TOPLINE SHOES LTD. AND ANR. vs. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 20-07-2022

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Full Judgment Text

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2125 OF 2009 TOPLINE SHOES LIMITED  AND ANOTHER                            APPELLANT(S) VERSUS PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                        RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. th The appeal challenges the judgment dated 7  July 2008 1. passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay thereby dismissing the Writ Petition Nos.207 and 1490 of 2005,   filed   by   the   present   appellants   arising   out   of   the concurrent   orders   passed   by   the   learned   Mumbai   Debts Recovery Tribunal­1 (for short “DRT”) in O.A. No.948 of 2000 st dated   31   October   2002   and   the   learned   Debts   Recovery Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Dr. Mukesh Nasa Date: 2022.07.28 17:10:44 IST Reason: Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai (for short “DRAT”) in Appeal 1 th Nos.152 of 2002 and 43 of 2004 dated 24  November 2004. 2. The respondent–Bank had filed an O.A. No.948 of 2000 against the present appellants raising certain claims. In the said   proceedings,   the   appellants   filed   a   counter­claim claiming   therein   that   certain   amount   deposited   in   the current account opened by them with the respondent­Bank, was illegally withheld by the respondent–Bank. The learned st DRT vide order dated 31  October 2002 dismissed both, the claim   of   the   bank   as   well   as   the   counter­claim   of   the appellants.   Being   aggrieved   thereby,   both  the   respondent­ Bank as well as the appellants had preferred appeals before the learned DRAT. Both the appeals were dismissed. Being aggrieved thereby, two writ petitions were filed, one by the respondent­Bank and the other by the appellants. As far as the writ petition of the respondent­Bank is concerned, the same was disposed of as withdrawn since the respondent­ Bank   did   not   press   the   same.   The   writ   petition   of   the appellants   was,   however,   dismissed   vide   the   impugned judgment. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. Mr. S. N. Bhat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on 3. behalf of the appellants submitted that both the DRT and the 2 DRAT as well as the High Court have grossly erred in arriving at the conclusion that the claim of the present appellants was covered under Article 113 and not by Article 22 of the Schedule   to   the   Limitation   Act,   1963   (for   short   “the Limitation Act”). 3.1. Mr.   Bhat   further   submitted   that   though  the   amount deposited by the appellants was not a security or a fixed deposit,   still   it   was   an   amount   which   belonged   to   the appellants   and   was   illegally   withheld   by   the   respondent­ Bank. He therefore submitted that in view of Article 22 of the Limitation Act, the cause of action to file a counter­claim would begin from the date on which a notice was sent by the appellants   to   the   respondent­Bank,   i.e.,   from   September, 1999. He has submitted that since the counter­claim was filed in the year 2000, i.e., within a period of three years from the   date   of   issuance   of   notice,   the   same   was   within limitation. 3.2. Mr. Bhat submitted that in the present case, a clear question of law has arisen as to whether in the facts of the present case, Article 22 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act 3 would be applicable for consideration. He submitted that the High Court, the DRT as well as the DRAT have erroneously held that in the present case Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and not Article 22 of the Limitation Act. Mr. S. N. Bhat relies on the judgment of this Court in 4. the case of   Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. v. Attar­Ul­ 1 . Nissa & Others 5. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned counsel appearing on behalf   of   the   respondent–Bank   has  submitted   that  no error could be noticed in the concurrent orders passed by the DRT, the DRAT and the High Court. He submitted that in the facts of the present case, the DRT, the DRAT as well as the High Court have rightly held that the counter­claim would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. 6. By now, it is a settled principle of law that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The issue of limitation cannot be decided by ignoring the factual scenario. 7. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 41 of the order st dated 31   October 2002 in O.A. No.948 of 2000 passed by the learned DRT: “ 41.  It is not the case of the Defendants that they 1 [1967] 1 SCR 792 4 had paid the amount to the Applicants by way of deposit   as   securities   till   the   account   was   finally settled.  On the  contrary  it  is their  case  that the Applicant   Bank   had   extracted   the   amount   from them   by   exerting   undue   influence   etc.   While narrating their case the Defendants have specifically pleaded that in the Board Meeting, the possibility of approaching the Court against the Applicant Bank was   also   contemplated   and   considered.   However, they   thought   it   better   not   to   drag   the   Applicant Bank to the court to avoid adverse publicity and mar their chance of receiving the loan even from other Banks. It is thus obvious that a conscious decision was taken by Defendant No.1 Company to pay   off   whatever   demanded   by   Applicant   Bank without joining the issue and they had accordingly paid the amount maybe much against their wishes. Subsequently if the Defendants wanted to recover the   said   amount   they   ought   to   have   taken   out proper proceedings before proper forum within the statutory period of three years. This was admittedly not done. The said amount cannot be recovered by filing a counter claim after the period of six years.” 8. It could thus clearly be seen that in the factual position as apparent in the present matter, the specific case of the defendants­appellants   was   that   the   respondent­Bank   had extracted   the   amount   from   them   by   exerting   undue influence. It could further be seen that the Board of Directors of   the   Appellant   had   contemplated   and   considered   the possibility of approaching the Court against the respondent– Bank.   However,   it   was   thought   fit   not   to   drag   the 5 respondent­Bank to the Court to avoid adverse publicity and mar their chances of receiving loans from other banks. It could  thus  be  seen that the  learned DRT has  come  to a finding   of   fact   that   it   was   the   conscious   decision   of   the appellants to pay off whatever amount was demanded by the respondent–Bank   without   joining   the   issue   and   they   had accordingly  paid  the  amount,   may   be   much  against  their wishes. Admittedly, the said amount, which according to the 9. appellants,   was   paid   under   undue   influence   in   the   year 1994. 10. It appears that after waiting for a period of five years, the appellants woke up from their deep slumber and issued a nd notice on 22  September 1999. 11. The DRT, the DRAT as well as the High Court have concurrently held that the counter­claim of the appellants was  based  upon  the  amount  deposited  in the year  1994, which according to the appellants was paid under undue influence. If that be so, no error could be noticed in the finding of the fact as recorded by the DRT, the DRAT and the High   Court   that   the   counter­claim   was   squarely   covered under Article 113 and not under Article 22 of the Limitation 6 Act. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is 12. dismissed. ...................J.           (B.R. GAVAI) ………………………………...................J. (PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA) NEW DELHI; JULY 20, 2022. 7