Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
M. R. BALAJI AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MYSORE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
28/09/1962
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION:
1963 AIR 649 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 439
CITATOR INFO :
D 1964 SC 179 (13,14,17,18,30)
R 1964 SC1823 (14)
R 1967 SC1283 (6)
F 1968 SC 507 (6)
R 1968 SC1012 (7)
F 1968 SC1379 (316)
MV 1971 SC 530 (271)
R 1971 SC1762 (24)
RF 1971 SC2206 (4)
R 1971 SC2303 (21,22,23)
E 1972 SC1375 (63,75,80,83,86,88,98,101)
F 1973 SC 930 (22,23,24,32)
R 1974 SC 532 (14)
RF 1975 SC 563 (14,16,23,28,34)
D 1976 SC 490 (26,68,126,184)
R 1981 SC 298 (28,88,89,110,131,132)
R 1981 SC 588 (13)
O 1985 SC1495 (9,10,13,24,51,59,63,64,95,99,
RF 1988 SC 959 (2,8,10)
F 1989 SC 903 (26)
RF 1992 SC 1 (91)
ACT:
Admission into Colleges-Reservation of seats for socially
and educationally backward classes and Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes-Scope of-Directive Principles-Supreme Court
not to fix percentage-Constitution of India, Arts. 15 (4),
16 (4), 29 (2), 46, 340.
HEADNOTE:
On July 26, 1958, the State of Mysore issued an order that
all the communities excepting the Brahmin community, fell
within the definition of educationally and socially backward
classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and 75% of
seats in educational institutions were reserved for them.
Similar orders reserving seats were issued on May 14, 1959,
July 22,
440
1959, June 9, 1960 and July 10, 196 1. The percentage of
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seats reversed varied in various orders, but all of them.
were set aside when challenged.
On July 31, 1962, the State of Mysore passed another order
which superseded all previous orders made by the State under
Art. 15 (4) for reservation of seats. Under that order, the
backward classes were divided into two categories, backward
classes and more backward classes. The order reserved 68%
of the scats in the engineering and medical colleges and
other technical institutions for the educationally and
socially backward classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, and left only 32 per cent seats for the merit pool.
The order was challenged by 23 petitioners by a writ
petition under Art. 32. The petitioners contended that but
for the reservations made by the impugned order, they would
have been entitled to admission in the respective colleges
for which they had applied. They contended that the
classification made under the order was irrational and the
reservation of 68% scats made by the order was a fraud on
Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution.
Held, that the impugned order was a fraud on the consti-
tutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15(4) and the
same be quashed. The impugned order categorises the
backward classes on the sole basis of caste which is not
permitted by Art. 15 (4). The reservation of 68% scats is
inconsistent with the concept of the special provision
authorised by Art. 15 (4). However, this Court would not
attempt to lay down definitely and in an inflexible manner
as to what should be the proper
percentage for reservation.
Reservation should and must be adopted to advance the
prospects of weaker sections of society, but while doing so,
care should be taken not to exclude admission to higher
educational centres of deserving and qualified candidates of
other communities. Reservations under Arts. 15 (4) and 16
(4) must be within reasonable limits. The interests of
weaker sections of society, which are a first charge on the
States and the Centre, have to be adjusted with the
interests of the community as a whole. Speaking generally
and in a broad way, a special provision should be less than
50%. The actual percentage must depend upon the relevant
prevailing circumstances in each case.
The object of Art. 15 (4) is to advance the interests of the
society as a whole by looking after the interests of the
weaker elements in society. If a provision under Art. 15
(4) ignores the interests of society, that is clearly
outside the scope of
441
Art. 15 (4). it is extremely unreasonable to assume that in
enacting Art. 15 (4), Parliament intended to provide that
where the advancement of the backward classes or the
Scheduled Castes and Tribes were concerned, the fundamental
right.% of the citizens constituting the rest of the society
were to be completely and absolutely ignored.
Considerations of national interest and the interests of the
community and the society as a whole have already to be kept
in mind.
Article 15 was amended and Art. 15 (4) was added in view of
the judgment of this Court in the State of Madras v. Smt.
Champakam Dorairajan and The State of Madras v. C. R.
Srinivasan [1951] S. C. R. 525. Article 15 (4) is a proviso
or an exception to Arts. 15 (1) and 29 (2). If an order is
justified by the provisions of Art. 15 (4), its validity
cannot be questioned on the ground that it violates Art. 15
(4) or Art. 29 (2).
It is true that the Constitution contemplates the appoint-
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ment of a commission whose report and recommendations can be
of assistance to the authorities concerned for taking
adequate steps for the advancement of backward classes, but
this does not mean that the appointment of the commission
and the subsequent steps that would follow it are a
condition precedent to any action being taken under Art. 15
(4). The special provisions contemplated under Art. 15 (4)
can be made by the Union or the States by an executive
order. It cannot be said that the President alone can make
special provision for the advancement of the backward
classes.
Article 15 (4) authorises the State to make special pro-
vision for the advancement of socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens as distinguished from the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Some backward
classes may, by presidential order, be included in Scheduled
Castes and Tribes, and in that sense the backward classes
for whose improvement provision is made in Art. 15 (4) are
comparable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The backwardness under Art. 15 (4) must be social and
educational. It is not either social or educational, but it
is both social and educational. Though caste in relation to
Hindus may be a relevant factor to consider in determining
the social backwardness of groups or classes of citizens, it
cannot be made the sole or dominant test. There are certain
sections of Indian society such as Christians, Jains,
Muslims, etc., who do not believe in caste system, and the
test of caste does not apply to them. Moreover, social
backwardness is in the Ultimate analysis the result of
poverty to a very large extent.
442
The classes of citizens who are deplorably poor
automatically socially backward. Moreover, the occupation
of citizens and the place of their habitation also result in
social backwardness. The problem of determining who are
socially backward classes, is undoubtedly very complex, but
the classification of socially backward citizens on the
basis of their castes alone is not permissible under Art. 15
(4).
In determining the educational backwardness of a class of
citizens, the literacy test supplied by the Census Reports
is not adequate. It is doubtful if the test of the average
of the student population in the last three high school
classes is appropriate in determining educational
backwardness. Io any case, the State is not justified in
including, in the list of backward classes castes or
communities whose average of student population per thousand
is slightly above or very near or just below the State
average. The legitimate view to take is that the classes of
citizens whose average is well or substantially below the
State average can be treated as educationally backward. It
is not for this Court to lay down any hard and fast rule in
this matter. It is the duty of the State to decide the
matter in a manner which is consistent with the requirements
of Art. 15 (4).
The division of backward classes into two categories of
backward classes and more backward classes is not warranted
by Art. 15 (4). Art. 15 (4) authorises special provision
being made for the really backward classes but by
introducing two categories, what is intended is to devise
measures for all classes of citizens who are less advanced
as compared to the most advanced classes in the State. That
is not the scope of Art. 15 (4).
The object of making a special provision for the advancement
of castes or communities is to carry out the Directive
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Principle enshrined in Art- 46. Unless the educational and
economic interests of the weaker sections of the people are
promoted quickly and liberally, the ideal of establishing
social and economic equality cannot be attained. Article 15
(4) authorises the State to take adequate steps to achieve
the object.
While making adequate reservation under Art. 16 (4), care
should be taken not to provide for unreasonable, excessive
or extravagant reservation because that would by eliminating
general competition in a large field and by creating
widespread dissatisfaction among the employees, materially
affect their efficiency. Like the special provision
improperly made under Art. 15 (4), reservation made under
Art. 16 (4) beyond the permissible and legitimate limits is
a fraud on the Constitution.
443
Ramakrishna Singh Rain Singh v. State of Mysore A. I. R.
1960 Mysore 338, S. A. Partha v. The State of Mysore, A. 1.
R. 1961 Mysore 220, The State of Madras v. Shrimathi
Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S. C. R. 525 and General
Manage?-, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 S. C. R.
586, referred to
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petitions Nos. 90 to 11 2 of
1962.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S. K. Venkataranya Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for
the petitioners.
G. Ethirajulu Naidu, Advocate General of the State of
Mysore, B. R. L. Iyengar, D. M. Chandrasekhar and P. D.
Menon, for the Respondent No. 1.
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the Interveners.
1962. September 28. ’The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Since 1958 the Stale of Mysore has been
endeavouring to make a special provision for the advancement
of the socially and educationally backward classes of
citizens in the State of Mysore under Article 15 (4) of the
Constitution, and every time when an order is passed in that
behalf, its validity has been challenged by writ
proceedings. Four previous orders passed in that behalf
were challenged by writ proceedings taken against the State
under Art. 226 in the High Court of Mysore. The present
petitions filed by the respective petitioners under Art. 32
dispute the validity of the last order passed by the State
of Mysore on the July 31, 1962, under Art. 15 (4).
Out of the twenty-three petitioners, six had applied for
admission to the Pre-professional Class in Medicine in the
Medical Colleges affiliated either
444
to the Mysore University or to the Karnatak University, and
seventeen had applied for admission to the First Year of the
5 Year integrated course leading to the Degree of B. E. in
the University of Mysore. According to the petitioners, but
for the reservation made by the impugned order, they would
have been entitled to the admission in the respective
colleges for which they had applied. As a result of the
reservation made by the said order, students who have
secured less percentage of marks have been admitted, but not
the petitioners. That, in brief, is the petitioners’
grievance and they urge that the impugned order which has
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denied them the facility of admission in the respective
colleges is void under Arts. 15 (1) and 29 (2) and should
not be enforced against them. Accordingly, the petitioners
pray that a writ of mandamus and/or any suitable writ or
direction should be issued against respondent No. 1, the
State of Mysore (hereinafter called the State), and the two
Selection Committees which have been impleaded as
respondents 2 & 3. The petitioners’ case is that the
impugned order which has been passed under Art. 15 (4) is
not valid because the basis adopted by the order in
specifying and enumerating the socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens in the State is unintelligible
and irrational, and the classification made on the said
basis is in consistent with and outside the provisions of
Art. 15 (4). It is also urged by them that the extent of
reservation prescribed by the said order is so unreasonable
and extravagant that the order, in law, is not justified by
Art. 15 (4) and, in substance, is a fraud on the power
conferred by the said Article on the State.
These allegations are denied by the State and it is urged on
its behalf that the classification made is both rational and
intelligible and the reservation prescribed by the order is
fully justified by Art. 15 (4). The contention that the
order is a colourable exercise
445
of the State’s power and amounts to a fraud on the
Constitution is disputed.
As we have just indicated, the impugned order was preceded
by four other orders and so, it is necessary to refer to the
said orders in their sequence to understand the background
of the dispute between the parties. On the 26th,July 1958,
the State issued an order that all the communities,
excepting the Brahmin community, fell within the definition
of educationally and socially Backward Classes and Scheduled
Castes and Tribes, and provided for the said communities and
tribes reservation of 75% of seats in educational
institutions. For the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes, the percentage of reservation was 15% and 3%
respectively. This percentage for the Scheduled Castes &
Tribes has been maintained in all the subsequent orders.
The order issued by the State on the 26th July, 1958, was
challenged before the Mysore High Court and it appears that
the State conceded before the High Court that there was a
drafting error in the Government Order and so, it did not
press its case that the said order was valid. In the
result, the writ petitions filed to challenge the validity
of the order succeeded and the impugned order was quashed.
In 1959, two separate orders were passed by the State on the
14th May and 22nd July respectively. By the first order,
all communities, excepting Brahmins, Baniyas and Kayasts
among the Hindus and Muslims, Christians and Jains, were
classified as socially and educationally Backward Classes.
It appears that 65% of the seats were reserved for these
socially and educationally Backward Classes and Scheduled
Castes and Tribes. These orders were challenged before the
Mysore High Court in the case of Ramakrishna Singh Ram Singh
v. State of Mysore(1). The High Court upheld the pleas
raised by the petitioners and quashed the impugned (1) A.I.R.
1960 Mysore 338.
(1) A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 338.
446
orders. In the result, the High Court directed that the
applications made by the petitioners for admission to
the respective colleges should be considered without
reference to the said orders, but subject to the reservation
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for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes made therein.
The State then appointed a Committee called the Mysore
Backward Classes Committee with Dr. R. Nagan Gowda as its
Chairman, to investigate the problem and advise the
Government as to the criteria which should be adopted in
determining the educationally and socially Backward Classes,
and the special provisions which should be made for their
advancement. The Committee made an interim report, and in-
the light of the said report, the State passed an order on
the 9th June, 1960 regulating admissions for that year into
the professional and technical colleges. Broadly stated,
the effect of this order was that 60% of the seats were left
open for what may be conveniently described as the ’merit
pool’ available to candidates according to their merits. 40%
were reserved for the ’reservation pool’, 22% of which were
reserved for the Backward Classes, 15% for the Scheduled
Castes and 3% for the Scheduled Tribes. This order was also
challenged before the Mysore High Court in S. A. Partha v.
The State of Mysore(1). It appears that, on the whole, the
High Court did not feel satisfied that the scheme of the
special provision made by the impugned order was invalid,
but it thought that the allotment of seats under the
provisions of the said order in favour of the other Backward
Classes in excess of 22% reserved for them otherwise than by
open competition amounted to an unreasonable restraint on
the fundamental right of other citizens and, therefore, was
invalid. Having reached this decision, the High Court indi-
cated the manner in which the reservation in favour of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other Backward
Classes should be worked out so as to
(1) A.I.R. 1961 Mysore 220,
447
avoid a successful challenge under Arts. 15 (1) and 29 (2).
Thereafter, the Nagan Gowda Committee made its report in
1961 and in the light of the said report and the
recommendations made therein, the State proceeded to make an
order under Art. 15 (4) on July 10, 1961. This Order begins
with the observation that the Nagan Gowda Committee has come
to the conclusion that in the present circumstances, the
only practicable method of classifying the Backward Classes
in the State is on the basis of castes and communities, and
it has specified the criteria which should be adopted for
determining the educational and social backwardness of the
communities. The two criteria specified in the report at,(,
then set out. The order then expresses the States’s
concurrence with the proposal made by the Committee that the
Backward Classes should be Sub divided into two cate-
gories--Backward and the More Backward, and it adopts the
test laid down by the report in that behalf. This approach,
according to the order, is realistic and practicable. On
the question is to the communities which should be treated
as backward, the State made some variations in the
recommendations made by the Committee. It held that
Lingayats and Bhunts who formed part of Vokkaligas, should
be treated as backward. In that connection, the State
noticed the fact that the recommendation of the Committee in
respect of the said two communities was not unanimous, and
it observed that a large percentage of Lingayat population
lives in rural areas and most of them are engaged in
agriculture and mannual labour and suffer from all the
consequences of illiteracy and poverty. In regard to the
Bhunts, the State thought that they could not be
distinguished from the rest of the Vokkaligas. The order
then adds that Satanis, Nayars and Zoreastrians whose
average according to the educational test prescribed by the
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Committee was as per thousand of population (whereas that of
Lingayats is
448
7. 1) need not be treated as backward. The order then
examines the question as to the percentage which should be
reserved, and it rejects the Committee’s recommendation of
reservation of 68% all-told on the ground that such a large
percentage of reservation would not be in the larger
interests of the State. That is why, according to the
order, 48% was fixed as the total reservation in favour of
the Backward Classes, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes together; that means, 30% was reserved for the
Backward Classes. Annexure I to this order gives a list of
81 Classes and 135 More Backward Classes.
On July 31, 1962, the State passed the impugned order which
supersedes all previous orders made by the State under Art.
15(4) for reservation of the seats in favour of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as well as the
Backward Classes. Under this order, the Backward Classes
are divided into two categories (1) Backward Classes and (2)
More Backward Classes. The’ effect of this order is that it
has fixed 50% as the quota for the reservation of seats for
Other Backward Classes; 28% out of this is reserved for
Backward Classes so-called and 22% for More Backward
Classes. The reservation of 15% and 3% for the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively continues to be the
same. The result of this order is that 68% of the seats
available for admission to the Engineering and Medical
Colleges and to other technical institutions specified in
the order passed on July 10, 1961 is reserved, and only 32%
is available to the merit pool. In other words, the percen-
tage of reservation to the extent of 68%, which, according
to the order of July 10, 1961, would have been against the
larger interests of the State, has, by the impugned order,
been accepted. The petitioners contend that the
classification made by this order is irrational and the
reservation of 68% made by it is a fraud on Article 15 (4).
449
The problem raised for our decision by the present petitions
involves the consideration of sociological, social and
economic factors, and so, before dealing with the
contentions raised by the parties before us, it is necessary
to set out briefly the material which has been adduced
before us. On January 29, 1953, the President appointed the
Backward Classes Commission by virtue of the power conferred
on him under Art. 340 (1) of the Constitution. This
Commission made its report on March 30, 1955. The
Commission was required "to investigate the conditions of
socially and educationally backward classes within the
territory of India and the difficulties under which they
labour, and to make recommendations as to the steps that
should be taken by the Union or any State to remove such
difficulties and to improve their condition." Art. 340 (1)].
According to the Commission, the relevant factors to
consider in classifying Backward Classes would be their
traditional occupation or profession; the percentage of
literacy or the general educational advancement made by
them; the estimated population of the community, and the
distribution of the various communities throughout the State
or their concentration in certain areas. The Commission
also thought that the social position which a community
occupies in the caste hierarchy would also have to be
considered, as well as its representation in Government
service or in the industrial sphere. (p. 47). According to
the Commission., the causes of educational backwardness
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amongst the educationally and socially backward communities
were:-
1. Traditional apathy for education on
account of social and environmental conditions
or occupational handicaps.
2. Poverty and lack of educational
institutions in rural areas.
3. Living in inaccessible areas.
450
4. Lack of adequate educational aids, such
as free studentships, scholarships and
monetary grants.
5. Lack of residential hostel facilities.
6. Unemployment among the educated which
acts as a damper on the desire of the members
to educate their- children; and
7. Defective educational system which does
not train students for appropriate occupations
and professions. (p.- 107).
The Committee realised that, in substance, the problem of
the Backward Classes is really the problem of Rural India
(p. 55). It appears that having considered several criteria
which may be relevant in determining which classes are
backward, the Committee ultimately decided to treat the
status of caste as an important factor in that behalf, and
it is on that basis that it proceeded to make a list of
Backward Communities which were specified in Volume 11 of
the Report.
Dealing with the problem of university education, the
Committee observed that the present rush of students to the
Universities should be prevented in the larger interests of
the country and that could be done only by training students
in various occupations and professions at the secondary
stage itself. But the Committee noticed that so long as
University Degree qualification continues to be a pre-
requisite to Government service, it was not easy to prevent
the rush at the doors of the Universities, and so, the
Committee proceeded to recommend that in all Science,
Engineering, Medicine, Agriculture, Veterinary and other
technical institutions, a reservation of 70% of the seats
should be made for qualified students of Backward Classes
till such time as accommodation can be provided for all
students eligible for admission. (pp. 119 & 125).
451
That, in brief, is the nature of the material available from
the Commission’s Report.
It is, however, significant that the Chairman of the
Commission who signed the Report confestet to a feeling of
grave dissatisfaction with the approach adopted in the
Report in determining the question as to which communities
could be regarded as backward under Art. 15(4). "My eyes
were however opened," says the Chairman in his covering
letter to the President, "to the dangers of suggesting
remedies on caste basis when I discovered that it is going
to have a most unhealthy effect on the Muslim and Christian
sections of the nation," and he added that the said
consciousness gave him a rude shock and drove him to the
conclusion that the remedies suggested by the Commission
were worse than the evil it was out to combat. According to
the Chairman, "if we eschew the principle of caste, it would
be possible to help the extremely poor and deserving from
all communities. Care, however, being taken to give
preference to those who come from the traditionally
neglected social classes." Even though the Chairman thus
expressed his distress in very strong language over the
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basis adopted by the Commission, he ultimately agreed to the
proposal of the Commission for the reservation of seats. for
Backward Classes to the extent of 70 percent.
The Report made by the Backward Classes Commission along
with the Chairman’s covering letter was considered by the
Central Government in due course. The Central Government
apparently did not feel satisfied about the approach adopted
by the Commission in determining as to who should be treated
as Backward Classes under Article 15(4). The Memorandum
issued by the Government of India on the Report of the
Commission points out that it cannot be denied that the
caste system is the greatest hindrance in the way of our
progress towards an egalitarian society, and the recognition
of’
452
the specified castes as backward may serve to maintain and
even perpetuate the existing distinctions on the basis of
castes. Besides, the memorandum goes on to add that some of
the tests applied by the Commission were more or less of an
individual character, and even if they were accepted, they
would encompass a large majority of the country’s
population. If the entire community, says the memorandum,
barring a few exceptions, has thus to be regarded as
backward, the really needy would be swamped by the multitude
and hardly receive any special attention or adequate
assistance, nor would such dispensation fulfill the
conditions laid down in Art. 340 of the Constitution. The
memorandum, therefore, emphasised that action on a
systematic and elaborate basis can be proceeded with only
after the necessary positive tests and criteria have been
laid down for determining which classes or sections are
really entitled to get special relief and assistance. To
that end, further investigation was obviously indicated.
Even so, instructions were issued by the Central Government
to the State Governments requesting them to render every
possible assistance and to give all reasonable facilities to
the people who come within the category of Backward Classes
in accordance with their existing lists and also to such
others who in their opinion deserve to be considered as
socially and educationally backward in the existing
circumstances.
On April 24, 1962, the Central Government wrote to the
Secretary of Education Department of the Government of
Mysore on the subject of reservation of seats under Article
15(4). In this communication it was observed that the
Central Government had considered the said question and was
of opinion that a uniform policy should be followed all over
the country at least in non-Government institutions. It was
then added that the All-India Council for Technical
Education had recommended that the reservation for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other
453
backward communities may be up to 25 % with marginal
adjustments not exceeding 10% in exceptional cases. The
Central Government, therefore, suggested that in all non-
Government institutions in the State, the reservations under
Art. 15 (4) should not in any case exceed 35%.
In this connection, it would be interesting to refer to the
report made by the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in 1959. In this Report, the Commissioner
refers to the pilot survey made by the Dy. Registrar
General of India at the request of the Government of India.
This survey was made with the help of material collected at
the time of 1951 Census with a view to find out whether
occupations could be adopted as suitable basis for deter-
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mining social and educational backwardness. A preliminary
analysis of the data collected indicated that it would be
possible to draw up a list of socially and educationally
backward occupations on the basis of:--
(a) any non-agricultural occupations in any
State in India in which 500% or more of the
persons belong to the Scheduled Castes or the
Scheduled Tribes; or
(b) any non-agricultural occupations in
which literacy percentage of the persons
depending thereon Is less than 500% of the
general literacy in the State.
In his Report, the Commissioner has adversely commented on
the classification made by the State in the impugned order.
It now remains to consider the report made by the Nagan
Gowda Committee appointed by the State. This Report
proceeds on the basis that higher social status has
generally been accorded on the basis of caste for centuries;
and so, it takes the view that the low social position of
any community is, therefore,
454
mainly due to the caste system. According to the Report,
there are ample reasons to conclude that social backwardness
is based mainly on racial, tribal, caste and denominational
differences, even though economic backwardness might have
contributed to social backwardness. It would thus be clear
that the Committee approached its problem of enumerating and
classifying the socially and educationally backward
communities on the basis that the social backwardness
depends substantially on. the caste to which the community
belongs, though it recognised that economic condition may be
a contributory factor. The classification made by the
Committee and the enumeration of the backward communities
which it adopted shows that the Committee virtually equated
the classes with the castes. According ’to the Committee,
the entire Lingayat community was socially forward, and that
all sections of Vokkaligas,’excluding Bhunts, were socially
backward. With regard to the Muslims, the majority of the
Committee agreed that the Muslim community as a whole should
be classified as socially backward. The Committee further
decided that amongst the backward communities two divisions
should be made (i) the Backward and (ii) the More Backward.
In making this distinction, the Committee applied one test.
It enquired: "Was the standard of education in the community
in question less than 500% of the State average? -If it was,
the community should be regarded as more backward; if it was
not, the community should be regarded as backward." As to
the extent of reservation in educational institutions, the
Committee’s recommendation was that 28% should be reserved
for backward and 22% for more backward. In other words, 50%
should be reserved for the whole group of backward
communities besides 150% and 3% which had already been
reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
respectively. That is how according to the Committee, 68%
was carved out by reservation for the betterment of the
Backward Classes and the Scheduled Castes an
455
Tribes’ It is on the basis of these recommendations that the
Government proceeded to make its impugned order.
Article 15(4) provides that nothing in this Article or in
clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making
any special provision for the advancement of any socially
and educationally backward Classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. This Article was
added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act ’1951. The
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object of this amendment was to bring Articles 15 and 29 in
line with Art. 16(4). It will be recalled that in the case
of The State of v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan(1) the
validity of the Government order issued by the Madras
Government fixing certain proportions in which students
seeking for admissions to the Engineering and Medical
Colleges in the State should be admitted, was challenged.
The said Government Order was on the face of it a communal
order fixing the admissions in the Stated proportion by
reference to the communities of. the candidates. This order
was struck down by the Madras High Court and the decision of
the Madras High Court was confirmed by this Court in appeal,
on the ground that the fundamental rights guaranteed by
Articles 15(1) and 29(2) were not controlled by any
exception, and that since there was no provision under Art.
15 corresponding to Art. 16(4), the impugned order could not
be sustained. It was directly as a result of this decision
that Art. 15 was amended and Art. 15(4) was added. Thus,
there is no doubt that Art. 15(4) has to be read as a
proviso or an exception to Articles 15(1) and 29(2). In
other words, if the impugned order is justified by the
provisions of Art. 15(4), its validity cannot be impeached
on the ground that it violates Art. 15(1) or Art. 29(2).
The fundamental rights guaranteed by the said two provisions
do not affect the validity of the special provision which it
is permissible to ’make under Art. 15(4).
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 525.
456
This position is not and cannot be in dispute. The
petitioners contend that the impugned order is invalid
because it is not justified by Art. 15(4).
The first argument which has been urged by Mr. Iyyangar
on behalf of the petitioners is that it is not competent to
the State to make an order under Art. 15(4) unless a
Commission has been appointed under Art. 340 (1) and a copy
of the report of the said Commission is laid before the
House of Parliament under Art. 340(3). The argument is that
Art. 340 provides for the appointment of a Commission to
investigate the conditions of Backward Classes. The
Commission so appointed is required to make a report
recommending what steps should be taken to improve the
conditions of the Backward Classes [Art. 340(2). When the
Report is received by the President, the President is
required to cause a copy-of the Report together with the
memorandum explaining the action taken thereon to be laid
before each House of Parliament [Art. 340(3)]. It is the
President who is to take action on the Report and then lay
it before the House of Parliament and it is only the
President who can, therefore, make special provision for the
advancement of the Backward Classes. That is the effect of
reading Articles 340 and 15(4) together. In our opinion,
this contention is misconceived. It is true that the
Constitution contemplated the appointment of a Commission
whose report and recommendations, it was thought, would ’Be
of assistance to the authorities concerned to take adequate
steps for the advancement of Backward Classes; but it would
be erroneous to assume that the appointment of the
Commission and the subsequent steps that were to follow it
constituted a condition precedent to any action being taken
under Art. 15(4). Besides, it would be noticed that Art.
340(1) provides that recommendations had to be made by the
Commission as to the steps that should be taken by the union
or any State, inter alia, to improve the condition of the
457
Backward Classes ; and that means that the recommendations
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were to be made which would be implemented in their
discretion by the Union and the State Government and not by
the President. Thus Art. 340(1) itself shows that it is the
Union or the State that has to take action in pursuance of
the recommendations made, and so, the argument that the
President alone has to act in this matter cannot be
accepted.
Then it is urged that even if special provision can be made
by the State under Art. 15(4), the said provision must be
made not by an executive order but. by legislation. This
argument. is equally misconceived. Under Art. 12, the State
includes the Government and the Legislature of each of the
States, and so, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the
State must necessarily mean the Legislature and not the
Government. Besides, where the Constitution intended that a
certain action should be taken by legislation and not by
executive action, it has adopted suitable phraseology in
that behalf. Article 16(3) and (5) are illustrations in
point. Both the said subclauses of Art. 16, in terms, refer
to the making of the law by the Parliament in respect of the
matters covered by them. Similarly, Articles 341 (2) and
342 (2) expressly refer to a law being made by Parliament as
therein contemplated. Therefore, when Art. 15(4)
contemplates that the State can make the special provision
in question, it is clear that the said provision can be made
by an executive order.
Art. 15(4) authorises the State to make a special provision
for the advancement of any socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens, as distinguished from the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. No doubt, special
provision can be made for both categories of citizens, but
in specifying the categories, the first category is
distinguished from the second. Sub-clauses (24) and (25) of
Art. 366 define Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
respectively,
458
but there is no clause defining socially and educationally,
backward classes of citizens, and so, in determining the
question as to whether a particular provision has been
validly made under Art. 15 (4),or not, the first, question
which falls to be determined is whether the State has
validly, determined who should .be included in those
Backward Classes. It seems fairly clear that the back and
classes of citizens,, for whom special provision is
authorised to be made are, by Art. 15(4) itself, treated as
being similar to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which have been
defined were known to be backward and the Constitution-
makers felt no doubt that special provision had to be made
for their advancement. It was realised that in the Indian
society there were other classes of citizens who were
equally, or may be somewhat less, backward than the
Scheduled Castes and Tribes and it was thought that some
special provision ought to be made even for them. Article
341 provides for the issue of public notification specifying
the castes, races or tribes which shall, for the purposes of
this Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes either
in the State or the Union territory as the case may be.
Similarly,’ Art. 342 makes a provision for the issue of
public notification in respect of Scheduled Tribes. Under
Article 338 (3), it’ is provided that references to the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be construed as
including references to such other Backward Classes as the
President may, on receipt of the report of a Commission
appointed under Art. 340(1), by order, specify and also to
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the Anglo Indian community. It would thus be seen that This
provision contemplates that some Backward Classes may by the
Presidential order be included in Scheduled castes and
Tribes. That helps to bring, out the point that the
Backward Classes for whose improvement special provision is
contemplated, by Art. 15 (4) are in the matter of their,,
backwardness comparable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribe
459
In considering the scope and extent of the expression
"’backward classes’ under Art. 15(4), it is necessary to
remember that the concept of backwardness is not intended to
be relative in the sense that any classes who arc backward
in relation to the most advanced classes of the society
should be included in it. If such relative tests were to be
applied by reason of the most advanced classes, there would
he several layers or strata of backward classes and each one
of them may claim to be included under Art. 15(4). This
position is not disputed before us by the learned Advocate-
General for the State. The backwardness under Art. 15(4)
must be social and educational. It is not either social or
educational but it is both social and educational; and that
takes us to the question as to how social and educational
backwardness has to be determined.
Let us take the question of social backwardness first. By
what test should it be decided whether a particular class is
socially backward or not ? The group of citizens to whom
Article 15(4) applies -ire described as ’classes of
citizens’, not as castes of citizens.A class, according to
the dictionary meaning, shows division of society according
to status, rank or caste. I In the Hindu social structure,
caste unfortunately plays an important part in determining
the status of the citizen. Though according to sociologists
and Vedic scholars, the caste system may have originally
begun on occupational or functional basis, in course of
time, it became rigid and inflexible. The history of the
growth of caste system shows that its original functional
and occupational basis was later over-burdened with
considerations of purity based on ritual concepts, and that
led to its ramifications which introduced inflexibility and
rigidify. This artificial growth inevitably tended to
create a feeling of superiority and inferiority and to
foster narrow caste loyalties. Therefore, in dealing with
the question as to whether any class of citizens is socially
460
backward or not, it may not be irrelevant to consider the
caste of the said group of citizens. In this connection, it
is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the special
provision is contemplated for classes of citizens and not
for individual citizens as such, and so, though the caste of
the group of citizens may be relevant, its importance should
not be exaggerates. If the classification of backward
classes of citizens was based solely on the caste of the
citizen, it may not always be logical and may perhaps
contain the vice of perpetuating the caste themselves.
Besides, if the caste of the group of citizens was made the
sole basis for determining the social backwardness of the
said group, that test would inevitably break down in
relation to many sections of Indian society which do not
recognise castes In the conventional sense known to Hindu
society. How is one going to decide whether Muslims,
Christians or jains, or even Lingayats are socially backward
or not ? The test of castes would be inapplicable to those
groups, but that would hardly justify the exclusion of these
groups in toto from the operation of Art. 15(4). It is not
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unlikely that in some States some Muslims or Christians or
jains forming groups may be socially backward. That is why
we think that though castes in relation to Hindus may be a
relevant factor to consider in determining the social
backwardness of groups or classes of citizens, it cannot be
made the sole or the dominant test in that behalf. Social
backwardness is on the ultimate analysis the result of
poverty, to a very large extent. The classes of citizens
who are deplorably poor automatically become socially
backward. They do not enjoy a status in society and have,
therefore, to be content to take a backward seat. It is
true that social backwardness which results from poverty is
likely to be aggravated by considerations of caste to which
the poor citizens may belong, but that only shows The
relevance of
461
both caste and poverty in determining the backwardness of
citizens.
The occupations of citizens may also contribute to make
classes of citizens socially backward. There are some
occupations which are treated as inferior according to
conventional beliefs and classes of citizens who follow
these occupations are apt to become socially backward. The
place of habitation also plays not a minor part in
determining the backwardness of a community of persons. In
a sense, the problem of social. backwardness is the problem
of Rural India and in that behalf, classes of citizens
occupying a socially backward position in rural area fall
within the purview of Art. 15(4). The problem of determin-
ing who are socially backward classes is undoubtedly very
complex. Sociological, social and economic considerations
come into play in solving the problem and evolving proper
criteria for determining which classes are socially backward
is obviously a very difficult task; it will need an
elaborate investigation and collection of data and examining
the said data in a rational and scientific way. That is the
function of the State which purports to act under Art.
15(4). All that this Court is called upon to do in dealing
with the present petitions is to decide whether the tests
applied by the impugned order are valid under Art. 15(4).
If it appears that the test applied by the order in that
behalf is improper and invalid, then the classification of
socially backward classes based on that test will have to be
held to be inconsistent with the requirements of Art. 15(4).
What then is the test applied by the State in passing the
impugned order ? We have already seen that the Nagan Gowda
Committee appointed by the State was inclined to treat the
caste as almost the sole basis in determining the question
about the social backwardness of any community. The
Committee has no doubt incidentally referred to the general
462
economic condition of the community as a contributory
factor; but the manner in which it has enumerated the
backward any more backward classes leaves no room for doubt
that the predominant, if not the sole, test that weighed in
their minds was the test of caste. When we consider the
impugned order itself. the position becomes absolutely
clear. The impugned order has adopted the earlier order of
July 10, 1961, with some changes as to the quantum of
reservation, and so, it is necessary to examine the earlier
order in order to see what test was applied by the State in
classifying the backward Classes. In its preamble, the
order of July 10, 1961, clearly and unambiguously states
that the Committee had come to the conclusion that in the
present circumstances, the only practicable method of
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classifying the Backward Classes in the State is on the
basis of castes and communities and the State Government
accepts this test. In. other words, on the order as it
stands there can be no room for doubt that the
classification of backward and more backward classes was
made by the State Government only on the basis of their
castes which basis was regarded as a practicable method. It
is true that in support of the inclusion of the Lingayats
amongst the Backward Classes the order refers to some other
factors, but neither the Report of the Nagan Gowda
Committees, nor the orders passed by the State Government on
July 10, 1961, and July 31, 1962, afford any indication as
to how any test other than that of the caste was applied in
deciding the question. The learned Advocate-General has
contended that the statement in the preamble of’ the order
of July 10, 1961 should not be literally construed and he
has argued that the words used in the relevant portion are
inartistic and he has suggested that the order is not based
on the sole basis of castes. We are not impressed by this
argument. We have considered both the orders in the light
of the Report’ and the recommendations made by the Nagan
Gowda Committee and we are satisfied that the classification
463
of the socially backward classes of citizens made by the
State proceeds on the only consideration of their castes
without regard to the other factors which are undoubtedly
relevant. If that be so, the social backwardness of the
communities to whom the impugned order applies has been
determined in a manner which is not permissible under Art.
15(4) and that itself would introduce an infirmity which is
fatal to the validity of the said classification.
The next question to consider is in regard to the
educational backwardness of the classes of citizens. The
Nagan Gowda Report and the impugned order proceed to deal
with this question on the basis of the average of student
population in the last the High School classes of all High
Schools in the State in relation to a thousand citizens of
that community. On the figures supplied to the Committee
which admittedly are approximate and not fully accurate, the
Committee came to the conclusion that the State average of
student population in the last three High School classes of
all High Schools in the State was 69 per thousand. The
Committee decided that all Castes whose average was less
than the State average of 6.9 per thousand should be
regarded as backward communities, and it further held that
if the average of any community was less than 50% of the
State average, it should be regarded as constituting the
more backward classes. It may be conceded that in determin-
ing the educational backwardness of a class of citizens, the
literacy test supplied by the Census Reports may not be
adequate; but it is doubtful if the test of the average of
student population in the last three High School classes is
appropriate in determining the educational backwardness.
Having regard to the fact that the test is intended to
determine who are educationally backward classes, it may not
be necessary or proper to put the test as high as has been
done by the Committee. But even assuming that the test
applied is rational and permissible under Art. 15(4),
464
the question still remains as to whether it would be
legitimate to treat castes or communities which are just
below the State average as educationally backward classes.
If the State average is 6.9 per thousand, a community which
satisfies the said test or is just below the said test
cannot be regarded as backward. It is only communities
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which are well below the State average that can properly be
regarded as educationally backward classes of citizens.
Classes of citizens whose average of student population
works below 50% of the State average are obviously educa-
tionally back-ward classes of citizens. Therefore, in our
opinion, the State was not justified in including in the
list of Backward Classes, castes or communities whose
average of student population per thousand was slightly
above, or very near, or just below the State average.
It will be recalled that the Nagan Gowda Committee had
recommended that the Lingayats should not be treated as
Backward Classes. The State has decided otherwise, and in
doing so, the State has taken the view that the figures
arrived at by the Committee should be corrected to the
nearest integer as, in the nature of things, says the order
of July 10, 1960, it is not possible to attain absolute
mathematical precision in making such assessments. That is
how the State average was raised from (6.9 to 7 per
thousand. Even after increasing the State average to 7, the
position with regard to Lingayat community was that its
average of student, population was 7.1 per thousand
according to the Committee’s calculations and according to
the decision of the State 7, and yet the Lingayats as a
community have been held to be an educationally backward
class of citizens under the State order. This result has
been achieved by adding,1 to the State average and deducting
,1 from the Lingayats’ average. The Ganigas whose average
of student population is 7 per thousand are likewise
included in the list of Backward Classes. If the State
465
average is 6.9 or 7, it would, we think, be manifestly
erroneous to regard those communities as educationally
backward whole student population ratio works at the same
level as the State average.
In regard to the Muslims, the majority view in the Committee
was that the Muslim community as a whole should be treated
as socially backward. This conclusion is stated merely as
a conclusion and no data or reasons are cited in support of
it. The average of student population in respect of this
community works at 5 per thousand and that, in our opinion,
is not so below the State average that the community could
be treated as educationally backward in the State of Mysore.
Therefore, we are not satisfied that the State was justified
in taking the view that communities or castes whose average
of student population was the same as, or just below, the
State average, should be treated as educationally backward
classes of citizens. If the test has to be applied by a
reference to the State average of student population, the
legitimate view to take would be that the classes of
citizens whose average is well or substantially below the
State average can be treated as educationally backward. On
this point again, we do not propose to lay down any hard and
fast, rule; it is for the State to consider the matter and
decide it in a manner which is consistent with the
requirements of Art. 15 (4).
In this connection, it is necessary to add that the sub-
classification made by the order- between Backward Classes
and More Backward Classes does not appear to be justified
under Art. 15(4). Art. 15(4) authorises special provision
being made for the really backward classes. In introducing
two categories of Backward Classes, what the impugned
order, in substance, purports to do is to devise measures
for the benefit- of all the classes of citizens who are less
advanced, compared to the most advanced classes in the
State, and that, in our opinion, is not the scope
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466
of Art. 15(4). The result of the method adopted by the
impugned order is that nearly 90% of the population of the
State is treated as backward, and that illustrates how
the order in fact divides the population of the State into
most advanced and the rest, and puts the latter into two
categories of Backward and More Backward. The
classification of the two categories, therefore, is not
warranted by Art. 15(4).
That takes us to the question about the extent of the
special provision which it would be competent to the State
to make under Art. 15(4). Article 15(4) authorises the
State to make any special provision for the advancement of
the Backward Classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. The learned Advocate-General
contends. that this Article must be read in the light of
Art. 46, and he argues that Art. 15(4) has deliberately and
wisely placed no limitation on the State in respect of the
extent of special provision that it should make. Art. 46
which contains a directive principle, provides that the
State shall promote with special care the educational and
economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and
in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all
form,% of exploitation. There can be no doubt that the
object of making a special provision for the advancement of
the castes or communities, there specified, is to carry out
the directive principle enshrined in Art. 46. It is obvious
that unless the educational and economic interests of the
weaker sections of the people are promoted quickly and.
liberally, the ideal of establishing social and economic
equality will not be attained, and so, there can be no doubt
that Art. 15(4) , authorises the State to take adequate
steps to achieve the object which it has in view. No one
can dispute the proposition that political freedom and even
fundamental rights can have very little meaning or
significance for the Backward Classes and the Scheduled
Castes
467
Scheduled Tribes unless the backwardness and inequality from
which they suffer are immediately redressed. The teamed
Advocate-General, however, suggests that the absence of any
limitation on the State’s power to make an adequate special
provision indicates that if the problem of backward classes
of citizens and Schedule a Caste and Tribes in any given
State is of such a magnitude that it requires the
reservation of all seats in higher educational institutions,
it would be open to the State to take that course. His
argument is that the only test which can be applied is
whether or not having regard to the problem which the State
is called upon to meet, the provision made is reasonably
adequate or not. Thus presented, the argument is, no doubt,
prima facie attractive, and so, it must be carefully
examined.
When Art. 15(4) refers to the special provision for the
advancement of certain classes or scheduled castes or
scheduled tribes, it must not be ignored that the provision
which is authorised to be made is a special provision ; it
is not a provision which is exclusive in character, so that
in looking after the advancement of those classes, the State
would be justified in ignoring altogether the advancement of
the rest of the society. It is because the interests of the
society at large would be served by promoting the
advancement of the weaker elements in the society that Art.
15(4) authorises special provision to be made. But if a
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provision which is in the nature of an exception completely
excludes the rest of the society, that clearly is outside
the scope of Art. 15(4). It would be extremely unreasonable
to assume that in enacting Art. 15(4) the Parliament
intended to provide that where the advancement of the
Backward Classes or the Scheduled Castes , and Tribes was
concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens
constituting the rest of the society were to be completely
and absolutely ignored,
468
In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the
reservation made by the impugned order is in regard to
admission in the seats of higher education in the State. It
is well-known that as a result of the awakening caused by
political freedom, all classes of citizens are showing a
growing desire to give their children higher university
education and so, the Universities are called upon to face
the challenge of this growing demand. While it is necessary
that the demand for higher education which is thus
increasing from year to year must be adequately met and
properly channelised, we cannot overlook the fact that in
meeting that demand standards of higher education in
Universities must not be lowered. The large demand for
education maybe met by starting larger number of educational
institutions, vocational schools and polytechnics. But it
would be against the national interest to exclude from the
portals of our Universities qualified and competent students
on the ground that all the seats in the Universities are
reserved for weaker elements in society. As has been
observed by the University Education Commission, "he indeed
must be blind who does not see that mighty as are the
political changes, far deeper are the fundamental questions
which will be decided by what happens in the universities"
(p. 32). Therefore, in considering the question about the
propriety of the reservation made by the impugned order, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that the reservation is made
in respect of higher university education. The demand for
technicians scientists, doctors, economists, engineers a
experts for the further economic advancement of the country
is so great that it would cause grave prejudice to national
interests if considerations of merit are completely excluded
by whole-sale reservation of seats in all Technical, Medical
or Engineering colleges or institutions of that kind.
Therefore, considerations of national interest and the
interests of the community or society as a whole cannot be
ignored in determining the question as to whether the
special provision
469
contemplated by Art. 15(4) can be special provision which
excludes the rest of the society altogether. In this
connection, it would be relevant to mention that the
University Education Commission which considered the problem
of the assistance to backward communities, has observed that
the percentage of reservation shall not exceed a third of
the total number of seats, and it has added that the
principle of reservation may be adopted for a period often
years. (p. 53).
We have already noticed that the Central Government in its
communication to the State has suggested that reservation
for backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
may be up to 25% with marginal adjustments not exceeding 10%
in exceptional cases.
The learned Advocate-General has suggested that reservation
of a large number of seats for the weaker sections of the
society should not affect either the depth or efficiency of
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scholarship at all, and in support of this argument, he has
relied on the observations made by the Backward Classes
Commission that it found no complaint in the States- of
Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin and Mysore where the
system of recruiting candidates from other Backward Classes
to the reserve quota has been in vogue for several decades.
The Committee further observed that the representatives of
the upper classes did not complain about any lack of efficiency i
n the offices recruited by reservation (p.
135). This opinion, however, is plainly inconsistent with
what is bound to be the inevitable consequence of
reservation in higher university education. If admission to
professional and technical colleges is unduly liberalised it
would be idle to contend that the quality of our graduates
will not suffer. That is not to say that reservation should
not be adopted; reservation should and must be adopted to
advance the prospects of the weaker section’s of society,
but in providing for special
470
measures in that behalf care should be taken not to exclude
admission to higher educational centres to deserving and
qualified candidates of other communities. A special
provision contemplated by Art. 15(4) like reservation of
posts and appointments contemplated by Art. 16(4 must be
within reasonable limits. The interests of weaker sections
of society which are, a first charge on the states and the
Centre have to be adjusted with the interests of the
community as a whole. The adjustment of these competing
claims is undoubtedly a difficult matter, but if under the
guise of making a special provision, a State reserves
practically all the seats available in all the colleges,
that clearly would be subverting the object of Art. 15 (4).
In this matter again.. we arc reluctant to say definitely
what would be a proper provision to make. Speaking
generally and in a ];road way, a special provision should be
less than 50%; how much less than 50% would depend upon the
relevant prevailing circumstances in each case. In this
particular case it is remarkable that when the State
issued its order on July 10, 1961, it emphatically expressed
its opinion that the reservation of 68% recommended by the
Nagan Gowda Committee would not be in the larger interests
of the State. What happened between July 10, 1961, and July
31, 1962, does not appear on the record. But the State
changed its mind and adopted the recommendation of the
Committee ignoring its earlier decision that the said
recommendation was contrary to the larger interests of the
State. In our opinion, when the State makes a special
provision for the advancement of the weaker sections of
society specified in Art. 15(4), it has to approach its task
objectively and in a rational manner. Undoubtedly, it has
to take reasonable and even generous steps to help the
advancement of weaker elements; the extent of the problem
must be weighed, the requirements of the community at large
must be borne in mind and a formula must be evolved which
would strike a reasonable balance
471
between the several relevant considerations. Therefore, we
are satisfied that the reservation of 68% directed by the
impugned order is plainly inconsistent with Art. 15 (4). The
petitioners contend that having regard to the infirmities in
the impugned order, action of the State in issuing the said
order amounts to a fraud on the Constitutional power
conferred on the State by Art. 15(4). This argument is
well-founded, and must be upheld. When it is said about an
executive action that it is a fraud on the Constitution, it
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does not necessarily mean that the action is actuated by
mala fides. An executive action which is patently and
plainly outside the limits of the constitutional authority
conferred on the State in that behalf is struck down as
being ultra, vires the State’s authority. If, on the other
hand, the executive action does not patently or overtly
transgress the authority conferred oil it by the
Constitution, but the transgression is covert or latent, the
said action is struck down as being a fraud on the relevant
constitutional power. It is in this connection that courts
often consider the substance of the matter and not its form
and in ascertaining the substance of the matter, the
appearance or the cloak, or the veil of the executive action
is carefully scrutinized and if it appears that
notwithstanding the appearance, the cloak or the veil of the
executive action, in substance and in truth the
constitutional power has been transgressed, the impugned
action is struck down as a fraud on the Constitution. We
have already noticed that the impugned order in the present
case has categorised the Backward Classes on the sole basis
of caste which, in our opinion, is not ’permitted by Art.
15(4); and we have also held that the reservation of 68%
made by the impugned order is plainly inconsistent with the
concept of the special provision authorised by Art. 15(4).
Therefore, it follows that the impugned order is a fraud on
the
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Constitutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15(4).
The learned Advocatc-General has made an earnest and strong
plea before us that we should not strike.down the order, but
should strike down only such portions of the order which
appear to us to be unconstitutional on the doctrine of
severability. He has urged that since 1938, the State has
had to make five orders to deal with the problem of
advancing.the lot of the Backward Classes and the State is
anxious that the implementation of the impugned order should
not be completely prohibited or stopped. We do not see how
it would be possible to sever the invalid provisions of the
impugned order. If the categorisation of the Backward
Classes is invalid, this Court cannot and would not attempt
the task of enumerating the said categories; and if the
percentage of reservation is improper and outside Art.
15(4), this Court would not attempt to lay down definitely
and in an inflexible manner as to what would be the proper
percentage to reserve. In this connection, it may be
relevant to refer to one fact on which the petitioners have
strongly relied. It is urged for them that the method
adopted by the Government of Maharashtra in exercising its
powers under Art. 15(4) is a proper method to adopt. It
appears that the Maharashtra Government has decided to
afford financial assistance, and make monetary grants to
students seeking- higher education where it is shown that
the annual income of their families is below a prescribed
minimum. The said scheme is not before us and We are not
called upon to express any opinion on it. However, we may
observe that if any State adopts such a measure, it may
afford relief to and assist the advancement- of the Backward
Classes in the State, because backwardness, social and
educational, is ultimately and primarily due to poverty. An
attempt can also be made to start newer and more educational
institutions, polytechnics, vocational institutions and even
rural
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Universities and thereby create more opportunities for
higher education. This dual attack on the problem posted by
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the weakness of backward communities can claim to proceed on
a rational, broad and scientific approach which is
consistent with, and true to, the noble ideal of a secular
welfare democratic State set up, by the Constitution of this
country. Such an approach can be supplemented, if necessary
by providing special provision by way of reservation to aid,
the Backward classes and Scheduled castes and Tribes. It
may well be that there may be other ways and means of
achieving the same result. In our country where social and
economic conditions differ from State to State, it would be
idle to expect absolute uniformity of approach; but in
taking executive action to implement the policy of Art.
15(4). It necessary for the States to remember that the
policy which is intended to be implemented is the policy
which has been declared by Art. 46 and the preamble of the
Constitution. It is for the attainment of social and
economic justice that Art. 15(4) authorises the making of
special provisions for the advancement of the communities
there contemplated even if such provisions may be
inconsistent with the fundamental; rights, guaranteed tinder
Art. 15 or 29(2). The context, therefore, requires that the
executive action taken by the State must be based on an
objective approach, free from all extraneous pressures. The
said action is intended to do social and economic justice
and must be taken in a manner that justice is and should be
done.
Whilst we are dealing with this question, it would be
relevant to add that the provisions of Art. 15(4) are
similar to those of Art. 16(4) which fell to be considered
in the case of The General Manager, Southern Railway v.
Rangoon(1). In that case, the majority decision of this
Court held that the power of reservation which is conferred
on the State under Art. 16(4) can be exercised by the State,
in a proper
(1) (1962) 2 S. C. R. 586,
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case not only by providing for reservation of appointments,
but also by providing for reservation of selection posts.
This conclusion was reached on the basis that it served to
give effect to the intention of the Constitution-makers to
make adequate safeguards for the advancement of Backward
Classes and to secure their adequate representation in the
Services. The judgment shows that the only point which was
raised for the decision of this Court in that case was
whether the reservation made was outside Art. 16(4) and that
posed the bare question about the construction of Art.
16(4). The- propriety, the reasonableness or the wisdom of
the impugned order was not questioned because it was not the
respondents case that if the order was justified under Art.
16(4), it was a fraud on the Constitution. Even so, it was
pointed out in the judgment that the efficiency of
administration is of such a paramount importance that it
would be unwise and impermissible to make any reservation at
the cost of efficiency of administration; that, it was
stated, was undoubtedly the effect of Art. 335. Therefore,
what is true in regard to Art. 15(4) is equally true in
regard to Art. 16(4). There can be no doubt that the
Constitution-makers assumed, as they were entitled to, that
while adequate reservation under Art. 16(4), care would be
taken not to provide for unreasonable, excessive or
extravagant reservation, for that would, by eliminating
general competition in a large field and by creating wide-
spread dissatisfaction amongst the employees, materially
affect efficiency. Therefore, like the special provision
improperly made under Art. 15(4), reservation made under
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Art: 16(4) beyond the permissible and legitimate limits
would be liable to be challenged as a fraud on the
Constitution. In this connect ion it is necessary to
emphasis that Art. 15 (4) is an enabling provision; it does
not impose an obligation, but merely leaves it to the
discretion of the appropriate government to take suitable
action, if necessary.
475
In the result, we allow the writ petitions and direct, that
an appropriate writ or order or direction should, be issued
restraining the three respondents from giving effect to the
impugned order in terms of the prayer made in clauses (i)
and (ii) of paragraph 38 of the petitions. The petitioners
would be entitled to their costs, one set of hearing fees.
Petitions allowed.