Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
TARLOK SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF AMRITSAR AND ANOTHER.
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/08/1986
BENCH:
OZA, G.L. (J)
BENCH:
OZA, G.L. (J)
PATHAK, R.S.
CITATION:
1986 AIR 1957 1986 SCR (3) 617
1986 SCC (4) 27 JT 1986 199
1986 SCALE (2)299
ACT:
Punjab Municipal Corporation Act 1976: ss. 384 and 269
and Civil Procedure Code, 1908: 0.41, R. 27-Proceedings
before District Judge in applications, references and
appeals under the Municipal Corporation Act-Applicability of
procedures contemplated in C.P.C.
Words and Phrases:
Expression "as far as it can be made applicable"-
Connotation of-S. 384, Punjab Municipal Corporation Act,
1976.
HEADNOTE:
Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act
1976 states that the procedure provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it
can be made applicable, in the disposal of applications,
appeals or references that may be made to the District Judge
under the Act or any bye-law made thereunder.
A dispute between the Railways and the Municipal
Corporation resulted in revocation of the sanction for
construction of certain shops situated on the road along
side the railway line in the city of Amritsar. Subsequently,
the Municipal Commissioner passed an order directing
demolition of these shops. The appellant, who is an allottee
of one of these shops on licence from the Railways, being
aggrieved by that order preferred an appeal before the
District Judge under s. 269(2) of the Act. In that appeal,
the District Judge rejected an application submitted by the
appellant for recording of evidence. The appellant filed a
writ petition against that order before the High Court which
took the view that if the District Judge so feels the
application for recording of evidence could be considered
under Order 41, Rule.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the appeal by Special Leave to this Court on the
question:
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Whether in an appeal filed under s. 269(2) of the Punjab
Municipal Corporation Act 1976, the procedure of a civil
suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to
be followed in view of the language of s. 384 of the 1976
Act.
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Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,
^
HELD: The language used in s. 384 of the Punjab
Municipal Corporation Act 1976 only indicates that the
procedure as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure in
regard to a suit will have to be followed in proceedings
under that Act when the matter goes to the District Judge
either by way of an application, reference or appeal. The
use of the phrase "as far as it can be made applicable" in
that section goes to show that it is not expected in any one
of the proceedings contemplated therein-that is,
applications, appeals and references-to follow the procedure
of a suit technically and strictly in accordance with the
provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is
only for the purposes of guidance that the procedure of a
suit as Provided in the Code of Civil Procedure can be
considered. [621A-B; C-D]
In an appropriate case whenever the District Judge
feels satisfied he may give an opportunity to the parties to
lead evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as it will be open to him to apply the procedure
as far as it can be made applicable in the facts and
circumstances of each case. [621E-F]
It, therefore, could not be said that in an appeal
under s. 269 sub-cl.(2) before a District Judge the
procedure of a suit as provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure will be necessary. [621B-C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2843 of
1986
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.1982 of the
Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 5548
of 1982.
V.M. Tarkunde, Raian Karanjawala, Mrs. M. Karanjawala
and Ejaz Mazbooi for the Appellant.
Naunit Lal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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OZA,J. Leave granted.
This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 5548
of 1982 dated 17.12.1982.
The appellant is a shopkeeper occupying Shop No. 13
situated on the road along side the Railway Line, Golebagh
site in the city of Amritsar. There are 56 other shops
similarly situated which are occupied by other allottees
like the petitioner. The premises in occupation of the
petitioner and other shopkeepers are on licences given by
the Railway since April 1981. After the sanction was given
to Railway for construction of these shops some dispute
arose and the Corporation chose to revoke the sanction and
ultimately as a result of litigation the present petitioner
and the other shopkeepers similarly situated were given a
notice to show cause by the Municipal Corporation, Amritsar
and under section 269(i) of the Punjab Municipal Corporation
Act, 1976. This was a composite notice also under Section
270(1) of the said Act. The petitioner received this notice
along with other shopkeepers in the first half of October
1981.
The petitioner and other shopkeepers submitted their
replies to the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation and the
Commissioner passed an Order directing the demolition of the
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shops on 9.11.1981. This order was served on the petitioner
and all other shopkeepers. The petitioner being aggrieved by
this order preferred an appeal before the District Judge
under Section 269 sub-clause (2). In this appeal before the
District Judge the District Judge rejected an application
submitted by the petitioner for recording of evidence and it
was against this order passed by the District Judge that the
petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court
wherein the Division Bench of the High Court took a view
that if the District Judge so feels the application for
recording of evidence could be considered under Order 41
Rule 27.
The only question raised in this appeal is about the
interpretation of Section 384. It was contended before us by
the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the
language of Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation
Act, 1976 in this appeal before the District Judge the
procedure of a civil suit as provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure will have to be followed and on the basis of this
provision it was contended that the District Judge was bound
to follow the procedure of a civil suit thereby framing of
issues and recording of evidence
620
is necessary whereas the learned counsel for the respondent
Municipal Corporation contended that the language of Section
384 only provides that in these proceedings before the
District Judge the procedure of a civil suit as far as
possible will be followed. It was, therefore, contended that
the expression "civil suit" in Section 384 includes an
appeal as an appeal is nothing but a continuation of
proceedings of the civil suit and therefore the meaning of
Section 384 could only be that in case of appeal the
procedure of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure shall
be followed.
Learned counsel for the parties also draw our attention
to various facts and the manner in which the shops were
initially allotted and the grievance that the Municipal
Corporation had about the allotment of these shops to the
particular persons. But in our opinion those are matters not
relevant for the purpose of decision of this case. The only
question that arises is as to whether in an appeal filed
under Section 269 sub-clause (2) the procedure of a civil
suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to
be followed in view of language of Section 384 of the Punjab
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. Section 384 reads as
follows:
"The procedure provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, in regard to suits shall be
followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in
the disposal of applications, appeals or
references that may be made to the court of the
District Judge under this Act or any bye law made
thereunder."
This provision talks of the procedure provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure in regard to a suit shall be
followed but it also refers to "as far as it can be made
applicable" and the phrase that follows refers to an
application, appeal or reference.
This, therefore, clearly indicates that in the appeal,
application or reference the same procedure need not be
followed although it talks of the procedure of a civil suit
but it is also mentioned that as far as it can be made
applicable this goes to show that the procedure of a civil
suit will have to be followed if it is consistent with the
proceedings pending before the District Judge.
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The suit has not been specifically defined in the Code
and from the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure it
appears that an appeal also is a continuation of the suit.
The language used in Section 384
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therefore only indicates that the procedure as comtemplated
in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed in
these proceedings under this Act when the matter goes to the
District Judge either by way of an application, reference or
appeal. The procedure of this suit will include even the
procedure of an appeal and it is because of this that the
phrase as far as it can be made applicable has been used in
this section. It, therefore, could not be contended that in
an appeal under Section 269 sub-clause (2) before a District
Judge the procedure of a suit as provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure (filing of plaint, written statements,
issues, recording of evidence) will be necessary. The three
proceedings contemplated in Section 384 are application,
reference and appeal and therefore out of the scheme of the
Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to the procedure of a
civil suit or an appeal the relevant provisions will have to
be applied for purposes of guidance of procedure and
therefore the use of the phrase as far as it can be made
applicable clearly indicates that it is not expected in any
one of these proceedings to follow the procedure of a suit
technically and strictly in accordance with the provisions
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is only for
purposes of guidance that the procedure of a suit as
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure can be considered
and it will be the discretion of the authority (the District
Judge) to apply as far as it could be applied in the
appropriate proceedings. In our view, therefore, what High
Court said, appears to be proper as the High Court stated in
the impugned judgment that if the District Judge so feels,
he may allow any additional evidence to be led under Order
41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact, it would
be enough to say that in an appropriate case whenever the
District Judge feels satisfied he may give an opportunity to
the parties to lead evidence as it will be open to the
District Judge to apply the procedure as far as it can be
made applicable in the facts and circumstances of each case.
We, therefore, see no substance in this appeal. It is,
therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances, no order as to
costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.
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