Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GIRDHARI LAL & SONS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BALBIR NATH MATHUR & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT26/02/1986
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
KHALID, V. (J)
CITATION:
1986 AIR 1499 1986 SCR (1) 383
1986 SCC (2) 237 1986 SCALE (1)272
CITATOR INFO :
D 1987 SC2173 (3)
RF 1988 SC1737 (98)
ACT:
DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958:
Sections 17 & 18 - ’Sub-tenant’ when entitled to
protection against eviction - Consent of landlord to the
sub-tenancy and notice of creation of sub-tenancy to be
evidenced in writing-letter of sub-tenancy - Attested by
landlord - Whether sufficient.
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES :
Statute - Interpretation of - Primary duty of court
Ascertain intention of legislature - Actual or imputed
Thereafter interpret statute so as to promote and advance
its object and purpose by supplementing the written word if
necessary.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent-landlord, Balbir Nath Mathur had let out
the demised premises to a firm M/s. Om Prakash & Co., whose
three partners were close relations of the respondent-
landlord. The tenant-firm in turn leased out the premises to
the appellant-firm. A letter executed by the tenant-firm and
attested by the respondent land-lord was passed on to the
appellant-firm had confirmed the lease and further undertook
to pay to the appellant-firm as damages a sum calculated at
the rate of Rs. 2,500 per month for the unexpired period of
the lease if the appellant-firm had to vacate the premises
before the expiry of the lease period of two years.
Simultaneously, the appellant-firm also executed a letter
addressed to the respondent-landlord, in which, after
referring to the lease of the premises in their favour, it
was stated that they would pay a sum of Rs.8,400 per annum
as donation to the trust of which respondent-landlord and
others were trustees, if they stayed on in the premises
after the expiry of the period of lease. By a letter dated
June 10. 1975 the tenant-firm had
384
demanded payment of arrears of rent from appellant-firm.
This letter was signed by the respondent-landlord himself on
behalf of the tenant-firm.
The respondent-landlord obtained an ex parte decree for
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eviction against the tenant-firm and one of its partners. In
the execution proceedings, the appellant-firm, in whose
occupation the premises were, filed an objection petition
before the Rent Controller under 8.25 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. The objection petition was rejected by
the Rent Controller and his order was confirmed by the Rent
Control Tribunal as well as by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court lt was contended on behalf of
the appellant-firm/sub-tenant : (1) that they were not
subtenants but the direct tenants of respondent-landlord as
he himself and negotiated the lease and inducted them into
possession; (11) that even if they were sub-tenants only,
they were entitled to the protection of sections 17 and 18
of the Act; (111) that the decree obtained by the
respondent-landlord was a collusive decree and that a fraud
had been played upon the Court to get rid of the appellant-
firm and (lv) that there was consent in writing by the
landlord to he sub-tenancy, as well as notice in writing to
the landlord of the sub-tenancy within the meaning of
sections 17 and 18 of the Act and, therefore, they were
entitled to be protected against eviction.
Allowing the appeal,
^
HELD : (By the Court)
The appellant/sub-tenant is clearly entitled to the
protection of s. 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 and he cannot, therefore, be evicted in execution of
the decree obtained by respondent-landlord against tenant-
respondent. [396 F]
(Per Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
1. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is primarily
devised to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenants and
subtenants from demised premises and unreasonable
enhancement of
385
rent. Showing an awareness of the problems of sub-tenants,
the Legislature enacted 88. 17 and 18 for their protection.
[395 C-D; E-F]
2. me Legislature while offering protection to a sub-
tenant who has been inducted into possession by a landlord
has limited the protection to the sub-tenant who can
establish the consent of the landlord by documentary
evidence to which the landlord and the tenant or the sub-
tenant are parties. So it is provided that the previous
consent of the landlord has to be in writing and that a
notice in the prescribed manner has to be given to the
landlord by the tenant or the sub-tenant. The essence of the
requirement, therefore, 18 that the consent of the landlord
to the sub-tenancy and the notice of the creation of the
sub-tenancy have to be evidenced by writing. The writing is
to be such as to indicate clearly the consent of the
landlord to the creation of a sub-tenancy and his knowledge
of the particular sub-tenancy after its creation. The
writing relating to the consent and the writing relating to
the knowledge (notice) may be by different documents or they
may telescope into the same document. [395 H; 396 A-C]
3. There is no magical form in which the consent is to
be given nor any charmed form in which the notice is to be
sent. The essence of the matter is that the consent to the
sub-tenancy and the notice of the sub-tenany in respect of
the premises must be evidenced by written consent of the
landlord and the tenant or the sub-tenant. [396 D-E]
Where, as in the instant case, the agreement or the
letter of the sub-tenancy in respect of the demised premises
is attested by the landlord himself, there can be w question
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that the landlord has given his previous consent and that he
has notice in writing of the sub-tenancy in respect of the
particular premises. The requirements of sections 17 and 18
of the Act both as regards to his consent and the notice to
him are satisfied. [396 C-D]
4. The primary and foremost task of a court in
interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the
intention, the court must then strive to so interpret the
statute as to promote and advance the object and purpose of
the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the court
may even depart
386
from the rule that plain words should be interpreted
according to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and
mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid
patent injustice, anamoly or absurdity or to avoid
invalidation of a law, the court would be well justified in
departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so
as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment
by supplementing, the written word, if necessary. [391 B-D]
Hawkins v. Gatbercole, 43, English Reports 1129, Comet
Radio Vision Services v. Farnell Trand Bord, [1971] III All
E.R. 230; Seaford Court Estate Limitd v. Ashor, [1949] 2 All
B.R. 155; Ruggy Joint Water Board v. Fottit, [1972] 1 A.E.R.
l057; K.P. Verghese v. I.T.O., [1981] 4 S.C.C. 173; State
Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. M. Khan [1981] S.C.C. 82; Som
Prakash Rathi v. Union of India, [1981] S.C.C. I 449, Ravula
Sobba Rao v. C.I.T., [1956] S.C.R. 577; Govindlal v. Market
Committee, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 482 and Babaji Kondaji v. Nhasik
Merchants Coop. Bank, [1984] 2 S.C.C. 50 relied upon.
(Per Khalid, J.)
In normal cases a sub-tenant under the Delhi Rent e
Control Act 1958 can get relief under the provisions of the
Act only if he satisfies the twin conditions in s. 17 viz.
there must be the previous consent to writing by the
landlord of the creation of the sub-tenancy, and a notice in
the prescribe manner by the sub-tenant of the creation of
the sub-tenancy to the landlord within one month of the date
of such creation. It is only then these two conditions are
satisfied that the consequences mentioned in s. 18 will
follow. [398 B-C]
Normally, 8. 17 should be strictly complied with, for
the sub-tenant to get the benefit under s.18. [398 F]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2153 of
1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.9.1980 of the
Delhi High Court in S.A. No. 287 of 1980.
M.K. Mukhi, Girish Chandra and Mrs. Sarla Chandra for
the Appellants.
387
F.S. Nariman, R.N. Karanjawala, Mrs. Manik
Karanajawala, Ejaz Maqbooi, M.L. Lahoty, S.P. Singh, K.P.
Gupta and Miss Helevs Marc for the Respondents.
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Balbir Nath Mathur obtained an
exparte decree for eviction against M/s. Om Prakash &
Company and Kusum Rani, a partner of M/s. Om Prakash &
Company in respect of the ground floor of premises of No.90,
Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. Three of the partners of M/s. Om
Prakash & Company, it must be mentioned at the outset, are
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the sister-in-law and the two minor daughters of Balbir Nath
Mathur himself. When Balbir Nath Mathur sought to execute
the decree for eviction, M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons who are in
occupation of the premises filed an objection petition
before Rent Controller, purporting to do so under 8.25 of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The objection petition was
rejected by the Rent Controller. The order of the Rent
Controller was confirmed an appeal, by the Rent Control
Tribunal and, by the High Court on further revision. M/s.
Girdhari Lal & Sons have filed this appeal with the special
leave of this court.
The Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal
concurrently found that Balbir Nath Mathur was the owner of
the premises, that Om Prakash & Company was the tenant and
that Girdhari Lal & Sons were the sub-tenants under Om
Prakash & Company. The case of the appellants was that lt
was Balbir Nath Mathur that negotiated the lease and
inducted them into possession and that they were not sub-
tenants but the direct tenants of Balbir Nath Mathur. Even
if they were sub-tenants only, they claimed that they were
entitled to the protection of sections 17 and 18 of the
Delhi Rent Control Act. They alleged that the decree
obtained by Balbir Nath Mathur was a collusive decree and
that a fraud had been played upon the court to get rid of
the appellant, M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons. In view of the
concurrent findings that Om Prakash & Company was the tenant
and M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons were the sub-tenants, we accept
that finding and proceed to consider the question whether
the appellants are entitled to the protection of sections 17
and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
388
At the time when the premises was leased by Om Prakash
& Company to M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons a letter executed by
Om Prakash & Company and attested by Balbir Nath Mathur was
pass ed on to M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons. By this letter, Om
Prakash & Company confirmed the lease and further undertook
to pay to the appellant as damages a sum calculated at the
rate of Rs.2500 per month for the unexpired period of the
lease if the appellant had to vacate the premises before the
expiry of the lease period of two years Simultaneously M/s.
Girdhari Lal & Sons executed a letter addressed to Balbir
Nath Mathur in which they stated, after referring to the
lease of the house in their favour by Om Prakash & Company,
that they would pay a sum of Rs.8400 per annum as donation
to the Shre Visheshwar Nath Memorial Public Charitable
Trust, a trust of which Balbir Nath Mathur and others were
trustees, if they stayed in the premises after the expiry of
the period of lease. Another important document to which we
may make a reference is a letter dated June 10, 1975 by
which Om Prakash & Company demanded payment of arrears of
rent from M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons. This letter was signed
by Balbir Nath Mathur himself on behalf of Om Prakash
Company. The contention of the appellants is that there was
consent in writing by the landlord to the sub-tenancy, as
well as notice and writing to the landlord of the sub-
tenancy within the meaning of sections 17 and 18 of the
Delhi Rent Control Act and therefore the sub-tenants M/s.
Girdhari Lal & Sons were entitled to be protected against
eviction.
In order to appreciate the contention of the appellant
it is necessary to set out sections 17(1) and 18(1) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 :-
"17(1) Where, after the commencement of this Act,
any premises are sub-let either in whole or in
part by the tenant with the previous consent in
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writing of the landlord, the tenant or the sub-
tenant to whom the premises are sub-let may, in
the prescribed manner, gave notice to the landlord
of the creation of the sub-tenancy within one
month of the date of such sub-letting and notify
the termination of such sub-tenancy within one
month of such termination.
(2)..........................................
389
(3)..........................................
18(1) Where an order for eviction in respect of
any premises is made under section 14 Against a
tenant but not against a sub-tenant referred to in
section 17 and a notice of the sub-tenancy has
been given to the landlord, the sub-tenant shall,
with effect from the date of the order, be deemed
to become a tenant holding directly under the
landlord in respect of the premises in his
occupation on the same terms and conditions on
which the tenant would have held from the
landlord, if the tenancy had continued.
(2)........................................."
Rule 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 provides
that a notice of the creation or termination of sub-tenancy
required under s.17 shall be in Form "E". Rule 22 provides
that unless otherwise provided by the Act, any notice or
intimation required or authorised by the Act to be served on
any person shall be served (a) by delivering it to the
person; or (b) by forwarding it to the person by registered
post with acknowledgement due. Form "E" provides for a
statement of full particulars of the demised premises, such
as the street, municipal ward and house number, names of the
tenant and the sub-tenant, details of the portion sublet,
rent payable by the sub-tenant, date of creation of the sub-
tenancy, etc.
It may be worthwhile to restate and explain at this
state certain well known principles of Interpretation of
Statutes: Words are but mere vehicles of thought. They are
meant to express or convey one’s thoughts. Generally, a
person’s words and thoughts are coincidental. No problem
arises then, but, not in frequently, then are not. It is
common experience with most men, that occasionally there are
no adequate words to express some of their thoughts. Words
which very nearly express the thoughts may be found but not
words which will express precisely. There is then a great
fumbling for words. Long winded explanations and, in
conversation, even gestures are resorted to. Ambiguous words
and words which unwittingly convey more than one meaning are
used. Where different interpretations are likely to be put
on words and a question
390
arises what an individual meant when he used certain words,
he may be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say
that he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the
legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws and
difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has
said, a legislature can not be asked to sit to resolve those
difficulties. The legislatures, unlike on individuals,
cannot come forward to explain themselves as often as
difficulties of interpretation arise. So the task of
interpreting the laws by finding out what the legislature
meant is allotted to the courts. Now, if one person puts
into words the thoughts of another (as the draftsman puts
into words the thoughts of the legislature) and a third
person (the court) is to find out what they meant, more
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difficulties are bound to crop up. The draftsman may not
have caught the spirit of the legislation at all; the words
used by him may not adequately convey what 18 meant to be
conveyed; the words may be ambiguous; they may be words
capable of being differently understood by different
persons. How are the courts to set about the task of
resolving difficulties of interpretation of the laws? The
foremost task of a court, as we conceive it, in the
Interpretation of Statutes, 18 to find out the intention of
the legislature. Of course, where words are clear and
unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such
words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words must
have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, lt may
be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the
words plainly say. This is the real basis of the so called
golden rule of construction that where the words of statutes
are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. A
court should give effect to plain words, not because there
is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but
because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the
intention of the Legislature to other as well as judges.
Intention of the legislature and not the words is paramount.
Even where the words of statutes appear to be prima facie
clear and unambiguous it may some times be possible that the
plain meaning of the worts does not convey and may even
defeat the intention of the legislature; in such cases there
is no reason why the true intention of the legislature,
if it can be determined, clearly by other means, should not
be given effect. Words are meant to serve and not to govern
and we are not to add the tyranny of words to the other
tyrannies of the world.
391
Parliamentary intention may be gathered from several
sources. First, of course, it must be gathered from the
statute itself, next from the preamble to the statute, next
from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, thereafter from
Parliamentary debates, reports of Committees and Commissions
which preceded the legislation and finally from all
legitimate and admissible sources from where there may be
light. Regard must be had to legislative history too.
Once Parliamentary intention is ascertained and the
object and purpose of the legislation is known, it then
becomes the duty of the court to give the statute a
purposeful or a functional interpretation. this is what is
meant when, for example, it is said that measures aimed at
social amelioration should receive liberal or beneficent
construction. Again, the words of a statute may not be
designed to meet the several uncontemplated forensic
situations that may arise. The draftsman may have designed
his words to meet what Lord Simon of Glaisdale calls the
’primary situation’. It will then become necessary for the
court to impute an intention to Parliament in regard to
’secondary situations’. Such ’secondary intention’ may be
imputed in relation to a secondary situation so as to best
serve the same purpose as the primary statutory intention
does in relation to a primary situation.
So we see that the primary and foremost task of a court
in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascetained the
intention, the court must then strive to so interpret the
statute as to promote or advance the object and purpose of
the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the court
may even depart from the rule that plain words should be
interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be
no neek and mute submission to the plainness of the
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language. To avoid patent injustice, anamoly or absurdity or
to avoid invalidation of a law, the court would be well
justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of
construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose
of the enactment by supplementing, the written word if
necessary.
In an old English case, Hawkins v. Gathercole, 43
English Reports 1129, Turner, CJ., referred to two earlier
cases reported by Plowden. In the first case of Stradling v.
Morgan,
392
the Judges were reported to have said :
"That the Judges of the law in all times past have
so far pursued the intent of the makers of the
statutes, that they have expounded Acts which were
general in words to be but particular, where the
intent was particular ........ From which cases it
apears that the sages of the law heretofore have
construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in
some appearance; and those statutes which
comprehend all things in the letter, they have
expounded to extend but to somethings; and those
which generally prohibit all people from doing
such an act, they have interpreted to permit some
people to do it; and those which include every
person in the letter, they have adjudged to reach
to some persons only; which expositions have
always been founded upon the intent of the
Legislature, which they have collect ed, sometimes
by considering the cause and necessity of making
the Act, sometimes by comparing one part of the
Act with another, and sometimes by foreign
circumstances, so that they have ever been guided
by the intent of the Legislature, which they have
always taken according to the necessity of the
matter, and according to that which 18 consonant
to reason and good discretion.
Turner, CJ himself added,
"The passages to which I have referred have
selected only as containing the best summary with
which I acquainted of the law upon this subject In
determining the question before us, we have
therefore, to consider not merely the words of
this Act of Parliament, but the intent of the
Legislature, to be collected from the cause and
necessity of the Act being made, from a comparison
of its several parts, and from foreign (meaning
extraneous) circumstances so far as they can
justly be considered to throw light upon the
subject."
In a forthright pronouncement Goulding, J. said in
Comet Radio Vision & Services v. Farnell Trand Borg, [1971]
393
All E.R. 230.
"...The language of parliament though not to be
extended beyond its fair construction, is not to
be interpreted in so slavishly literal a way as to
stultify the manifest purpose of the legislature."
In Seaford Court Estates Limited v. Ashor [1949] 2 All
E.R. 155 Lord Denning, who referred to Plowden’s Reports
already mentioned by us, said :
"Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it
must be remembered that it is not within human
powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which
may arise, and, even if it were, it is not
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possible to provide for them in terms free from
all ambiguity..... A Judge cannot simply fold his
hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work
on the constructive task of finding the intention
of Parliament, and he must do this not only from
the language of the statute, but also from a
construction of the social conditions which gave
rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed
to remedy and then he must supplement the written
word so as to give force and life to the intention
of the legislature. Put into homely metaphor, it
is this: A judge should ask himself the question
how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come
across this ruck in the contexture of it they
would have straightened it out? He must then do
what they would have done. A judge should not
alter the material of which the Act is woven, but
he can and should iron out the creases."
In Rughy Joint Water Board v. Foottit [1972] 1 A.E.R.
1057, Lord Simon of Glaisdale said :
"The task of the courts is to ascertain what was
the intention of Parliament, actual or to be
imputed, in relation to the facts as found by the
court....But on scrutiny of a statutory provision,
it will generally appear that a given situation
was within the direct contemplation of the
draftsman as
394
the situation calling for statutory regulation:
this may be called the primary situation. As to
this, Parliament will certainly have manifested an
intention -’The Primary Statutory Intention’. But
situations other than the primary situation may
present themselves for judicial decisions
secondary situations. As regards these secondary
situations, it may seem likely in some cases that
the draftsman had them in contemplation; in others
not. Where it seems likely that a secondary
situation was not within the draftsman’s
contemplation, it will be necessary for the court
to impute an intention to Parliament in the way I
have described, that is, to determine what would
have been this statutory intention if the
secondary situation had been within Parliamentary
contemplation (a secondary intention)."
It may not be out of place to refer here to what Harold
Laski said in his Report of the Committee on Ministers’
powers:
"The present methods of statutory interpretation
make the task of considering the relationship of
statutes, especially in the realm of great social
experiments, to the social welfare they are intend
ed to promote one in which the end involved may
become unduly narrowed, either by reason of the
unconscious assumptions of the Judge or because he
is observing the principles of interpretation
devised to suit interests we are no longer
concerned to protect in the same degree as
formerly...The method of interpretation should be
less analytical and more functional in character;
it should seek to discover the effect of the
legislative precept in action so as to give full
weight to the social value it is intended to
secure."
In 1981, the Australian Parliament added a new section
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15AA(1) to the Acts Interpretation Act, 1901, requiring that
in statutory interpretation "A construction that would
promote the purpose or object" of an Act (even if not
expressed in the Act), be preferred to one that would not
promote that purpose
395
or object. Julius Stone in his ’Precedent And Law - Dynamics
of Common Law Growth’ also refers to this provision.
Our own court has generally taken the view that
ascertainment of legislative intent is a basic rule of
statutory construction and that a rule of construction
should be preferred which advances the purpose and object of
a legislation and that though a construction, according to
plain language, should ordinarily be adopted, such a
construction should not be adopted where it leads to
anomalies, injustices or absurdities, vide K.P. Varghese v.
I.T.O. [1981] 4 S.C.C.173, State Bank of Travsncore v. Mohd.
M.Khan [1981] 4 S.C.C.82, Som Prakash Rathi v. Union of
India [1981] 1 S.C.C. 449, Ravula Subba Rao v. C.I.T. [1956]
S.C.R. 577, Govindlal v. Market Committee [1976] 1 S.C.R.
482 & Babaji Kondaji v. Nasik Merchants Coop. Bank [1984] 2
S.C.C. 50.
Bearing these broad principles in mind if we now turn
to the Delhi Rent Control Act, it is at once apparent that
the Act is primarily devised to prevent unreasonable
eviction of the tenants and sub-tenants from demised
premises and unreasonable enhancement of rent. In
particular, the purpose of sections 17 and 18 is clearly to
protect the sub-tenants from eviction where a landlord
obtains a decree for eviction against the principal tenant.
In an action for eviction by a landlord against the
principal tenant, the sub-tenant has no defence of his own
under the ordinary law, even if he has been inducted into
possession with the consent of the landlord. He has to go
with the tenant. He can claim no right to sit in the
premises apart and distinct from the right of the tenant.
Showing an awareness of the problems of sub-tenants, the
legislature enacted sections 17 and 18 for their protection.
The protection was afforded to sub-tenants who had been
inducted into possession with the consent of the landlord.
While so extending a protecting hand to the sub-tenants who
had genuinely obtained the consent of the landlord alone
should be entitled to that protection. The legislature
wanted to prevent persons who had somehow managed to get
into possession, having been inducted into such possession
by the tenant or otherwise from putting forward baseless
claims that they were inducted into possession with the
consent of the landlord. So the legislature while offering
protection to a sub-tenant who has been inducted into
possession by a landlord
396
has limited the protection to the sub-tenant who can
establish the consent of the landlord by documentary
evidence to which the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant
who can establish the consent of the landlord by documentary
evidence to which the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant
are parties. So it is provided that the previous consent of
the landlord has to be in writing and that a notice in the
prescribed manner has to be given to the landlord by the
tenant or the sub-tenant.
The essence of the requirement, therefore, is that the
consent of the landlord to the sub-tenancy and the notice of
the creation of the sub-tenancy have to be evidenced by
writing.
The writing is to be such as to indicate clearly the
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consent of the landlord to the creation of a sub-tenancy and
his knowledge of the particular sub-tenancy after its
creation.
The writing relating to the consent and the writing
relation to the knowledge (notice) may be by different
documents or they may telescope into the same document.
Where, as in the present case, the agreement or the letter
of the sub-tenancy in respect of the demised premises is
attested by the landlord himself, there can be no question
that the landlord has given his previous consent and that he
has notice in writing of the sub-tenancy in respect of the
particular premises. The requirements of sec. 17 and 18 both
as regards to his consent and the notice to him are
satisfied. There is no magical form in which the consent is
to be given nor any charmed form in which the notice is to
be sent. As we said, the essence of the matter is that the
consent to the sub-tenancy and the notice of the sub-tenancy
in respect of the premises must be evidenced by writing
signed by the landlord and the tenant or the sub-tenant. In
this view of the matter, the appellant in the present case
is clearly entitled to the protection of secs. 17 and 18 of
the Delhi Rent Control Act and he cannot, therefore, be
evicted in execution of the decree obtained by Balbir Nath
Mathur against Om Prakash & Company. We do not consider it
necessary to embark into a discussion of the two cases cited
before us Jagan Nath v. Abdul Aziz A.I.R. 1973 Delhi p.9 and
Murari Ial v. Abdul Ghafar I.L.R. 1974 1 Delhi 45.
During the pendency of the appeal in this court, an
order was made to the effect that from January 1, 1985
onwards, the appellant should deposit a sum of Rs.3,600
every month out of which the respondent would be entitled to
draw out a sum of Rs.1,800 only. On behalf of the
appellants, it was also
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undertaken that the suit filed by them against the
respondents for fixation of fair rent would be withdrawn by
them. We are informed that the suit has not yet been
withdrawn. We declare that the suit filed by the appellant
for the fixation of fair rent shall stand dismissed as
withdrawn. We further direct that with effect from January
1, 1985 onwards, the rent for the premises shall be Rs.3,600
per month and it will be so paid and adjusted. The amount
now in deposit may be drawn out by the respondents. The
appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above. There will
be no order as to costs.
KHALID, J. I have gone through the Judgment prepared by
my learned brother. I agree with the conclusion that the
appeal has to be allowed.
We have before us two parties, both affluent. No tears
need be shed either for the one or the other. The tenant
before us, or to be precise the sub-tenant, is a firm which
does not deserve any sympathy from us and that for an
excellant reason. They had given an undertaking before this
Court that they would withdraw the suit filed by them for
fixation of fair rent. This undertaking they did not respect
till now, obviously with the oblique motive of compelling
the landlord to get the rent reduced and at the same time
walk away with an order from this Court avoiding eviction.
Left to myself, I would have declined relief to the
appellants or at least directed them to pay a sum of
Rs.5,000 every month as rent. However, in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case, where the conduct of the
landlord is anything but wholesome, I agree with my learned
brother in the order passed by him allowing the appeal. But,
I would like to make my position clear regarding the scope
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and purpose of section 17 and 18 of the Act.
The normal rule is that all rights created by a tenant
disappear along with the disappearance of his tenancy unless
there are special satisfactory safeguards for the sub-
tenants. A sub-tenant has no independent existence de-hors
the tenant who inducted him into possession. In the Act
before us a subtenant is given a special right, not
available to him under the general law, but that right is
circumscribed by specific conditions laid down in section
17. We have chosen to rescue the appellants before us only
because of the hide and seek
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conduct displayed by the so-called tenant and the so-called
land-lord in this case. The facts speak for themselves. Even
a man who runs can see that the so-called tenant in this
case is the alter ego of the so-called land-lord. There is a
total identification between the two. It is their attempt to
over reach the appellants by dubious methods that has, in
fact, imperilled their case, and it is for this reason that
the appellants get relief from us, even though strict
adherence to the conditions imposed under section 17 is
absent.
In normal case a sub-tenant under the Act can get
relief under the provision of the Act only if he satisfies
the twin conditions laid down in section 17, viz., that
there must be the previous consent in writing by the land-
lord, of the creation of the sub-tenancy and a notice in the
prescribed manner by the sub-tenant of the creation of the
sub-tenancy to the land-lord within one month of the date of
such creation.
It is only when these two conditions are satisfied that
the consequences mentioned in section 18(1) will follow. I
should not, therefore, be understood to hold the view that,
as a general rule, in all cases where the sub-tenant some-
how secures the signature of the land-lord in some
communication relating to tenancy, a consent in writing
satisfying the requirements of the section is to be assumed.
In this case, Messrs Om Prakash & Company and Balbir Nath
Mathur have been hand in gloves with one another to defeat
the appellants. It is the attestation by Balbir Nath Mathur
on behalf of Messrs Om Prakash & Company in the letter dated
June 10, 1975, that has found favour with us to assume
consent in writing in the peculiar facts of the case. This,
according to me, is an exceptional case with facts peculiar
to its own. Normally, section 17 should be strictly complied
with, for the sub-tenant to get the benefit under section
18.
A.P.J. Appeal allowed.
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