Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2
PETITIONER:
REV.FATHER BRAIN E FERNANDES ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/02/1996
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
CITATION:
JT 1996 (2) 641 1996 SCALE (2)452
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3648 OF 1996
-----------------------------
(Arising out of SLP (C) 15795 of 1995)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
We have heard the learned counsel on both sides.
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 was published in the State Gazette on July 26,
1965 and the declaration was published on May 17, 1969. The
Award came to be made on September 22, 1986 within the
period provided under Section 11-A incorporated by the
Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Therefore, the appellants have
approached the High Court. The High Court dismissed their
W.P.No.2694/89 by order dated June 14, 1995, Thus these
appeals by special leave.
Shri Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the
appellants, has contended that in similar cases relating to
the same survey No.294, the High Court had quashed the
declaration under Section 6 relegating the parties for an
enquiry under Section 5-A on the ground that the erratum
notification was published for the first time without giving
any opportunity to the appellants and was followed by
declaration under Section 6. Therefore, the action of the
authorities in this case also is illegal. We find no force
in the contention. As noted by the High Court in the order
that the only defect as noted was that instead of survey
numbers, guntha numbers have been given in the Erratum
relating to specification of survey numbers. In other words,
the identity of the land was not in dispute and the land was
also part of the notification under Section 4(1). Therefore,
there is no illegality in the notification under Section
4(1) as originally published. In fact, the enquiry under
Section 5A after giving an opportunity to the appellants was
held and thereafter declaration under Section 6 was
published. No objection in this behalf was taken. Under
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 2
those circumstances, we do not find any force in the
contention of Shri Sorabjee. It is true that the High Court
had quashed the declaration under Section 6 but nonetheless
an opportunity had been given to all those persons and
thereafter Section 6 declaration would follow. The only
condition precedent is that the acquisition would serve
public purpose. So long as the public purpose subsists, the
enquiry under Section 5-A shall be conducted and the
competent authority would take a decision whether the public
purpose still subsists to sustain the notification under
Section 4(1). Under those circumstances, we do not think
that there is any force in the contention of Shri Sorabjee.
It is then contended by Shri Sorabjee that this Court
in Ramchand & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC
44] would have interfered and quashed the acquisition under
Section 4(1) for a long delay on the part of the
authorities, but for the intervention of third party rights.
In this case, since the appellants are still in possession
and no third party rights have been created, the
notification requires to be quashed. We find no force in the
contention. It is true that admittedly, there is long
inaction on the part of the authorities. As noted by this
Court, since limitation has not been prescribed for the
actions to be pursued by the authorities, after the
publication of the declaration under Section 6 inordinate
delay is being caused in making the award and offering the
amount. With a view to remove the defect, the Amendment Act
1984 was brought on statute and the limitation under
Section 11-A was introduced enjoining the State to make the
award within two years from the date of the publication of
the notification required under Section 6-A. On failure
thereof, the notification under Section 4(1) and the
declaration under Section 6 shall stand lapsed. In this
case, immediately after the Amendment Act had come into
force, within two years, the award under Section 11 was
made. But this Court noticing the injustice that would be
meted out in determination of the compensation on account of
long lapse of time, directed in Ramchand’s case (supra) to
pay additional amount of 12% per annum from the date of the
notification under Section 4(1). In that case, within two
years from the date of the Aflatoon’s case, i.e., August 24,
1976. The same ratio applies to the facts in this case. The
respondents are directed to pay the additional amount of 12%
per annum to the appellants from May 17, 1969, the date of
the declaration since after the declaration, they kept over
the matter for a long time.
The appeals are accordingly allowed to the above
extent. No costs.