Full Judgment Text
TRUPTI
SADANAND
BAMNE
2026:BHC-OS:3812-DB
Digitally signed by
TRUPTI SADANAND
BAMNE
Date: 2026.02.10
11:48:24 +0530
919-wpl-42108-2025.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 42108 OF 2025
Samco Securities Ltd.
Naman Midtown Office No. 1104,
“A” Wing, Behind Kamhar Kridakendra
S B Parth Prabhadevi, Mumbai – 400013 … Petitioner
Versus
Triton Communications Pvt. Ltd.
43, prospect Chambers Annex,
Dr.D.N.Road, Fort, Mumbai 400001 … Respondent
...
Ms.Moleena Thakur with Ms.Nooraksa Ansari i/b. Samudra Legal LLP for
the Petitioner.
Mr.Sunand Subramaniam i/b. Mr.Rishi Murarka for the Respondent.
...
CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE &
ABHAY J. MANTRI, JJ.
DATE : FEBRUARY 05, 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT (Per : Ravindra V. Ghuge, J.) :-
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the
consent of the parties.
2. The Petitioner has put forth prayer clauses (a), (b) and (c), as
under :
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“a. That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to call for
the record and proceedings of the arbitration
between the Petitioner and the Respondent arising
out of the said Agreement and, after examining the
legality, validity and propriety of the same, be
pleased to appropriate writ, order or direction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, quashing
and setting aside the Impugned Order passed by the
Learned Sole Arbitrator.
b. That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to hold and
declare that the Learned Sole Arbitrator has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between the
parties arising out of post-termination services
rendered after 31.07.2019, which are not governed
by any valid and subsisting arbitration agreement
under Section 7 of the Act and consequently be
pleased to direct termination of the arbitral
proceedings in respect of such disputes as being
without jurisdiction.
c. In the alternative to prayer clause b, direct the
Learned Sole Arbitrator to decide the Petitioner's
application under section 16 of the Act as a
preliminary issue, within a time-bound period,
before proceeding further with the arbitral
proceedings.”
3. The learned Advocate for the Petitioner has vehemently
canvassed all the grounds formulated in the pleadings.
4. The learned Advocate for the Respondent relied upon two
orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition (L) No.
39997 of 2025, (SAP India Private Limited and Anr. V/s. Cox and Kings
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Limited), dated 23.12.2025 and Writ Petition No. 11281 of 2025,
(Shivranjan Towers Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit Versus
Bhujbal Constructions & Ors.) , dated 04.09.2025, which indicate that an
Application under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(the Act of 1996) is to be entertained only in exceptional cases where there
is a clear case of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction.
5. The grievance of the Petitioner is that the Application filed
under Section 16 of the Act of 1996 should have been dealt with by the
concerned Authority at the earliest and should have delivered a verdict as
to whether the arbitration proceedings are maintainable or not. The
foundation laid by the Petitioner in the said Application is that the Contract
Agreement has been terminated between the Petitioner and the Respondent
and, as such, the arbitration clause would stand extinguished and the
remedy of approaching the Arbitrator would not be available. We find that
the said submission cannot be sustained.
6. We have perused the impugned order passed by the Tribunal
under Section 16 of the Act of 1996, dated 09.10.2025. To cut short the
issue, it would be apposite to reproduce paragraph Nos. 14 to 17 set out in
the Discussion and Findings of the Arbitrator, hereunder:
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“14. The principal contention of the Respondent is
that the Agreement was terminated by its
communications of 11 and 17 June 2019, and that
any subsequent services were rendered under ad
hoc or oral arrangements, independent of the
arbitration clause. The Claimant, on the other
hand, disputes the validity of the alleged
termination and asserts that services rendered after
July 2019 were in fact governed by the terms of
the original Agreement, including the arbitration
clause. The Claimant further submits that the
arbitration clause is separable and independent,
and survives any termination of the substantive
contract.
15. It is apparent that the issue of whether there
was a valid termination is intrinsically a matter of
evidence. The Claimant denies receipt of the Letter
dated 17 June 2019, and submits that there is no
acknowledgment, signature, or other confirmation
of service. Even as regards the email of 11 June
2019, the Claimant contends that it does not satisfy
the contractual requirements under Clause V.
Similarly, whether the services rendered post-July
2019 fall within the ambit of the original
Agreement or constitute separate ad hoc
arrangements cannot be determined without
assessing the conduct of the parties, the terms of
the invoices, and the circumstances under which
payments were made. Both these issues/questions
are therefore fact-intensive and closely interwoven
with the merits of the dispute. It is important to
state that, at this juncture, no evidence has been led
by either the Respondent or the Claimant.
16. While the law establishes that a Section 16
objection is ordinarily to be decided at the earliest
stage, it has been recognized by the Delhi High
Court in Surender Kumar Singhal & Ors. v. Arun
Kumar Bhalotia & Ors. [(2021) 279 DLT 636) that
where the objection is fact-intensive and closely
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linked to the merits, the Tribunal may defer its
adjudication until after evidence has been led. This
approach prevents premature determination that
could inadvertently prejudice a party and ensures
that jurisdiction is decided on a complete factual
record. Moreover, the doctrine of separability, and
survival of the Arbitration Clause post termination,
underscores that arbitration clauses are
autonomous and may survive termination of the
underlying contract, further highlighting the
complexity of the questions raised in the present
case.
17. In the present matter, a premature
determination of the Respondent's Section 16
objection would necessitate adjudication of
disputed facts, including receipt, acknowledgment,
and compliance with notice requirements for
termination communications, as well as the
characterization of post-July 2019 services. Any
such premature determination could inadvertently
prejudice a party or result in a finding based on an
incomplete factual record. In the interest of
ensuring fairness and adherence to natural justice,
the Tribunal finds it necessary to defer its
adjudication until after the parties have led all
relevant evidence, including written
communications, invoices, ledger entries, and oral
testimony.”
7. It is well settled that if any issue raised as a preliminary issue
requires oral and documentary evidence to arrive at conclusion on the
issue, such Applications are not to be decided at a preliminary stage.
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8. The Arbitrator has merely postponed the decision on the
Application under Section 16, as he is convinced that oral and
documentary evidence would be required to adjudicate on the Application,
and that the Application can be decided along with the main proceedings. A
plausible view has been taken by the Arbitrator. Merely because a different
view is possible, it would not mean that the impugned order is to be
branded as perverse or erroneous, in view of the law laid down in Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, and Surya Dev Rai v.
Ram Chander Rai, AIR 2003 SC 3044 : (2003) 6 SCC 682 .
9. In view of the above, this Writ Petition is dismissed.
10. Rule stands discharged.
(ABHAY J.MANTRI, J.) (RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
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SADANAND
BAMNE
2026:BHC-OS:3812-DB
Digitally signed by
TRUPTI SADANAND
BAMNE
Date: 2026.02.10
11:48:24 +0530
919-wpl-42108-2025.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 42108 OF 2025
Samco Securities Ltd.
Naman Midtown Office No. 1104,
“A” Wing, Behind Kamhar Kridakendra
S B Parth Prabhadevi, Mumbai – 400013 … Petitioner
Versus
Triton Communications Pvt. Ltd.
43, prospect Chambers Annex,
Dr.D.N.Road, Fort, Mumbai 400001 … Respondent
...
Ms.Moleena Thakur with Ms.Nooraksa Ansari i/b. Samudra Legal LLP for
the Petitioner.
Mr.Sunand Subramaniam i/b. Mr.Rishi Murarka for the Respondent.
...
CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE &
ABHAY J. MANTRI, JJ.
DATE : FEBRUARY 05, 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT (Per : Ravindra V. Ghuge, J.) :-
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the
consent of the parties.
2. The Petitioner has put forth prayer clauses (a), (b) and (c), as
under :
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“a. That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to call for
the record and proceedings of the arbitration
between the Petitioner and the Respondent arising
out of the said Agreement and, after examining the
legality, validity and propriety of the same, be
pleased to appropriate writ, order or direction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, quashing
and setting aside the Impugned Order passed by the
Learned Sole Arbitrator.
b. That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to hold and
declare that the Learned Sole Arbitrator has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between the
parties arising out of post-termination services
rendered after 31.07.2019, which are not governed
by any valid and subsisting arbitration agreement
under Section 7 of the Act and consequently be
pleased to direct termination of the arbitral
proceedings in respect of such disputes as being
without jurisdiction.
c. In the alternative to prayer clause b, direct the
Learned Sole Arbitrator to decide the Petitioner's
application under section 16 of the Act as a
preliminary issue, within a time-bound period,
before proceeding further with the arbitral
proceedings.”
3. The learned Advocate for the Petitioner has vehemently
canvassed all the grounds formulated in the pleadings.
4. The learned Advocate for the Respondent relied upon two
orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition (L) No.
39997 of 2025, (SAP India Private Limited and Anr. V/s. Cox and Kings
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919-wpl-42108-2025.odt
Limited), dated 23.12.2025 and Writ Petition No. 11281 of 2025,
(Shivranjan Towers Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit Versus
Bhujbal Constructions & Ors.) , dated 04.09.2025, which indicate that an
Application under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(the Act of 1996) is to be entertained only in exceptional cases where there
is a clear case of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction.
5. The grievance of the Petitioner is that the Application filed
under Section 16 of the Act of 1996 should have been dealt with by the
concerned Authority at the earliest and should have delivered a verdict as
to whether the arbitration proceedings are maintainable or not. The
foundation laid by the Petitioner in the said Application is that the Contract
Agreement has been terminated between the Petitioner and the Respondent
and, as such, the arbitration clause would stand extinguished and the
remedy of approaching the Arbitrator would not be available. We find that
the said submission cannot be sustained.
6. We have perused the impugned order passed by the Tribunal
under Section 16 of the Act of 1996, dated 09.10.2025. To cut short the
issue, it would be apposite to reproduce paragraph Nos. 14 to 17 set out in
the Discussion and Findings of the Arbitrator, hereunder:
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“14. The principal contention of the Respondent is
that the Agreement was terminated by its
communications of 11 and 17 June 2019, and that
any subsequent services were rendered under ad
hoc or oral arrangements, independent of the
arbitration clause. The Claimant, on the other
hand, disputes the validity of the alleged
termination and asserts that services rendered after
July 2019 were in fact governed by the terms of
the original Agreement, including the arbitration
clause. The Claimant further submits that the
arbitration clause is separable and independent,
and survives any termination of the substantive
contract.
15. It is apparent that the issue of whether there
was a valid termination is intrinsically a matter of
evidence. The Claimant denies receipt of the Letter
dated 17 June 2019, and submits that there is no
acknowledgment, signature, or other confirmation
of service. Even as regards the email of 11 June
2019, the Claimant contends that it does not satisfy
the contractual requirements under Clause V.
Similarly, whether the services rendered post-July
2019 fall within the ambit of the original
Agreement or constitute separate ad hoc
arrangements cannot be determined without
assessing the conduct of the parties, the terms of
the invoices, and the circumstances under which
payments were made. Both these issues/questions
are therefore fact-intensive and closely interwoven
with the merits of the dispute. It is important to
state that, at this juncture, no evidence has been led
by either the Respondent or the Claimant.
16. While the law establishes that a Section 16
objection is ordinarily to be decided at the earliest
stage, it has been recognized by the Delhi High
Court in Surender Kumar Singhal & Ors. v. Arun
Kumar Bhalotia & Ors. [(2021) 279 DLT 636) that
where the objection is fact-intensive and closely
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linked to the merits, the Tribunal may defer its
adjudication until after evidence has been led. This
approach prevents premature determination that
could inadvertently prejudice a party and ensures
that jurisdiction is decided on a complete factual
record. Moreover, the doctrine of separability, and
survival of the Arbitration Clause post termination,
underscores that arbitration clauses are
autonomous and may survive termination of the
underlying contract, further highlighting the
complexity of the questions raised in the present
case.
17. In the present matter, a premature
determination of the Respondent's Section 16
objection would necessitate adjudication of
disputed facts, including receipt, acknowledgment,
and compliance with notice requirements for
termination communications, as well as the
characterization of post-July 2019 services. Any
such premature determination could inadvertently
prejudice a party or result in a finding based on an
incomplete factual record. In the interest of
ensuring fairness and adherence to natural justice,
the Tribunal finds it necessary to defer its
adjudication until after the parties have led all
relevant evidence, including written
communications, invoices, ledger entries, and oral
testimony.”
7. It is well settled that if any issue raised as a preliminary issue
requires oral and documentary evidence to arrive at conclusion on the
issue, such Applications are not to be decided at a preliminary stage.
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8. The Arbitrator has merely postponed the decision on the
Application under Section 16, as he is convinced that oral and
documentary evidence would be required to adjudicate on the Application,
and that the Application can be decided along with the main proceedings. A
plausible view has been taken by the Arbitrator. Merely because a different
view is possible, it would not mean that the impugned order is to be
branded as perverse or erroneous, in view of the law laid down in Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, and Surya Dev Rai v.
Ram Chander Rai, AIR 2003 SC 3044 : (2003) 6 SCC 682 .
9. In view of the above, this Writ Petition is dismissed.
10. Rule stands discharged.
(ABHAY J.MANTRI, J.) (RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
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