Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
R. L. KAPUR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MADRAS
DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1972
BENCH:
SHELAT, J.M.
BENCH:
SHELAT, J.M.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1972 AIR 858 1972 SCR (3) 417
1972 SCC (1) 651
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1990 SC 772 (16)
RF 1991 SC2176 (25)
R 1992 SC 904 (17,19)
ACT:
Penal Code--S. 70 read with S. 25 of the General Clauses Act
1897--Whether security deposited in Court in certain
contempt matters can be adjusted against a fine imposed upon
him in those proceedings after the lapse of 6 years.
HEADNOTE:
The appeal is directed against the order of the High Court
of Madras directing a sum of Rs. 500/- deposited in the High
Court as security for the appellants appearance before it in
certain contempt of Court proceedings, to be adjusted
against the fine imposed upon him in those proceedings. The
contempt of Court proceedings (No. 3 of 1962) were taken
against the appellant in the High Court in respect of a
letter written and addressed by the appellant to the then
Chief Justice of the High Court and which contained certain
remarks in regard to the dismissal of the appellant’s
revision application by a single judge of the High Court.
The contempt with which the plaintiff was charged in those
proceedings was contempt of the High Court and not the City
Civil Court, in which the appellant had filed the suit ’from
which, the said revision application arose. In those
proceedings, the High Court by its judgment, held the
appellant guilty of contempt of Court and sentenced him to 6
months simple imprisonment and fine. The appellant served
out the sentence of imprisonment but failed to pay the fine.
The said amount of Rs. 500, deposited in the said contempt
proceedings remained unattached till 1971. when two
applications were filed in the High Court-one by the
appellant for refund and the other by the State for
adjustment of the said amount towards the fine remaining
unpaid and the High Court allowed the State’s application
for payment of the said sum towards satisfaction of the said
unpaid fine. Counsel for the appellant relied on S. 70 of
the Penal Code and urged that six years having elapsed since
the passing of the order imposing fine upon the appellant,
the State application was time barred and the High Court
could not pass the impugned order. Further, counsel relied
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on S. 25 of the General Clauses Act 1897 which provides that
Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Code in relation to the issue and
execution of warrants for the levy of fines shall apply to
all fines imposed under any Act, Regulation etc., and since
a fine which was imposed upon the appellant, was an order
passed under the Contempt of Court Act 1952, Section 70 of
the Penal Code was applicable. Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (i) See. 5 of the Penal Code provides, inter alia,
that its provisions are not to affect the provisions of any
special or local law and under Art. 215 of the Constitution,
every High Court being a Court of Record, have all the
powers of such a Court including the power to punish fore
contempt of itself. The jurisdiction a special one. not
arising or derived from the Contempt of Court’s Act 1952,
and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal
Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. The law as to
contempt of Court, as administered by the
418
Madras High Court, in the present case, is a special law and
therefore, S. 70 of the Penal Code does not apply to the
facts and circumstances of the case.. Further since such a
special law does not prescribe any period of limitation for
collecting and satisfying a fine imposed thereunder no
question of limitation would arise. [420 A]
(ii) The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of
itself arises not under any Act, such as Contempt of Courts"
Act, but the Constitution itself vests these rights on every
High Court, and no Act of a Legislature could take away that
jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own
authority and since the sentence of fine and imprisonment
passed against the appellant was not imposed under any act
or statute,Section 25 of the General Clauses Act has no
application in the present case. [420 E-F]
Sukhdev SinghSondhi v The Chief Justice and Judges of the
Pepsu High Court [1954]S.C.R. 454 referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 185 of
1971.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
June 19, 1971 of the Madras High Court in Application Nos.
1171 and 1172 of 1971.
S. N. Prasad, for the appellant.
A. V. Rangam, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed
against the order of the High Court of Madras, directing a
sum of Rs. 500, deposited in the High Court as security for
the appellant’s appearance before it in certain contempt of
court proceedings, to be adjusted against the fine imposed
upon him in those proceedings. It appears that the contempt
of court proceedings, being No. 3 of 1962, were taken
against the appellant in the High Court in respect of a
letter written and addressed by the appellant to the then
Chief Justice of the High Court and which contained certain
remarks in regard to the dismissal of the appellant’s
revision application by a single Judge of the High Court.
Thus, the contempt with which the plaintiff was charged in
those proceedings was contempt of the High Court, and not
the City Civil Court, Madras, in which the appellant had
filed the suit from out of which the said revision
application arose. In those proceedings, the High Court, by
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its judgment and order, dated February 25, 1964, held the
appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to
six months’ single imprisonment and fine. The appellant
served out the sentence of imprisonment, but failed to pay
the fine.
419
It appears that the said amount of Rs. 500, deposited, as
aforesaid, in the said contempt proceedings, remained
unattached till 1971. In 1971, two applications were filed
in the High Court, one by the appellant for refund of the
said amount and the other on behalf of the State for
adjustment of the said amount towards the fine remaining
unpaid. By an order, dated June 29, 1971, the High Court
dismissed the appellant’s application for refund and allowed
the State’s application for payment of the said sum towards
satisfaction of the said unpaid fine.
As against the said order, counsel for the appellant relied
on sec. 70 of the Penal Code and urged that six years having
elapsed since the passing of the order imposing fine upon
the appellant, the State’s application was time barred and
the High Court could not pass the impugned order, the effect
of which was to collect the said fine from out of the said
deposit. If sec. 70 were to apply to the said contempt of
court proceedings, there is no doubt that the State’s
application would be time barred as that section in terms
provides that such fine can be levied within six years after
the passing of the order of conviction and sentence. But
sec. 5 of the Penal Code provides, inter alia, that its
provisions are not to affect the provisions of any special
or local law. Under sec. 41 of the Penal Code, a special
law is one applicable to a particular subject. Therefore,
if the law as to contempt of court, as administered by the
High Court of Madras, a chartered High Court, were to be
regarded as special law, sec. 70 of the Penal Code,
obviously, cannot apply,, and since such a special law does
not prescribe any period of limitation for collecting and
satisfying a fine imposed thereunder, no question of
limitation would arise.
Counsel, however, relied on sec. 25 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897 which provides that secs. 63 to 70 of the Penal
Code and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in
relation to the issue and execution of warrants for the levy
of fines shall apply to all fines imposed under "any Act,
Regulation, rule or bye-law" unless such Act, Regulation,
rule or bye-law contains an express provision to the
contrary. The argument was that the order of sentence which
imposed upon the appellant the fine was and must be regarded
as an order passed under the Contempt of Courts Act, XXXII
of 1952, and consequently, sec. 70 of the Penal Code was
applicable.
The question is, does the power of the High Court of Madras
to punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1952, so that under see. 25 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, secs. 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would
apply? The answer to such a question is furnished by Art.
215 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1952
420
themselves. Art. 215 declares that every High Court shall
be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
Whether Art. 215 declares the power of the High Court
already existing in it by reason of its being a court of
record, or whether the Article confers the power as inherent
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in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not
arising or derived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952,
and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal
Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a position is
also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1952. Sec. 3 of that Act provides that every High
Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers
and authority in accordance with the same procedure and
practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it
as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself.
The only limitation to the power is, as provided by sub-sec.
(2), that it shall not take cognizance of a contempt
committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such
contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code. As
explained in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and
Judges of the Pepsu High Court,(1) sec. 3 of the Act is
similar to sec. 2 of the 1926 Act, and "far from conferring
a new jurisdiction, assumes, as did the Old Act, the
existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High
Court and further assumes the existence of a special
practice and procedure, for it says that every High Court
shall exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority
"in accordance with the same procedure and practice." In any
case, so far as contempt of the High Court itself is
concerned, as distinguished from that of a court subordinate
to it, the Constitution vests these rights in every High
Court, and so no Act of a legislature could take away that
jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own
authority. No doubt, sec. 5 of the Act states that a High
Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into and try a
contempt of itself or of a court subordinate to it whether
the alleged contempt is committed within or outside the
local limits of its jurisdiction and whether the contemnor
is within or outside such limits. The effect of sec. 5 is
only to widen the scope of the existing jurisdiction of a
special kind and not conferring a new jurisdiction. It is
true that under sec. 4 of the Act the maximum sentence and
fine which can be imposed is respectively simple
imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2,000, or
both. But that again is a restriction on an existing
jurisdiction and not conferment of a new jurisdiction. That
being the position, sec. 25 in the General Clauses Act, 1897
cannot apply. The result is that sec. 70 of the Penal Code
is no impediment by way of limitation in the way of the
recovery of the fine.
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 454, at 463.
421
It is true that the deposit was made for a particular
purpose, that is, to secure the presence of the appellant
at the time of the hearing of the said contempt proceedings.
But the High Court, as a court of record, being clothed with
a special jurisdiction, has also all incidental and
necessary powers to effectuate that jurisdiction.
Consequently, it had the power to order satisfaction of fine
imposed by it from out of an available fund deposited by or
on behalf of or for the benefit of the appellant.
In our view, the contentions raised on behalf of the
appellant cannot, for the reasons aforesaid, be sustained.
The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order
as to costs.
S.C. Appeal
dismissed.
422
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