Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
M/S. SUWALAL ANANDILAL JAIN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX.BIHAR-II. RANCHI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/03/1997
BENCH:
SUJATA V. MANOHAR, K. VENKATASWAMI
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
K.Venkataswami J.
The question that has been referred to this Court under
Section 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called
"the Act") reads as follows :-
"Whether on the facts and
circumstances of the case, the
assessee’s claim to the benefit of
clause (b) of Section 40 of the
Income Tax Act. 1961 has been
rightly disallowed?".
The assessment year in question is 1976-77. The case of
the assessee firm was that M/s. Shanti Kumar Jain, Ashok
Kumar Jain, Raj Kumar Jain and Niranjan were partners in the
firm in their capacity as karta of respective HUF. They have
advanced monies to the assessee firm in their individual
capacity. The assessee firm in their individual investments
made in their respective individual capacity. It is the
further case of the assessee firm that it has maintained two
separate ledger accounts of the partners; one of individual
as loan creditor and another of Karta of HUF as partner in
the firm. The source of the money, according to the
assessee, quite separate. The assessee firm claimed that the
interest paid to them shall not be included while computing
the income chargeable under head "profits and gains of
business or profession". Notwithstanding such claims, the
Income Tax Officer applied Section 40(b) of the Act and
completed the assessment by Order dated 29.1.1978. The
result was that the interest paid to the partners in the
circumstance stated above was included under, the head
"profits and gains of business or profession".
On appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the
assessment was confirmed by an Appellate Order dated
27.8.1980. Still aggrieved, the assessee firm preferred
further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The
Tribunal relaying upon an unreported decision of the Patna
High Court in Tax Case No. 83-84 of 1971 in the case of M/s.
Makhan Lal Harnarayan vs. Commissioner of Income Tax. Bihar,
confirmed the view taken by the Income Tax Officer and
upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In view of
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the divergence of views among the High Court on the
application of Section 40(b) of the Act, the issue has been
referred to this Court.
We have heard counsel on both sides.
Under identical circumstance, this Court in M/s Brij
Mohan Das Laxman Das vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Amritsar (JT 1997 (1) SC 155) had occasion to consider an
identical issue. Jeevan Reddy J. Speaking for the Bench
after noticing the subsequent amendment to section 40 by
Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984 under which Explanation
(2) inter alia has been added, has observed as follows:-
In Gajanand Poonam Chand vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax (1984
174 I.T.R.346), the Rajasthan High
Court has taken a view that the
said Explanation is merely
declaratory in nature and that,
therefore, even for the assessment
years prior to April 1, 1985, the
position of law should be under
stood to be the same. In support of
this proposition, the High Court
relied upon the fact that
ordinarily the purpose of an
Explanation is to clarify that
which is already enacted and not to
introduce something new. The High
Court opined that the Explanation
was inserted by the Parliament with
a view to settle the controversy as
to the meaning and effect of the
said clause among the several High
Courts and that the Explanation
puts a seal of approval on the view
taken by the majority of the High
Courts. The High Court also
referred to the definition of
"person" in clause (31) of section
2. It pointed out that the
definition shows clearly that an
individual, a H.U.F. and a firm are
distinct persons/entities for the
purpose of the Income Tax Act. The
High Court, therefore, concluded
that since an individual and a
H.U.F. are two distinct entities
for the purpose of the Act. Clause
(b) of Section 40 has no
application where the interest is
paid to the partner on deposits
made by him with the firm in his
individual capacity where such
person is a partner not in his
individual capacity but as
representing a H.U.F. Sri G.C.
Sharma, learned counsel for the
appellant-assessee, strongly relies
upon this decision and commends it
for our acceptance. Learned counsel
points out that even before the
enactment of Taxation Laws
(Amendment) ACT, 1984 ( which
inserted Explanation 2 aforesaid),
a majority of the High Courts in
the country had taken the same view
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though a few High Courts in the
country had taken the same view
though a few High Courts have no
doubt taken a contrary view. Looked
at from any angle, sri sharma says,
the issue must be answered in
favour of the assessee.
Clause (b) of Section 40 is based
upon and is a resconginition of the
basic nature of relationship
between a firm and its partner. In
Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Chidambaram Pillai ( (1977) 106
I.T.R. 292), this Court observed:-
"Here the first thing that we must
grasp is that a firm is not a legal
person even though it has some
attributes of personality.
Partnership is a certain relation
between persons, the product of
agreement to share the profits of a
business. ’Firm’ is collective
noun, a compenditous expression to
designate an entity, not a person.
In Income-tax law, a firm is a unit
of assessment, by special
provisiors, but is not a full
person which leads t the next step
that since a contract of employment
requires two distinct persons viz,
the employer and the employee,
there cannot be a contract of the
service. in strict law, between a
firm and one of its partners. So
that any agreement for remuneration
of a partner for taking part in the
conduct of the business must be
regarded as portion of the profits
being made over as a reward for the
human capital brought in. Section
13 of the patnership Act brings
into focus this basis of
partnership business."
This Court also quoted with
approval the passage from Lingley
on the law of Partnership to the
effect: In point of law, a partner
may be the debtor or the creditor
of his co-partners, but he cannot
be either debtor or creditor of the
firm of which he is himself a
member, nor can be employed y his
firm, for a man cannot be his own
employer". The provisions in
Chapters III and IV of the
Partnership Act amply define and
delineate the duties, obligation
and rights of the partners vis-a-
vis the firm. The question yet
remains where an individual is a
partner in one capacity, e.g. as a
representative of another person,
can he have no other capacity vis-
a-vis the firm. To be more,
precise.does the above position of
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law preclude an idividual. Who is a
partner represeting a H.U.F. from
depositing his personal funds with
the patnership and receiving
interest thereon? Explanation 2
says in clear terms that there is
no such bar. This is the
legislative recognition of the
theory of different capacities an
individual may hold- no doubt
confined to clause (b) of Section
40. Once this is so, we see no
reason to hold that this theory of
different capacities is not valid
or available for the period
anterior to April 1, 1985.
According, we hold that even for
the period anteriror to April 1,
1985, any interest paid to a
partner, who is a partner
representing his H.U.F. on the
deposit of his personally
individual funds, does not fall
within the mischief of clause (b)
of Section 40. In this view of the
matter we agree with the view taken
by the Rajasthan High Court in
Gajanand Poonam chand that
Explanation 2 in the context of
clause (b) of Section 40 is
declarateory in nature. According,
we allow this appeal, set aside the
judgment of the High Court and
answer the question referred under
Section 256 in the affirmative,
i.e. in favour of the assessee and
against the Revenue".
In view of the above pronouncement of this Court. we do
not think that this question requires and further
elucidation. According the question is answered in favour of
the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order
as to costs.