SANJEEV KUMAR GOEL vs. NEETA AGGARWAL THRU LEGAL GUARDIAN/MOTHER & ANR.

Case Type: Criminal Misc Case

Date of Judgment: 29-07-2015

Preview image for SANJEEV KUMAR GOEL vs. NEETA AGGARWAL THRU LEGAL GUARDIAN/MOTHER & ANR.

Full Judgment Text


$~29
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Decision: July 29, 2015

+ CRL.M.C. 3008/2015
SANJEEV KUMAR GOEL ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Arvind Pandey, Advocate
versus

NEETA AGGARWAL THR. LEGAL GUARDIAN/ MOTHER &
ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Karan Singh, Additional
Public Prosecutor for respondent-
State with ASI Ravinder Singh
Mr. Dinesh Sabharwal, Advocate
with respondent No.1 in person
and her legal guardian/mother
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR

JUDGMENT
% (ORAL)
Quashing of FIR No.53/2014, under Sections 328/342 of IPC
registered at police station Crime Branch, Delhi is sought on the basis of
affidavit of Smt. Urmil Aggarwal , who is the legal guardian/mother of
respondent No.1- Neeta Aggarwal .
Notice.
Mr. Karan Singh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for
respondent-State accepts notice and Mr. Dinesh Sabharwal, Advocate,
accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.1, who submits that Smt. Urmil
Aggarwal, who is the mother of respondent No.1, has been appointed
Legal Guardian of respondent No.1 by the Family Court.
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent–State submits
CRL.M.C. 3008/2015 Page 1


that respondent No.1 as well as her Legal Guardian/Mother- Smt. Urmil
Aggarwal , present in the Court, has been identified to be the complainant
party of the FIR in question by their counsel as well as by ASI Ravinder
Singh on the basis of identity proof produced by them. Learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State further submits that the
investigation of this case is complete and no other Section is sought to be
added.
Smt. Urmil Aggarwal-Legal Guardian/Mother of respondent No.1
submits that the dispute between the parties and she has been duly
compensated to the tune of ` 45 lac out of which the balance amount of
` 15 lac has been received by her today by way of demand draft bearing
th
No. 226259 of 16 July, 2015 and that divorce by mutual consent has
nd
been already granted by the Family Court on 22 May, 2015 and now,
the misunderstanding, which led to registration of the FIR in question,
now stands cleared between the parties. Smt. Urmil Aggarwal-Legal
Guardian/Mother of respondent No.1 affirms the contents of her affidavit
th
of 20 July, 2015 supporting this petition and submits that now no
dispute with petitioner survives and so, the proceedings arising out of the
FIR in question be brought to an end.
In „Gian Singh Vs State of Punjab‟ (2012) 10 SCC 303, Apex
Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in cases
like the instant one, by observing as under:-
“Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise
between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the
immediate and prompt attention of a court which should
endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such
compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the
CRL.M.C. 3008/2015 Page 2


society or would promote savagery.
Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute
between the offender and the victim has been settled
although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as
in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be
an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that
the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace
is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor.”

The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a
recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 .
The pertinent observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh (Supra)
are as under:-
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High Court
would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and
quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement
with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in
those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties
have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on
that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is
filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
CRL.M.C. 3008/2015 Page 3


(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have
been committed under special statute like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes
should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire
disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote
and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the
accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to
be generally treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone. However, the High Court would
not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as
to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the
CRL.M.C. 3008/2015 Page 4


sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the
High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body,
nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of
injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding
factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High
Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility
of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement
and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case
it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be
swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is
going to result in harmony between them which may improve
their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at
this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-
sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the
charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the
evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after
prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
CRL.M.C. 3008/2015 Page 5


evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the
High Court should refrain from exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would
be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section
307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where
the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the
matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a ground to
accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has
already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is
proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already
recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and in view of
aforesaid affidavit of Smt. Urmil Aggarwal-Legal Guardian/Mother of
respondent No.1 and the fact that respondent No.1 has been duly
compensated, I find that continuance of proceedings arising out of the
FIR in question would be an exercise in futility as the misunderstanding,
which led to registration of the FIR, now stands cleared between the
parties.
Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.53/2014, under
Sections 328/342 of IPC registered at police station Crime Branch, Delhi
and the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed qua petitioner.
This petition is accordingly disposed of.

(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
JULY 29, 2015
s
CRL.M.C. 3008/2015 Page 6