
allowed for grant of the statutory benefits as prayed for by the
respondents.
9. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and its authorities, i.e. the
appellants, challenged this finding through intra-Court appeals,
4
before a Division Bench of the High Court. As already noticed
hereinabove, the High Court has partly allowed these appeals in a
common judgment and order. The Division Bench modified the earlier
order to the extent of holding that the 1947 Regulations and the
2013 Act are not repugnant to each other in principle but rather
function in different fields. However, the Division Bench confirmed
that statutory benefits flow to the respondents from the 2013 Act
(even for acquisitions under the 1947 Regulations). Finally, the
impugned order indicates that all acquisitions completed under the
1947 Regulations may be reopened for re-determination of their
compensation as per the 1894 or the 2013 Act, as the case may be.
10. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants and Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari, learned counsel for the
respondents, and carefully perused the material placed on record.
11. The present appeals turn upon the interplay between a pre-
constitutional special Regulation, namely, the 1947 Regulations,
and the 1894/2013 Acts, with particular reference to the
entitlement of claimants to solatium and interest. It is thus
appropriate at this juncture to refer to certain key provisions of
the 1947 Regulations. Firstly, we find that ‘Jhum’ lands are
defined in Section 2(b) of the 1947 Regulations, which reads to the
following effect:
“( b) “Jhum Lands” means and includes all lands which any
member or members of a village or community have
customary rights to cultivate by means of shifting
cultivation or to utilise by clearing jungle or grazing
5
livestock provided that such village or community is in a
permanent location but does not include :-
(i) any land which has been or is under process of
being terraced for the purpose of permanent or
semipermanent cultivation whether by means of
irrigation or not.
(ii) any land attached appurtenant to a dwelling house
and used for the purpose of permanent cultivation, or
(ii) any land which in the opinion of the [Deputy
Commissioner] is subject to permanent cultivation.
Explanation :- (1) any land which is otherwise Jhum land
according to the above definition shall be deemed to be so
notwithstanding the fact that a part or the whole thereof may
have been planted with fruit trees, bamboos, or tung or
reserved for growing firewood.
(2) Any village or community shall be held to be in permanent
location of it always remains within a specific area, although
part or the whole of such village or community may migrate
from time to time to different localities within that area. ”
12. Since Section 2(b) refers to the ‘Customary Rights’, a brief
reference to Section 4 of the 1947 Regulations may also be relevant
for our limited discussion. That provision is reproduced below:
“ 4. (1) A Customary right to Jhum land shall be deemed to
be established in favour of village or a community when
6
such village or community has enjoyed the right to
cultivate or utilize such Jhum land for not less than 5
years prior to making of this Regulation.
(2) A customary right to Jhum land shall be deemed to
be established in favour of an individual
cultivator,-
(a) if he inherited the land in accordance with a
local custom;
(b) if he purchased the land prior to the making
of this Regulation and such purchase was not
contrary to local custom, or
(c) if he has purchased the land at any date
subsequent to making of this Regulation, provided
such purchase was not contrary to any local
custom or any provisions of this Regulation, or
(d) if, being a resident of permanent village, he
has brought the land under cultivation, and the
land has not been cultivated at any time within
30 years preceding his bringing the same into
cultivation:
Provided that such land is within cultivatable reach
of his own village. ”
13. Finally, it is abundantly noticeable that the most contentious
provision in these appeals is Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations,
whose interpretation goes to the very essence of the dispute.
Section 10 – titled as “Acquisition for public purpose” – reads as
7
follows:
“ 10. The Government may acquire any Jhum land required for
a public purpose. No formal acquisition proceedings shall
be necessary but an opportunity shall be given to those
having rights in the land to show cause against such
acquisition and reasonable compensation shall be paid for
all land required under this section.
Land so acquired shall, if relinquished by the
Government at any time, be returned to the village,
community or individual from whom it was acquired on
refund, if any, of such compensation to the Government as
the latter may decide. ”
14. A brief perusal of these provisions and the preamble of the
1947 Regulations indicates that they are a special law, enacted in
exercise of powers conferred under Section 92(2) of the Government
of India Act, 1935 in order to safeguard, regulate, and protect the
rights of the tribes indigenous to the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya
Frontier Tracts over the ‘Jhum’ lands.
15. In other words, the 1947 Regulations were enacted to protect
and regulate the customary tenure of ‘Jhum’ lands in the Frontier
Tracts, recognising their distinct character and insulating them
from the general regime of land acquisition. Section 10 of the 1947
Regulations, which authorises acquisition for public purpose by the
State, dispenses with elaborate procedures, and instead stipulates
a mandatory opportunity of hearing and payment of fair and just
8
market price of the acquired land. It is evident that the framers
of the 1947 Regulations sought to ensure the security of tribal
land while equipping the State with its eminent domain authority to
requisition such land in the larger public interest.
16. Thus, there cannot possibly be any room to doubt the fact that
the 1947 Regulations do not envisage the routine procedure followed
under the 1894/2013 Acts, i.e. the issuance of Notification
proposing the acquisition; the subsequent Declaration of such
acquisition; issuance of notice(s) before passing of an award, etc.
Due to such omissions, it seems that the appellants have always
construed Section 10 to mean that the land can be acquired without
prescribing any rigid procedure, so long as there is compliance of
the expression of “reasonable compensation”, which is averred to be
transparent and non-discriminatory.
17. It is this shapeless “reasonable compensation” that has worried
the respondents, who sought applicability of the 2013 Act, a
decidedly more thorough legislation with determinative elements for
the calculation of compensation, including statutory benefits such
as solatium and additional interest.
18. The controversy, therefore, revolves primarily around the
manner and the procedure that may be required to be followed by the
State Government while acquiring the ‘Jhum’ lands. The High Court,
vide the impugned judgment, has firstly referred to various
constitutional provisions in order to hold that the land could be
acquired only under provisions of the 1894/2013 Act(s) and that
Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations is merely an enabling provision
9
under which ‘Jhum’ lands can be acquired.
19. We find considerable force in this approach of the High Court.
The phrase “reasonable compensation” is an open-textured
expression, designed to confer flexibility. It cannot be read as
permitting compensation which is merely notional or arbitrary. In
constitutional jurisprudence, reasonableness of compensation must
align with the guarantees of Article 14 and Article 300A. The right
to property, though no longer fundamental, is nonetheless a
constitutional right which cannot be divested save by authority of
law, and such deprivation must meet tests of fairness and non-
arbitrariness.
20. In this backdrop, subsequent legislative developments furnish
an important guide. The 2013 Act — enacted to replace the 1894 law
— represents the considered will of Parliament as to what
constitutes just recompense when property is taken for public
purpose. It mandates not only market value but also ‘solatium’ and
‘interest’, recognising that compulsory acquisition imposes a
special burden upon the landholder.
21. While the 1947 Regulations may provide an alternate procedural
framework for the North-Eastern Frontier Tracts, they cannot be
interpreted in isolation from this broader evolution of law. To
construe “reasonable compensation” narrowly, ignoring ‘solatium’
and ‘interest’, would be to perpetuate inequality: two landholders
losing their property for identical projects — one under the 2013
Act, another under the 1947 Regulations — would stand on palpably
10
different footings, without rational justification. Such a
construction would not withstand scrutiny under Article 14.
22. In this sense, we are in agreement with the High Court that
“reasonable compensation” in Section 10 must be harmonised with the
prevailing legislative standards of the time, and that solatium and
interest are not alien imports but integral components of fairness.
This interpretive technique properly reflects the principle that
subordinate or special legislation must be read in the light of
constitutional values and later general enactments, particularly
where the language is sufficiently elastic.
23. At the same time, we are conscious of the limits of judicial
intervention. The High Court, in its impugned judgment, permitted
reopening of all concluded acquisitions under the 1947 Regulations
for reassessment of compensation. Such an approach, in our
considered opinion, may travel beyond the permissible bounds.
Finality of administrative action cannot be lightly unsettled; to
do so would not only destabilise public projects but also create
fiscal uncertainty. Balance must therefore be struck by ensuring
that pending and future acquisitions are aligned with the standards
of the 2013 Act, while leaving untouched those transactions where
compensation has been finally determined and accepted.
24. Before we part with these appeals, it merits mentioning that
the controversy before us has since been laid to rest by
legislative intervention. The Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract
Jhum Land Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2024, namely, Act No. 11 of
11
2024 (which has come into force in the State of Arunachal Pradesh
with effect from 07.08.2024) has introduced a proviso to Section 10
explicitly stipulating that compensation under the 1947 Regulations
shall not be less than that computed under the law of land
acquisition in force at the relevant time. This amendment confirms,
in statutory form, the interpretive conclusion reached by the High
Court and supplemented by us. However, as a matter of legislative
policy, it operates prospectively and cannot, by itself, justify
disturbing concluded acquisitions.
25. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct that the
respondents shall also be entitled to solatium as well as interest
in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act.
26. The appellants shall ensure that any arrears towards solatium
and interest, wherever not yet paid, are released to the landowners
of the subject-acquisition within a period of three months from
today.
27. It is further clarified that the obligation of the State to pay
‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ shall be without prejudice to its right
to recover the same from the ultimate beneficiaries of the
acquisition, in accordance with law.
28. In respect of concluded acquisitions where compensation has
been finally determined, accepted and disbursed, no reopening shall
be permissible. The impugned judgment of the High Court is
therefore set aside, to that extent. However, in all matters which
remain pending either before the competent authority or before a
12
Court/Tribunal, the compensation shall be recomputed to include
solatium and interest as above.
29. The directions contained in our interim order dated 03.07.2023
regarding the deposit of amounts with the Deputy Commissioner shall
be given full effect. In the event such deposits represent solatium
and interest payable to the true landowners, the same together with
the accrued interest in the Fixed Deposit shall be disbursed to the
claimants without delay.
30. With these directions, the appeals are allowed in part. The
judgment of the High Court stands modified to the extent indicated
above.
31. All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.
.........................J.
(SURYA KANT)
.........................J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 16, 2025.
13
2025 INSC 1186
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.11884-11888 OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.9585-9589 of 2023)
THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH & ANR. … APPELLANTS
Versus
MIHIN LALING & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
1. Leave granted.
2. The core controversy in the instant set of appeals concerns
the purported legal dissonance between two Statutes, both of which
inter alia provide for land acquisition by the State authorities.
While on the one hand is the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract
Jhum Land Regulation, 1947 (hereinafter, `1947 Regulations’), a
pre-independence legislation governing the acquisition of ‘Jhum’
lands in the State of Arunachal Pradesh; on the other are the
settled land laws prevailing in the rest of the country, i.e.
either the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, `1894 Act’) or
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2025.10.06
19:16:02 IST
Reason:
its successor-statue, the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 (hereinafter, `2013 Act’).
2
3. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and its Authorities are before
us in appeal against the judgment and final order dated 12.09.2022,
passed by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court (Itanagar
Bench) (hereinafter, ‘High Court’) with respect to the validity of
the compensation provided for acquisition of certain ‘Jhum’ lands,
undertaken under the provisions of the 1947 Regulations.
4. The High Court has, vide the impugned judgment, inter alia
held that the 1947 Regulations and the 2013 Act function in
distinct legislative spheres, and are therefore not repugnant to
each other under Article 254 of the Constitution. It has also
upheld the learned Single Judge’s finding that the appellant-
authorities must provide solatium and interest to the respondents
as per the scheme of the 2013 Act.
5. Before proceeding with adjudication on merits, it is apposite
to briefly explicate the facts, which are broadly admitted. The
lands of the private-respondents were notified to be acquired on
17.02.2014, in a Notification issued under Section 10 of the 1947
Regulations. Notably, these lands were sought to be acquired for
the purpose of construction of the Trans-Arunachal-Highway
(hereinafter, ‘TAH’) along the Potin–Bopi (Godak) corridor.
6. The estimates for compensation were drawn up by the concerned
Departments, and communicated to the relevant landowners.
Pertinently, no solatium or additional interest formed part of
these calculations. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents made
3
representations before the Deputy Commissioner, Lower Subansiri
District, Ziro. These representations were negatived by the
Authority, citing Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations as a provision
which merely necessitates “reasonable compensation”, and no other
statutory benefit.
7. The private-respondents thereafter approached the High Court
seeking the benefits provided under the 2013 Act’s acquisition
mechanism. However, the High Court relegated them to the statutory
remedy of appealing before the State Governor, postulated under
Section 17 of the 1947 Regulations. By order dated 14.08.2020, the
Governor was pleased to reject their appeal, holding that since the
acquisition was effected under the 1947 Regulations, there would be
no applicability of the 2013 Act.
8. Still aggrieved, the respondents again approached the High
Court assailing the Governor’s rejection. The learned Single Judge
of the High Court allowed this Writ Petition vide order dated
25.04.2022, reasoning that the State’s laws cannot be repugnant to
the Central legislation and they are, to that extent, void. Thus,
while the acquisition under the 1947 Regulations was held to be
valid, its compensation was ordered to be calculated as per the
model laid down in the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the High Court
allowed for grant of the statutory benefits as prayed for by the
respondents.
9. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and its authorities, i.e. the
appellants, challenged this finding through intra-Court appeals,
4
before a Division Bench of the High Court. As already noticed
hereinabove, the High Court has partly allowed these appeals in a
common judgment and order. The Division Bench modified the earlier
order to the extent of holding that the 1947 Regulations and the
2013 Act are not repugnant to each other in principle but rather
function in different fields. However, the Division Bench confirmed
that statutory benefits flow to the respondents from the 2013 Act
(even for acquisitions under the 1947 Regulations). Finally, the
impugned order indicates that all acquisitions completed under the
1947 Regulations may be reopened for re-determination of their
compensation as per the 1894 or the 2013 Act, as the case may be.
10. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants and Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari, learned counsel for the
respondents, and carefully perused the material placed on record.
11. The present appeals turn upon the interplay between a pre-
constitutional special Regulation, namely, the 1947 Regulations,
and the 1894/2013 Acts, with particular reference to the
entitlement of claimants to solatium and interest. It is thus
appropriate at this juncture to refer to certain key provisions of
the 1947 Regulations. Firstly, we find that ‘Jhum’ lands are
defined in Section 2(b) of the 1947 Regulations, which reads to the
following effect:
“( b) “Jhum Lands” means and includes all lands which any
member or members of a village or community have
customary rights to cultivate by means of shifting
cultivation or to utilise by clearing jungle or grazing
5
livestock provided that such village or community is in a
permanent location but does not include :-
(i) any land which has been or is under process of
being terraced for the purpose of permanent or
semipermanent cultivation whether by means of
irrigation or not.
(ii) any land attached appurtenant to a dwelling house
and used for the purpose of permanent cultivation, or
(ii) any land which in the opinion of the [Deputy
Commissioner] is subject to permanent cultivation.
Explanation :- (1) any land which is otherwise Jhum land
according to the above definition shall be deemed to be so
notwithstanding the fact that a part or the whole thereof may
have been planted with fruit trees, bamboos, or tung or
reserved for growing firewood.
(2) Any village or community shall be held to be in permanent
location of it always remains within a specific area, although
part or the whole of such village or community may migrate
from time to time to different localities within that area. ”
12. Since Section 2(b) refers to the ‘Customary Rights’, a brief
reference to Section 4 of the 1947 Regulations may also be relevant
for our limited discussion. That provision is reproduced below:
“ 4. (1) A Customary right to Jhum land shall be deemed to
be established in favour of village or a community when
6
such village or community has enjoyed the right to
cultivate or utilize such Jhum land for not less than 5
years prior to making of this Regulation.
(2) A customary right to Jhum land shall be deemed to
be established in favour of an individual
cultivator,-
(a) if he inherited the land in accordance with a
local custom;
(b) if he purchased the land prior to the making
of this Regulation and such purchase was not
contrary to local custom, or
(c) if he has purchased the land at any date
subsequent to making of this Regulation, provided
such purchase was not contrary to any local
custom or any provisions of this Regulation, or
(d) if, being a resident of permanent village, he
has brought the land under cultivation, and the
land has not been cultivated at any time within
30 years preceding his bringing the same into
cultivation:
Provided that such land is within cultivatable reach
of his own village. ”
13. Finally, it is abundantly noticeable that the most contentious
provision in these appeals is Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations,
whose interpretation goes to the very essence of the dispute.
Section 10 – titled as “Acquisition for public purpose” – reads as
7
follows:
“ 10. The Government may acquire any Jhum land required for
a public purpose. No formal acquisition proceedings shall
be necessary but an opportunity shall be given to those
having rights in the land to show cause against such
acquisition and reasonable compensation shall be paid for
all land required under this section.
Land so acquired shall, if relinquished by the
Government at any time, be returned to the village,
community or individual from whom it was acquired on
refund, if any, of such compensation to the Government as
the latter may decide. ”
14. A brief perusal of these provisions and the preamble of the
1947 Regulations indicates that they are a special law, enacted in
exercise of powers conferred under Section 92(2) of the Government
of India Act, 1935 in order to safeguard, regulate, and protect the
rights of the tribes indigenous to the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya
Frontier Tracts over the ‘Jhum’ lands.
15. In other words, the 1947 Regulations were enacted to protect
and regulate the customary tenure of ‘Jhum’ lands in the Frontier
Tracts, recognising their distinct character and insulating them
from the general regime of land acquisition. Section 10 of the 1947
Regulations, which authorises acquisition for public purpose by the
State, dispenses with elaborate procedures, and instead stipulates
a mandatory opportunity of hearing and payment of fair and just
8
market price of the acquired land. It is evident that the framers
of the 1947 Regulations sought to ensure the security of tribal
land while equipping the State with its eminent domain authority to
requisition such land in the larger public interest.
16. Thus, there cannot possibly be any room to doubt the fact that
the 1947 Regulations do not envisage the routine procedure followed
under the 1894/2013 Acts, i.e. the issuance of Notification
proposing the acquisition; the subsequent Declaration of such
acquisition; issuance of notice(s) before passing of an award, etc.
Due to such omissions, it seems that the appellants have always
construed Section 10 to mean that the land can be acquired without
prescribing any rigid procedure, so long as there is compliance of
the expression of “reasonable compensation”, which is averred to be
transparent and non-discriminatory.
17. It is this shapeless “reasonable compensation” that has worried
the respondents, who sought applicability of the 2013 Act, a
decidedly more thorough legislation with determinative elements for
the calculation of compensation, including statutory benefits such
as solatium and additional interest.
18. The controversy, therefore, revolves primarily around the
manner and the procedure that may be required to be followed by the
State Government while acquiring the ‘Jhum’ lands. The High Court,
vide the impugned judgment, has firstly referred to various
constitutional provisions in order to hold that the land could be
acquired only under provisions of the 1894/2013 Act(s) and that
Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations is merely an enabling provision
9
under which ‘Jhum’ lands can be acquired.
19. We find considerable force in this approach of the High Court.
The phrase “reasonable compensation” is an open-textured
expression, designed to confer flexibility. It cannot be read as
permitting compensation which is merely notional or arbitrary. In
constitutional jurisprudence, reasonableness of compensation must
align with the guarantees of Article 14 and Article 300A. The right
to property, though no longer fundamental, is nonetheless a
constitutional right which cannot be divested save by authority of
law, and such deprivation must meet tests of fairness and non-
arbitrariness.
20. In this backdrop, subsequent legislative developments furnish
an important guide. The 2013 Act — enacted to replace the 1894 law
— represents the considered will of Parliament as to what
constitutes just recompense when property is taken for public
purpose. It mandates not only market value but also ‘solatium’ and
‘interest’, recognising that compulsory acquisition imposes a
special burden upon the landholder.
21. While the 1947 Regulations may provide an alternate procedural
framework for the North-Eastern Frontier Tracts, they cannot be
interpreted in isolation from this broader evolution of law. To
construe “reasonable compensation” narrowly, ignoring ‘solatium’
and ‘interest’, would be to perpetuate inequality: two landholders
losing their property for identical projects — one under the 2013
Act, another under the 1947 Regulations — would stand on palpably
10
different footings, without rational justification. Such a
construction would not withstand scrutiny under Article 14.
22. In this sense, we are in agreement with the High Court that
“reasonable compensation” in Section 10 must be harmonised with the
prevailing legislative standards of the time, and that solatium and
interest are not alien imports but integral components of fairness.
This interpretive technique properly reflects the principle that
subordinate or special legislation must be read in the light of
constitutional values and later general enactments, particularly
where the language is sufficiently elastic.
23. At the same time, we are conscious of the limits of judicial
intervention. The High Court, in its impugned judgment, permitted
reopening of all concluded acquisitions under the 1947 Regulations
for reassessment of compensation. Such an approach, in our
considered opinion, may travel beyond the permissible bounds.
Finality of administrative action cannot be lightly unsettled; to
do so would not only destabilise public projects but also create
fiscal uncertainty. Balance must therefore be struck by ensuring
that pending and future acquisitions are aligned with the standards
of the 2013 Act, while leaving untouched those transactions where
compensation has been finally determined and accepted.
24. Before we part with these appeals, it merits mentioning that
the controversy before us has since been laid to rest by
legislative intervention. The Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract
Jhum Land Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2024, namely, Act No. 11 of
11
2024 (which has come into force in the State of Arunachal Pradesh
with effect from 07.08.2024) has introduced a proviso to Section 10
explicitly stipulating that compensation under the 1947 Regulations
shall not be less than that computed under the law of land
acquisition in force at the relevant time. This amendment confirms,
in statutory form, the interpretive conclusion reached by the High
Court and supplemented by us. However, as a matter of legislative
policy, it operates prospectively and cannot, by itself, justify
disturbing concluded acquisitions.
25. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct that the
respondents shall also be entitled to solatium as well as interest
in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act.
26. The appellants shall ensure that any arrears towards solatium
and interest, wherever not yet paid, are released to the landowners
of the subject-acquisition within a period of three months from
today.
27. It is further clarified that the obligation of the State to pay
‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ shall be without prejudice to its right
to recover the same from the ultimate beneficiaries of the
acquisition, in accordance with law.
28. In respect of concluded acquisitions where compensation has
been finally determined, accepted and disbursed, no reopening shall
be permissible. The impugned judgment of the High Court is
therefore set aside, to that extent. However, in all matters which
remain pending either before the competent authority or before a
12
Court/Tribunal, the compensation shall be recomputed to include
solatium and interest as above.
29. The directions contained in our interim order dated 03.07.2023
regarding the deposit of amounts with the Deputy Commissioner shall
be given full effect. In the event such deposits represent solatium
and interest payable to the true landowners, the same together with
the accrued interest in the Fixed Deposit shall be disbursed to the
claimants without delay.
30. With these directions, the appeals are allowed in part. The
judgment of the High Court stands modified to the extent indicated
above.
31. All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.
.........................J.
(SURYA KANT)
.........................J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 16, 2025.
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