Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4903-05 of 2004
PETITIONER:
Chadat Singh
RESPONDENT:
Bahadur Ram and Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/08/2004
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP ) Nos. 22808-22810/2002)
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
As the only point on which notice was issued related to the
desirability of disposing of the Second Appeal in terms of Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the ’Code’) without formulating the
substantial question of law by the High Court, it is not necessary to deal with
the factual aspects in detail. The second appeal and two miscellaneous
petitions were disposed of by a common judgment which form matrix of the
present appeals.
Respondent-Bahadur Ram filed a suit for specific performance against
9 defendants. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. However, the same
was upset by learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra . Bahadur Ram
filed Second Appeal No.594/1995 against the judgment of learned
Additional District Judge. By the impugned judgment the trial Court’s
judgment and decree have been restored and that of the first Appellate Court
was reversed.
Though various points were urged by learned counsel for the appellant
it is not necessary to go into those aspects in view of the limited scope of the
present appeals in view of the notice issued. There is no appearance on
behalf of the respondents.
Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
the High Court was not justified in disposing of the Second Appeal without
formulating the substantial question or questions of law as mandated by
Section 100 of the Code.
In view of Section 100 of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall
precisely state substantial question or questions of law involved in the appeal
as required under sub-section (3) of Section 100. Where the High Court is
satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved it shall
formulate that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to
be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section
100.
Section 100 of the Code deals with "Second Appeal". The provision
reads as follows:
"Section 100- (1) Save as otherwise expressly
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provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for
the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High
Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court
subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is
satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of
law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an
appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum
of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of
law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial
question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate
that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so
formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the
appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve
such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be
deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to
hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other
substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is
satisfied that the case involves such question."
A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does
not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the
second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being
so, the judgment cannot be maintained.
In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000 (1) SCC 434) this Court in
para 10, has stated thus:
"10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976
Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to
formulate a substantial question of law and it is not
permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate
Court without doing so."
Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000 (3) SCC 708) this Court
has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals
involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
"7. It is to be reiterated that under section 100 CPC
jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second
appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a
substantial question of law and it does not confer any
jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure
questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under
section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of
the matter the High Court did not even notice the
question of law formulated by it at the time of admission
of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the
impugned judgment. Further, the fact findings courts
after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant
entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that
is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive
and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became
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adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two
courts below were based on proper appreciation of
evidence and the material on record and there was no
perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If
the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee
or under a batai agreement then from the permissive
possession it is for him to establish by cogent and
convincing evidence to show hostile animus and
possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner.
Mere possession for a long time does not result in
converting permissive possession into adverse possession
(Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994 (6) SCC
591). Hence the High Court ought not to have interfered
with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts
below."
The position has been reiterated in Kanahaiyalal and Ors. V.
Anupkumar and Ors. (JT 2002 (10) SC 98)
In the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside. We remit
these matters to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The
appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.