Full Judgment Text
Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2012
[REPORTABLE]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2012
Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh …Appellant
Versus
The State of Uttarakhand …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Rajesh Bindal, J.
1. The appellant, who was husband of the deceased,
has filed the present appeal challenging his conviction and
sentence under sections 304B, 498A and 201 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). The Trial Court had sentenced the
appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years under
Section 304B, 2 years under Section 498A and 2 years under
Section 201 IPC. However, the High Court of Uttarakhand at
Nainital had reduced the sentence of the appellant under
Section 304B IPC from ten years to seven years.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Anita Malhotra
Date: 2023.04.20
16:49:17 IST
Reason:
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2. The appellant and deceased Chhilo Kaur got married
in the year 1993. The deceased was residing in her
matrimonial home. On 24.6.1995 at 6.15 p.m. father of the
deceased, Pratap Singh (PW-1) filed complaint with the P.S.
Jaspur stating that his daughter Chhilo Kaur was married to the
appellant about two years ago. In the marriage, he had given
sufficient dowry as per his status. Two months after the
marriage, his daughter came to her parental home and told the
complainant (PW-1) that her in-laws are asking her to bring a
motorcycle as the same was not given in dowry. The
complainant pacified his daughter stating that at present he is
not capable of giving motorcycle, however, whenever he is in a
position to do so, he will certainly give and sent his daughter
back to her matrimonial home. Thereafter, whenever his
daughter came to the parental home, she used to talk about
the demand of motorcycle and subsequently after about one
year of marriage, the demand for land was also made. Every
time he used to pacify his daughter and sent her back. On the
previous day i.e. on 23.6.1995, one Jagir Singh of village
Bhogpur Dam, where his daughter lived after marriage with the
appellant came to complainant and told him that his daughter,
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Chhilo Kaur has been murdered by her in-laws. On getting the
information, the complainant along with his wife came to
village Bhogpur Dam on 24.6.1995 and were shocked to know
that on 22.6.1995 in the morning at about 8.00 a.m., his
daughter was beaten up and strangulated to death by her
husband Charan Singh, (the appellant herein), brother-in-law,
Gurmeet Singh (accused no.2) and mother-in-law Santo Kaur
(accused no.3). They had cremated the dead body without
even informing the complainant. She was killed on account of
non-fulfilment of demand of motorbike and land in dowry. The
matter was investigated and chargesheet was filed against
Charan Singh, Gurmeet Singh and Santo Kaur.
3. The prosecution examined six witnesses and defence
examined one witness. The Trial Court, after evaluating the
evidence, convicted Charan Singh (appellant), Gurmeet Singh
and Santo Kaur under Sections 304B, 498A and 201 IPC and
sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten
years u/s 304B IPC, rigorous imprisonment for two years u/s
498A IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years u/s 201 IPC.
In appeal filed by the convicts before the High Court, the
conviction and sentence of Gurmeet Singh (brother-in-law) and
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Santo Kaur (mother-in-law) under Section 304B, 498A and 201
IPC were set aside and they were acquitted of the charges,
whereas the conviction of the appellant was upheld. However,
the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of ten years under
Section 304B IPC, awarded to the appellant was reduced to
seven years. It is the aforesaid judgment of the High Court
which is under challenge in the present appeal.
4. Mr. Shubhranshu Padhi, learned counsel who was
requested to assist the Court as an amicus curiae on account of
absence of the counsel who filed the appeal, submitted that the
conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be legally
sustained either under Sections 304B or 498A IPC. The pre-
requisites for raising presumption under Section 304B IPC is
that soon before the death, the deceased had been subjected
to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand
of dowry. The presumption in regard to dowry death can be
raised in terms of Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (for short, ‘IEA’) only if it is shown that soon before death,
such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for,
or in connection with the demand of dowry.
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5. If the evidence led by the prosecution is examined,
no case for conviction under Section 304B or 498A IPC can
possibly be made out as none of the witnesses have stated that
there was any harassment or cruelty to the deceased or
demand of dowry immediately before her death. The marriage
took place in the year 1993, the deceased died on 22.6.1995.
None of the family members of the deceased including her
father, maternal grandmother or the maternal uncle have
stated anything about the harassment of the deceased
immediately before her death in connection with demand of
dowry. In fact, the maternal grandmother and two maternal
uncles who were living at distance of about one farlang from
the village of the deceased were even present at the time of
her cremation. They did not raise any issue either by lodging a
complaint to the police or otherwise. In fact, it was admitted by
the maternal grandmother and the uncles of the deceased that
after the cremation, with the intervention of the panchayat,
they had collected all the dowry articles. It was further
submitted that intimation was also given to the father of the
deceased who in fact was living at a distance of about 290 kms.
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However, the cremation could not be delayed on account of
waiting for the arrival of the father of the deceased.
6. It was further argued that one material witness, Jagir
Singh, who was named by the complainant in the FIR, has not
been produced by the prosecution in evidence. He is the
person who according to the complainant is a resident of village
Bhogpur Dam, where the deceased used to live in her
matrimonial home. He had informed the complainant about the
death of his daughter. Why this material witness was withheld
by the prosecution? As per the statement of the I.O. Babban
Singh, who appeared as PW-6, during investigation the
statement of Jagir Singh was recorded. Once the ingredients of
Sections 304B, 498A IPC and Section 113B of IEA are not made
out, no presumption of dowry death can be raised. In support
of the arguments, reliance was placed on Baijnath v. State of
1
M.P . It was further argued that the allegations against the
appellant, his brother and mother were same. However,
against acquittal of his brother and mother, no appeal has been
preferred by the State and death of the wife of the appellant
was not unnatural as she was suffering from fits. In her cross-
1 (2017) 1 SCC 101
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Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2012
examination, the maternal grandmother admitted that the
deceased had fits.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State
submitted that it is a case in which a young woman was killed
by her in-laws in lust for dowry. The marriage was merely two
years old and the death was unnatural. The deceased was
cremated without even informing her parents. The maternal
grandmother and the two uncles who were present at the time
of cremation had seen injury marks on the body of the
deceased and also the broken tooth. They could not lodge the
complaint as they were threatened. The death occurred in the
matrimonial home, hence onus lies heavily on the appellant to
dislodge the presumption. There is sufficient material on record
in the form of statements of witnesses produced by the
prosecution that there was repeated demand for dowry by the
appellant. There is no error in the judgment of the High Court.
Sufficient indulgence has already been shown by the High Court
by reducing the sentence of the appellant from ten years to
minimum seven years as provided under Section 304B of the
IPC.
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8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the relevant record.
9. The marriage of the appellant with the deceased was
solemnised in the year 1993. She died on 22.6.1995. FIR was
registered on the complaint of the father of the deceased on
24.6.1995 against Charan Singh, the appellant herein, brother-
in-law, Gurmeet Singh and mother-in-law Santo Kaur. However,
in appeal filed by the convicts before the High Court, brother-in-
law, Gurmeet Singh and mother-in-law, Santo Kaur were
acquitted whereas the conviction of the appellant was upheld.
The sentence awarded to the appellant under Section 304B IPC
was reduced from ten years rigorous imprisonment to seven
years rigorous imprisonment. The sentence of two years
rigorous imprisonment each awarded under Section 498A and
Section 201 IPC was affirmed.
10. The conviction of the appellant is under Sections
304B and 498A IPC raising presumption regarding dowry death
within seven years of marriage. To appreciate the arguments
raised by the learned counsel for the parties, a perusal of
Section 304B and 498A IPC and Section 113B of the Indian
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Evidence Act would be required. The same are extracted
hereinbelow:-
“304B. Dowry death .— (1) Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances
within seven years of her marriage and it is shown
that soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry
death”, and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,
“dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than seven years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life.
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty — Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
“cruelty” means —
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
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demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.
113B. Presumption as to dowry death .— When
the question is whether a person has committed the
dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon
before her death such woman had been subjected by
such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court
shall presume that such person had caused the
dowry death.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
“dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in
Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”.
11. The interpretation of Sections 304B and 498A IPC
came up for consideration in Baijnath’s case (supra). The
opinion was summed up in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are
extracted below:-
| “25. Whereas in the ofef nce of dowry death<br>defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients<br>thereof are: | |
|---|---|
| (i) death of the woman concerned is by any<br>burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than<br>in normal circumstances, and | |
| (ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and | |
| (iii) that soon before her death, she was<br>subjected to cruelty or harassment by her<br>husband or any relative of the husband for, or in<br>connection with, any demand for dowry. |
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| The ofef nce under Section 498-A of the<br>Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if<br>she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this<br>Section exposits “cruelty” as: | |
| (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature<br>as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide<br>or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or<br>health (whether mental or physical), or | |
| (ii) harassment of the woman, where such<br>harassment is with a view to coercing her or any<br>person related to her to meet any unlawful<br>demand for any property or valuable security or<br>is on account of failure by her or any person<br>related to her to meet such demand. | |
| 26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the<br>lady by her husband or his relative for or in<br>connection with any demand for any property or<br>valuable security as a demand for dowry or in<br>connection therewith is the common constituent of<br>both the ofef nces. | |
| 27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have<br>the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry<br>Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as<br>explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the<br>conduct of the tormentor, the consequences<br>precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto.<br>Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the<br>husband or any relative of his for or in connection<br>with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the<br>gravamen of the two ofef nces. |
12. As the aforesaid case was also pertaining to dowry
death, presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence
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Act was also discussed in detail in paras 29 to 31 of the
aforesaid judgment. The same are extracted below:-
“29. Noticeably this presumption as well is
founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the
woman dead for or in connection with any demand
for dowry by the person charged with the offence.
The presumption as to dowry death thus would get
activated only upon the proof of the fact that the
deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or
harassment for or in connection with any demand for
dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable
contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the
legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the
otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of
commission of the offence of dowry death by the
person charged therewith.
30. A conjoint reading of these three
provisions, thus predicate the burden of the
prosecution to unassailably substantiate the
ingredients of the two offences by direct and
convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption
engrafted in Section 113-B of the Act against the
accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the
husband or his relative or the person charged is thus
the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory
presumption, to draw the person charged within the
coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate
by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to
prove such fact, the person accused of either of the
above referred offences cannot be held guilty by
taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the
shortfall in proof.
31. The legislative primature of relieving the
prosecution of the rigour of the proof of the often
practically inaccessible recesses of life within the
guarded confines of a matrimonial home and of
replenishing the consequential void, by according a
presumption against the person charged, cannot be
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overeased to gloss over and condone its failure to
prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated in the
sections involved, lest justice is the casualty”.
13. A conjoint reading of Section 304B IPC and Section
113B of the Indian Evidence Act with reference to the
presumption raised was discussed in para 32 of the aforesaid
judgment, which is extracted below:-
| “32. | This Court while often dwelling on the | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| scope and purport of Section 304-B of the Code and | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Section 113-B of the Act have propounded that the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| presumption is contingent on the fact that the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ofef nce of Section 304-B as in | Shindo | v. | State of | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Punjab | [ | Shindo | v. | State of Punjab | , (2011) 11 SCC | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 517 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 394] and echoed in | Rajeev | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Kumar | v | . | State of Haryana | [ | Rajeev Kumar | v. | State of | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Haryana | , (2013) 16 SCC 640 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 346] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| . In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| under Section 304-B of the Code is that the accused | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| must have subjected the woman to cruelty in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| connection with demand for dowry soon before her | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| death and that this ingredient has to be proved by | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| then the Court will presume that the accused has | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| committed the ofef nce of dowry death under Section | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| earlier decision of this Court in | K. Prema S. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Rao | v. | Yadla Srinivasa Rao | [ | K. Prema S. Rao | v. | Yadla | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Srinivasa Rao | , (2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2003 SCC (Cri) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 271] to the efef ct that to attract the provision of | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Section 304-B of the Code, one of the main | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ingredients of the ofef nce which is required to be | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| established is that “soon before her death” she was |
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| subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection | ||
|---|---|---|
| with the demand for dowry” | . |
14. With reference to the legal position as referred to
above, the matter is now required to be examined as to
whether the case in hand falls in the category where the
presumption can be raised against the appellant relieving the
prosecution from proving its case and putting the onus on the
accused/appellant.
15. The date of death of the deceased is 22.6.1995. She
was cremated on the same day. The stand taken by the
appellant was that the parents of the deceased were informed
who were living about 290 kms. away. However, they could not
reach on time. It was further submitted that the maternal
grandmother and two maternal uncles who were living at a
distance of about one furlong from the matrimonial residence of
the deceased when she died were present at the time of
cremation. They neither raised any issue nor did they inform
the police. Rather on the intervention of the panchayat, they
had taken all the dowry articles.
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16. The cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the
death. In his evidence, Pratap Singh (PW-1), father of the
deceased stated that two months after the marriage his
daughter came to the parental home stating that the appellant
was demanding motorcycle, however, she was sent back.
Thereafter, she again came and apprised him that the demand
of motorcycle was being pressed by the appellant. Besides
motorcycle, land was also demanded. There is nothing in the
statement that any such demand was raised immediately
before the death as the incidents sought to be referred to are
quite old. He admitted in his cross examination that at the time
of funeral, his mother-in-law and two brothers-in-law were
present. However, they were threatened not to lodge the
complaint. Balbir Singh (PW-2), maternal uncle of the
deceased, merely stated that at the time of marriage sufficient
dowry was given by the father of the deceased. However, later
he heard that the appellant had demanded the motorcycle. In
his cross-examination, he admitted that he was living at the
distance of about one furlong from the house of the appellant.
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No dowry was demanded at the time of marriage of the
deceased. He did not state that the deceased ever shared with
him about the demand of dowry or any harassment on account
of non-fulfilment thereof though he was living close to the
matrimonial house of the deceased.
17. Beero Bai (PW-3), the maternal grandmother of the
deceased, stated that her house is located at a distance of
about one mile from the house of the appellant. She used to go
to the house of the deceased. The deceased was being treated
badly. She was not allowed to go to her parental house. The
deceased informed her that the appellant used to ask her to
bring motorcycle from her maternal grandmother. After the
death of her husband in February 1995, the appellant asked the
deceased to get land from her maternal grandmother. On a
demand made to her, she replied in negative. However, in her
cross-examination, she stated that the land was not demanded
from her. Even in her statement, there is nothing to suggest
that soon before the death, any cruelty or harassment was
made to the deceased, either by the appellant or his family
members. All what is stated is regarding the demand. There
are no details of any cruelty or harassment, though this witness
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was living about a kilometre from the house of the deceased
and is her maternal grandmother.
18. Joginder Singh (PW-4) is another witness produced by
the prosecution, who is maternal uncle of the deceased. He
was declared hostile.
19. Rajindra Singh (PW-5), Sub Inspector was a formal
witness who had only registered the FIR and arrested the
accused.
20. Babban Singh (PW-6), Circle Officer, Faridpur was the
Investigating Officer. In his examination-in-chief, he admitted
that he recorded the statement of Jagir Singh. He is the person
who, as per the complaint made to the police, had informed the
father of the deceased about the death of his daughter.
However, he was not produced in evidence.
21. In the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution,
none of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment
to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members
on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or
otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by
anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of
motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident.
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The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil
the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B
IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the
ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same
reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the
deceased soon before her death.
22. Defence had produced Gurmej Singh as DW-1, who
was head of the village at the time of incident. He stated that
the information about the death was given to the parents of the
deceased and other family members. He stated that
belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal
grandmother and uncle after cremation. His statement is in
line with the admission made by Biro Bai (PW-3), maternal
grandmother, Balbir Singh (PW-2). Meaning thereby that there
was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.
23. On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by
the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the pre-
requisites to raise presumption under Section 304B IPC and
Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been
fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.
Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial
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home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to
convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC. The
cause of death as such is not known.
24. For the reasons mentioned above, in our opinion, the
conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 304B,
498A and 201 IPC cannot be legally sustained. The appeal is
accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court
is set aside. The bail bonds stand cancelled.
_____________, J.
(Abhay S. Oka)
____________, J.
(Rajesh Bindal)
New Delhi
April 20, 2023
// NR, PM //
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