Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10529 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.11696 OF 2007)
SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS & ANR. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
RAVI NATH MISRA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.
1. Leave granted.
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2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and
th
Order dated 7 May, 2007 of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, Civil Side in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.47201 of
2002.
3. The question for consideration is whether Section 12(3) of the
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short “the Act”) providing for ‘deemed
vacancy’ is applicable to a situation where the tenant or a member
of his family builds, acquires or otherwise gets a vacant building in
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the area concerned after commencement of the tenancy but prior to
application of the Act to the tenancy in question.
4. Brief reference to facts giving rise to the question is necessary.
The accommodation in question was let out for residential purpose
st
w.e.f. 1 June, 1981 and was assessed for house tax for the first time
st
on 1 October, 1983. Under Section 2(2) of the Act, the Act which
th
otherwise came into force on 15 July, 1972, was not applicable to
the building during ten years from the date on which its construction
was completed. The construction is deemed to be completed, inter
alia, on the date on which the first assessment of letting value is
made by the local authority concerned, which in the present case
st
was 1 October, 1983. Thus, the Act became applicable to the
th
accommodation in question in the year 1983. On 7 June, 1987, the
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tenant purchased another residential house bearing number 198 at
Safipur-II, Kanpur Nagar.
5. The City Magistrate, Kanpur, in his capacity as Rent Controller,
th
vide Order dated 5 September, 2002, declared the premises in
question to be vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act on account of
purchase of residential house by the wife of the tenant in the year
1987. The tenant filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.47201 of
2002 against the Order of the Rent Controller declaring the premises
th
in question to be vacant and also the subsequent order dated 30
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September, 2002 releasing the accommodation in favour of the
landlord under Section 16 of the Act. The High Court accepted the
petition holding that no vacancy can be declared if the tenant or his
family member purchased the house before the Act became
applicable. Reliance was placed on a Five-Judge Full Bench of the
High Court in Mangi Lal vs. Additional District Judge &
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others. . It is against the said Order that the present appeal has
been preferred.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. The Act provides for the regulation of letting and rent and the
eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in
urban areas and for matters connected therewith. Reference to all
the provisions of the Act may not be necessary for adjudication of
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the issue involved, except to Section 12 which provides for deemed
vacancy of a building in certain cases. Section 12(3) reads as
follows :
“12(1) ………….
(2) …………..
(3) In the case of a residential building,
if the tenant or any member of his family
builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant
state or gets vacated a residential building
in the same city, municipality, notified area
or town area in which the building under
tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to
1 (1980) Allahabad Rent Cases, 55
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have ceased to occupy the building under
his tenancy:
Provided that if the tenant or any member
of his family had built any such residential
building before the date of commencement
of this Act, then such tenant shall be
deemed to have ceased to occupy the
building under his tenancy upon the
expiration of a period of one year from the
said date.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-
section--
(a) a person shall be deemed to have
otherwise acquired a building, if he is
occupying a public building for residential
purposes as a tenant, allottee or licensee;
(b) the expression "any member of family",
in relation to a tenant, shall not include a
person who has neither been normally
residing with nor is wholly dependent on
such tenant.”
8. Learned counsel for the appellant-landlord submits that under
the scheme of the Act, the above provision should be interpreted to
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mean that a tenant who has already acquired another residential
building in the same city, is not entitled to protection against
eviction even if such acquisition is before commencement or
applicability of the Act, as the object of the Act is to protect a needy
person and not a person who has already acquired another building.
No doubt the expression “ builds or otherwise acquires in a
vacant state or gets vacated ” may give an impression that the
provision is applicable in respect of acquisition after the Act
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becomes applicable, the context and the scheme of the Act clearly
indicate that any acquisition of alternative accommodation by the
tenant after commencement of the tenancy is covered by the
provision This becomes clear when reference is made to the proviso
which purports to be more beneficial to the tenant in giving extra
protection to the tenancy for one year from the date of
commencement of the Act. The proviso clearly refers to a situation
where the tenant had built the alternative accommodation before
the commencement of the Act. The scope of proviso is always
narrower than the main provision. He submitted that the Full Bench
judgment has been wrongly relied upon by the High Court for the
contrary view and if so read, the same does not lay down correct
law. Reference has also been made to Judgments of this Court in
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Goppumal vs. Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarakadheeshji &
2
another and Gajanan Dattatraya vs. Sherbanu Hasang Patel
3
& others which have been referred to in the Full Bench Judgment.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant opposed the above
submission. According to him, on a plain reading, Section 12(3) can
apply only if acquisition of alternative premises by the tenant is
after the Act becomes applicable. In the present case, the Act
became applicable only in the year 1993 and prior thereto, by virtue
2 (1969) 1 SCC 792
3 (1975) 2 SCC 668
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of Section 2(2), the building was exempted from the operation of the
Act. He, thus, supports the view taken by the High Court.
10. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions.
11. The object of rent law is to balance the competing claims of
the landlord on the one hand to recover possession of building let
out to the tenant and of the tenant to be protected against arbitrary
increase of rent or arbitrary eviction, when there is acute shortage
of accommodation. Though, it is for the legislature to resolve such
competing claims in terms of statutory provisions, while interpreting
the provisions the object of the Act has to be kept in view by the
Court. Unless otherwise provided, a tenant who has already
acquired alternative accommodation is not intended to be protected
by the Rent Act.
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12. In Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal , this Court
observed :
“5. It will be useful to state the principles
relevant for interpretation of a provision
contained in a rent control law like the one
with which we are dealing. The spurt of
provincial rent control legislations is a
necessary consequence of population
explosion. In Prabhakaran Nair v. State of
T.N. [(1987) 4 SCC 238] the Court noticed
craving for a home — a natural human
instinct, intensified by post-war migration of
human beings en bloc place to place, the
partition
of the country and uprooting of the
people from their hearth and home as vital
4 (2002) 5 SCC 397
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factors leading to acute housing shortage
persuading the legislatures to act and enact
rent control laws. The Court emphasized the
need of making the landlord and tenant
laws rational, humane, certain and capable
of being quickly implemented. Benefit of
society at large needs an equalistic balance
being maintained between apparently
conflicting interests of the owners of the
property and the tenant by inducing and
encouraging the landlords to part with
available accommodation for reasonable
length of time to accommodate tenants
without unreasonably restricting their right
to have the property being restored to
them, more so, when they genuinely require
it. Such limited safeguarding of landlords’
interest ensures a boost to construction
activity which in turn results in availability
of more houses to accommodate more
human souls with a roof on their heads.
Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as His Lordship then
was, articulated the empty truism in such
words as have become an oft-quoted
quotation (SCC p. 262, para 36)—
“Tenants are in all cases not the weaker
sections. There are those who are weak
both among the landlords as well as the
tenants.”
6. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of
Maharashtra [ (1998) 2 SCC 1] this Court
emphasized the need of social legislations
like the Rent Control Act striking a balance
between rival interests so as to be just to
law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one
and give a disproportionate benefit or
protection to another section of the
society.” (SCC p. 22, para 29) While the
shortage of accommodation makes it
necessary to protect the tenants to save
them from exploitation but at the same time
the need to protect tenants is coupled with
an obligation to ensure that the tenants are
not conferred with a benefit
disproportionately larger than the one
needed. Socially progressive legislation
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must have a holistic perception and not a
short-sighted parochial approach. Power to
legislate socially progressive legislations is
coupled with a responsibility to avoid
arbitrariness and unreasonability. A
legislation impregnated with tendency to
give undue preference to one section, at the
cost of constraints by placing shackles on
the other section, not only entails
miscarriage of justice but may also result in
constitutional invalidity.
7. In Arjun Khiamal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C.
Tuliani [(1989) 4 SCC 612] this Court
dealing with rent control legislation
observed that provisions contained in such
legislations are capable of being
categorized into two: those beneficial to the
tenants and those beneficial to the landlord.
As to a legislative provision beneficial to the
landlord, an assertion that even with regard
to such provision an effort should be made
to interpret it in favour of the tenant, is a
negation of the very principle of
interpretation of a beneficial legislation.
8. The need for reasonable interpretation of
rent control legislations was emphasized by
this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad
Khan. [(1979) 1 SCC 273] Speaking in the
context of reasonable requirement of
landlord as a ground for eviction,
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the Court
guarded against any artificial extension
entailing stretching or straining of language
so as to make it impossible or extremely
difficult for the landlord to get a decree for
eviction. The Court warned that such a
course would defeat the very purpose of the
Act which affords the facility of eviction of
the tenant to the landlord on certain
specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v.
Lajwanti [(1980) 1 SCC 290] this Court has
observed, while the rent control legislation
has given a number of facilities to the
tenants, it should not be construed so as to
destroy the limited relief which it seeks to
give to the landlord also. For instance, one
of the grounds for eviction which is
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contained in almost all the Rent Control
Acts in the country is the question of
landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The
concept of bona fide necessity should be
meaningfully construed so as to make the
relief granted to the landlord real and
practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr
Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]
the Court has held that the concept of bona
fide need or genuine requirement needs a
practical approach instructed by the
realities of life. An approach either too
liberal or too conservative or pedantic must
be guarded against.
9. The rent control legislations are heavily
loaded in favour of the tenants treating
them as weaker sections of the society
requiring legislative protection against
exploitation and unscrupulous devices of
greedy landlords. The legislative intent has
to be respected by the courts while
interpreting the laws. But it is being
uncharitable to legislatures if they are
attributed with an intention that they lean
only in favour of the tenants and while
being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of
being unfair to the landlords. The legislature
is fair to the tenants and to the landlords —
both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable
and balanced approach while interpreting
rent control legislations starting with an
assumption that an equal treatment has
been meted out to both the sections of the
society. In spite of the overall balance tilting
in favour of the tenants, while interpreting
such of the provisions as take care of the
interest of the landlord the court should not
hesitate in leaning in favour of the
landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in
rent control legislations to take care of
those situations where the landlords too are
weak and feeble and feel humble.”
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13. In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance &
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Investment Co. Ltd. & others , it was observed :
“33. Interpretation must depend on the text
and the context. They are the bases of
interpretation. One may well say if the text
is the texture, context is what gives the
colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are
important. That interpretation is best which
makes the textual interpretation match the
contextual. A statute is best interpreted
when we know why it was enacted. With
this knowledge, the statute must be read,
first as a whole and then section by section,
clause by clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word. If a statute is looked at, in
the context of its enactment, with the
glasses of the statute-maker, provided by
such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take colour
and appear different than when the statute
is looked at without the glasses provided by
the context. With these glasses we must
look at the Act as a whole and discover
what each section, each clause, each
phrase and each word is meant and
designed to say as to fit into the scheme of
the entire Act. No part of a statute and no
word of a statute can be construed in
isolation. Statutes have to be construed so
that every word has a place and everything
is in its place. It is by looking at the
definition as a whole in the setting of the
entire Act and by reference to what
preceded the enactment and the reasons
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for
it that the Court construed the expression
“Prize Chit” in Srinivasa and we find no
reason to depart from the Court’s
construction.”
14. The Full Bench of the High Court in Mangi Lal (supra), rightly
held that the grammar cannot control the interpretation of the
provision which has to be read in the context. It will be appropriate
5 (1987) 1 SCC 424
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to reproduce relevant part of the said Judgment which is as follows :
“43. The interpretation canvassed on behalf
of the landlord is only grammatical and so
ultra-legalistic. It is what is called the literal
approach. In Kammins v. Zenith Investments
Ltd. (1971) AC 850 Lord Diplock drew a
clear distinction between the 'literal
approach' and the 'purposive approach',
and used the purposive approach to solve
the question.
44. Recently, the House of Lords considered
the rules of interpretation of statutes in
Stock v. Frank Jones Tiption Ltd. (1978) 1
WLR 231. In that case Viscount Dilhorne
said:
“It is now fashionable to talk of a purposive
construction of a statute, but it has been
recognised since the 17th century that it is
the task of the judiciary in interpreting an
Act to seek to interpret it 'according to the
intent of them that made it' (Coke 4 Inst
33).”
The better approach is the purposive
approach, namely, to seek the legislative
intent and not be led away by a strict literal
construction of the words.
45. Lord Denning put it very pithily in
Seaford Count Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2
KB 281 as under:
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“We do not sit here to pull the language of
Parliament and of Ministers to pieces and
make nonsense of it. That is an easy thing
to do, and it is a thing to which Lawyers are
too often prone. We sit here to find out the
intention of Parliament and of Ministers and
carry out, and we do this better by filling in
the gaps and making sense of the
enactment than by opening it up to
destructive analysis.”
The Court’s function is to clarify the
language so as to satisfy the legislative
intent.
46. The word ‘has’ has been used in
the Act in many other provision, e.g.,
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section 20 permits a suit for ejectment
where the tenant ‘has sublet’. There the
word ‘has’ may have a different
significance, because of, inter-alia, its
legislative history.”
15. Thus, in our view, mere use of present tense in Section 12(3) is
not intended to limit the applicability of the provision to acquisition
of accommodation by the tenant after the Rent Act becomes
applicable. In the context, the provision also covers the situation
where the tenant has acquired alternative accommodation before
the applicability of the Rent Act. This view is further supported by
the language of the proviso. The proviso clearly shows that the
provision in question is not intended to be limited to a situation
where alternative accommodation is acquired after the Act
commences or becomes operative. The provision also covers a
situation where the alternative accommodation is acquired prior to
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that. The scope of proviso is narrower than the main provision.
16. In S. Sundaram Pillai & others vs. V.R.
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Pattabiraman & others , it was observed:
“27. The next question that arises for
consideration is as to what is the scope of a
proviso and what is the ambit of an
Explanation either to a proviso or to any
other statutory provision. We shall first take
up the question of the nature, scope and
extent of a proviso. The well established
rule of interpretation of a proviso is that a
proviso may have three separate functions.
6 (1985) 1 SCC 591
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Normally, a proviso is meant to be an
exception to something within the main
enactment or to qualify something enacted
therein which but for the proviso would be
within the purview of the enactment. In
other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart
from the main enactment nor can it be used
to nullify or set at naught the real object of
the main enactment.
28. Craies in his book Statute Law (7th Edn.)
while explaining the purpose and import of
a proviso states at p. 218 thus:
“The effect of an exception or qualifying
proviso, according to the ordinary rules of
construction, is to except out of the
preceding portion of the enactment, or to
qualify something enacted therein, which
but for the proviso would be within it.... The
natural presumption is that, but for the
proviso, the enacting part of the section
would have included the subject-matter of
the proviso.”
29. Odgers in Construction of Deeds and
Statutes (5th Edn.) while referring to the
scope of a proviso mentioned the following
ingredients:
“p. 317. Provisos —These are clauses of
exception or qualification in an Act,
excepting something out of, or qualifying
something in, the enactment which, but for
the proviso, would be within it.
p. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a
clause may exceptionally have the effect of
a substantive enactment.”
30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at
pages 294-295 has collected the following
principles in regard to a proviso:
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(a) When one finds a proviso to a section
the natural presumption is that, but for
the proviso, the enacting part of the
section would have included the subject-
matter of the proviso.
(b) A proviso must be construed with
reference to the preceding parts of the
clause to which it is appended.
(c) Where the proviso is directly
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repugnant to a section, the proviso shall
stand and be held a repeal of the section
as the proviso speaks the latter intention
of the makers.
(d) Where the section is doubtful, a
proviso may be used as a guide to its
interpretation: but when it is clear, a
proviso cannot imply the existence of
words of which there is no trace in the
section.
(e) The proviso is subordinate to the
main section.
(f) A proviso does not enlarge an
enactment except for compelling
reasons.
(g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is
inserted by way of abundant caution.
(h) A construction placed upon a proviso
which brings it into general harmony with
the terms of section should prevail.
(i) When a proviso is repugnant to the
enacting part, the proviso will not prevail
over the absolute terms of a later Act
directed to be read as supplemental to
the earlier one.
(j) A proviso may sometimes contain a
substantive provision.”
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17. We, thus, hold that the view taken by the High Court that
acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenant, prior to
enforcement of the Act, is not covered by Section 12(3) of the Act is
not correct in law. The Full Bench Judgment, to the extent it
supports the said view, also does not lay down correct law and will
stand overruled.
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18. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned
order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the
Rent Controller. No costs.
………………………………………J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
………………………………………J.
(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)
………………………………………J.
(R. BANUMATHI)
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 25, 2014
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