Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11499 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30348 OF 2011)
K.K. SAKSENA .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Leave granted.
2) By the impugned judgment dated April 25, 2011 passed by the High
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Court of Delhi in LPA No. 554 of 2006, the High Court has held that the
writ petition against respondent No.1, namely, International Commission
on Irrigation and Drainage (for short, 'ICID'), under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not maintainable as it is not a 'State' under Article 12 of
the Constitution. It has also held that its actions or not amenable for
judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, either. It resulted in
dismissal of the said intra-court appeal, which was filed challenging the
judgment of the learned Single Judge rendered in the writ petition filed
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by the appellant taking the same view. The appellant even filed review
petition seeking review of the judgment dated April 25, 2011, which met
the same fate as the said review petition was dismissed by the High
Court by orders dated August 05, 2011.
3) From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the issue agitated before us
pertains to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India against the respondents herein. This has arisen in
the following circumstances:
4) The appellant herein was appointed to the post of Secretary, ICID, vide
letter of appointment dated January 03, 1997. Pursuant to that letter,
he joined the services in ICID on January 20, 1997. Thereafter, his
services were terminated vide letter dated August 15, 1999, with
immediate effect from August 16, 1999, on the ground that the same
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were no longer required by the ICID. It was followed by a
communication dated August 27, 1999 whereby the appellant was given
two cheques in the sum of ₹ 77,388/- and ₹ 98,141.50/- towards three
months' basic pay in lieu of notice and the dues towards contributory
provident fund respectively. It would be pertinent to note that these
dues were given pursuant to the request of the appellant contained in
his letter dated August 19, 1999 claiming three months' salary as per
the rules as also payments for provident fund. After receiving these
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cheques, the appellant requested for revocation of the order of
termination, which was followed by reminders dated September 02,
1999 and October 16, 1999. As he did not receive any response to the
aforesaid requests, he approached the High Court by filing writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India alleging that the
termination of his services by the ICID was an act of arbitrariness and
unreasonableness and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Plea of the appellant in this behalf was that the said order of termination
was without holding the inquiry and no reason was given to dispense
with the said inquiry as well and, therefore, was in violation of ICID
Employees Conduct Rules, 1967, particularly Rule 33(b) thereof, which
mandates reason to be given for dispensing with the inquiry.
5) In the writ petition, the appellant also specifically took the plea that ICID
is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India
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and further it is involved in performing public duty. It was averred that
ICID is under the control of Government and the criteria and test set out
for determining whether a corporation or society is a 'State' or 'other
authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India is satisfied
inasmuch as ICID was established by the Central Government by giving
a grant of ₹ 15,000/- in 1950; that there are instances when the
Government officers had come on deputation to the society; that the
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Central Government has been paying the subscription for administrative
and other functions of ICID and, hence, the financial control rests with
the Government; that the staffing pattern of the ICID is in accord with
the line of the Government; that ICID has monopoly status since it is the
only society established by the Government of India to bring together
information on irrigation from India and outside; that the Government
provides to it irrigation related information generated in the country and
uses public cost and also uses information pulled by it for Government
irrigation works; and that the President or Vice President in-charge of
the central office of the society is a Government officer and the officer of
the Central Government is ex-officio Secretary General, though he does
not draw salary from ICID. Additional plea was taken that in any case
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was
maintainable even if ICID does not qualify to be a 'State' within the
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purview of Article 12 of the Constitution inasmuch as the term 'other
authority' appearing in Article 226 was of much wider connotation and it
would embrace within itself those authorities which discharge public
functions or public duty of great magnitude. The appellant pleaded that
going by the functions which ICID is discharging, it is apparent that
these are public functions and, therefore, writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India could be filed against it.
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6) ICID filed its counter affidavit controverting the aforesaid pleas taken by
the appellant in his writ petition. The stand taken by the appellant was
refuted by contending that ICID is neither a State under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India nor is it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. It was put forth that the said society does not
fulfill the requisite tests which would bring it within the purview of Article
12 of the Constitution inasmuch as the management of the affairs of the
society is vested in an International Executive Council (IEC) consisting
of office bearers and one duly appointed representative from each
National Committee; that the office bearers of ICID consist of one
President, 9 Vice Presidents and 1 Secretary General and all the office
bearers, except the Secretary General, who is the full-time office bearer
appointed by IEC, are elected by majority of votes of the members of
the said Council; that the representatives of the World Bank, FAO,
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United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) and International Irrigation Management Institute amongst
others, have a place in the International Executive Council of ICID as
permanent observers; that the representatives of the World Bank, FAO,
UNESCO and other related UN agencies also participate in the work
and various activities of ICID; that ICID comprises about 30 staff
members in all and works under the general supervision of the Council
and under the immediate direction of the President; that Clause 7.3 of
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the Constitution of ICID empowers the Secretary General to frame such
rules and procedure as he considers necessary for governing the staff
and for the proper functioning of the central office in consultation with
the staff committee; that the following of a staffing pattern by ICID in the
line of the Central Government does not bring the society under the
control of the State; that ICID is an independently funded organization
whose functions are financed by subscriptions from several countries;
and that deputation of some officers from the Government at certain
times does not give it the character of a State.
7) Plea of the appellant regarding availability of remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution was opposed on the ground that ICID does not
perform any public duty which would make it amenable to writ
jurisdiction since its objects stimulate and promote the development and
the application of the arts, sciences and techniques of engineering,
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agriculture, economics, ecology and social sciences in managing water
and land resources for irrigation, drainage, flood control and river
training and for research in a more comprehensive manner adopting
upto date techniques and its activities cannot be stated to be
intrinsically public in nature or closely related to those performable by
the State in its sovereign capacity.
8) The order of termination was sought to be justified on merits as well,
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taking up the contention that the appellant was not performing the
duties satisfactorily and, therefore, his services were dispensed with, as
per the Rules and, hence, no inquiry was necessary. Various other
grounds were also pleaded to justify the order of termination.
9) After hearing the arguments on either side, the learned Single Judge of
the High Court dismissed the writ petition at the threshold, without going
into the question about the validity of the termination of the appellant's
services as he held that ICID is neither a 'State' under Article 12 of the
Constitution, nor is it discharging functions which will bring it within the
ambit of public duty making it amenable to the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As a result, writ
petition was dismissed vide judgment dated January 17, 2006. As
pointed out above, this view of the learned Single Judge has been
upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned judgment
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dated April 25, 2011. In the process, the Division Bench has discussed
the aspect of maintainability on the touchstone of Article 12 as well as
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in great details.
10) Mr. Dinesh Agnani, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
was candid in conceding that he was not joining issues insofar as the
judgment of the High Court hold ICID not to be 'State' under Article 12 of
the Constitution. Thus, this part of the judgment has been accepted by
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the appellant. However, the quintessence of the argument advanced by
him, with great emphasis, was that ICID was performing public duty. He
referred to the functions which ICID is discharging and made a
strenuous attempt to show that those functions would come within the
ambit of public functions and the duties of ICID as public duty, which
would bring it within the ambit of the expression 'other authority'
appearing in Article 226 of the Constitution and making ICID amenable
to the writ jurisdiction.
11) Because of the concession of the learned senior counsel, though we
are absolved from undertaking any exercise on the character of ICID on
the issue as to whether it is a 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution
or not, nevertheless, we deem it appropriate to delve the manner in
which this issue is dealt with by the High Court. Reason for doing the
same is that it will have some bearing on the other related issue which
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is the main brunt of the appellant's submissions.
12) The High Court has referred to the provisions of the Constitution of ICID
while embarking on the aforesaid discussion and in this process it has
noted as under:
“14...The preamble which occurs in Article 1 of the
Constitution of ICID reads as follows:
“1.1 The International Commission on Irrigation and
Drainage is established as a Scientific, Technical,
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Professional, and Voluntary Not-for-Profit Non-
Governmental International Organization (NGO-
ONG), dedicated, inter alia, to enhance the world-
wide supply of food and fibre for all people by
improving water and land management, and the
productivity of irrigated and drained lands through the
appropriate management of water, environment and
the application of irrigation, drainage and flood
control techniques.
1.2 In the text of this Constitution, the International
Commission on Irrigation and Drainage is referred to
as the Commission or as ICID (CIID in the French
version) and among international authorities, as CID
(CIID).”
15. Article 3 deals with Membership. The basis of
membership is as follows:
“3.1 ICID consists of National Committees of
Participating Countries, on the basis of one National
Committee for each such country. Where no
National Committee exists, officers of government or
of an institution or institutions effectively representing
interests within the scope of the objects of the
Commission may participate in ICID activities. In
such cases one officer shall be designated as
Representative.
3.2 Any geographical area independently
administered by a sovereign government and having
interest in the activities of the Commission shall be
eligible to participate in the activities of the
Commission. Accordingly, in exceptional cases, the
Council may, having regard to the coexistence of
separate sovereign geographical areas or countries,
accept the representation of the sovereign parts of a
country by separate National Committees. In the
case of a Federal System of government, or similar
set-up, only one National Committee shall be
recognized for membership in ICID.”
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16. Article 4 deals with the composition of the national
committees and its responsibility.
17. Article 5 deals with the International Executive
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Council. Clause 5.1 of Article 5 reads as follows:
“5.1 The International Executive Council, hereinafter
called the Council, the Executive Council or the IEC
is vested with the management of the affairs of the
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage.
5.2 The Council shall consider all matters of policy
which may be initiated or sponsored by any member
National Committee or Office-Bearer or by the
Management Board and may itself initiate and
determine or otherwise advise and lay down any
matter of policy. The Central Office of ICID shall act
as an instrument for carrying into effect all decisions
taken by the Council. The Council shall also
consider what action, if any, need be taken on the
recommendations or conclusions of the studies,
experiments or discussions organized by the
Commission. All matters affecting the executive or
administrative functions and financial liabilities of
ICID must come up before the Council and its
decisions shall be conclusive.”
18. Article 6 provides for the office-bearers. Clause 6.2
deals with the election of President and Vice-Presidents.
Clause 6.3.1 provides for the appointment of Secretary
General. It is profitable to reproduce clause 6.3.1:
“6.3.1 Nomination: The Secretary-General shall be
nominated by the President, acting as Chairperson of
the Management Board, and appointed by Council.
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19. Article 7 deals with Management. Clause 7.1 deals
with Management Board. It is as follows:
“7.1 The Council shall be assisted in the
management of the affairs of the Commission by a
Management Board composed of the President of
ICID, who shall be the Chairperson, immediate past
President of ICID (one year only), Chairpersons of
the Permanent Technical Activities Committee,
Permanent Finance Committee and Permanent
Committee on Strategy Planning and Organizational
Affairs and the Secretary-General.”
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Clause 7.2 of Article 7 provides that the Central
Officer shall be located in New Delhi, India and shall be
maintained under the general provision of the Council and
under the immediate direction of the President. Clause
7.3.1 deals with financial management.
20. Article 10 provides for dues, subscriptions and
funds. It is apposite to reproduce clauses 10.1, 10.2 and
10.3, which read as follows:
“ Annual Subscriptions
10.1 In order to defray the cost of the activities of the
Commission or for special purposes, the National
Committees or representative organizations of
participating countries shall regularly pay to the order
of the Secretary-General annual subscriptions (in as
near the beginning of each calendar year as may be
possible) on the basis pre-determined by the Council
and taking into consideration, inter alia, the interest
and the capacity to pay of the participating country.
National Committees or representative organizations
of participating countries shall also pay such other
special subscriptions as may be determined by the
Council.
10.2 For each Congress, regional conference,
technical session, international workshop or such
other international activity, the Council may, in
consultation with the National Committee of the host
country, fix individual registration fees, or fees for
participating organizations. In addition, the portion of
the proceeds that should accrue to the budget of the
Central Office of the Commission from such events
shall also be determined by the Council.
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Funds
10.3 The Central Office shall be authorized to
receive and to handle as funds of the Commission,
any subscription, subvention or gift that may be made
in the general interests of the objects of the
Commission, or for specific research, special
investigation or experimental work; and it may
arrange, under general authority given by the
Council, cooperative research, investigations or
experimental work with other international
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organizations, properly qualified institutions,
governmental or private, or with technical societies or
associations.”
21. Article 12 deals with dissolution and liquidation.
Clause 12.1 deals with dissolution which reads as follows:
“12.1 ICID may be declared dissolved only by a
decision to be reached at a regular or a special
meeting of the Council and provided that at least two-
thirds of the total number of participating countries,
whether represented at such a meeting of the
Council or not, vote for dissolution.”
Clause 12.2 deals with liquidation and its procedure.”
13) ICID has also framed its bye-laws which provide for election of office
bearers, working bodies of ICID, permanent committees, role and
membership, temporary working bodies, International Executive Council
and various other aspects. After taking note of the aforesaid provisions,
the High Court while coming to the conclusion that respondent No.1 is
not a 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution, summed up the
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position in the following manner:
“23. On a comprehensive survey of the Constitution of
ICID and the bye-laws, we do not perceive that there is
either any control of the government either financially,
functionally or administratively or it is dominated by any
action of the government. We do not even remotely see
that there is any kind of pervasive control. Some officers
may be coming on deputation regard being had to the
character of the ICID or there may be initially a grant of
Rs.15,000/- in 1950 or some aid at times but that does not
clothe it with the character and status of 'other authority'
as understood under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Hence, we conclude and hold that ICID is not an
instrumentality of state or other authority under Article 12
of the Constitution of India.”
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14) We may also like to point out that the aforesaid examination of the issue
undertaken by the High Court is keeping in view the principles laid down
by this Court in catena of judgments and the tests which are to be
applied to arrive at the decision as to whether a particular authority can
be termed as 'State' or 'other authority' within the meaning of Article 12.
It took note of the Constitution Bench decision in Ajay Hasia & Ors. v.
1
Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. , wherein the following six tests were
culled out from its earlier judgment in the case of Ramana Dayaram
2
Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors :
“(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of
the corporation is held by Government it would go a long
way towards indicating that the corporation is an
instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p.507,
para 14)
(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so
much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the
corporation, it would afford some indication of the
corporation being impregnated with governmental
character. (SCC p.508, para 15)
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(3) It may also be a relevant factor...whether the
corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State
conferred or State protected. (SCC p.508, para 15)
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may
afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency
or instrumentality. (SCC p.508, para 15)
(5) If the functions of the corporation of public importance
and closely related to governmental functions, it would be
1
(1981) 1 SCC 722
2
(1979) 3 SCC 489
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a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an
instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p.509,
para 16)
(6) “Specifically, if a department of Government is
transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor
supportive of this inference' of the corporation being an
instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p.510,
para 18).”
15) The Court also took into consideration and referred to the following
passage from the judgment in Pradeep Kumar Biswas & Ors. v.
3
Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors. :
“40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests
formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles
so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex
hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning
of Article 12. The question in each case would be –
whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established,
the body is financially, functionally and administratively
dominated by or under the control of the Government.
Such control must be particular to the body in question
and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a
State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the
control is merely regulatory whether under statute or
otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”
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16) The aforesaid judgment was relied upon by another Constitution Bench
4
in M/s. Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. In that
case, the Court was concerned with the issue as to whether Board of
Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) is a 'State' within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution. After detailed discussion on the
functioning of the BCCI, the Constitution Bench concluded that it was
3
(2002) 5 SCC 111
4
(2005) 4 SCC 649
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not a 'State' under Article 12 and made the following observations in this
behalf:
“30. However, it is true that the Union of India has been
exercising certain control over the activities of the Board
in regard to organising cricket matches and travel of the
Indian team abroad as also granting of permission to
allow the foreign teams to come to India. But this control
over the activities of the Board cannot be construed as an
administrative control. At best this is purely regulatory in
nature and the same according to this Court in Pradeep
Kumar Biswas case is not a factor indicating a pervasive
State control of the Board.”
17) Before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the Court had summarized
the legal position, on the basis of earlier judgments, in para 22, which
reads as under:
“22. Above is the ratio decidendi laid down by a seven-
Judge Bench of this Court which is binding on this Bench.
The facts of the case in hand will have to be tested on the
touchstone of the parameters laid down in Pradeep
Kumar Biswas case . Before doing so it would be
worthwhile once again to recapitulate what are the
guidelines laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case for a
body to be a State under Article 12. They are:-
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“(1) Principles laid down in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid
set of principles so that if a body falls within any one
of them it must ex hypothesi, be considered to be a
State within the meaning of Article 12.
(2) The question in each case will have to be
considered on the basis of facts available as to
whether in the light of the cumulative facts as
established, the body is financially, functionally,
administratively dominated, by or under the control of
the Government.
(3) Such control must be particular to the body in
question and must be pervasive.
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(4) Mere regulatory control whether under statute or
otherwise would not serve to make a body a State."
18) It is in the context of the aforesaid legal position and the Constitution of
ICID, its bye-laws were examined by the High Court and conclusion
arrived at (as already extracted above) that ICID does not qualify to be
a 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution.
19) It would be necessary to keep in mind the aforesaid legal position qua
Article 12, which has been accepted by the learned senior counsel for
the appellant, while dealing with the issue as to whether ICID performs
public functions or discharges public duty which makes it amenable to
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus, we
have to proceed on the premise that there is no pervasive governmental
control over the functioning of ICID and merely because some
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government officers come on deputation, it has no consequence.
20) Keeping in view the aforesaid matrix, we proceed to the issue which
was canvassed before us.
21) Before we take note of the submissions of Mr. Agnani, it would be apt to
scan through the judgment of the High Court to find as to how this issue
is dealt with by it.
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22) After taking note of certain judgments of this Court wherein the
principles are laid down as to how the term 'authority' used in Article 226
is to be read in contradistinction to the same term used in Article 12 of
the Constitution and what would constitute public function/public duties,
the Court took note of Clause 2.1 and 2.2, which read as follows:
“ Mission
2.1 The Mission of the International Commission on
Irrigation and Drainage is to stimulate and promote the
development of the arts, sciences and techniques of
engineering, agriculture, economics, ecology and social
science in managing water and land resources for
irrigation, drainage, flood control and river training
applications, including research and development and
capacity building, adopting comprehensive approaches
and up-to-date techniques for sustainable agriculture in
the world.
Scope
2.2 The Commission in achieving its mission may
consider the following objectives:
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“(a) Planning, financing, socio-economic and
environmental aspects of irrigation, drainage, flood
control and undertakings for the reclamation and
improvement of lands as well as the design,
construction and operation of appurtenant
engineering works including dams, reservoirs,
canals, drains and other related infrastructure for
storage, conveyance, distribution, collection and
disposal of water.
(b) Planning, financing, socio-economic and
environmental aspects of schemes for river training
and behaviour, flood control and protection against
sea water intrusion of agricultural lands as well as
the design, construction and operation of
appurtenant works, except such matters as relate to
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the design and construction of large dams,
navigation works and basic hydrology.
(c) Research and development, training and
capacity building in areas related to basic and
applied science, technology, management, design,
operation and maintenance of irrigation, drainage,
flood control, river training improvement and land
reclamation.
(d) Facilitation of international inputs required by the
developing countries, particularly the low income
countries lagging in the development of irrigation and
drainage.
(e) Promotion of the development and systematic
management of sustained irrigation and drainage
systems.
(f) Pooling of international knowledge on the topics
related to irrigation, drainage and flood control and
making it available worldwide.
(f) Addressing of international problems and
challenges posed by irrigation, drainage and flood
control works and promoting evolution of suitable
remedial measures.
(h) Promoting savings in use of water for agriculture.
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(i) Promoting equity including gender equity between
users and beneficiaries of irrigation, drainage and
flood control systems.
(j) Promotion of preservation and improvement of soil
and water quality of irrigated lands.”
23) From the aforesaid it transpires that ICID has been established as a
scientific, technical, professional and voluntary non-governmental
international organization dedicated to enhance the worldwide supply of
food and fibre for all people by improving water and land management
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of the productivity of irrigated and drained lands so that the appropriate
management of water, environment and the application of irrigation,
drainage and flood control techniques. In the opinion of the High Court,
these functions are not similar to or closely related to those performed
by the State in its sovereign capacity. The activities undertaken by
ICID, a non-governmental organization, do not actually partake the
nature of public duty or State action and there was absence of public
element. The High Court also held that duties discharged do not have a
positive application of public nature as ICID carries on voluntary
activities, which many a non-governmental organizations perform.
24) It was argued by Mr. Agnani, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant, that the High Court grossly erred in holding a society
registered in India as international body when the settled law was that
once incorporated in an Act of country, the body was amenable to law of
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the said country even if its (i) activities were spread abroad (or beyond
territorial boundary of the country) or subscribers of Memorandum of
Association (MOA) and office bearers, etc. including the foreigners; (ii)
ICID was not granted any international status by Government of India
under UN Privileges and Immunities Act; and (iii) ICID was not listed as
an international body in the Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs list of international organizations in India.
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25) Referring to the judgment in M/s. Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra), Mr.
Agnani's submission was that in that case the Constitution Bench had
held that if the function of the body were akin to State functions, the
aggrieved party could always seek remedy by way of writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution even if the body was not the State.
According to him, the High Court omitted to refer to its following
functions laid down by the Government of India in 1948 and
incorporated in the MOA of ICID as the objects and the means of
accomplishing these objects:
“To encourage progress in design, construction,
maintenance and operation of large and small irrigation
works and canals (including navigation canals); to bring
together information thereon; and to study all questions
relating thereto.”
He argued that the design, construction, maintenance and
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operation of irrigation works are functions of State Irrigation
Departments, duly supported by the Ministry of Irrigation. The Ministry
does not directly execute these works but only facilitates their execution
and its facilitating activities do not take it away from the ambit of State
functions. ICID also works as Secretariat and its above functions were
akin to State functions. Para 31 of the Constitution Bench decision in
M/s. Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra), while referring to the decision in Shri
Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna
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5
Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors. , has
further said that form of body concerned is not very much relevant and
what is relevant is the nature of duty imposed on the body. Thus,
according to him, the writ against ICID was admissible on account of its
above defined nature of duty.
He further argued that, in fact, the learned Single Judge had
admitted that functions of ICID were of relevance and value to public
and Government which itself shows public nature of its functions, but
writ was denied saying they were not intrinsically public in nature when
no verdict of this Court ever classified a public function into intrinsic and
non-intrinsic.
26) His next submission was that the High Court also did not discuss the
MOA of ICID, though it was necessary to deal with the same while
deciding an issue of this nature. His other related argument was
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predicated on the judgment of this Court in Anadi Mukta Sadguru
(supra). He particularly referred to para 14 of the said judgment
wherein this Court ruled that mandamus cannot be refused to aggrieved
party if service conditions were not purely of private nature. His
submission was that the High Court, in analyzing admissibility of writ
under Article 226 of the Constitution, has neglected the service
conditions of ICID, which from outset include the pay as paid in
5
(1989) 2 SCC 691
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Government of India, fundamental and supplementary rules of
Government of India, permanency, lien, deputation of Government
servants etc. as in Government sponsored societies.
He concluded his submissions by insisting that this Court should
accept that ICID, being a body incorporated in India, discharged public
function and was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. When the Government had laid down its
functions, ICID could not be a private body and the appellant, according
to the note on his selection as new Secretary of ICID, was appointed to
a public office and ICID, by its own admission, was a Government
sponsored society.
27) Learned counsel for respondent No.1, on the other hand, placed heavy
reliance upon the reasons given by the High Court in its judgment and
submitted that every aspect of the matter has been lucidly and
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convincingly dealt with in the impugned judgment, which was rendered
keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court and, therefore, it
would not warrant any interference.
28) We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments of learned
counsel for the parties.
29) If the authority/body can be treated as a 'State' within the meaning of
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23
Article 12 of the Constitution of India, indubitably writ petition under
Article 226 would be maintainable against such an authority/body for
enforcement of fundamental and other rights. Article 12 appears in Part
III of the Constitution, which pertains to 'Fundamental Rights'.
Therefore, the definition contained in Article 12 is for the purpose of
application of the provisions contained in Part III. Article 226 of the
Constitution, which deals with powers of High Courts to issue certain
writs, inter alia , stipulates that every High Court has the power to issue
directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including, in
appropriate cases, any Government, for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
30) In this context, when we scan through the provisions of Article 12 of the
Constitution, as per the definition contained therein, the 'State' includes
the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and
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Legislature of each State as well as “all local or other authorities within
the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India”. It
is in this context the question as to which body would qualify as 'other
authority' has come up for consideration before this Court ever since,
and the test/principles which are to be applied for ascertaining as to
whether a particular body can be treated as 'other authority' or not have
already been noted above. If such an authority violates the
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24
fundamental right or other legal rights of any person or citizen (as the
case may be), writ petition can be filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and
seeking appropriate direction, order or writ. However, under Article 226
of the Constitution, the power of the High Court is not limited to the
Government or authority which qualifies to be a 'State' under Article 12.
Power is extended to issue directions, orders or writs “to any person or
authority”. Again, this power of issuing directions, orders or writs is not
limited to enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III, but
also 'for any other purpose'. Thus, power of the High Court takes within
its sweep more “authorities” than stipulated in Article 12 and the subject
matter which can be dealt with under this Article is also wider in scope.
31) In this context, the first question which arises is as to what meaning is to
be assigned to the expression 'any person or authority'. By catena of
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judgments rendered by this Court, it now stands well grounded that the
term 'authority' used in Article 226 has to receive wider meaning than
the same very term used in Article 12 of the Constitution. This was so
held in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru (supra). In that case, dispute arose
between the Trust which was managing and running science college
and teachers of the said college. It pertained to payment of certain
employment related benefits like basic pay etc. Matter was referred to
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25
the Chancellor of the Gujarat University for his decision. The
Chancellor passed an award, which was accepted by the University as
well as the State Government and a direction was issued to all affiliated
colleges to pay their teachers in terms of the said award. However, the
aforesaid Trust running the science college did not implement the
award. Teachers filed the writ petition seeking mandamus and direction
to the trust to pay them their dues of salary, allowances, provident fund
and gratuity in accordance therewith. It is in this context an issue arose
as to whether writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was
maintainable against the said Trust which was admittedly not a statutory
body or authority under Article 12 of the Constitution as it was a private
trust running an educational institution. The High Court held that the
writ petition was maintainable and said view was upheld by this Court in
the aforesaid judgment. The discussion which is relevant for our
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purposes is contained in paras 14 to 19. However, we would like to
reproduce paras 14, 16 and 19, which read as under:
“14. If the rights are purely of a private character no
mandamus can issue. If the management of the college
is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will
not lie. These are two exceptions to Mandamus. But
once these are absent and when the party has no other
equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied.
It has to be appreciated that the appellants-trust was
managing the affiliated college to which public money is
paid as Government aid. Public money paid as
Government aid plays a major role in the control,
maintenance and working of educational institutions. The
aided institutions like Government institutions discharge
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26
public function by way of imparting education to students.
They are subject to the rules and regulations of the
affiliating University. Their activities are closely
supervised by the University authorities. Employment in
such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public
character. (See – The Evolving Indian Administrative Law
by M.P. Jain (1983) p.266). So are the service conditions
of the academic staff. When the University takes a
decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on
the management. The service conditions of the academic
staff are, therefore, not purely of a private character. It
has super-added protection by University decisions
creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff
and the management. When there is existence of this
relationship, mandamus cannot be refused to the
aggrieved party.
xx xx xx
16. There, however, the prerogative writ of
mandamusmus ( sic ) confined only to public authorities to
compel performance of public duty. The 'public authority'
for them means every body which is created by statute –
and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So
Government departments, local authorities, police
authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations,
are all 'public authorities;. But there is no such limitation
for our High Courts to issue the writ 'in the nature of
mandamus'. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High
Court to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs.
This is a striking departure from the English law. Under
Article 226, writs can be issued to 'any person or
authority'. It can be issued “for the enforcement of any of
the fundamental rights and for any other purpose”.
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xx xx xx
19. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the
context, must receive a liberal meaning like the term in
Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of
enforcement of fundamental rights under Art.32. Article
226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for
enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-
fundamental rights. The words “Any person or authority”
used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only
to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.
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27
They may cover any other person or body performing
public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very
much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty
imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the
light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority
to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty
is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus
cannot be denied.”
32) In para 14, the Court spelled out two exceptions to the writ of
mandamus, viz. (i) if the rights are purely of a private character, no
mandamus can issue; and (ii) if the management of the college is purely
a private body “with no public duty”, mandamus will not lie. The Court
clarified that since the Trust in the said case was an aiding institution,
because of this reason, it discharges public function, like Government
institution, by way of imparting education to students, more particularly
when rules and regulations of the affiliating University are applicable to
such an institution, being an aided institution. In such a situation, held
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the Court, the service conditions of academic staff were not purely
of a private character as the staff had super-aided protection by
University's decision creating a legal right and duty relationship
between the staff and the management . Further, the Court explained
in para 19 that the term 'authority' used in Article 226, in the context,
would receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12, inasmuch
as Article 12 was relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of
fundamental rights under Article 31, whereas Article 226 confers power
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28
on the High Courts to issue writs not only for enforcement of
fundamental rights but also non-fundamental rights. What is relevant is
the dicta of the Court that the term 'authority' appearing in Article 226 of
the Constitution would cover any other person or body performing public
duty. The guiding factor, therefore, is the nature of duty imposed on
such a body, namely, public duty to make it exigible to Article 226.
33) In K. Krishnamacharyulu & Ors. v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College
6
of Engineering & Anr. , this Court again emphasized that where there
is an interest created by the Government in an institution to impart
education, which is a fundamental right of the citizens, the teachers who
impart education get an element of public interest in performance of
their duties. In such a situation, remedy provided under Article 226
would be available to the teachers. The aforesaid two cases pertain to
educational institutions and the function of imparting education was
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treated as the performance of public duty, that too by those bodies
where the aided institutions were discharging the said functions like
Government institutions and the interest was created by the
Government in such institutions to impart education.
7
34) In G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute & Anr. ,
the Court was concerned with the nature of function performed by a
6
(1997) 3 SCC 571
7
(2003) 4 SCC 225
Page 28
29
research institute. The Court was to examine if the function performed
by such research institute would be public function or public duty.
Answering the question in the negative in the said case, the Court made
the following pertinent observations:
“28...Although, it is not easy to define what a public
function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that
such functions are similar to or closely related to those
performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The
primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and
training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on
a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot
be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role
which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India
and its activities are designed to benefit people from all
over the world. While the Indian public may be the
beneficiary of the activities of the institute, it certainly
cannot be said that the ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian
public to provide research and training facilities.”
Merely because the activity of the said research institute enures to
the benefit of the Indian public, it cannot be a guiding factor to
determine the character of the Institute and bring the same within the
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sweep of 'public function or public duty'. The Court pointed out:
“28...In Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual, AIR
1960 ( sic -1969) SC 1306, the Court construed Art. 226 to
hold that the High Court could issue a writ of mandamus”
to secure the performance of the duty or statutory duty” in
the performance of which the one who applies for it has a
sufficient legal interest”. The Court also held that:
“...an application for mandamus will not lie for an
order of reinstatement to an office which is
essentially of a private character nor can such an
application be maintained to secure performance of
obligations owed by a company towards its workmen
or to resolve any private dispute. (See Sohan Lal v.
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30
Union of India, 1957 SCR 738).”
35) Somewhat more pointed and lucid discussion can be found in the case
8
of Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas & Ors. , inasmuch as in that
case the Court culled out the categories of body/ persons who would be
amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. This can be found in
para 18 of the said judgment, specifying eight categories, as follows:
“18. From the decisions referred to above, the position
that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the
State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body;
(iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a
company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a
private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a
private body discharging public duty or positive obligation
of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under
liability to discharge any function under any statute, to
compel it to perform such a statutory function.”
9
36) In Binny Ltd. & Anr. v. V. Sadasivan & Ors. , the Court clarified that
though writ can be issued against any private body or person, the scope
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of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. It is the nature of
duty performed by such person/body which is the determinative factor
as the Court is to enforce the said duty and the identity of authority
against whom the right is sought is not relevant. Such duty, the Court
clarified, can either be statutory or even otherwise, but, there has to be
public law element in the action of that body.
8
(2003) 10 SCC 733
9
(2005) 6 SCC 657
Page 30
31
37) Reading of the categorization given in Federal Bank Ltd. (supra), one
can find that three types of private bodies can still be amenable to writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, which are mentioned at
serial numbers (vi) to (viii) in para 18 of the judgment extracted above.
38) What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid
judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is a 'State' within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition
under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we
may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private
law rights. There are catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not
necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of
judicial review of an action under the administrative law. Reason is
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obvious. Private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of
Common Law that involves relationships between individuals, such as
law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be
maintainable against an authority, which is 'State' under Article 12 of the
Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the
Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged,
is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.
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32
39) Within a couple of years of the framing of the Constitution, this Court
remarked in Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Subba
10
Rao that administrative law in India has been shaped in the English
mould. Power to issue writ or any order of direction for 'any other
purpose' has been held to be included in Article 226 of the Constitution
'with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in
somewhat the same position as the Court of the King's Bench in
England. It is for this reason ordinary 'private law remedies' are not
enforceable through extraordinary writ jurisdiction, even though brought
th
against public authorities (See – Administrative Law ; 8 Edition; H.W.R.
Wade & C.F. Forsyth, page 656). In a number of decisions, this Court
ha held that contractual and commercial obligations are enforceable
only by ordinary action and not by judicial review.
40) On the other hand, even if a person or authority does not come within
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the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution, but is performing public duty,
writ petition can lie and writ of mandamus or appropriate writ can be
issued. However, as noted in Federal Bank Ltd. (supra), such a
private body should either run substantially on State funding or
discharge public duty/positive obligation of public nature or is under
liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to
perform such a statutory function.
10
AIR 1953 SC 210
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33
41) In the present case, since ICID is not funded by the Government nor it
is discharging any function under any statute, the only question is as to
whether it is discharging public duty or positive obligation of public
nature. It is clear from the reading of the impugned judgment, the High
Court was fully conscious of the principles laid down in the aforesaid
judgments, cognizance whereof is duly taken by the High Court.
Applying the test in the case at hand, namely that of ICID, the High
Court opined that it was not discharging any public function or public
duty, which would make it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226. The discussion of the High Court is contained
in paras 33 to 35 and we reproduce the same for the purpose of our
appreciation:
“33. On a perusal of the preamble and the objects, it is
clear as crystal that the respondent has been established
as a Scientific, Technical, Professional and Voluntary
Non-Governmental International Organization, dedicated
to enhance the world-wide supply of food and fibre for all
people by improving water and land management and the
productivity of irrigated and drained lands so that the
appropriate management of water, environment and the
application of irrigation, drainage and flood control
techniques. It is required to consider certain kind of
objects which are basically a facilitation process. It
cannot be said that the functions that are carried out by
ICID are anyway similar to or closely related to those
performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. It is
fundamentally in the realm of collection of data, research,
holding of seminars and organizing studies, promotion of
the development and systematic management of
sustained irrigation and drainage systems, publication of
newsletter, pamphlets and bulletins and its role extends
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34
beyond the territorial boundaries of India. The
memberships extend to participating countries and
sometimes, as by-law would reveal, ICID encourages the
participation of interested national and non0member
countries on certain conditions.
34. As has been held in the case of Federal Bank Ltd.
(supra), solely because a private company carries on
banking business, it cannot be said that it would be
amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The Apex Court has
opined that the provisions of Banking Regulation Act and
other statutes have the regulatory measure to play. The
activities undertaken by the respondent-society, a non-
governmental organization, do not actually partake the
nature of public duty or state actions. There is absence
of public element as has been stated in V.R. Rudani and
others (supra) and Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of
Engineering and another (supra). It also does not
discharge duties having a positive application of public
nature. It carries on voluntary activities which many a
non-governmental organizations perform. The said
activities cannot be stated to be remotely connected with
the activities of the State. On a scrutiny of the constitution
and by-laws, it is difficult to hold that the respondent-
society has obligation to discharge certain activities which
are statutory or of public character. The concept of public
duty cannot be construed in a vacuum. A private society,
in certain cases, may be amenable to the writ jurisdiction
if the writ court is satisfied that it is necessary to compel
such society or association to enforce any statutory
obligation or such obligations of public nature casting
positive public obligation upon it.
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35. As we perceive, the only object of the ICID is for
promoting the development and application of certain
aspects, which have been voluntarily undertaken but the
said activities cannot be said that ICID carries on public
duties to make itself amenable to the writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
42) We are in agreement with the aforesaid analysis by the High Court and
it answers all the arguments raised by the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant. The learned counsel argued that once the
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35
society is registered in India it cannot be treated as international body.
This argument is hardly of any relevance in determining the character of
ICID. The focus has to be on the function discharged by ICID, namely,
whether it is discharging any public duties. Though much mileage was
sought to be drawn from the function incorporated in the MOA of ICID,
namely, to encourage progress in design, construction, maintenance
and operation of large and small irrigation works and canals etc., that by
itself would not make it a public duty cast on ICID. We cannot lose sight
of the fact that ICID is a private body which has no State funding.
Further, no liability under any statute is cast upon ICID to discharge the
aforesaid function. The High Court is right in its observation that even
when object of ICID is to promote the development and application of
certain aspects, the same are voluntarily undertaken and there is no
obligation to discharge certain activities which are statutory or of public
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character.
43) There is yet another very significant aspect which needs to be
highlighted at this juncture. Even if a body performing public duty is
amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial
review, as already pointed out above. Only those decisions which have
public element therein can be judicially reviewed under writ jurisdiction.
11
In The Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. Imanual & Ors. , as
11
(1969) 1 SCC 585
Page 35
36
already discussed above, this Court held that the action challenged did
not have public element and writ of mandamus could not be issued as
the action was essentially of a private character. That was a case
where the concerned employee was seeking reinstatement to an office.
44) We have also pointed out above that in Sata Venkata Subba Rao
(supra) this Court had observed that administrative law in India has
been shaped on the lines of English law. There are catena of
judgments in English courts taking same view, namely, contractual and
commercial obligations are enforceable only by ordinary action and not
by judicial review. In Queen (on the application of Hopley) v .
Liverpool Health Authority & Ors. (unreported) (30 July 2002), Justice
Pithford helpfully set out three things that had to be identified when
considering whether a public body with statutory powers was exercising
a public function amenable to judicial review or a private function. They
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are: (i) whether the defendant was a public body exercising statutory
powers; (ii) whether the function being performed in the exercise of
those powers was a public or a private one; and (iii) whether the
defendant was performing a public duty owed to the claimant in the
particular circumstances under consideration.
45) Even in Anadi Mukta Sadguru (supra), which took a revolutionary turn
and departure from the earlier views, this Court held that 'any other
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37
authority' mentioned in Article 226 is not confined to statutory authorities
or instrumentalities of the State defined under Article 12 of the
Constitution, it also emphasized that if the rights are purely of a private
character, no mandamus could issue.
46) It is trite that contract of personal service cannot be enforced. There are
three exceptions to this rule, namely: (i) when the employee is a public
servant working under the Union of India or State; (ii) when such an
employee is employed by an authority/ body which is a State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India; and (ii) when such an
employee is 'workmen' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and raises a dispute regarding his
termination by invoking the machinery under the said Act. In the first
two cases, the employment ceases to have private law character and
'status' to such an employment is attached. In the third category of
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cases, it is the Industrial Disputes Act which confers jurisdiction on the
labour court/industrial tribunal to grant reinstatement in case termination
is found to be illegal.
47) In the present case, though we have held that ICID is not discharging
any public duty, even otherwise, it is clear that the impugned action
does not involve public law element and no 'public law rights' have
accrued in favour of the appellant which are infringed. The service
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38
conditions of the appellant are not governed in the same manner as
was the position in Anadi Mukta Sadguru (supra).
48) We, thus, do not find any infirmity in a well considered judgment of the
High Court. The appeal, being devoid of any merits, is, accordingly,
dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
.............................................J.
(J. CHELAMESWAR)
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 18, 2014.
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