Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1433-1434 of 2007
PETITIONER:
John K. John
RESPONDENT:
Tom Varghese & Anr
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/10/2007
BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6038-6039 of 2005]
S.B. SINHA, J :
1. Leave granted.
2. The complainant is before us being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with
a judgment and order dated 24.08.2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of
the High Court of Kerala in Crl. R.P. Nos. 2255 and 2256 of 2004 whereby
and whereunder the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the
learned Trial Judge and affirmed by the Appellate Court, was set aside.
3. Respondent allegedly issued two cheques in favour of the appellant
herein. The said cheques when presented were dishonoured for want of
insufficient funds. As despite service of notice, the respondent did not make
any payment, two complaint petitions were filed against him.
4. The question which arose for consideration before the learned Trial
Judge and consequently before the Court of Appeal as also the Revisional
Court was as to whether the said cheques had been issued towards discharge
of any existing debt.
5. Relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The complainant
used to run chitties. Respondent was a subscriber to three chitties conducted
by the firm of the appellant. In respect of one of the chitties, the bid was
held on 7.10.1997 for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The amount was paid on
3.11.1997. Bid was again made by the respondent in relation to another
chitty on 7.04.1998, for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The amount was paid on
25.06.1998. Allegedly, Respondent committed defaults in payment of the
instalments in relation thereto with effect from 7.04.1998.
Indisputably, a suit for realization of the said amount was filed by the
appellant against the respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Court,
Kottayam which was marked as O.S. No. 1 of 2000. Another suit being O.S.
No. 168 of 2000 was instituted before the Munsiff Court, Changancherry
claiming a sum of Rs. 55,900/-. Respondent, apart from the aforementioned
two chitties, was a subscriber to another chitty for a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. It
was not prized by the respondent. On an allegation that the respondent
along with three others had borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- from him on
26.03.1998 wherefor he executed a demand promissory note and as despite
demand, the said amount was not paid to him, the appellant instituted
another suit being O.S. No. 362 of 1999 in the Subordinate Court, Kottayam
for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with interest.
6. Appellant herein admittedly was conducting chitty transactions in the
name of a firm known as \021Karappara Chitty Funds\022. He is a partner of the
said firm. The suits were instituted by him representing the said firm.
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Appellant contended that despite the fact that the respondent herein was a
defaulted subscriber of two prized chitties, he took personal loan from him
in his personal capacity.
7. Before the learned Trial Judge, the respondent examined two
witnesses who proved the aforementioned fact. The learned Trial Judge, in
its judgment, took notice of the pendency of the several civil litigations by
and between the parties hereto. It, however, proceeded on the basis that as
admittedly cheques have been issued by the respondent which on
presentation were not honoured, he committed an offence under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short \023the Act\024). The said findings of
the learned Trial Judge was upheld in appeal by Shri K. Ramakrishnan,
learned Additional Sessions Judge by a judgment and order dated
17.03.2004.
8. The High Court, however, in the revision application filed by the
respondent herein opined that the learned Trial Judge as also the Appellate
Court could not have rejected the evidence adduced by the respondent and in
particular those of DWs 1 and 2 in view of the fact that admitted and proved
facts strengthened their versions or at least probabilised the same. Holding
that the respondent herein has successfully rebutted the presumption arising
under Section 139 of the Act, it was held that the appellant did not succeed
in proving that the respondent had borrowed any sum for which the said
cheques were issued.
9. Mr. B.V. Deepak, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, submitted that the High Court was not correct in reversing the
findings of the learned Trial Judge as also the Court of Appeal in exercise of
its revisional jurisdiction. There was no reason, the learned counsel
contended, as to why a presumption in terms of Section 139 of the Act could
not have been raised against the accused as admittedly the cheques were
issued by him which, on presentation, were dishonoured.
10. Relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The complainant is
a partner of a firm which is in the business of running chitty fund. The fact
that the respondent subscribed three chitties and that he could not pay the
instalments of the prized amount is not in dispute. Pendency of three civil
suits filed by the firm through the appellant against the respondent is also not
in dispute. The High Court upon analyzing the materials brought on records
by the parties had arrived at a finding of fact that in view of the conduct of
the parties it would not be prudent to hold that the respondent borrowed a
huge sum despite the fact that the suits had already been filed against him by
the appellant. Presumption raised in terms of Section 139 of the Act is
rebuttable. If, upon analysis of the evidence brought on records by the
parties, in a fact situation obtaining in the instant case, a finding of fact has
been arrived at by the High Court that the cheques had not been issued by
the respondent in discharge of any debt, in our opinion, the view of the High
Court cannot be said to be perverse warranting interference by us in exercise
of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India. The High Court was entitled to take notice of the conduct of the
parties. It has been found by the High Court as of fact that the complainant
did not approach the court with clean hands. His conduct was not that of a
prudent man. Why no instrument was executed although a huge sum of
money was allegedly paid to the respondent was a relevant question which
could be posed in the matter. It was open to the High Court to draw its own
conclusion therein. Not only no document had been executed, even no
interest had been charged. It would be absurd to form an opinion that
despite knowing that the respondent even was not in a position to discharge
his burden to pay instalments in respect of the prized amount, an advance
would be made to him and that too even after institution of three civil suits.
The amount advanced even did not carry any interest. If in a situation of this
nature, the High Court has arrived at a finding that the respondent has
discharged his burden of proof cast on him under Section 139 of the Act, no
exception thereto can be taken.
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11. It is now a well-settled principle of law that this Court in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India would
ordinarily not interfere with the judgment of acquittal, if two views are
possible.
In M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani v. State of Kerala and Another
[(2006) 6 SCC 39], this Court held:
\02354. In any event the High Court entertained an
appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal,
it was in fact exercising the revisional
jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate
power against a judgment of acquittal, the High
Court should have borne in mind the well-settled
principles of law that where two views are
possible, the appellate court should not interfere
with the finding of acquittal recorded by the
court below.\024
[See also Mahadeo Laxman Sarane & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra,
2007 (7) SCALE 137]
12. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals
which are dismissed accordingly.